**Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme, 2019-2021**

**Key results:**
- Strengthened national and regional maritime law response to piracy
- Maritime strategies in place and operational in Ghana and Nigeria
- Research informed regional dialogue and capacity development strengthens maritime security
- Maritime operational planning and response enhanced to counter piracy in Gulf of Guinea

**Justification for support:**
- Enhance capacity and response of Gulf of Guinea to piracy and armed robbery at sea, particularly off the coast of Nigeria.
- Enhance strategic and legal frameworks and capacities of Ghana and Nigeria so that maritime law enforcement responses and justice mechanisms enable alleged criminals to be prosecuted.
- Contribute to increasing safety of seafarers and the ease of sea borne trade, thereby contributing to the blue economy and development. These aspects will also benefit Danish trade and shipping interests.

**Major risks and challenges:**
- The current weak and incomplete state of the national and regional maritime security architecture means that results may take longer to accrue than anticipated.
- Lack of coherency within national priorities may undermine programme objectives and implementation
- Possible duplication from other like-minded donors.

**Communication and public diplomacy:**
- Concrete demonstration of Danish commitment to supporting national and regional efforts to strengthen maritime security
- Part of a cohesive effort with other international partners
- Draws upon areas where Denmark has comparative advantages (operational planning, response)

**Strategic objective:**
*Enhanced regional maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through more capable maritime and law enforcement institutions at national and regional level.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement</th>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Total budget: DKK M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSE 1 – strengthened maritime law response</td>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>12,55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSE 2 – maritime strategies</td>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>6,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSE 3 – research, dialogue, training</td>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>7,35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSE 4 – operational planning &amp; response</td>
<td>Danish Defence</td>
<td>16,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocated</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA, reviews etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>DKK 46 million</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIMS</td>
<td>African Union Integrated Maritime Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APP</td>
<td>Africa Programme for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMATT</td>
<td>British Military Advisory and Training Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRESMAC</td>
<td>Centre of Regional Maritime Surveillance for Centre Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRESMAO</td>
<td>Centre of Regional Maritime Surveillance for West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDC</td>
<td>Defence Defence Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMA</td>
<td>Danish Maritime Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community for West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIMS</td>
<td>ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMD</td>
<td>ECOWAS Maritime Domain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7+++FoGG</td>
<td>G7+++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GGC</td>
<td>Gulf of Guinea Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMA</td>
<td>Ghana Maritime Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoG</td>
<td>Gulf of Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Inter-regional Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISPS</td>
<td>International Ship and Port Facility Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Maritime Domain Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMCC</td>
<td>Multinational Maritime Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOC</td>
<td>Maritime Operations Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTISC</td>
<td>Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMASA</td>
<td>Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCIMF</td>
<td>Oil Companies International Marine Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance (according to DAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSF</td>
<td>Peace and Stabilisation Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDDC</td>
<td>Royal Danish Defence College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLAS</td>
<td>Safety of Life at Sea Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US NAVAF</td>
<td>United States Navy Africa Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Table of Contents

Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................................. ii

Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................................ iii

1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 2

2 Strategic considerations and justification .................................................................................................. 2

  2.1 Context for the programme and development engagements ................................................................. 2

  2.2 Summary of the strategic framework and overall strategic objectives ..................................................... 7

  2.3 Theory of change and key assumptions ..................................................................................................... 9

  2.4 Past results and lessons learned ........................................................................................................... 11

  2.5 Considerations about Danish strengths, interests and opportunities ...................................................... 12

  2.6 Justification at programme level ........................................................................................................... 13

  2.7 Adherence to the international aid agenda ............................................................................................ 15

  2.8 Contextual risks and possible scenario analysis .................................................................................... 15

3 Programme summary ................................................................................................................................. 17

  3.1 Programme objective .............................................................................................................................. 17

  3.2 Justification of choice of partners and criteria used .................................................................................. 18

  3.3 Considerations regarding ODA and non-ODA funds .......................................................................... 19

  3.4 Short summary of development engagements ....................................................................................... 20

  3.5 Adaptive programming ......................................................................................................................... 34

4 Overview of management set-up .............................................................................................................. 35

  4.1 Overview of programme management .................................................................................................. 35

  4.2 Approval of unallocated funds ............................................................................................................... 36

  4.3 Local Advisory Group .......................................................................................................................... 36

  4.4 Inter-ministerial resource group ............................................................................................................ 36

  4.5 Technical assistance ............................................................................................................................... 36

  4.6 Monitoring, reviews and evaluation ....................................................................................................... 37

  4.7 Financial management .......................................................................................................................... 38

  4.8 Anti-corruption measures ..................................................................................................................... 38

  4.9 Communicating results ......................................................................................................................... 39

5 Programme budget .................................................................................................................................. 39
1 Introduction

This Programme Document sets out the rationale and proposed structure for a three-year programme of civilian and military stabilisation support to enhance maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF). The overall objective of the support is **enhanced regional maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through more capable maritime and law enforcement institutions at national and regional level.** It builds on Denmark’s current and previous diplomatic, stabilisation, and development engagement in the region and has been designed to complement Denmark’s other channels of support within an overall funding envelope of DKK 46 million between April 2019 and December 2021 (33 months).¹ The programme further strengthens Denmark’s contribution to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. It also reinforces Denmark’s commitment to stability, the rule of law and human rights as most recently expressed in the Danish Government’s new Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019-2020 and in the Priority Paper outlining the Danish priorities in combatting piracy and other kinds of maritime crime (2018). Consultations with maritime authorities in Ghana and Nigeria indicate that a Danish contribution along the lines described in this programme document would be welcome.

The programme has been designed around four interlinked peace and stabilisation engagements:

- **PSE 1** – strengthened maritime law response to piracy (through UNODC)
- **PSE 2** – maritime strategies in place and operational (through IMO)
- **PSE 3** – research informed dialogue and capacity development strengthens maritime security (through the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre – KAIPTC)
- **PSE 4** – maritime operational planning and response enhanced to counter piracy (via Danish defence).

This programme has been prepared in accordance with the new Peace and Stabilisation Guidelines (October 2018). It responds directly to the thematic priority concerning strengthening maritime security.

2 Strategic considerations and justification

2.1 Context for the programme and development engagements

Piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea is a significant threat to regional and international shipping, with an increasing number of incidents occurring in international and territorial waters (particularly in the waters around Nigeria, which reportedly saw an increase from 33 to 48 incidents from 2017 to 2018).² Incidents include piracy and theft of property (including illegal oil bunkering), kidnap for ransom, illegal fishing, and drug trafficking.³ Such incidents have a variety of security and economic costs that affect international trade. However, there are also implications for local communities. Illegal fishing, for example, depletes the fish stock and thereby reduces local revenues, disproportionately affecting women who form the majority of the labour force for fisheries processing.⁴ There are also risks of environmental pollution arising inter alia from oil spillage.

---

¹ Note: PSED 4 was approved in advance in February 2019.
² According to Oceans Beyond Piracy, the number of incidents in the Gulf of Guinea now significantly exceed those occurring off the Horn of Africa 97 incidents compared to 54 in 2017). The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports also that incidents off the coast of Ghana have increased from 1 to 10 from 2017 to 2018.
⁴ Women in Maritime, Discussion Paper, May 2018, Laura Burroughs, Sasha Egorova, Emina Šadić, Kelsey Soeth
While piracy and armed robbery at sea take place off-shore\(^5\), their drivers or root causes are predominantly land-based and include unemployment and lack of alternative livelihood options, particularly amongst youth and around the Niger Delta.\(^6\) Demographic pressures are expected to exacerbate this situation if combined with continued political and economic marginalisation.\(^7\) The situation is not helped by the absence of specific anti-piracy legislation, which means that suspected maritime criminals are rarely prosecuted.\(^8\) The lack of appropriate legislation also has potential negative human rights implications. The overall human rights picture in the Gulf of Guinea remains mixed. A number of countries, including Ghana and Nigeria, continue to maintain the death penalty, for example.\(^9\)

The black market for oil in West Africa provides an incentive for targeting vessels carrying petroleum products. Previously, there have been indications that some piracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea may have been politically motivated “as a form of protest”, although this now seems less certain and analysis suggests that illicit gain is the most common incentive.\(^10\) Criminal activity is both facilitated by endemic corruption and helps to fuel it.

Enabling factors include the presence of criminal syndicates and national legal systems, law enforcement and maritime authorities that do not have the tools and capacity to respond to these threats at sea and on land. Naval forces and maritime law enforcement (MLE) capacities lack sufficient operating capacity and/or readiness and operate with a weak Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).\(^11\) This makes it difficult for maritime authorities to ensure safe passage and anchorage for international shipping. Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria have each established “secure zones” near major ports. These are clearly demarcated areas where ships can anchor to wait for a berth or conduct ship-to-ship (STS) cargo transfers, although reports indicate that attacks also occur in these zones.\(^12\) The costs of utilising these secure zones falls to the shipping companies. Globally, Danish Shipping estimates that Danish companies use around DKK 1 billion annually to prevent and avoid attacks by pirates.\(^13\) Off the coast of Nigeria, the Nigerian Navy responds to requests for assistance. Also private maritime security companies are providing (for a fee) escort services using private vessels with Nigerian armed forces personnel on board. Nonetheless, attacks continue to occur, including in relation to Danish chartered vessels.\(^14\)

Meanwhile, the amount of international shipping and other maritime interests (such as off-shore industries and fishing) in the Gulf of Guinea continues to rise. About 5% of Danish shipping’s exports, at an approximate value of DKK 9.5 billion annually, are to West Africa, with Nigeria, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast as the main markets. Mærsk, for example, operates around 40% of maritime trade in the region. At any given time, an estimated 30+ Danish operated vessels are in the Gulf of Guinea, making approximately 2,500 port calls a year. In addition, Denmark has significant investments in several ports in the region, including Lagos (Nigeria), Tema (Ghana), and Abidjan.

\(5\) International Maritime Bureau, 2018  
\(7\) Maritime security and development in Africa, Ukrit Trolle Smed, CMS, University of Copenhagen, 2015  
\(8\) At the time of writing, both Ghana and Nigeria have anti-piracy legislation in preparation.  
\(9\) UNODC is actively seeking the exclusion of the death penalty from anti-piracy legislation. A human rights assessment is included in Annex 1.  
\(11\) See, for example, Lindskov & Nordby, This section also builds upon observations gained through interviews during the formulation mission in October 2018.  
\(12\) Oceans Beyond Piracy  
\(13\) Piracy, Policy paper, Danish shipping, December 2017  
\(14\) Most recently, the hijack of the Mærsk chartered ship Pomerenia Sky on 27 October during which 11 seamen were reportedly kidnapped. www.shippingwatch.dk
(Ivory Coast). The Danish footprint in the offshore sector in the region is also growing, with the employment of several Danish-operated drilling vessels off the coast of Ghana and equipment suppliers establishing business, in particular in Ghana.

2.1.1 International and regional policy environment

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) include a number of objectives that are relevant to maritime security and the contribution that improvements in the maritime environment can make to development. These include SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), SDG 17 (partnerships), and indirectly to SDG 14 (Life below water). All three will be strengthened through enhanced maritime governance, rule of law and justice. Furthermore, by supporting sustainable fishing and livelihoods, SDG 14 also contributes also to SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth), and SDG 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure).

Meanwhile, UN Security Council Resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012) urged regional states to increase their anti-piracy cooperation, develop and implement national maritime security strategies, establish legal frameworks, develop and implement trans-national and trans-regional coordination centres, and encouraged international partners to support these efforts. As states’ territorial waters and economic zones can easily be transited and as states’ capacity to respond operationally varies, it is recognized that a regional approach is required. Steps towards this are being taken through Gulf of Guinea Commission (GCC) and the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (2013) and the African Union and ECOWAS integrated maritime strategies (AIMS and EIMS). These cover a range of maritime issues, including the blue economy (trade, fishing etc.), environmental protection, disaster management, legal matters, as well as maritime security. The Lomé Charter, which was agreed by AU Heads of State in 2016, will provide a legally-binding framework for this once it has been ratified.\(^{15}\)

ECOWAS’s commitment to strengthening maritime security (as with ECCAS to the south) needs to be seen in the context of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA), both of which are being supported by Denmark through the Africa Programme for Peace (APP). As regional economic communities (RECs), ECOWAS and ECCAS contribute to APSA and AGA by strengthening sub-regional cooperation on security and governance issues, including countering piracy, strengthening governance and the rule of law. The AIMS and EIMS documents and the Yaoundé Code of Conduct provide cohesive vehicles for this.

As a result, a regional maritime security architecture is in the process of being established based on an Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC in Yaoundé), two regional maritime operation centres (one in West Africa (called CRESMAO in Abidjan) and one in Central Africa), and a series of multinational maritime cooperation centres (MMCCs) based on a zonal approach through which coastal states are grouped into six zones.\(^{16}\) The MMCCs are linked to national Maritime Operation Centres (MOCs) in each country. The overall purpose of this arrangement is to provide a mechanism whereby maritime information can be passed to neighbouring states and responses to illegal activity, environmental threats and other incidents that may arise can be coordinated.

*Figure 1: Yaoundé structure of zonal and regional centres*

---

\(^{15}\) As at February 2018, 35 African states had signed the Charter and one (Togo) had ratified it.

\(^{16}\) The zones most relevant for PSE 4 are zones E (that includes Nigeria) and F (that includes Ghana). The MMCCs for these zones are located in Benin and Ghana respectively.
The ICC is in the process of being fully established and has the task of coordinating this work but there is still some way to go and the capacity at national level varies greatly from one country to another, as does the nature of the maritime threat. Currently only the MMCC in Zone D (in Cameroun) has reached full operational capability, while the pilot MMCC in Zone E (Benin) has an initial operational capability and the MMCC in Zone F (Ghana) has been established and equipped but is still only manned by Ghanaians. Interoperability and cooperation between the MMCCs is therefore at a minimum level and primarily consists of irregular telephone communication. At this stage, no real time Maritime Situation Picture is exchanged between the MMCCs. Maritime Operational Planning is not yet underway at zonal level due to the lack of procedures, agreements between member states and institutionalised planning tools. This severely limits the possibility for joint operational responses in relation to threats that transit from one country’s territorial waters to another.

2.1.2 National capacities and commitment

Implementation of the regional maritime security architecture that is developing in the Gulf of Guinea depends also upon the commitment of littoral states to prioritise and develop national capacities (and the budgets and inter-agency arrangements to support them) as well as the cooperation principles and legal, operational and administrative flexibility to interact regionally.

Naval and coastguard capabilities are generally low outside of territorial waters. Operational constraints include low standards of operational readiness of military and civil maritime vessels and crews. This can be due to poor maintenance and shortages of basic materials, such as fuel. The effect of this varies, but generally, it reduces the number and readiness of vessels able to put to sea. Coverage improves in proximity to the coastline and where there are offshore installations such as oil platforms.

Ghana's navy has received notable upgrades since the discovery of offshore oil deposits. It has received several newer patrol vessels and there are plans to purchase additional vessels. Four small patrol boats were commissioned last year (donated by China). The operations pattern is primarily focused on the protection of the offshore industries and the navy tries to have 24/7 coverage of the large western oil fields. In eastern territorial waters, patrols are conducted on an irregular basis.

Nigeria's navy is by far the largest in the region, including patrol boats for riverine operations throughout the Niger Delta as well as larger ships for offshore operations. Nevertheless, the navy has long suffered from a lack of funding and is currently stretched by operations against crude oil theft and insurgent operations in the Niger Delta. Moreover, although operations continue to be hampered by a lack of vessels, intelligence, operational readiness and training (basic to advanced), capabilities are improving and the Nigerian Navy is increasingly likely to respond to incidents.
Two other critical weaknesses in the national response are the absence of agreed anti-piracy legislation and national maritime strategies. The former perpetuates impunity and corruption within the sector while the latter has the effect of exacerbating these operational shortcomings due to the absence of a frame for inter-agency cooperation, information sharing and response. However, some positive steps are now being taken. In Ghana, a national maritime security strategy has been prepared but is awaiting the approval of an integrated maritime strategy, which will act as an umbrella instrument. In Nigeria, there have been calls by the national maritime agency (NIMASA) for a similar strategy.

Ghana has established an inter-ministerial National Maritime Security Committee (NMSC), and in Nigeria steps towards such a mechanism are now being taken, although a set of harmonised procedures for arrest, detention and prosecution of vessels and persons exists. Also positive, was the proposal from an IMO/UNODC managed seminar in Abuja in mid-2018 for a Maritime Operations Control Centre under the Office of the National Security Advisor to act as a permanent interagency body with desk officers from different agencies for monitoring and coordinating maritime operations.

In both countries, draft legislation on piracy has been prepared but has not yet been approved. In the relatively few cases where suspected illegal operators have been apprehended, national legal and judicial systems lack the legal basis and/or capacity to ensure due process and prosecution. For example, in the MT Maximus (2016) case, alleged pirates were arrested by the Nigerian authorities but the lack of a specific piracy law in Nigeria meant that they could not be prosecuted for piracy.

2.1.3 Overview of international support arrangements

While the Yaoundé process provides a basic architecture, the current absence of agreed national maritime security strategies means that national efforts lack cohesion and it is challenging for donors to identify harmonised approaches to support. In this respect, key international actors include: the EU, U.S., UK, France, and Denmark, Norway, Germany, and the Netherlands. UN agencies, particularly UNODC and IMO are also active.

The EU’s GOGIN programme, which Denmark supported in the first phase of the GOG MSP (2015-2018), has utilised a small permanent field presence (via Expertise France) and this has enabled it to make some gains in developing coordination structures at the regional and zonal level (see figure 2.2), although their actual impact may be limited while the institutions concerned remain only partially staffed.

The EU is also introducing a €29 million programme of support called SWAIMS, which will take legal reform on piracy and maritime crime forward including legal assessments and drafting of legislation, follow up, and support to implementation of passed legislation in pilot countries. The SWAIMS programme further includes capacity building for prosecutors and judges; cooperation with other prosecuting states; support to potential handover of suspected pirates; support to drafting of Standard Operating Procedures for prosecutors and maritime law enforcement; drafting of Memorandum of Agreement between countries on operations at sea and hand-over to prosecuting states; drafting of a Manual on evidence collection for admissibility in different court systems; and, support to future potential piracy trials. The Danish Embassy in Abuja will participate in the SWAIMS Steering Committee as an observer, which will also contribute to harmonisation.

GIZ is supporting ECOWAS’ links to the Yaoundé architecture, including through the provision of equipment to CRESMAO and the MMCCs. The U.S., UK and France are primarily providing operational training support. A significant U.S. contribution is provided by the OBANGAME

---

17 Harmonised Standard Operating Procedures (HSOPS)
18 Oceans Beyond Piracy
EXPRESS exercise series. Part of the UK's military support to Nigeria is directed towards improving the Nigerian Navy's effectiveness and support has also been provided to Nigerian maritime special forces. French support includes training linked to the regular French naval presence in the Gulf of Guinea.

Amongst international organisations, UNODC acts as an implementing agency in relation to the key area of legal capacity building. This is particularly the case with the SWAIMS programme described above, where UNODC is one of the main implementing partners. UNODC’s contribution to both SWAIMS and the GoG MSP (PSE 1) have been carefully harmonised to ensure the two are complementary by supporting criminal justice systems by filling the maritime law enforcement gap.

INTERPOL is supporting mechanisms whereby West African police forces can more easily share information relating to criminal activity. IMO supports states’ compliance with international agreements, such as SOLAS and the ISPS Code, but it is also positioning itself to take a leading role in the development of national maritime security strategies.

At the policy level, international political support is being provided through the G7++ Gulf of Guinea initiative but this has yet to translate into a robust operational arrangement for coordination of capacity development support. Denmark is a member of the G7++ Friends of Gulf of Guinea arrangement, which meets annually, and includes also representatives from the shipping and offshore industries. G7++FOGG provides a useful mechanism to link international stakeholders with regional governments. Key issues highlighted by the shipping industry include concern at the increase in piracy and armed robbery incidents (especially kidnap for ransom), the need for a functioning regional maritime architecture and response mechanism (including contact points and operational responses, and data security).

2.2 Summary of the strategic framework and overall strategic objectives

The GoG Maritime Security Programme (GoG MSP) has been designed so that it is fully aligned with key Danish and international frameworks relating to maritime security. It is a concrete deliverable in relation to the Priority Paper outlining the Danish priorities in combating piracy and other kinds of maritime crime from 2019 and beyond. The paper’s objectives concerning the Gulf of Guinea are: (a) strengthening maritime governance in Nigeria and Ghana, including by assisting their legal frameworks and ability to investigate and prosecute maritime crime; (b) promoting regional cooperation and coordination; and (c) strengthening the ability of national and regional authorities to monitor the maritime domain and respond to emerging threats.

The programme is also a direct contribution to the Danish Government’s new Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019-2020, which inter alia reiterates Denmark’s commitment to a rules-based international society, democratic values, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), international responses to conflict. The strategy notes that support will be provided through the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) to the Gulf of Guinea.

Other Danish and international policy frameworks to which the programme responds include:

- The Strategy for Danish development cooperation and humanitarian action – The World 2030. The GoG MSP will contribute primarily to the first strategic goal, this being security and development – Peace, stability and protection.

---

20 G7++FOGG meetings in December 2017 and December 2018
21 Priority paper for the Danish efforts to combat piracy and other types of maritime crime, 2019-2022
The internal note Prioriteringen af Freds og Stabiliseringsfonden efter 2017, which inter alia notes the intention to counter piracy and maritime crime through a focus on capacity development of relevant authorities, information collection and dissemination, harmonisation of laws, rules and strategies concerning countering and prosecution of maritime crime, including in the Gulf of Guinea.

UNSCRs 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012) which urged regional states to increase their anti-piracy cooperation, legal arrangements, and encouraged international partners to support these efforts.

The Sustainable Development Goals, notably SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), SDG 17 (partnerships), and indirectly to SDG 14 (Life below water). The programme will also complement efforts towards SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth), and SDG 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure). These goals are also reflected amongst the strategic objectives of the programme implementing partners, in particular UNODC and IMO, and they feature within Denmark's Strategic Sector Cooperation with Ghana.22

The Lomé Charter (2016) which, inter alia, requires African states to promote and enhance cooperation in maritime domain awareness, prevention of piracy and other forms of maritime crime through early warning and to establish appropriate national, regional and continental institutions and ensure the implementation of policies to promote safety and security at sea.23

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO)’s strategy for West and Central Africa which aims to support regional efforts in line with IMO Resolution A.1069(28) on the Prevention and Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activity in the Gulf of Guinea, including via the development of maritime strategies and procedures. This includes support in relation to the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code, and the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The Yaoundé Code of Conduct (2013), which in relation to combatting piracy and armed robbery at sea, aims to strengthen states’ pursuit, seizure, and prosecution of persons suspected of committing piracy. This includes information sharing, coordination and cooperation, and training.

The African Union and ECOWAS integrated maritime strategies (AIMS and EIMS) respectively, which seek to strengthen responses across a range of maritime threats and promote the blue economy etc.

The EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea (2014), which aims to help states to strengthen their maritime capabilities, the rule of law, and effective governance through effective multi-agency cooperation, as set out in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. Inter alia, the EU Strategy is being implemented through the SWAIMS programme with which UNODC is a partner and where Denmark will participate as an observer on the Steering Committee.

The programme has been prepared in accordance with the revised Guidelines for the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) (2018), which is a Whole-of-Government arrangement providing scope for drawing from Danish foreign policy, development, security and justice resources.

22 See, for example, the publications "IMO and sustainable development" and "UNODC and the Sustainable Development Goals". The SSC highlights SDG 1: No poverty; SDG 8: Decent work and economic growth; SDG 9: Industry, innovation and infrastructure; and SDG 14: Life below water

2.3 Theory of change and key assumptions

The overall programme structure is illustrated in the diagram below.

The Programme’s overall objective is that maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is strengthened through increased capacity and connectedness of maritime institutions at national and regional level. As states’ territorial waters and economic zones can easily be transited, a regional approach is required. The building blocks for this are a combination of strengthened approaches and capacities at national and regional level in line with the SDGs, UNSC resolutions, the Lomé Charter, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, AIMS and EIMS, and the programme will assist Nigeria and Ghana and the region as a whole to meet their obligations in this regard. Improved maritime governance structures, legal frameworks, and response capabilities are interlinked in preventing and combatting the problem of piracy and maritime crime. Without them, maritime crime can largely continue with impunity, and the programme therefore seeks to strengthen national and regional efforts in these areas alongside inputs from other international partners.

The overall change logic at outcome level involved here is that:

If Denmark provides financial support to legal and strategic capacity building that enhances the effectiveness of efforts of Nigeria and Ghana to improve their maritime governance arrangements, including via appropriate maritime strategies; and if Denmark supports building enhanced planning and response capacity that allows interregional, regional organizations and coastal states in the Gulf of Guinea to achieve timely and accurate decision-making that enables actions to neutralize threats in the maritime domain; and if Denmark provides financial and technical expert support to (i) enhance regional dialogue on maritime security, (ii) improve maritime operational response capacities, and (iii) strengthens the legal capacity to prosecute alleged criminal actors within the maritime area; and if Denmark aligns its maritime security efforts with other international donors and regional and sub-regional strategies;
Then Nigeria and Ghana will have increased capacity to detect, share information and manage responses to threats to shipping; will have a stronger basis to prosecute maritime crime; and interregional, regional organizations and coastal states in the Gulf of Guinea will have increased capacities, capabilities and frameworks feeding into operational and sustainable MDA and responses to emergencies/incidents;

Resulting in more timely and effective operational responses from Maritime Law Enforcement authorities in Nigeria and Ghana and with other countries in the region and the effective prosecution of persons engaged in or supporting maritime crime;

Eventually leading to a reduction in the number of attacks on international and local shipping and enhanced security, trade and contributions from the blue economy to socio-economic development in the countries in the Gulf of Guinea as well as internationally.

This theory of change builds upon a number of contextual and programmatic assumptions. In relation to the former, it is assumed that:

- Effective and sustainable maritime security arrangements in the Gulf of Guinea are best ensured through supporting locally owned initiatives that are anchored in the EIMS and Yaoundé architecture. Note that this is a different situation to that in the Horn of Africa where the capacity for local operational responses has been more limited. The programme prioritises improvements at the national level as strengthening here is a critical enabler also for improvements at the regional level. However, engagement at the regional level will also be included (especially in PSE 3 and partly in PSE 1).

- Countries and regional organisations have the political will to cooperate within the framework that is being established and are prepared to enter into legal and practical agreements with each other providing the basis for a cohesive regional approach. It is assumed, for example, that the structures under the Yaoundé architecture will be further developed and populated with regional and national staff and equipment in a manner that facilitates interoperability and timely response. This aspect has so far proven problematic. In its political dialogue, Denmark will underline the importance of meeting national staffing responsibilities within regional structures.

- Countries recognise and develop effective national coordination mechanisms, including maritime strategies and inter-agency arrangements, and that they are open to international assistance in these endeavours. There are positive signs that countries in the Gulf of Guinea recognise the importance of meeting their national and regional obligations (At a meeting with the Danish Ambassador to Nigeria in Lagos on 21 January 2019, the Director General of NIMASA emphasised these points and that his organisation was interested in receiving Danish assistance).

Programmatic assumptions are that:

- Stronger inter-agency cooperation mechanisms at national and regional level will help facilitate improvements in maritime law enforcement responses to maritime crime, including stronger judicial processes. This Whole of Government approach underlies the UN, AU, ECOWAS and ICC recommendations concerning strengthening of maritime security. It is also reflected in good international practice, including in Denmark.

- Nigerian and Ghanaian maritime authorities are open to international assistance and are prepared to invest counterpart time and effort in support arrangements, thereby ensuring productive use of the support offered. It is also assumed that UNODC and IMO have sufficient local weight through their mandates to engage substantively with local authorities. Maritime authorities express an interest in international cooperation. It is assessed that the cooperation must be underpinned by continuous political dialogue as well as ensuring that counterparts are consulted in possible support arrangements at an early stage. Implementing partners, together with the two Danish embassies, will
underline the importance attached to ensuring maximum engagement and ownership from counterparts so that potential benefits are realised.

- Developments are unlikely to be even. It is assumed that support will therefore need to be flexible and responsive to unforeseen challenges and windows of opportunity that may emerge. The programme will prioritise both Ghana and Nigeria. The programme will devote a proportionately greater effort to promoting change in Nigeria given the importance of progress here. Nonetheless, the outcome of such efforts will be closely monitored and adjustments made where necessary.
- The employment of suitably qualified and adaptable embedded technical advisors offers a practical implementation modality combined with other methods, including group training, seminars and dialogue. It is assumed that that these advisors are actively supported by agencies mandated to assist regional capacity development, such as UN agencies. The programme will also invest in local advisors (one in Accra and one in Abuja) to assist the UN agencies with additional embassy support where necessary.
- Suitable arrangements can be agreed with Nigeria and possibly Ghana and with international partners (U.S, UK and possibly France) enabling Danish military capacities to be deployed in a training capacity. The programme will draw from the experience of these partners regarding the optimum type of arrangement.
- The programme can complement other Danish development and trade efforts in the two focus countries, including via the Strategic Sector Cooperation (SSC) in Ghana, and the extensive engagement of Danish shipping.
- The programme is effectively harmonised with the EU SWAIMS programme. This will be achieved through regular dialogue with the EU Delegation in Abuja, through alignment of the UNODC contributions to both SWAIMS and the GoG MSP, and through Danish participation on the SWAIMS Steering Committee.

2.4 Past results and lessons learned

The first phase of the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme from 2015-2018 (DKK 15 million) was implemented through earmarked funding with two partners - the EU’s Gulf of Guinea programme, GoGIN, and a more limited engagement with the IMO supporting improving port security through contribution to the IMO’s West and Central Africa Maritime Security Trust Fund. The latter reflected a change in programme design because the original plan to support regional maritime domain awareness through data collection and dissemination through a locally anchored Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre (MISTC) proved not to be viable. The experience from these two engagements has underlined the importance of good coordination and dialogue with the implementing partner and opportunities for Danish participation and follow-up.

Within the military area, the Danish defence has provided capacity building of special operations forces (SOF) in Cameroun, with generally positive results. The Danish Special Operations Command provided education and training support in 2016 (pilot project), 2017 and 2018, covering staff methodology, law of war, evidence collection as well as technical and tactical training in boarding, close combat, crime scene investigation, extended first aid, tactical sanitation and landing. The training has been provided during OBANGAME EXPRESS in Cameroon in partnership with the United States, the Netherlands and Norway. The engagements have had positive results in terms of an increasing ability among trainees who have subsequently functioned as local instructors.

Denmark has also been supporting operational planning and response. Inter alia, the Danish Navy has contributed to the exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS series in various maritime operations centres. The Naval Staff conducted Maritime Operations Planning Courses in 2017 and 2018 to improve the ability of coastal states to plan maritime operations - in cooperation with the other coastal states in the region. The courses were planned, prepared and implemented in collaboration
with US NAVAF, the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) and in 2018 the French Navy. This has clearly demonstrated that the concept can be used in the future.

Within the legal area, UNODC assess that there is a need to focus on two key areas. First, to enhance the collection and handling of evidence at sea (i.e. MLE officials need a better understanding of legal issues); and secondly, there must be an improvement in the handling of maritime cases on land (i.e. legal personnel need a better understanding of maritime issues to know what they are mandated to do and what the limits of this are).

Denmark has also previously supported the Maritime Anti-Corruption Network (MACN) to strengthen anti-corruption efforts in Nigerian ports. This has been based on the assessment that notes one of the main challenges faced by shipping companies is the wide individual discretionary powers’ of local officials. This leads to unpredictable interpretation of laws, making it difficult to prepare for port calls and governmental actions. Since 2012, the MACN has, inter alia, developed new harmonized port call and vessel clearance procedures (SOPs), governance guidelines, and grievance systems across ports in Nigeria and government authorities. Project deliverables have been reported to be well received, useful and have had an impact on reducing corruption in the ports. However, MACN survey results also demonstrate that further work is required to raise awareness and incentivise adoption of the new procedures and tools to achieve impact.24

More broadly, partners’ experiences strongly suggest a need for flexibility and local ownership. Both UNODC and IMO have experienced difficulties in counterpart buy-in to joint activities that have previously been agreed. This underlines the need for political dialogue and consensus on activities and needs. Both agencies also prioritise the use of long-term embedded advisors, which allows for daily interaction with counterparts and enabling a smoother transition for the latter to take the lead and own the process. The development of trust is a key aspect here and counterparts need to demonstrate commitment in order to accept advisors embedded within their agencies.

The experience points to the fact that, because maritime crimes are often transnational in nature, there is a need to ensure a regional approach to capacity development and ensuring that appropriate linkages are in place to facilitate cooperation. This observation underlines the relevance of anchoring capacity building efforts within the Yaoundé architecture and ensuring that ECOWAS also has a visible role to play. Arrangements facilitating inter-regional dialogue will also be relevant in this respect.

2.5 Considerations about Danish strengths, interests and opportunities

Denmark has significant political, security and economic interests in promoting a safer and more secure maritime domain in the region. As stated in the recent Danish priority paper on maritime security, a positive political, economic and development trajectory is a clear Danish foreign policy objective. Danish shipping companies, port operators and providers of offshore supplies and services are directly affected by the state of maritime security as the increasing Danish trade to West Africa is dependent upon a secure, cost-effective maritime supply chain. As already noted, at any one time there are around 30+ Danish operated vessels in the Gulf of Guinea making up to 2,500 port calls a year.

As part of its international support to West Africa, Denmark is an active contributor to the G7+++FOGG. Building upon the Danish diplomatic and development presence in West Africa, the significant Danish shipping interests, and the platform provided by the present programme, the MFA will maintain this policy and dialogue role.

24 Nigeria Collective Action, MACN Impact Report, July 2018
As already noted, there are synergies between this programme and the support being provided to Ghana via the Strategic Sector Cooperation between the Danish Maritime Authority (DMA - Søfartsstyrrelsen) and its Ghanaian counterpart, the Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA). DMA’s support to Ghana during 2016 focused primarily on enhancing Ghana’s response to IMO audits. More recently, however, the cooperation has involved training of harbour pilots to ensure that the new container terminal at Tema is capable of handling larger and more modern vessels and that Ghanaian authorities are able to utilise modern technology relating to e-navigation and the maritime domain. These will also enhance Ghana’s response to future IMO audits and, more broadly, to the SDGs. The SSC with Ghana has established good relationships with the GMA, which can be utilised to ease the start-up of the GoG MSP. In addition, the presence of the Danish maritime growth adviser at the Embassy in Accra (funded via SSC) will be an important technical asset upon which the programme can draw (see below).

Indirect synergies will be possible with the Africa Programme for Peace (APP), which is managed from the Embassy of Denmark in Addis Ababa, and includes a focus on ECOWAS. The latter has an important maritime security role in relation to the Yaoundé process (alongside ECCAS) but the precise relationships (particularly relating to the ICC) require further clarification. ECOWAS’ capacity in this area remains limited and it is not expected to be a direct partner in the Gulf of Guinea Programme. Nonetheless, it is highly relevant that Denmark’s dialogue and cooperation with ECOWAS (via the APP) is fully informed by the GoG MSP and vice versa. The Maritime Military Adviser at the Embassy in Abuja will be able to assist in this respect.

2.6 Justification at programme level

The mix of political, trade, development, and security interests outlined above provides the justification for taking a Whole-of-Government approach to strengthening maritime security. As such, the Peace and Security Fund (PSF) offers a practical means for programming. The support is able to draw from the capacity and experience offered by the Danish maritime advisors in the Embassies in Abuja and Accra, while also performing other functions, are able to interact at both a policy and technical level with local stakeholders.

The programme’s overall justification lies in the interplay between security, political, development, and economic/trade factors, including Danish interests:

a. The Gulf of Guinea is essential to the economies of the countries bordering it. About 90% of the region’s international trade is moving by sea, the offshore oil sector has an estimated 4.5% of the world’s reserves that have only started being developed, and fishery is providing the livelihood for millions of people. Ghana and Nigeria are to foci for this. The high rates of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the region, particularly off the coast of Nigeria (48 incidents in 2018), place the lives of international seafarers at risk and threaten the further development of the blue economy. Improving maritime safety, including regional coordination, build-up of national governance capabilities and implementation of strategies to enhance the sustainable protection and exploitation of the region’s blue economy is, therefore, a priority.

b. Denmark has substantial political, economic and development interests in the region, which require a well-functioning and safe maritime domain. As already noted, a substantial number of Danish operated vessels utilise the Gulf of Guinea, making approximately 2,500 port calls a year. Danish companies have invested in several major ports in the region and are also expected to support oil exploitation, in particular in Ghana. Reflecting this involvement, support to enhancing maritime security is highlighted as a priority in the Danish Government’s Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019-2020 and the Priority Paper on maritime security.
c. The AU and ECOWAS have both issued forward-looking integrated maritime strategies in this regard and the Yaoundé process now provides an architecture through which important parts of them can be implemented. UNSC resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012) require coastal states and the wider international community to cooperate on addressing piracy and robbery at sea in line with a rule of law and human rights based approach. The EU’s Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea (2014) aims to help states to strengthen their maritime capabilities, the rule of law, and effective governance.

Programmatically, the support is also justified against the OECD-DAC quality criteria as presented in table 2 below.

Table 2: Justification against the OECD-DAC quality criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OECD-DAC criteria</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>The programme responds to critical shortcomings in the national and regional response to maritime crime as identified in UNSC resolutions and recent international meetings (such as the 2018 FOGG++ and the 2018 Sustainable Blue Economy Conference). It is fully aligned with key elements of ECOWAS integrated maritime strategy and the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and reflects also national reform priorities, in particular regarding more effective utilisation of maritime security capacities. In addition, the programme benefits from recent and on-going capacity development work undertaken by IMO and UNODC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>The effectiveness across the programme builds upon the previous work of IMO, UNODC as well as Danish defence contributions (to training of maritime response). Effectiveness will be enhanced by a flexible approach that responds to opportunities (as well as threats) and by the use of clear milestones. Results will depend upon promoting local ownership through political dialogue from the Danish Embassies in Abuja and Accra, but also via UNODC and IMO. The use of embedded advisors in two of the engagements represents an opportunity to generate ownership as these individuals will operate in a participatory and inclusive fashion. Meanwhile, the use of a dialogue mechanism in the third engagement will enable the programme to gather key interlocutors together for consensus building. Effectiveness is also enhanced by focusing the support on a few key areas that are likely to have wider enabling effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>The support will primarily be advisory and training performed directly by IMO, UNODC and Danish defence personnel. Where relevant, the capacities will be integrated into existing support arrangements that are already working. The programme has four engagements, each with a small number of output areas, thereby enabling concentration of effort. The fourth engagement will utilise a regional institution closely connected to the Ghanaian Government, to ECOWAS and to the ICC and which has a solid reputation and good convening power and training capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>The likelihood for impact is strengthened due to the economic interests in promoting a safe and secure maritime domain but may be uneven due to the political economy within the two main focus countries. Taking a step-by-step approach, building upon political commitments and trade incentives, and the efforts already being made, will help promote impact in the medium term. The impact actually achieved will also depend upon the contribution from other initiatives, both nationally and from other development partners (under the G7++) and an effort will be made to promote these.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>All output areas place significant emphasis on capacity development and efficient and effective utilisation of existing resources. The design is thus aimed at enhancing capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
OECD-DAC criteria | Assessment
--- | ---
 | without establishing unsustainable mechanisms.

2.7 Adherence to the international aid agenda

As already noted, the programme will contribute directly to SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), SDG 17 (partnerships), and indirectly to SDG 14 (Life below water) as well as to other SDGs. Two of the programme’s implementing partners (IMO and UNODC) are incorporating the SDGs within their programmatic frameworks and will report on progress made towards them.

The programme is closely aligned to the international and regional policy agenda for maritime security as presented in section 2.2 above. Key objectives in this respect are spelt out in UNSC resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012), in the ECOWAS EIMS document and in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. This includes enhancing regional cooperation and national capacities, including inter-agency cooperation, the legal framework, maritime domain awareness, and the ability to respond effectively to criminal activity. These aspects of closely interlinked and the programme will support their interplay through its focus on promoting maritime strategies at national level as mechanisms to improve coordination and overall coherence of effort. As the strategies become clearer, it will be easier for Denmark and other international actors to align with concrete national programmes and reform initiatives.

The programme also prioritises harmonised approaches from international partners and this will be promoted through the Danish MFA’s policy role in fora such as the G7++ (where coordination of support at programmatic level needs strengthening) and through linking up with like-minded partners where this is feasible. The Danish technical support includes two Danish maritime advisors (in Abuja and Accra) who will contribute to this as they will be in contact with other actors and will be able to promote common efforts. Currently, the scope for joint programming does not appear significant, although opportunities may arise in due course. The support (PSE 4) will, however, work closely with the U.S. and others in the relation to utilising platforms and arrangements that will be in place during OBANGAME EXPRESS and possibilities for joining with the UK (and possibly others) on boarding training will be actively sought as this will provide a good modality through which Danish military resources can be utilised.

From an aid effectiveness perspective, there are also advantages to be gained from channelling funding via multilateral bodies (in this case UN agencies, UNODC and IMO) that have strong mandates relevant to the maritime security area, that are already engaged with relevant government counterparts, and that can channel funding from various sources.

2.8 Contextual risks and possible scenario analysis

There is an overall need for concerted efforts at international, regional and national level to counter piracy and robbery at sea. However, there are various contextual and programmatic risks. The contextual risks relate primarily to the weakness of the regional architecture provided by the Yaoundé process (although it is slowly developing); the absence of cohesive strategic direction at national level (although this is now also emerging) and shortcomings in maritime governance and legal due process (which is also slowly developing); and weaknesses also in the Maritime Situation Awareness and operational response (which is partially in place). These weaknesses, which the programme seeks to address, mean that there are also risks that results may be difficult to achieve, take longer than anticipated, or be unsustainable.

A second set of risks relates to human rights. One the one hand, the current absence of fit for purpose anti-piracy legislation raises risks that alleged maritime criminals are prosecuted using
inappropriate legal mechanisms, which could raise human rights concerns. The programme directly seeks to mitigate this through its support for maritime law enforcement based on international good practice. UNODC, for example, is seeking to ensure that the anti-piracy laws being developed exclude any provision for the death penalty. In addition, there is a safeguarding concern where Danish military experts have been involved in training Ghanaian and Nigerian counterparts. To mitigate this, the training will emphasise good practice that is human rights compliant.

A third set of risks relate to the possibility that intended beneficiaries (being regional and national maritime agencies) are unable to interact effectively with the programme. This could be because of inadequate or conflicting policy direction leading to weak ownership; lack of capacity and budgets; and competing interests between agencies.

The programme has therefore been designed around a most likely case but is alert to the possibility that other scenarios could emerge, either enabling faster progress or delaying it:

a. Positive, but slow incremental change. This is the most likely case and is the basis upon which the programme has been designed. It assumes that each engagement is able to start on time and that there is sufficient buy-in from key counterparts for the engagements to deliver the outputs envisaged. It is, however, unlikely that the engagements will develop at the same speed (and there is also likely to be some difference regarding risks and implementation rates within engagements). For example, in PSE 1 (legal) and PSE 2 (strategies), it may prove more difficult to get the envisaged advisory functions embedded within counterpart agencies in Nigeria than in Ghana. PSE 2, which starts off with a mapping exercise as a basis for building consensus amongst national stakeholders and mitigates this risk as part of its approach. In PSE 1, it will be important that UNODC secures counterpart agreement as early as possible. In PSE 3 (dialogue), it is expected that initial research activities will be able to start immediately and pave the way for dialogue and training events. In PSE 4 (response), there will be a need for the Danish maritime advisor in Abuja to secure the necessary agreements for the expected Danish contribution to OBANGAME EXPRESS and this will be achieved through the exercise planning conferences and bilaterally with the US. The level of risk is higher for other parts of this engagement because a single point of entry has not yet been identified. With regard to outcomes, this scenario assumes steady progress relating to strategies, legal, and response capabilities, although there will continue to be gaps. PSE 3 (dialogue) will be used mitigate the effects of these through its mix of applied research, dialogue, and training.

b. Accelerated, positive change. In this scenario, the programme would experience higher than expected levels of uptake in one or more of the engagements. If the work to promote inter-agency cooperation and maritime strategies (PSE 2) gained additional momentum through good political buy-in (ideally spurred by PSE 3), this could have positive spin-offs for the work on legal reform and the Yaoundé architecture. While difficult to predict, it would suggest the value of retaining a modest amount of unallocated funding within the programme in order to utilise windows of opportunity that might emerge. Close cooperation with like-minded partners would add to this capacity to respond positively to such developments. The programme will include a Mid Term Review (MTR) at a relatively early stage (early 2020) in order to provide a mechanism whereby possibilities can be assessed.

c. Significantly slower than expected uptake, resistance. In this scenario, the contextual preconditions for expected progress will not be present and this will have a negative impact on the ability to achieve programme outputs at the rate expected. The conditions are likely to vary within the region and bureaucratic challenges could appear in one or more of the
countries involved. At the present time, risks appear greatest in Nigeria (due to the number of different agencies involved may have an impact on the speed and degree to which a coherent response to the Yaoundé agenda develops). Again, this scenario suggests that a flexible approach be built into the programme so that efforts can be directed to areas showing most traction. This would entail reducing funding for poorly performing areas and increasing it for areas that are showing good performance. These aspects will be continuously monitored and reported. The MTR will be tasked to examine these aspects and make recommendations.

A detailed risk analysis is included at Annex 5.

3 Programme summary

3.1 Programme objective

The objective of the programme is enhanced regional maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through more capable maritime and law enforcement institutions at national and regional level and progress towards this will be monitored by research undertaken through the programme (as part of PSE 3) and it will draw from progress being reported in relation to other results frameworks, including UNODC’s GMCP and EU SWAIMS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Enhanced regional maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through more capable maritime and law enforcement institutions at national and regional level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact Indicator</td>
<td>Growth in use of multi-agency approaches to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea in Gulf of Guinea in relation to (a) Progress in development of regional framework in accordance with the Yaoundé Code of Conduct with contributions from national structures, (b) level of national actions underpinned by maritime strategies, (c) status of legal process to enable prosecution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year</td>
<td>2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The programme will be implemented through four engagements, each with their own outcome areas that link into the overall objective above. These engagements are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSE 1</td>
<td>Legal frameworks and prosecution</td>
<td>(a) The maritime law enforcement response to crimes at sea has improved in Nigeria and Ghana (b) Coordination and cooperation among the states in the region increased through legal support to the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) and the Multi Maritime Coordination Centres (MMCCs) under zone E and F.</td>
<td>ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSE 2</td>
<td>Maritime strategy</td>
<td>Collaboration amongst departments and agencies in Nigeria and Ghana with an interest in maritime security supporting a</td>
<td>ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSE 3</td>
<td>Research, dialogue &amp; training</td>
<td>Enhanced joined-up responses of maritime security practitioners to shared threats to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea</td>
<td>ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| PSE 4 | Operational response         | (a) Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness capacity, cooperation and interoperability amongst West African coastal states  
(b) Capacity of Nigerian and Ghanaian maritime law enforcement agencies to respond to piracy and armed robbery at sea enhanced in line with international standards and rule of law | Non-ODA |

These outcome areas concern: (a) strengthening the capacity of maritime agencies (duty bearers) to undertake coordinated maritime security planning and service delivery, especially in relation to preventing and responding to incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea and including law enforcement and access to justice and (b) strengthening the knowledge, capacity and initiative of individuals within these agencies and thereby their ability to interact meaningfully with counterparts in related positions nationally, regionally and internationally; and (c) enhancing their ability to respond effectively to the needs of rights holders, including international shipping but also persons accused of maritime crime. Human rights and gender aspects of maritime security (at sea and on land) are integrated into all of the engagements.

### 3.2 Justification of choice of partners and criteria used

The programme will be implemented through a mix of modalities: PSE 1 and PSE 2 will utilise UNODC and IMO respectively as implementing partners and funds will be channelled as earmarked contributions to their West Africa Trust Funds. PSE 3 will take the form of a bilateral engagement with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). PSE 4 will be directly implemented by the Danish military via the maritime military advisor at the Embassy in Abuja. The partner selection has been based on the following criteria:

- **Known and trusted partners.** IMO and UNODC are both specialised UN agencies with whom Denmark has cooperated previously. IMO was an implementing partner for the previous phase (port security) and has a formal mandate in relation to UNCLOS. Inter alia, IMO has conducted audits of port safety and security in both Nigeria and Ghana and the organisation is very well known amongst national maritime agencies and regional maritime institutions. UNODC has a major role in relation to legal reforms in various areas and is currently providing support to Nigeria through an embedded advisor. Denmark has partnered with UNODC in various contexts, including counter terrorism. Both agencies are represented in the region (UNODC in Abuja and IMO in Accra). In relation to PSE 3, KAIPTC has been a long-standing Danish partner through the Africa Programme for Peace (APP). It is a well-respected research and training institution with strong links to the Ghanaian Government, to ECOWAS, and the ICC.

- **Ability to deliver in difficult contexts** concerns the extent to which partners in the past have been able to deliver results in areas with weak or complicated bureaucracies and whether the partner has the capacity to ensure monitoring and risk management in this environment. The partners will need to operate in Nigeria (Abuja and Lagos), which presents some security risks, although these are assessed to be manageable. Achieving sustainable results in Nigeria and Ghana is perhaps the greatest concern as the inter-agency systems in both countries are still developing – indeed, this is part of the justification for the programme. But the environment requires partners that have experience in operating in contexts that are
less than permissive. In this respect, IMO, UNODC and KAIPTC can all demonstrate this capacity.

- **Partner effectiveness.** UNODC, IMO and KAIPTC all have solid procedures and management capacity. In certain cases, these have been strengthened further; e.g. through tailored arrangements for risk monitoring and in relation to outcome reporting. The programme will also be assisted through the presence in Abuja and Accra of Danish maritime advisors collocated at the embassies.

- **Risk management** concerns the need for partners to have a strong risk management system, which ensures monitoring, management and mitigation of fiduciary as well as programmatic and institutional risks. UNODC, IMO and KAIPTC have a solid approach to risk management. Risks concerning PSE 4 will be mitigated through close cooperation with US (and possibly UK and French) assets in the region. The programme’s risk management framework will also reflect human rights concerns (see Annex 5).

- **Alignment and ownership.** The degree of alignment to relevant Ghanaian, Nigerian and regional institutions is expected to be critical. All the engagements are as aligned as possible and alignment will be further strengthened during programme start up. Implementing partners are in regular contact with national and international stakeholders. To ensure that relations remain strong, the national maritime agencies will be invited to participate in the dialogue meetings to be held under PSE 3. These events will also involve the Embassies in Accra and Abuja and the implementing partners. They will ensure that alignment continues to be strong, thereby strengthening ownership.

- **Attention to Danish priority areas including application of a human rights based approach, gender equality and women’s empowerment and youth.** The opportunities to promote transparency and accountability will be directly strengthened through the programme, especially through PSE 1 and PSE 2, which focus on the capacity and interaction of maritime agencies and the justice system. The programme’s overall approach will be participatory and inclusive, and these aspects will also be promoted in PSE 2 (strategies) and PSE 3 (research and dialogue). Human rights protection will be included as a cross cutting issue in all four engagements. In PSE 1, human rights will be highlighted during capacity building of law enforcement arrangements. Where relevant, this will include attention to gender issues. PSE 4 will include human rights protection as an element of the military response training.

### 3.3 Considerations regarding ODA and non-ODA funds

Being a PSF funded programme, the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme draws from both ODA and non-ODA-eligible funding sources. During the formulation process, due attention has been paid to the latest guidance from OECD/DAC in order to ensure the programme’s compliance. PSEs 1, 2 and 3 have been prepared so that they are fully DAC-able – that is the support is provided with a view to strengthening the rule of law within the maritime domain. PSE 1 will provide legal support and capacity development of prosecutors and law enforcement from civilian experts recruited by UNODC. In addition, engagement’s focus on strengthening judicial process in line with international standards will contribute to civilian oversight and democratic control. PSE 2 will also contribute to this goal through its focus on supporting the finalisation and implementation of inter-agency maritime strategies. The overall beneficiaries of improved maritime security through countering piracy and armed robbery at sea (being enhanced safety at sea, development of the blue economy, and reduced corruption and crime) are the civilian populations of countries in the Gulf of Guinea as well as regional and international seafarers. PSE 3 will strengthen dialogue and provide training to government agencies, including maritime law enforcement. Its precise content will be identified following a research and dialogue process but is

---

25 Revised reporting directives on ODA in the field of peace and security, OECD.
expected to include an Advanced Maritime Security Course, the content and delivery of which will be developed with due regard to ODA eligibility rules. PSE 4, which is primarily a contribution to this goal from the Danish military, is not considered DAC-able as it focuses directly on strengthening military responses and is therefore funded through Ministry of Defence sources.

3.4 Short summary of development engagements

This section provides an overview of the four engagements, including their expected results, theory of change, management arrangements and risks.

3.4.1 PSE 1 – strengthened maritime law response to piracy (through UNODC)

PSE 1 will strengthen the maritime law enforcement (MLE) capacity in Ghana and Nigeria in their response to piracy and maritime crime. This is part of a broader UNODC approach in improving the criminal justice response to transnational organized crime at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, including Ghana and Nigeria, that will draw from EU SWAIMS and other sources of funding, as described above. The engagement is closely harmonised with these other initiatives and is complementary to them. The focus will be on placing maritime law enforcement advisors within national maritime law enforcement agencies in the two countries; to ensure proper regional coordination with regard to legal aspects of the operational response at sea; and, strengthen the legal basis for the existing MMCCs (zone E and zone F) under the umbrella framework of the ICC.

The justification for the engagement hinges on the need to strengthen the basis for prosecutions related to incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea, which is currently weak and undermines efforts to combat piracy. The reason most countries in West Africa are still not at prosecution stage is due to the limited maritime capacities for law enforcement agencies and the absence of robust legal frameworks. The insufficient effectiveness of domestic justice systems and other factors inhibit the legal finish of prosecutions related to criminal activities at sea. This is emphasized by the fact that to date, there have been no successful prosecutions for maritime piracy in West Africa.

UNODC has been promoting human rights compliant legal reform and training prosecutors on law of the sea and maritime crime matters in Ghana and Nigeria since 2015. The experience is that embedded advisor work is the more sustainable approach as it allows for daily follow up and cooperation with key national counterparts. There is still a way to go to have fully trained and specialized teams among federal prosecutors and judges to take on piracy cases, but focus will be on more training and case work through organized mock trials. The process here applies from sea to land including arrests, collection of evidence, investigations and preparations for prosecution. This engagement focuses on strengthening the sea response and hand-over to land element, by placing embedded advisors to work with relevant maritime law enforcement agencies. The engagement will also respond to the need to strengthen agency interaction, which was a recommendation from a workshop on inter-agency cooperation undertaken by UNODC and IMO in September 2018. And it will support the ICC in establishing legal agreements for the existing operational cooperation between the countries under zones E and F of the Yaoundé framework. These are also areas identified by UNODC as currently not covered by any other main actor in the region.

Results framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 1</th>
<th>The maritime law enforcement response to crimes at sea has improved in Ghana and Nigeria.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome indicator</td>
<td>Number of arrests and prosecutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year</td>
<td>2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The theory of change is that if the capacity of maritime law enforcement agencies to gather evidence and process it is enhanced and if this takes place in a strengthened national (and regional) maritime legal framework, then the greater coordination and stronger legal basis will enable the justice system to reach prosecutions and reduce the currently highly level of impunity available, leading also to reduced levels of corruption and maritime crime. Important assumptions here are that there is sufficient buy-in and ownership from relevant law enforcement and justice stakeholders and that the capacity development can be anchored in structures that are sufficiently robust and connected to produce the desired effects. The implementation modality utilizing embedded advisors and practical, multi-agency exercises backed up by high-level dialogue from UNODC will help secure this.

The engagement’s intervention logic is based on the following outputs:

Output 1.1: MLE agencies in Ghana and Nigeria respectively have the knowledge, capacity and capability to conduct arrests at sea and prepare cases for prosecution will include one advisor per country to be based within a maritime law enforcement agency. The advisors will strengthen the national maritime law enforcement (MLE) capacity at sea and land, as well as further strengthen the inter-agency coordination and cooperation with the overall aim of reaching prosecution of piracy and maritime crime. This will include attention to human rights and gender aspects of MLE. The term per advisor will be ten months p.a (2019 – 2021). Both countries have shown appreciation for the support received so far through embedded mentors and there is still a need to continue.

Output 1.2: The knowledge on law of the sea and legal aspects of procedures on water, including evidence collection, boarding and search (VBSS) and hand-over procedures strengthened among law enforcement teams at both a national and regional level. These training series will include class room theory, case work and on water practice. The boarding scenarios will start with theory on land and later move to actual demonstration and practice at sea. The advisors under output 1.1 will be in charge of organizing and implementing the training.

Output 2.1: Legal aspects of joint sea operations under zone E and zone F strengthened through conducted training with the involvement and support of the embedded MLE advisors. The MLE advisors will support land and sea training in the two zones, E and F, with maritime law enforcement agencies in Ghana and Nigeria and with direct communication with the management of the MMCCs. This output will be informed by a gap and needs assessment following the introduction of legal arrangements with the ICC (which is part of the EU SWAIMS funding also being implemented by UNODC). The output will therefore not start before 2020.

It should be noted that further definition of these output areas and the precise arrangements concerning the technical advisers concerned will be undertaken following programme approval. Any changes requiring adjustment to the results framework will be notified to the Embassy of Denmark in Accra.

Choice of development engagement partner, modalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Coordination and cooperation among the states in the region increased through support to the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) and the Multi Maritime Coordination Centres (MMCCs) under zone E and F.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome indicator</td>
<td>Level of coordination between member states in zones E and F. Number of interdictions and arrests at sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The engagement will take the form of an earmarked contribution to UNODC’s Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP). UNODC has been supporting maritime legal development in the Gulf of Guinea since 2015 and is recognised as having capacity in this area. Its existing interaction with key stakeholders in Nigeria and Ghana provides a solid basis for securing beneficiary ownership and commitment to the engagement. As an implementing partner also for the EU’s SWAIMS programme, UNODC will also be able to promote coordination and reduce the risk of duplication between the two programmes. In implementing the engagement, UNODC will be guided by international law provisions and standards described in its manual “Maritime Crime: A Manual for Criminal Justice Practitioners”. This also ensures that the capacity building activities delivered will be in accordance with the rule of law and human rights and their compliance with this will be monitored. Similarly, UNODC’s efforts regarding PSE 1 will also contribute to the achievement of a number of SDGs (especially SDG 16), which feature in the organisation’s own objectives and reporting.

Management arrangements and financial modalities

The engagement will be managed by UNODC’s Regional Office for West and Central Africa in Senegal and activities in Nigeria will be coordinated with the UNODC Country Office for Nigeria. Day-to-day management of the engagement will be provided by a new position of project coordinator (to be based in Accra) and who will report to the UNODC Country Office in Abuja. The project coordinator will ensure coordination with national maritime agencies and provide management for training courses and exercises. The maritime law enforcement advisors will be contracted through a competitive process. They will focus on providing daily advice and guidance to national counterparts as well as taking a leading role in implementing substantive training and exercises on land and at sea. UNODC’s Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP), which provides an umbrella for this support, has a Management and Analysis team based at UNODC headquarters in Vienna, which supports GMCP implementation with financial and administrative monitoring and reporting.

The project coordinator in Accra will ensure regular interaction with the Danish Embassies in Abuja and Accra.

Monitoring framework

Monitoring will focus on three main components, namely: (i) financial and input monitoring (i.e. expenditure against budget); (ii) physical monitoring (i.e. timely implementation of activities against work plan, such as provision of training and mentoring etc.); and (iii) monitoring of results achieved and the response of target groups (e.g. application/use of knowledge/skills, new operating procedures, as well as counterpart satisfaction with the quality of support provided). UNODC will report against the results and budgets included in the project proposal and summarised in PSED 1. UNODC’s monitoring mechanisms are exercised on an on-going basis through procedural practices and the presence of UNODC staff in the region. Fortnightly updates are distributed by email to all relevant partners and those interested in the GMCP. Narrative progress reports are produced semi-annually and annually. The technical advisors embedded in counterpart agencies will be in a position to report back on implementation and progress made. In addition, the project coordinator will be monitoring the project implementation closely, including through site visits.

UNODC will deliver financial reports on an annual basis. The Danish Embassies in Accra and Abuja will also have the possibility to be further kept abreast with project progress and implementation through UNODC’s updates, the annual brochure, and regular visits to view on-going activities in the field.

The planned Mid Term Review of the programme in early 2020 also provides an important opportunity to assess progress and the adequacy of management and monitoring arrangements.

Budget at outcome level
The engagement has been designed as an ODA compatible contribution that focuses on enhancing the legal aspects of maritime crime responses in Ghana and Nigeria and the legal functioning of the Yaoundé architecture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Year 1 (2019)</th>
<th>Year 2 (2020)</th>
<th>Year 3 (2021)</th>
<th>Total Cost DKK M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1 – MLE strengthened to conduct arrests at sea and prepare cases for prosecution</td>
<td>2,57</td>
<td>2,57</td>
<td>2,46</td>
<td>7,60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 2 – ICC structure supported with legal aspects</td>
<td></td>
<td>0,46</td>
<td>0,39</td>
<td>0,85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme Coordinator</td>
<td>0,54</td>
<td>0,54</td>
<td>0,55</td>
<td>1,63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Programme Officer / admin support</td>
<td>0,23</td>
<td>0,23</td>
<td>0,24</td>
<td>0,70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel staff</td>
<td>0,11</td>
<td>0,11</td>
<td>0,11</td>
<td>0,33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>3,45</td>
<td>3,91</td>
<td>3,75</td>
<td>11,11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Support Costs 13%</td>
<td>0,45</td>
<td>0,51</td>
<td>0,48</td>
<td>1,44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,92</td>
<td>4,43</td>
<td>4,20</td>
<td>12,55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of risk analysis and risk response
UNODC has identified a number of contextual, programmatic and institutional risks and possible mitigation measures. A key contextual risk is that changes occur in government priorities with the result that institutional arrangements promoted by the engagement become less relevant. To counter this risk, programme staff will continuously engage with policy makers and government agencies to ensure their commitment and support in the implementation of the engagement and early warning of any changes. There is a programmatic risk that institutional memory is not integrated and/or too fragmented for a sustainable and independent management after completion. To mitigate this risk, UNODC will ensure continued follow-up with and training of focal points in the partner institutions. There is also a risk that high turnover in partner institutions causes the results to be short-lived. UNODC will secure agreements with concerned institutions to ensure that the staff trained stay in place for an adequate amount of time and perform the tasks for which they were trained. There is an institutional (and reputational) risk that human rights violations by counterparts occur. To help counter this, human rights and a human rights-based approach are mainstreamed in all programming and activities. UNODC will continue to advocate for abolition of the death penalty and the exclusion of the death penalty from anti-piracy legislation. UNODC will also ensure vetting of criminal justice practitioners to be trained, including consultation with OHCHR.

3.4.2 PSE 2 - Maritime strategies in place and operational (through IMO)
PSE 2 involves an earmarked Danish contribution to IMO’s International Maritime Security Trust Fund that will channel technical assistance to the further development and implementation of maritime strategies in Nigeria and Ghana between 2019-2021 in line with the countries’ work to implement UNSC resolution, 2039(2012), the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS and its AU counterpart (AIMS)), and regional agreements, such as the Lomé Charter and Yaoundé Code of Conduct. The support will involve the appointment of one or more technical advisors, to develop the basis for the further support during a six-month inception phase. Following this, a technical review of IMO’s proposals will be undertaken by the Danish Embassy in Accra to confirm their inclusion in the programme.

The justification for the engagement hinges upon the development and implementation of maritime strategies (that include wholly or in part a security dimension) that will be crucial to enabling an effective and cohesive inter-agency response to piracy and armed robbery at sea. The focus on Ghana is justified by the steps already taken in this direction and which will benefit from further
technical support during implementation. In Nigeria, the situation is less advanced while the needs are significant given the degree of piracy in Nigerian waters and the added value that a coordinated response can provide.

In Ghana, a maritime security strategy text has been agreed by the members of the National Maritime Security Committee (NMSC), and it is waiting for adoption. It is envisaged that IMO’s assistance through this engagement will assist the NMSC to incorporate the strategy in the new integrated maritime strategy that is expected to be adopted by mid 2019, and the engagement will then assist the development of an implementation plan and the initial implementation itself.

In Nigeria, there is a need to build upon the 2014 “table top” exercise that demonstrated the importance of holistic and cohesive approaches to maritime security, IMO’s subsequent ISPS training package to NIMASA, and the inter-agency workshop (conducted with UNODC), which provided a starting point for the development of a maritime security strategy.

Both Nigeria and Ghana have expressed an interest in receiving IMO’s assistance to the implementation of strategies for strengthening the security in their waters, although the details of this collaboration have yet to be fully agreed and will need to take account of the steps that have already been taken. For this reason, the engagement will commence with a scoping assessment and consultations with key counterparts (notably the GMA and NIMASA) to generate consensus on the optimum role for IMO. Once this has been achieved (by late 2019) a full proposal will be prepared and submitted for approval to the Embassy of Denmark in Accra (and the PSF Steering Committee). Beyond the scoping assessment, PSE 2 is therefore outlined here in tentative form and a full engagement will be developed during 2019 once the findings of the scoping are clear.

**Results framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 1</th>
<th>Collaboration amongst departments and agencies with an interest in maritime security so as to encourage a multi-agency approach for the robust implementation of national, regional and international maritime security measures strengthened</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome indicator</td>
<td>Status on production and approval of maritime strategies in (a) Ghana and (b) Nigeria. Status on agreement on implementation plans involving all key agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year</td>
<td>2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The **theory of change** for PSE 2 is that that if the capacities, interests and needs of the main maritime security authorities in Ghana and Nigeria are understood and feed into the development of a concrete, relevant and accepted work plan, and if support is provided to enhance the policy coordination and operational linkages between national maritime agencies and if this takes place within the overall framework provided by national strategic frameworks (that integrate national capacities and responsibilities), then the greater coordination and stronger legal basis provided will enable the key maritime actors to respond to maritime security threats more effectively and ensure due process regarding areas such as prosecution of alleged maritime criminals, leading also to improved levels of maritime safety, stronger regional cooperation, and reduced maritime crime. A key part of this theory of change is that the improved national inter-agency cooperation will also enable more effective and cohesive cooperation with neighbouring countries, which is an important part of the Yaoundé process.

**Key assumptions** here are that there is sufficient buy-in and ownership from relevant maritime agencies in Ghana and Nigeria (notably GMA, NIMASA, the two navies and other law enforcement and justice stakeholders) to agree on a Whole of Government approach. There are indications that stakeholders are moving in this direction. But further understanding of the context
and dialogue with partners is needed before a detailed work plan can be developed. The
engagement will therefore work towards these aspects during 2019 before moving into full
implementation in late 2019-2021. A further important assumption is that IMO has sufficient
convening power and leverage to engage with the respective actors. On this point, it should be
noted that the approaches described are within IMO’s international mandate and that both
countries are IMO members and there is an existing cooperation with regard to ISPS standards.
IMO will need to build upon this and there will be a need to ensure the engagement is well targeted.
To facilitate this, the engagement includes a short inception phase (scoping exercise) during which
the current state of play will be assessed and concrete activities to strengthen it will be developed.
The implementation modality utilizing embedded advisors and practical, multi-agency exercises
backed up by high-level dialogue from IMO will help secure this.

As noted above, IMO envisage a step-by-step approach that is fully anchored in the key national
agencies concerned (in Nigeria, this will include NIMASA, the Nigerian Navy, National Security
Advisor, Ministries of Justice, Defence and Transport, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Defence
and in Ghana, it will include GMA, the Ghanaian Navy, the Ministries of Justice, Defence and
Transport). As noted above, its implementation will need to recognise that progress is likely to
proceed at different speeds in the two countries and may require different levels of effort and
support from IMO Headquarters.

The initial results will therefore be focused on a single output:

Output 1: Understanding of pre-conditions for strengthened and more strategic approach to the maritime
domain in Nigeria and Ghana enhanced. This will have a particular focus on maritime safety and
security and provide concrete and actionable recommendations regarding the latter. It will
mainly comprise mapping of context, progress made to date, key challenges and potential
mitigation, concrete options for future support, key partners/actors, including international
actors. The main deliverables will be (a) Scoping assessment report and draft work plan/way
ahead including key milestones, objectives, targets etc. that can provide a solid basis for
agreement with maritime agencies in Nigeria and Ghana relating to the objectives of the
engagement. The report will include details of the strategies under development/and
approved, the key agencies involved and their roles, implementation plans, partners,
linkages to the regional (ICC) architecture etc. Relevant human rights and gender aspects
will also be covered. (b) Agreed work plan between IMO and lead agencies in Nigeria and
Ghana regarding advisory support.

Output 1 is a pre-cursor for the further development of the project plan for this engagement area
and the implementation strategy foresees that a detailed support plan for remainder of the
engagement is developed following the assessment and dialogue with stakeholders. The latter is
expected to be formed around the following:

Possible Output 2: Maritime strategy implementation action plans in Nigeria and Ghana developed,
especially relating to maritime security. This is expected to comprise technical assistance to
completion and operationalization of maritime strategies, including guidance regarding
institutional arrangements. The precise deliverables and timing will be developed based
upon the mapping assessment.

Possible Output 3: Implementation of maritime strategies in Nigeria and Ghana strengthened through
coordinated approaches amongst key actors. This will comprise mentoring of one or more of the
main maritime agencies in each country for an initial period (not full time) once
arrangements have been established. Again, the precise deliverables and timing will be
developed based upon the mapping assessment.
Choice of development engagement partner, modalities

IMO is the United Nations specialized agency responsible for safe, secure and efficient shipping and the prevention of pollution from ships. In 2006, IMO and 25 countries of the Maritime Association of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) initiated a process that led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Sub-Regional Integrated Coast Guard Network (MOWCA MoU). This MoU set out a number of ‘coast guard functions’ that need to be performed by coastal States, including countering piracy and armed robbery against ships. Since then, IMO has been conducting capacity building activities in the region under a programme that includes table top exercises, seminars and maritime security related training. IMO’s activities have a direct link to a number of the SDGs, especially SDG 14 (Life below water), SDG 1 (No poverty), SDG 8 (Decent work and economic growth) and the organisation reports on its contribution towards these.  

As an inter-governmental organisation, IMO offers advantages for Denmark regarding mandate and access to key stakeholders, which are important aspects that will help this engagement generate the political buy-in required. IMO will thus engage at the governmental level to ensure that the technical expertise offered is well targeted and relevant to the needs of the Ghanaian and Nigerian agencies involved. In doing so, IMO will also coordinate closely with UNODC and EU, both of which are also providing support to maritime agencies in the two countries.

Management arrangements and financial modalities

The technical assistance will initially be provided by one or more technical advisors, who will responsible for the scoping assessment and work plan design under IMO’s direction. They will have appropriate experience within the area of maritime security, including inter agency cooperation and law enforcement and able to work effectively with different government agencies within an interest in maritime domain in Nigeria and Ghana respectively. The advisor(s) will be identified through competitive recruitment according to IMO’s procedures. IMO has a pool of pre-approved consultants. Once a request for technical cooperation is received, a recruitment request needs to be submitted to a Panel of Recruitment. The Panel constitutes of members of all IMO divisions and is chaired by the Director of Technical Cooperation Division.

The advisor(s) will be supported by IMO in London, supplemented by IMO field missions as appropriate. IMO London will assume responsibility for managing the project, including political interaction with key stakeholders to ensure the delivery and ownership of project objectives. The support will not involve the provision or procurement of equipment.

Monitoring framework

IMO will report against the results and budgets included in the project proposal and summarised in PSED 2. Narrative and financial progress reports will be produced semi-annually and annually. The technical advisor(s) will report back on implementation and progress made on a regular basis and will also be available for update meetings with the Danish Embassies in Accra and Abuja. In addition, the project coordinator (based in IMO’s London HQ) will be monitoring the project implementation closely, including through site visits.

Budget at outcome level

The engagement has been designed as an ODA compatible contribution that focuses primarily on enhancing inter-agency cooperation amongst maritime agencies in Ghana and Nigeria and the implementation of international instruments, including UNSCR 2039 and the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. Funding approval will initially cover the requirements for Outcome 1 only and, provided

26 IMO and Sustainable Development, Brochure
that this is successful, a supplementary approval will be required for the subsequent outcomes/outputs. The total funding window for this engagement has been set at DKK 6 million.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Year 1 (2019)</th>
<th>Year 2 (2020)</th>
<th>Year 3 (2021)</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1 – Development of a multi-agency approach (output 1.1 assessment only)</td>
<td>0,66</td>
<td>tbd</td>
<td>tbd</td>
<td>tbd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel, DSA</td>
<td>0,32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMO staff input (P4 &amp; P5)</td>
<td>0,47</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Support Costs (5%)</td>
<td>0,07</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1,52</td>
<td>2,50</td>
<td>1,98</td>
<td>6,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of risk analysis and risk response**

The risks associated with this engagement are broadly similar to those affecting PSE 1. There is a programmatic risk that IMO is unable to generate sufficient practical buy-in from relevant counterpart institution in one or both countries to enable the second phase of the support to proceed. This will be mitigated through the scoping study in 2019 and through political efforts from IMO, supplemented from the Danish Embassies in Accra and Abuja, to generate the understandings required.

IMO also assess that there is a medium level risk of lack of buy-in/appetite to accept the advice being offered by the advisors or to take part in coordination meetings aimed at harmonising approaches across agencies. This risk is mitigated by the network that IMO has built over the last couple of years by IMO. The advisors would cooperate with focal points known to IMO. The risk will also be mitigated by the step-by-step approach suggested for the engagement, which foresees the initial scoping assessment as a vehicle for generating consensus and buy-in in addition to a clear overview of next steps.

Further downstream, there is also a risk of duplication of effort due to the many actors present in the region, who may decide to implement similar or closely related activities to those being carried out by IMO. This will be mitigated by the mapping assessment and through close coordination with other UN agencies, particularly UNODC, and partners, notably UK, U.S. and EU. There are also risks associated with turnover in key personnel, which would have the effect of slowing down or complicating implementation. The risk will be mitigated by continuous communication with the Permanent Representatives at IMO HQ and at capital level, chiefly through GMA and NIMASA.

3.4.3 PSE 3 – Research, dialogue and capacity development (through KAIPTC)

PSE 3 is intended as a mechanism to identify and promote solutions to shortcomings in the national and regional response to maritime crime, thereby providing an important supplement to other national, regional and international efforts. Anchored in the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), it will deliver knowledge products and draw from them to generate meaningful dialogue and capacity building. It will collaborate with key maritime actors such as the African Union (AU), ECOWAS, the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), the Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC) and national agencies. There is also scope to include Danish actors within this framework, such as the Danish Defence College (RDDC/FAK), the Centre for Military Studies at Copenhagen University and others. Moreover, the approach will encourage

---

27 Includes travel and DSA for IMO P4 in relation to political support to the engagement

28 Note that IMO staff will be expected to actively support outcome 1 through political dialogue with national stakeholders in Nigeria and Ghana. This costs is thus also partly a programme cost.

29 Standard IMO charge relating to central administrative costs
contributions from African sources of expertise, such as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Stellenbosch University, and the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) in Ghana.

The justification for the engagement rests upon a recognition that the national and regional level initiatives that are now emerging in response to the increase in piracy and other forms of maritime crime, on the one hand, and the international and regional maritime security-related norms to which countries in the Gulf of Guinea have signed up to, on the other, require reinforcing. There is also room for innovative thinking in relation to the connectivity between national agencies and regional structures (such as the ICC, CRESMAO and MMCCs). This can draw from good practice emerging, such as Nigeria’s Harmonized Standard Operating Procedures on Arrest, Detention and Prosecution (HSOPs, 2016).

**Results framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome indicator</th>
<th>Number of regional maritime security decisions adopted by consultative platforms of the project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>2019 No functional operational mechanism coordinating national and regional efforts towards concerted responses to maritime insecurity in the GoG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year</td>
<td>2021 At the end of project: at least, five (5) key national and regional decisions on maritime security informed by consensus decisions taken on the platform of this project</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The **theory of change** is that the development of research-based knowledge products concerning key policy and operational maritime security issues can serve as a basis for institutionalizing a platform for regular and meaningful dialogue where ideas can be explored and collaborative and consensus-based decisions taken amongst relevant maritime authorities and experts and forming also the basis for capacity development activities enhancing institutional and practitioner skill-sets to respond to the challenges in the maritime domain. This will lead to stronger, more cohesive and effective national and regional approaches to maritime security and an enhanced rate of implementation of the Yaoundé process with positive effects also for the uptake of the other engagements in this programme.

Key **assumptions** underpinning this approach are that KAIPTC has sufficient convening power to gather relevant experts and officials and that they are willing to contribute to reaching consensus on solutions that will be implemented within national and regional structures. In this respect, the choice of KAIPTC is strategic given the institution’s solid reputation and links to the Ghanaian Government, ECOWAS and ICC, amongst others.

The engagement’s intervention logic is based on three outputs:

**Output 1 - Research-based Knowledge Products as basis for dialogue** will deliver knowledge products to highlight key maritime security issues and thereby endeavour to raise the level of awareness at a policy, technical and operational level. Research will explore such issues as: mapping needs, responses and actors; mapping national and regional maritime legal and policy texts; reviewing and projecting implementation requirements of specific regional and legal and policy documents; exploring the nature and dimensions of piracy, robbery and crime at sea (including gender aspects); and maritime-related prosecutions etc. The precise research agenda will be determined following consultations with expert stakeholders and also technical level workshops. The research will lead to the production of policy papers that frame the issues for dialogue to ensure focused discussions in an iterative way.
Output 2 - A platform for Dialogue Series drawing from the research, KAIPTC will establish a platform for regular dialogues among international and national actors as well as with ECOWAS, ECCAS, GGC etc. at policy and technical level. The dialogues will also serve as a strategy for connecting the actors in the GoG countries and the sub-regional arrangements and drawing from the Yaoundé Code of Conduct which tasks Member-States to establish national maritime security committees.

Output 3 - Capacity development of maritime security practitioners will consist of training courses driven by research outputs of the project to ensure that targeted specialized professional competencies are developed to support the implementation of national and regional maritime security policies. Once again, actual training topics shall be identified through consultations and guided by project research outputs and related consensus decisions emerging from project dialogue platforms. This is expected to include an “Advanced Maritime Security Course” building on the existing foundational maritime security course already organized at the KAIPTC. The training is expected to primarily focus on non-military competences (e.g. legal and policy framework on maritime security).

KAIPTC will produce a detailed project implementation plan for the above outputs following programme approval and prior to commitment of any funds. This project plan will be subject to approval by the Embassy of Denmark in Accra.

Choice of development engagement partner, modalities

The engagement will be implemented by KAIPTC, which is an internationally recognised research and training institution based in Accra. KAIPTC is an ECOWAS Centre of Excellence and has also recently signed an MOU with the ICC, which increases its relevance from a maritime security perspective. Amongst the training current offered is a Maritime Security Course, and this could be raised to an advance level through the engagement if sufficient interest exists. From a Danish perspective, KAIPTC has been a long-term partner, chiefly through the Africa Programme for Peace (APP). The Embassy of Denmark is sitting on the KAIPTC management board and the organisation has close relation with a number of Danish defence and research institutions. Thus, there are very good possibilities to ensure a significant Danish footprint that will also reflect the priority attached to the programme by Danish authorities and the private sector.

Management arrangements and financial modalities

The engagement will be managed on a daily basis by a team of three full-time project staff led by a project coordinator (i.e. the Head of Conflict Management Programme who shall report directly to the Director, Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research (FAAR). The project team will set the project agenda based upon an annual plan (key events and budgets) and ensure that all planning tools and reporting obligations of the KAIPTC are met. From an internal KAIPTC perspective, the Director of FAAR shall be the entry point through which project-level decisions shall be transmitted to the Executive Management Committee of the KAIPTC and for that matter, integration of project activities into the wider KAIPTC scheme of activities. It shall be the responsibility of the project team to liaise with all project partners and ensure that all project targets are met.

External oversight will be provided by a steering committee consisting of senior representatives from the KAIPTC, the Embassy of Denmark in Accra and relevant partners such as ECOWAS, ECCAS, ICC, and CRESMAO in Cote d’Ivoire. The committee shall consider and approve quarterly proposals from the project team including commitments to set activities (i.e. research themes, dialogue events, and training courses), narrative and financial reporting, monitoring and evaluation, gender, communications and financial audits of project activities and disbursements.

Monitoring framework
Monitoring of PSE 3 will be undertaken by the project team and based on the results framework and annual plan developed by KAIPTC. This will include monitoring of risks and assumptions. The key developments will be reported to the steering committee on a semi-annual basis in the form of narrative and financial reports. The planned Mid Term Review of the programme in early/mid 2020 also provides an important opportunity to assess progress and the adequacy of management and monitoring arrangements.

**Budget at outcome level**

The engagement has been designed as an ODA compatible contribution that focuses primarily on enhancing the functionality of the Yaoundé architecture and the role of civil maritime authorities within this. Where law enforcement (and potentially also military) personnel are involved, their participation will not be the primary focus of the activity. A separate activity has been included under PSE 4 (non-ODA) to cater for issues of a more military nature.

The budget in DKK M is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output 1 - research</td>
<td>0,38</td>
<td>0,41</td>
<td>0,14</td>
<td>0,93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2 – dialogue events</td>
<td>0,99</td>
<td>0,69</td>
<td>0,11</td>
<td>1,79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 3 – training courses</td>
<td>0,12</td>
<td>1,01</td>
<td>1,01</td>
<td>2,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project coordinator (1)</td>
<td>0,19</td>
<td>0,19</td>
<td>0,19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project officer (x2)</td>
<td>0,23</td>
<td>0,23</td>
<td>0,23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steering committee mtgs</td>
<td>0,07</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0,07</td>
<td>0,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications and visibility strategy</td>
<td>0,02</td>
<td>0,03</td>
<td>0,03</td>
<td>0,06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative support/contribution to KAIPTC</td>
<td>0,33</td>
<td>0,33</td>
<td>0,33</td>
<td>0,99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>0,03</td>
<td>0,05</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>0,08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,35</td>
<td>2,94</td>
<td>2,21</td>
<td>7,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of risk analysis and risk response**

Poor national uptake of regional norms and practices has tended to undermine national implementation of the regional and international legal and policy instruments and remains a potential obstacle. This is both part of the rationale for the engagement as well as a contextual risk in the sense that it may undermine the expected results. There is a programmatic risk of countries nominating inappropriate participants, which will also undermine the effectiveness of the dialogue and the training. KAIPTC will use its close relations with major regional actors to manage this risk and the effects will be monitored. With regard to capacity development, the systemic challenge of personnel rotation could also undermine the engagement’s effects. This could also be a theme for discussion. Mitigating these risks and providing impetus to the engagement is the ICC’s multinational operational structure mandated to work with the operational agencies at the national level directly and also, coordinating a regional maritime security presence directly at the regional and national levels. The engagement will directly engage the political actors at the national level to strengthen national buy-in and anchoring.
PSE 4 will provide Danish military support to strengthen the operational capacity of Gulf of Guinea countries to monitor and mitigate security threats in the maritime domain and contribute to maritime governance, including rule of law (e.g., through strengthening forensic evidence collection). It will focus on (a) maritime operational planning training and practice with the aim to ensure a more effective utilisation of the maritime situation picture leading to timely decision making as part of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and (b) boarding procedures and practice to strengthen boarding, search and seizure skills, protect evidence, and ensure human rights observance. The intention is to provide a linked process that enhances counterparts’ operational response capacities and the ability to plan for their employment. The support will be provided through the framework offered by the US Navy through its OBANGAME EXPRESS exercise cycle, to which Denmark has previously contributed, and which provides an excellent means to utilise the synergies available from like-minded partners.

The rationale for supporting (a) operational planning and MDA is that more effective use of the MDA data available will strengthen countries’ operational responses by highlighting the areas where maritime law enforcement responses will be most effective and lead to arrests of alleged pirates and act as a deterrent. An important facilitator for this will be the development and use of standardised procedures (SOPs) so that MOCs, MMCCs etc. can talk to one another in real time. It is important that national MOCs and MMCCs can interoperable so that maritime law enforcement can be coordinated between countries (e.g., in cases of hot pursuit).

The rationale for strengthening (b) the effectiveness of boarding units is so that they operate in accordance with good practice, the rule of law and human rights in both opposed and unopposed situations and thereby increase the quality of forensic evidence for use in subsequent legal processes. Lessons learned from previous Danish SOF training provided to Cameroun are that training in boarding techniques is effective and provides a cadre of personnel able to subsequently act as instructors, thereby strengthening sustainability.

The engagement also includes some unallocated funds to augment the above outputs. The proposed arrangements for these are outlined further below.

Finally, the engagement provides funding for the Danish Maritime Military Adviser in Abuja. The Advisor also acts as Defence Attaché to Nigeria (and is also expected to be accredited to Ghana and ECOWAS in the future). As such, the Advisor is part of the overall staff at the Embassy of Denmark in Abuja, Nigeria and is posted under the Special Attaché Order and administratively under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Danish Defence as an employer. The Danish Ministry of Defence therefore pays a settlement fee to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which covers the administrative costs.

The Adviser’s main task is to follow military and defence and security policy developments in Nigeria, Ghana and the region closely, including with particular focus on maritime safety and security. The Advisor also ensures knowledge of how general political and economic developments affect security policy and are embodied in defence policies and keeps the Ministry of Defence and subordinate authorities informed about defence-related and security policy issues, especially maritime issues. In relation to this programme, the Adviser will provide local management of PSE 4 and support the other engagements.

Results framework

| Outcome 1 | Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness capacity, cooperation and interoperability amongst West African coastal states |

30 Terms of reference for the Maritime Military Advisor are attached at annex to PSE 4.
The theory of change is that if operational planning procedures are developed promoting effective and efficient interaction between national, zonal and regional centres, and that relevant personnel are trained in their use, and if operational capabilities amongst maritime law enforcement personnel relating to vessel boarding and search are enhanced (in both opposed and unopposed situations), then the Nigerian and Ghanaian maritime law enforcement agencies will use these improved procedures and capacities to effectively respond to maritime incidents (including piracy and robbery at sea) will improve leading to a more cohesive response to incidents, including cases that transit from one country’s territorial waters to another, and responses that are more effective and founded on the application of the rule of law and in line with international standards, and the collection of evidence that can be used in possible prosecution, ultimately leading to an increase in prosecutions and contributing to a reduction in such incidents and safer passage for local and international shipping.

Assumptions include that suitable West African units are available to be trained and that Denmark has a framework within which to fit (i.e. from a partner country e.g. US via OBANGAME EXPRESS). It is also assumed that suitable units are available to be trained on boarding and that Danish instructors have a framework within which to fit (i.e. from a partner country, e.g. US, UK). In the case of OBANGAME EXPRESS, the aim will be to engage DK maritime SOF in a particular part of the training. It is expected that anti-piracy parts of the exercise will be most relevant for zones E and F and especially Nigeria. It is assumed that a more effective operational response will enhance prosecutions and also have a deterrent effect.

The engagement’s intervention logic is based on four outputs:

**Output 1:** ICC and West African coastal states under CRESMAO have agreed tactical procedures to ensure communication and coordination of operational planning.

**Output 2:** ICC has developed relevant training material for maritime operation planning based upon agreed SOP on operational planning process and information sharing.

**Output 3:** Regional (and national) capacity to provide training in maritime operational planning enhanced.

These three outputs will be facilitated through Danish Navy experts with relevant experience in MDA and in planning and exercises who be deployed to the region during the OBANGAME EXPRESS exercise and course period. Denmark will also contribute to the development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for operational planning as well as associated training material. This support will be coordinated by the Danish Maritime Military Adviser in Abuja in
consultation with the ICC, US Naval Forces Africa (US NAVAF), and Danish defence authorities.

Output 4: Nigerian and Ghanaian navy and law enforcement agencies trained in vessel boarding and related aspects (e.g. securing evidence, human rights) as part of a rule of law-based response. Danish special operations forces will train local partner units from Nigeria and Ghana in boarding techniques under OBANGAME EXPRESS. The precise details for this will be decided in conjunction with the exercise planning meetings in 2019. In addition, it is intended to collaborate with the US or UK to provide advanced training following a concrete field assessment in Nigeria and/or Ghana. Being concerned with more advanced training, this part may include instructor capacity in close quarter battle, tactical sanitation, boarding, basic military skills, and law of war.

The engagement also includes minor unallocated funds (DKK 1,0 million) that could be used for additional activities contributing to the engagement’s overall goals. These include the possibility of supporting the ICC with a short term assistance (anchored in KAIPTC); supporting maritime operational planning training at KAIPTC using non-ODA funds; acting as host nation for an OBANGAME EXPRESS main planning conference in 2020 or 2021; and minor funding to take advantage of possibilities for joint support activities with close allies. These possibilities require further discussion with partners that will be undertaken in 2019. Once this has been concluded, approval will be sought by the Maritime Military Adviser through Danish Defence Command for commitment of the funds.

Choice of development engagement partner, modalities

The engagement will be directly implemented by Danish Defence Command and subordinate units (Danish Navy and Special Operations Command) that have the experience and capacity necessary to provide the inputs required. The engagement builds upon previous experience from operational planning contributions within the framework of OBANGAME EXPRESS and from training Cameroun forces in boarding techniques. These contributions were planned, prepared and implemented in collaboration with US NAVAF, the ICC, and in 2018 the French Navy. The approach has been that Denmark has supplied most of the instructors and the US and France have supplied logistics.

Management arrangements and financial modalities

The day-to-day management will rest with the Maritime Military Advisor in Abuja in close cooperation with Defence Command Denmark, especially on financial issues. The Advisor will also refer to the Embassy of Denmark in Accra. Outcome 1 will be implemented by the Royal Danish Navy Command and Outcome 2 will be implemented by the Danish Special Operations Command (SOCOM), both of which will operate under the guidance of the Maritime Military Adviser and Danish Defence Command.

A pre-condition for activities under outcome 2 is expected to be an “activity agreement” with the relevant Nigeria and Ghana authorities and/or the US or other partner involved that can provide a suitable legal and practical framework for the cooperation. These aspects will be clarified by Danish Defence Command prior to any formal commitment.

Decisions to initiate an activity from the unallocated funds will be made by Danish Defence Command in consultation with the Ministry of Defence and the Maritime Advisor and reported to the Embassy of Denmark in Accra and an updated engagement document will be issued. Approval of additional activities requires that lead implementers are identified from within the Danish defence so that implementation can proceed.

Financial input to PSE 4 financial reports will be generated by the implementing entities via Defence Command Denmark to the Maritime Advisor.
Monitoring framework

The monitoring framework for this engagement is provided by the results matrix shown above and will be adjusted as further activities are approved. Implementation will be monitored by the implementing entity, including in relation to risks and assumptions. Reporting will be provided by the implementing entity and provided to the Maritime Advisor in Abuja utilising the PSF reporting directive/form. The Advisor will generate a consolidated report for the engagement and, following consultation with Danish Defence Command, will submit this to the Embassy of Denmark in Accra. The planned Mid Term Review of the programme in early/mid 2020 also provides an important opportunity to assess progress and the adequacy of management and monitoring arrangements.

Budget at outcome level

The engagement has been designed as a non-ODA eligible contribution utilising funds from the Ministry of Defence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 2</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>2,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common activities 1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Maritime Adviser</td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>9,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocated</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>5,6</td>
<td>5,1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of risk analysis and risk response

Improving maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea presents a range of contextual, programmatic and institutional risks, including the impact of corrupt practices, security, and cross-country cooperation challenges, which the engagement will monitor and take into consideration. There is a risk that the regional bodies and Yaoundé Code of Conduct signatory countries will lack the political will to coordinate, collaborate and share information (this would underline the basis for joint operational planning). There is also a risk that the joint framework arrangements needed to facilitate a Danish contribution will prove more difficult to interact with – or take longer to identify - than expected. To mitigate this, Denmark will participate in exercise planning conferences and engage bilaterally with partners (U.S, UK etc.). There is a reputational risk that Nigerian and/or Ghanaian military personnel trained in boarding are not able to utilise the training effectively. In the worst case, this could mean that personnel concerned do not fully abide by international standards, including human rights. This will be mitigated through the selection procedures managed by the US and by follow up monitoring of the training.

3.5 Adaptive programming

The programme is designed with an adaptive programming approach in mind so that it can respond to changes in the context and uptake of outputs. The approach varies across the four engagements, as follows:

- For PSEs 1 and 2, the use of TA expertise by UNODC and IMO brings an inherent degree of flexibility in that the experts can be refocused as necessary, away from areas that are not progressing to areas that show more promise. This will be informed by the regular

31 Common activities relate to participation in planning conferences for OBANGAME EXPRESS as well as potential hosting of the main planning conference by Denmark in 2020 or 2021. These events relate to both outcome areas.
monitoring of the engagements and any decisions taken in consultation with the Embassy of Denmark in Accra.

- For PSE 3, a small contingency is included that will allow some additional flexibility. On a more general level, the engagement will be highly responsive to demand and the precise nature of research and dialogue events will be decided on an annual basis, with possibility for adjustment.
- For PSE 4, a small non-ODA unallocated amount is included (see below). However, in other respects this engagement is less flexible than the others as it (a) needs to respond to the planning arrangements of other partners (e.g. US NAVAF) and (b) a large portion of the funding is allocated to the work of the Maritime Military Adviser in Abuja, who also functions as defence attaché.
- The programme also includes a modest unallocated funding line (DKK 2.0 M which is ODA related and DKK 1.0 M which is non-ODA) in order to provide additional flexibility. It is planned that the ODA funds be allocated on the basis of recommendations from the Mid Term Review and reflecting the overall progress being made on PSEs 1, 2 and 3. The non-ODA funds lie within PSE 4 and earmarking has been included in PSED 4 in order to provide a guide on current thinking. For approval procedures, please see section 4.2 below.

The MTR will provide an opportunity to formally adjust the balance within engagements if necessary.

4 Overview of management set-up

4.1 Overview of programme management

At the strategic level, the Programme will report to and received guidance from the PSF Steering Committee.

Day-to-day management will be anchored at the Embassy of Denmark in Accra, with the Maritime Growth Counsellor as programme officer. The Counsellor will ensure close collaboration and coordination with the Maritime Military Advisor in Abuja, the Civil Maritime Advisor in Abuja, and the M&E Coordinator in Accra. Please see section 4.5 for further details of the advisors.

Apart from periodic reporting to the Peace and Stabilisation Fund Steering Committee, there will be an on-going dialogue with relevant departments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Defence Command Denmark. The Inter Ministerial Resource Group that was established during the formulation process will be maintained to help facilitate these linkages (see section 4.4 below).

For PSE 1 and PSE 2, the Danish support will be provided as earmarked contributions to UNODC’s Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) and IMO’s International Maritime Security Trust Fund Africa (IMSTF) and these partners’ management and reporting arrangements will be utilised. The principal interlocutor with the organisations on the Danish side will be the Maritime Growth Advisor at the Embassy in Accra, in close consultation with the Civil Maritime Advisor in Abuja (see below for a description of this role). The Growth Adviser in Accra will take the lead on activities relating to Ghana and the Civil Maritime Advisor in Abuja will do likewise for Nigeria.

For PSE 3, a close programmatic follow up is envisioned with regular meetings at KAIPTC. The Embassy of Denmark in Accra will take the lead in this, except where PSE 4 related aspects are concerned, where the lead will be the Maritime Military Advisor in Abuja. PSE 3 will provide a significant vehicle for dialogue with national, regional and international maritime security actors on both policy and technical issues and it will be highly relevant for Denmark to be closely engaged.
PSE 3’s dialogue fora will thus also be used as a vehicle for dialogue between the Danish Embassies in Accra and Abuja and key national stakeholders, such as GMA and NIMASA.

For PSE 4, the Maritime Military Advisor in Abuja will liaise directly with Defence Command Denmark and the Danish Ministry of Defence, as well as local actors, including UN NAVAF and other like-minded donors. The day-to-day management will rest with the Maritime Military Advisor in close cooperation with Defence Command Denmark, especially on financial issues.

4.2 Approval of unallocated funds

The programme includes a modest amount of unallocated funding (DKK 2,0 M - ODA) in order to provide additional programme flexibility. Decisions relating to the use of unallocated funds relating to PSEs 1, 2 and 3 will be taken by the Embassy of Denmark in Accra based upon short proposals/addendums to existing projects from implementing partners and at the request of the Embassy of Denmark. These will also take into account any recommendations in this regard from the Mid Term Review in 2020. All such additions will be ODA-eligible and will be aligned with the GoG MSP objectives and outcomes.

Decisions relating to the use of unallocated funds relating to PSE 4 will be taken by Danish Defence Command based upon short proposals/addendums to existing projects from the Maritime Military Advisor and/or other relevant sources. Such decisions will be discussed with the Ministry of Defence and with the Embassy of Denmark in Accra prior to approval. All such additions will utilise non-ODA funds.

4.3 Local Advisory Group

The programme includes several engagements that operate in adjacent thematic territory (in particular PSEs 1 and 2) and where scope for synergies are likely to exist. In order to encourage the exchange of experience, lessons learnt and to promote synergies and reduce the risk of overlap, a Local Advisory Group will be established comprising the four main implementing partners, the Danish Embassies in Accra and Abuja, and the programme’s technical advisors. The MFA/AFR (and MOD/DCD as necessary) will be able to join the meeting via video link. The group will meet at least once a year in Accra and will be chaired by the Embassy of Denmark in Accra. Terms of reference for the Local Advisory Group are attached at Annex 12.

4.4 Inter-ministerial resource group

The programme has a relatively large number of stakeholders and interested parties, both in Denmark and in the region. These include the Danish Embassies in Accra and Abuja, the Danish MFA (AFR & SSP), DMD, DCD, and to an extent also the DMA and RDDC. Beyond these, Danish Shipping and parts of the Danish private sector are important interested parties. During the formulation process, it was found useful to hold periodic meetings of the former group and the programme maintains this as an option during implementation as a format through which to review overall progress and discuss any issues arising. The need for such meetings will be considered on a case-by-case basis by the Embassy of Denmark in Accra (as programme owner). Terms of reference for the Inter Ministerial Resource Group are attached at Annex 13.

4.5 Technical assistance

Technical assistance provided by external experts is a key modality through which this programme will deliver its results and the arrangements for this are described in the individual engagement sections above. This includes the Danish Maritime Military Advisor in Abuja, who is also accredited as the Denmark’s Defence Attaché to Nigeria (in the process of being (side) accredited as Defence Attaché to Ghana).
With regard to overall programme implementation, two locally recruited advisors are planned:

a. **M&E Coordinator.** In relation to overall programme monitoring and support to engagement partners where this is needed, a locally recruited M&E Coordinator will be attached to the programme. This person will have expert knowledge of M&E and results based management and ideally also a solid understanding of the maritime security environment, thereby enabling him/her to interact with the implementing partners as well as other stakeholders. A key function of this advisor will be to supervise and support the reporting and from the four engagement partners. For PSEs 1, 2 and 3, this will involve drawing from the partners’ standard reporting. For PSE 4, it will involve close consultation with the Maritime Military Advisor in Abuja. Based upon the implementing partners’ reports, the M&E Coordinator will prepare an annual report to the PSF Secretariat using PSF reporting formats. The M&E Coordinator will be located at KAIPTC in Accra.

In addition to his/her M&E functions (which are not expected to fully occupy the person), there will be scope to contribute to KAIPTC’s other activities within the maritime security area. The expectation is that the person will thereby also support the Advanced Maritime Security Course, ideally as course director.

The M&E Coordinator’s ToR are attached at Annex 10. The Embassy of Denmark in Accra will recruit a suitably qualified individual based upon these ToR upon programme approval.

b. **Civil Maritime Advisor, Abuja.** The experience from previous Danish maritime security support in the region is that adequate resources need to be applied to support implementing partners and secure traction from cooperation partners. This is expected to be the case in Nigeria, which will take proportionately greater resources than Ghana due to the scale of reform required. To assist here it is envisaged to locally recruit a Civil Maritime Advisor (CMA), who will be located at the Embassy in Abuja under the management of the Military Maritime Advisor/Defence Attaché. The CMA’s primary function will be to interact with the Nigerian authorities concerned with PSE 1 and PSE 2 – and also with UNODC and IMO respectively. He/she will also participate in donor coordination meetings.

ToR for the CMA are included at Annex 11. The Embassy of Denmark in Abuja will recruit a suitably qualified individual based upon these ToR upon programme approval.

4.6 **Monitoring, reviews and evaluation**

The programme’s implementing partners will undertake regular monitoring of progress against results as well as developments in key assumptions and risks. This will feed into a six-month narrative and financial report and an annual narrative and financial report that will be prepared by the implementing partners in September and March each year and provided to the Embassy of Denmark in Accra. From these, the M&E Coordinator will prepare an annual report using the PSF reporting format for review by the Embassy of Denmark in Accra and then submission to the PSF Secretariat. The annual reporting cycle is thus:

- Six monthly narrative and financial reports (all engagements) prepared by implementing partners – September each year
- Annual narrative and financial reports (all engagements) prepared by implementing partners – March each year
- Annual PSF report on whole programme prepared by Embassy of Denmark in Accra – April each year.

A Mid Term Review (MTR) of the programme will be undertaken at a point in early 2020 with the purpose of assessing overall progress and determining whether major changes to the programme’s result areas are required. The MTR will also provide an opportunity to make adjustments to all the
engagements as part of an adaptive programming approach given that the engagements are heavily dependent upon local authorities’ buy-in and there are risks attached to this. Where this is appropriate, changes will be in line with the programme outcomes and outputs as described in this document and which are flexible. Funds for contracting external assistance for the MTR have been included in the programme budget and will be managed by the Embassy of Denmark in Accra.

4.7 Financial management

The financial management of the programme will be done in accordance with the DMFA and DMD/DCD regulations for financial management, including the *Guidelines for Programmes and Projects* (2018), *Danida’s Guidelines for Financial Management of Decentralised Units* (2015) and the *General Guidelines for Accounting and Auditing of Grants channelled through Multilateral Organisations* (2012).

The financial management of PSEs 1 and 2 will follow the rules and regulations of UNODC and IMO respectively, both of which have a proven track record of sound and robust financial management and sufficient back up mechanisms should these be needed. Both organisations utilise accounting systems that are in accordance with International Accounting Standards.

The financial management of PSE 3 will utilise KAIPTC’s own accounting systems, which are also in accordance with International Accounting Standards (IAS) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).

The financial management of PSE 4 will follow Danish national regulations as they apply to DMD/DCD and sub-ordinate authorities. Financial input to all PSE 4 Financial Reports will be generated by the Danish military implementing entities via Defence Command Denmark and provided to the Maritime Military Advisor in Abuja.

Bi-annual financial reports on the engagements will be prepared and coordinated by the M&E Coordinator and submitted on an annual basis by the Embassy in Accra to the PSF Secretariat.

On the basis of the reporting from implementing partners, the Embassy of Denmark in Accra will undertake a review of expenditure against the budget in January 2021 in order to ascertain the possible need for adjustment between budget lines and to ensure that over/under spending does not occur.

4.8 Anti-corruption measures

West Africa is one of the most corrupt areas in the World. The corruption risks associated with the programme are assessed as low given that none of the engagements envisages significant financial transfers to third parties; in the case of PSEs 1 and 2, UNODC and IMO have strong financial management practices in place. In the case of PSE 3, KAIPTC will be responsible for managing the Danish contribution. The Centre has been a long-standing Danish partner and has sufficiently strong systems in place. PSE 4 funds will be controlled by DCD and subordinate authorities.

Denmark has a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption and all suspected cases must be reported. The PSEDs therefore stress that strict measures must be in place to minimise the risk of corruption or misappropriation of funds and any suspected case of corruption or misappropriation of funds related to the programme must immediately report to the Danish MFA or DMD regardless of whether or not the funds involved are Danish funds, and regardless whether the case has been successfully handled or not. Failing satisfactory implementation of the above, the Danish support may be withdrawn and a claim for refund of monies previously transferred may be made, and, in case of gross negligence, mismanagement or outright abuse, legal redress may be sought.

---

32 IAS issued by the International Accounting Standards Board.
4.9 Communicating results

A communications framework is attached at Annex 7 and sets out the arrangements for various types of messaging in relation to the programme’s purpose, priorities and results. The framework notes that effective coordination and targeting of communications is essential and that the Embassy of Denmark in Accra will take this role in relation to major communications. The key stakeholders involved are the Danish Embassies in Accra and Abuja, the Danish MFA, DMD, DCD.

With regard to the implementing partners for PSEs 1, 2 and 3, it is expected that UNODC, IMO and KAIPTC will produce/update biannual fact sheets and notes on success stories (also on their homepages and social media) as well as knowledge dissemination through training and workshop events. In view of the political sensitivity of maritime security issues, implementing partners’ proposed communications will be finalised in consultation with the Embassy of Denmark in Accra.

5 Programme budget

The total budget is DKK 46 million and draws from ODA and non-ODA sources of funding. The programme covers the period April 2019 to December 2021 (33 months) and commitments are made on a yearly basis through the Danish Finance Act and in accordance with the Danish Defence Agreement. The funding will thus be allocated yearly in accordance with the yearly funding commitment system of the MFA. The budget at engagement level is shown in Table 6 below.

Table 6: GoG MSP budget, DKK M

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>DMD</td>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>DMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSED 1</td>
<td>3,92</td>
<td>4,43</td>
<td>4,20</td>
<td>12,55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSED 2</td>
<td>1,52</td>
<td>2,50</td>
<td>1,98</td>
<td>6,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSED 3</td>
<td>2,38</td>
<td>2,99</td>
<td>2,13</td>
<td>7,50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSED 4</td>
<td>5,30</td>
<td>5,60</td>
<td>5,10</td>
<td>16,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E TA</td>
<td>0,20</td>
<td>0,29</td>
<td>0,29</td>
<td>0,78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>0,15</td>
<td>0,29</td>
<td>0,29</td>
<td>0,73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocated</td>
<td>0,94</td>
<td>1,00</td>
<td>1,94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviews etc.</td>
<td>0,50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0,50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,17</td>
<td>11,94</td>
<td>9,89</td>
<td>30,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

- PSED 4 includes DKK 1,0 M unallocated funding that is non-ODA
- PSED 2 is shown as DKK 6,0 M in total. Within this, the precise budgets for 2020 and 2021 will be developed in 2019 and approval sought.
Annexes:
Annex 1: Context Analysis
Annex 2: Partner overview
Annex 3: Result Framework
Annex 4: Budget details
Annex 5: Risk Management Matrix
Annex 6: List of supplementary materials
Annex 7: Plan for communication of results
Annex 8: Process Action Plan for implementation
Annex 9: Summary of recommendations (signed)
Annex 10: ToR for M&E Coordinator, Accra
Annex 11: ToR for Civil Maritime Advisor, Abuja
Annex 12: ToR for Local Advisory Group
Annex 13: Inter Ministerial Resource Group

To be available to Council for Development Policy on request:

- Development engagement documentation (draft engagement documents and partner’s programme documents for all programmed development engagements).
- National partner strategies (final or draft versions).
- Other documents deemed relevant.
Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme

Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Document

PSED 1 – Strengthening the maritime law enforcement response to piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea (UNODC)

Introduction

The present peace and stabilisation engagement document provides the objectives and management arrangements for the peace and stabilisation cooperation concerning Danish support to Strengthened maritime law enforcement responses to piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea - Nigeria and Ghana. The Danish support is part of the support provided through Denmark’s Peace and Stabilisation Fund as part of the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme (GoG MSP) and will be implemented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). This is an ODA compatible contribution to the programme from Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds.

Parties

The parties are:

1. Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, represented by the Embassy of Denmark in Accra, and
2. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Documentation

“The Documentation” refers to the partner documentation and other relevant documentation for the supported intervention. This comprises the GoG MSP Programme Document and the background note for PSE 1. The latter has been prepared by UNODC and is attached at Annex A to this PSED.

The engagement is a direct contribution to the Danish Government’s new Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019-2020, which inter alia reiterates Denmark’s commitment to a rules-based international society, democratic values, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), international responses to conflict. Other relevant Danish documentation includes the revised PSF Guidelines (October 2018) and the Priority Paper outlining the Danish priorities in combatting piracy and other kinds of maritime crime (December 2018).

Contribution

The Embassy of Denmark in Accra commits to a contribution to the engagement of DKK 12,55 million for the period April 2019 to December 2021.

Strategic considerations and justification

Piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea is a significant threat to regional and international shipping, with a significant number of incidents (95 in 2016 and 97 in 2017)
occurring in international and territorial waters (particularly in the waters around Nigeria).\(^1\) Incidents include piracy and theft of property (including illegal oil bunkering), kidnap for ransom, illegal fishing, and drug trafficking.\(^2\) Enabling factors include the presence of criminal syndicates coupled with national legal systems, law enforcement and maritime authorities that are ill-equipped to respond to these threats at sea and on land. Maritime law enforcement (MLE) capacities lack sufficient operating capacity and/or readiness and operate with a weak Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).\(^3\) This makes it difficult for maritime authorities to ensure safe passage and anchorage for international shipping.

The regional architecture currently being established is based on an Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC) in Yaoundé, two regional maritime operation centres (one in West Africa (called CRESDMAO in Abidjan) and one in Central Africa (called CRESDMAC in Pointe-Noire), a series of Multinational Maritime Cooperation Centres (MMCCs) based on a zonal approach through which coastal states are grouped into five zones.\(^4\) The zones most relevant to this engagement are zones E and F (which include Ghana and Nigeria). The MMCCs are serviced by national Maritime Operation Centres (MOCs). The overall purpose of this arrangement is to provide a mechanism whereby maritime information can be passed from one state to another so that operational responses to illegal activity, environmental threats and other incidents that may arise can be coordinated and made more effective. To facilitate this, an operational legal framework is required that (a) facilitates exchange of information between countries, (b) enables maritime law enforcement to cooperate operationally, and (c) facilitates apprehension and prosecution of alleged maritime criminals.

The justification for this engagement is the pressing need to strengthen national legal frameworks and their subsequent implementation to enable successful prosecution of suspected maritime criminals in Ghana and Nigeria. In Ghana, a Maritime Offences Bill is being prepared. Similarly, in Nigeria, a Bill on Suppression of Piracy and other Maritime Offences has been prepared and is now before Parliament.

The lack of prosecutions related to incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea continues to undermine efforts to combat piracy. This is both due to the current lack of appropriate legislation but is also due to limited apprehension of suspected pirates and poor protection and collection of forensic evidence. It is important for the region to change this trend and ensure that there is no impunity to attacks at sea. While operational capacities are the focus of other parts of the programme, this engagement will strengthen the national maritime law enforcement capacity both at sea and land, as well as further strengthen the inter-agency coordination and cooperation with the overall aim of ensuring prosecution of piracy and maritime offences.

It is also recognised that further efforts are needed to make the maritime law enforcement arrangements fully functional. Inter alia, this requires further development of mechanisms for managing national maritime security, including effective and efficient interaction between them, and improved operational responses. The support will thus also promote Ghana and Nigeria’s

---

\(^1\) According to Oceans Beyond Piracy, the number of incidents in the Gulf of Guinea now significantly exceed those occurring off the Horn of Africa (97 incidents compared to 54 in 2017)


\(^3\) See, for example, Lindskov & Nordby. This section also builds upon observations gained through interviews during the formulation mission in October 2018.

\(^4\) The zones most relevant for PSE 4 are zones E (that includes Nigeria) and F (that includes Ghana). The MMCCs for these zones are located in Benin and Ghana respectively.
linkage to the existing Multinational Maritime Coordination Centres (zone E and zone F) in the region under the umbrella framework of the Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC).

The support complements other initiatives to strengthen the legal framework in the two countries and interaction between maritime agencies at the national and regional level. This includes the support being provided by IMO to maritime strategies and inter-agency cooperation (partly through this Danish programme but also via UK initiatives and the much larger EU SWAIMS programme). It is essential that the coordination arrangements that are developed take full account of legal requirements and provide the overall framework for UNODC’s work. UNODC will therefore ensure that IMO (and EU and UK) are fully appraised of the Danish support so that the various initiatives are complementary.

At the operational level, the United States Naval Forces Africa (US NAVAF) and several likeminded countries (including Denmark) cooperate through an exercise series called OBANGAME EXPRESS, which enables coastal states to practice a wide range of MDA and operational responses, including boarding and search procedures. Other like-minded partners supporting maritime security developments in the Gulf of Guinea include the UK and France. The future Danish contributions to operational training are included in a separate engagement (PSE 4) and are provided by non-ODA funds. The current engagement (PSE 1) will promote compliance of such operations with international law and national legislation.

The engagement has been designed so that it is fully aligned with key Danish and international frameworks relating to maritime security. It is a concrete deliverable in relation to the *Priority Paper outlining the Danish priorities in combating piracy and other kinds of maritime crime from 2019 and beyond*. The paper’s objectives concerning the Gulf of Guinea are: (a) strengthening maritime governance in Nigeria and Ghana, including by assisting their legal frameworks and ability to investigate and prosecute maritime crime; (b) promoting regional cooperation and coordination; and (c) strengthening the ability of national and regional authorities to monitor the maritime domain and respond to emerging threats. The engagement is also a direct contribution to the Danish Government’s new *Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019-2020*, which inter alia reiterates Denmark’s commitment to a rules-based international society, democratic values, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), international responses to conflict. Inter alia, the strategy notes that support will be provided through the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) to the Gulf of Guinea. In this regard, the PSF’s priorities include countering piracy and maritime crime through a focus on capacity development of relevant authorities, information collection and dissemination, harmonisation of laws, rules and strategies concerning countering and prosecution of maritime crime, including in the Gulf of Guinea.

**Engagement partners**

This engagement document differentiates between implementing partners and cooperation partners. The sole implementing partner will be the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as described in this PSED and at Annex A.

UNODC is the UN’s specialised agency dealing with maritime crime, drug related crime, criminal justice reform, organized crime and terrorism, corruption and economic crime. The engagement will take the form of an earmarked contribution to UNODC’s Global Maritime

---

5 *Priority paper for the Danish efforts to combat piracy and other types of maritime crime, 2019-2022*
6 *Internal Danish MFA/MoD/MoJ note Prioriteringen af Freds og Stabiliseringsfonden efter 2017*
Crime Programme (GMCP), which has been supporting maritime legal development in the Gulf of Guinea since 2015. As activities in this engagement focus on the Gulf of Guinea they will be under the management and responsibility of the UNODC Atlantic Ocean team based out of Abuja.

As part of its implementation role, UNODC will cooperate with a range of national, regional and international stakeholders (i.e. cooperation partners). Important national counterparts in Nigeria include the Nigerian Navy, the Nigerian Maritime and Safety Administration (NIMASA), the Police (Maritime Unit), the Ministry of Justice and the National Drugs Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA – maritime unit). In Ghana, national counterparts are: the Ghanaian Navy, the Ghana Police Service, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA). Other cooperation partners include international agencies (esp. the International Maritime Organisation – IMO); regional bodies such as ECOWAS and the ICC; and other development partners (esp. EU, U.S., UK, France and Germany).

**Theory of Change and assumptions**
The theory of change is that if the capacity of maritime law enforcement agencies to gather evidence and process it is enhanced and if this takes place in a strengthened national (and regional) maritime legal framework that is also linked to enhanced inter-agency cooperation, then the greater coordination and stronger legal basis available will enable the justice system to reach prosecutions and reduce the currently high level of impunity available, leading also to reduced levels of corruption and maritime crime.

Important assumptions here are that there is sufficient buy-in and ownership from relevant law enforcement and justice stakeholders and that the capacity development can be anchored in structures that are sufficiently robust and connected to produce the desired effects. The implementation modality utilizing embedded advisors and practical, multi-agency exercises backed up by high-level dialogue from UNODC will help secure this.

A further assumption is that UNODC is able to reach agreement with a suitable “host” agency in both countries and that concrete work plans that address key needs can be developed together. UNODC’s good relationship with the central actors in both countries will help facilitate this. The current assumption is that the advisors will be embedded in the Nigerian Naval Command and in the Ghanaian Maritime Police (this as a baseline while exploring the opportunity to work closer with the Ghanaian Navy). This will complement other advisors embedded elsewhere, including the Federal Ministry of Justice in Nigeria. By embedding the advisors in operational MLE actors, UNODC will focus on legal aspects of operations, thereby also strengthening their impact on the treatment of persons apprehended (in relation to human rights standards) and quality of evidence collected. This will be a useful complement to other aspects of the Danish GoG MSP, notably the military support. As such, the assumption is that the UNODC support will help link improvements in operational capacity to arrest suspected maritime criminals to their prosecution, thereby strengthening justice and rule of law.

**PSED Results framework**
The objective of the peace and stabilisation cooperation among the parties is: *Strengthened maritime law enforcement responses to piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea - Nigeria and Ghana*

This peace and stabilisation engagement will strengthen the development of sustainable and cohesive institutional arrangements for maritime law enforcement through enhancing the
effectiveness of domestic justice systems and the practical interaction between relevant actors, including the national maritime authorities, navies, maritime police and other law enforcement and justice actors so that there is a coordinated process to reach prosecutions that applies from sea to land, including arrests, collection of evidence, investigations and preparations for prosecution. The engagement will focus on the sea response and hand-over to land element. The engagement will prioritise women’s representation within its training and ensure that gender aspects are reflected in technical advice and capacity development. The engagement will build upon the existing mandate and contacts of UNODC.

The focus of activities will primarily be on strengthening the introduction and practice of anti-piracy legislation now being developed in Ghana and Nigeria and their anchoring within a robust framework for inter-agency cooperation, including at the regional level. As such, the engagement provides an important supplement to other legal support being provided by UNODC through the EU SWAIMS programme (which supports advisors in other authorities, including the ministries of justice). The two channels will complement each other and the choice of UNODC as implementing partner provides a mechanism for avoiding duplication.

The engagement has three outputs:

a. Output 1.1: MLE agencies in Ghana and Nigeria respectively have the knowledge, capacity and capability to conduct arrests at sea and prepare cases for prosecution which will include one advisor per country to be based within a maritime law enforcement agency. The advisors will strengthen the national maritime law enforcement (MLE) capacity at sea and land, as well as further strengthen the inter-agency coordination and cooperation with the overall aim of reaching prosecution of piracy and maritime offences. The term will be a total of 30 months per advisor over the three year implementation timeframe (2019 – 2021). Both countries have shown appreciation for the support received so far through embedded mentors and there is still a need to continue.

b. Output 1.2: The knowledge on law of the sea and legal aspects of procedures on water, including evidence collection, visit -board search and seize (VBSS) and hand-over procedures strengthened among law enforcement teams at both a national and regional level. These training series will include class room theory, case work and on water practice. The boarding scenarios will start with theory on land and later move to actual demonstration and practice at sea. The advisors under output 1.1 will be in charge of organizing and implementing the training.

c. Output 2.1: Legal aspects of joint sea operations under zone E and zone F strengthened through conducted training with the involvement and support of the embedded MLE advisors. The MLE advisors will support land and sea training in the two zones, E and F, with maritime law enforcement agencies in Ghana and Nigeria and with direct communication with the management of the MMCCs. This output will be informed by a gap and needs assessment following the introduction of legal arrangements with the ICC (which is part of the EU SWAIMS funding also being implemented by UNODC). The output will therefore not start before 2020.

Further definition of these output areas and the precise arrangements concerning the technical advisers concerned will be undertaken following programme approval. The Danish Embassy in Accra will be informed of any significant changes, which will be reflected in a revised results framework.
For Danish reporting purposes the following key outcome and output indicators have been selected to document progress:

**Table 1: Engagement results framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement objective</th>
<th>Ghana and Nigeria have a solid and comprehensive response to maritime threats in place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact indicator</td>
<td>Ghanaian and Nigerian maritime law enforcement agencies report greater capacity to respond to maritime crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 2021 National architectures in Ghana and Nigeria underpinned by anti-piracy laws and capacity to implement them leading to arrests and prosecution of suspected maritime criminals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Outcome 1**

The maritime law enforcement response to crimes at sea has improved in Ghana and Nigeria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome indicator</th>
<th>Number of arrests and prosecutions initiated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Year 2018 Few arrests and no prosecutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 2021 10 arrests and 5 prosecutions initiated per country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Output 1.1**

MLE agencies in Ghana and Nigeria respectively have the knowledge, capacity and capability to conduct arrests at sea and prepare cases for prosecution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output Indicator</th>
<th>Number of arrests; Number of prepared cases for prosecution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Year 2018 Lack of specialized MLE officers and knowledge on law of the sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 1 2019 Specialized maritime crime teams established in Ghana and Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 2 2020 Teams operational and conducting sea operations with results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 3 2021 At least ten arrests and five cases initiated for prosecution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Output 1.2**

The knowledge on law of the sea and legal aspects of procedures on water including evidence collection, VBSS and hand-over procedures strengthened among maritime teams at both a national and regional level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output indicator</th>
<th>Number of trainings conducted; Number of trainees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Year 2018 Few MLE officers have the knowledge on maritime crime and LoS matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 1 2019 One VBSS training conducted and MLE team familiar with process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 2 2020 Two VBSS training courses conducted and team conducting them without assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 3 2021 At least ten arrests and evidence collected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Outcome 2**

Coordination and cooperation among the states in the region increased through support to the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) and the Multi Maritime Coordination Centres (MMCCs) under zone E and F.

| Outcome indicator | Level of coordination between member states in zones E and F. Number of interdictions and arrests at sea |

---

7 The indicators will draw from other relevant results frameworks, including UNODC’s GMCP, Outcome 6 and EU SWAIMS, SO2. Please see the UNODC proposal for further details.
Legal aspects of joint sea activities under zone E and zone F strengthened through conducted training with the involvement and support of the embedded MLE advisors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>Little coordination among regional entities and MMCCs not operational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>MMCCs fully operational and states conducting joint operations. At least 3 arrests made due to joint operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Output indicator

| Degree to which Zone E and F are operational (including legal basis) and participate in joint sea operations |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>Zone E and Zone F not yet operational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 1</td>
<td>2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 2</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 3</td>
<td>2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The indicators set out above may be adjusted during the start up of the implementation following detailed dialogue with cooperation partners. If this happens, a revised results framework will be prepared and will be used as the basis for monitoring and reporting. Progress towards the outcome and output targets set out in the result framework above will be regularly monitored by UNODC. Progress will be reported through UNODC’s reporting format.

Should additional Danish financial contributions be made to PSE 1 via the GoG MSP unallocated funds to this engagement (see Programme Document) the details will be added to the results framework. These will include indicators and targets.

**Risk management**

Key risks and risk management arrangements are described in the GoG MSP Programme Document and in the PSE 1 background document at Annex A.

There is a contextual risk that changes occur in government priorities with the result that institutional arrangements promoted by the engagement become less relevant. To counter this risk, programme staff will continuously engage with policy makers and government agencies to ensure their commitment and support in the implementation of the engagement and early warning of any changes.

There is a programmatic risk that UNODC is unable to generate sufficient practical buy-in from relevant counterpart institutions in one or both countries to enable the technical advisors to be successfully attached. To mitigate this risk, UNODC will build upon its existing linkages to the main counterpart institutions (i.e. GMA, Ghanaian Maritime Police, NIMASA, Nigerian Navy and Nigerian Ministry of Justice) during the engagement start up phase to generate consensus about practical aspects of the assistance (location, work plan etc.). As part of this process, a counterpart institution in both countries will be confirmed.

In addition, there is a programmatic risk that institutional memory is not integrated and/or is too fragmented for a sustainable and independent management after completion. To mitigate this risk, UNODC will ensure continued follow-up with and training of focal points in the partner institutions. There is also a risk that high turnover in partner institutions causes the results to be short-lived. To mitigate this, UNODC will secure agreements with concerned institutions to ensure that the staff trained stay in place for an adequate amount of time and perform the tasks for which they were trained. The use of embedded advisors (also in other
UNODC programmes) will (a) provide early warning of possible problems and (b) provide good opportunities for dialogue to resolve them.

There is an institutional (and reputational) risk that human rights violations by counterparts occur. To help counter this, human rights and a human rights-based approach are mainstreamed in all programming and activities. In this engagement, UNODC specify risks and risk mitigation measures relating to human rights, including risks relating to the possible use of the death penalty (which remains on the statute books in both countries). UNODC will also ensure vetting of criminal justice practitioners to be trained, including consultation with OHCHR. UNODC is also promoting human rights compliant anti-piracy legislation, especially in relation to the death penalty. UNODC will report on progress in these respects.

Financial risks are regarded as low as funds will be managed directly by UNODC. Where procurement takes place (e.g. in relation to purchase of fuel for exercises), UNODC will ensure that there is full transparency and accountability for any transfers made and that this is reported in the biannual financial reporting.

Risks will be monitored regularly by UNODC and reported in biannual narrative reporting. The GoG MSP Mid Term Review in early/mid 2020 will provide an opportunity to reassess engagement risks.

Inputs/budget
The Embassy of Denmark in Accra will provide a total of DKK 12,55 million in ODA funds to the engagement over the period April 2019 – December 2021 (33 months) based upon the budget below.

Table 2: Budget (DKK M)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Year 1 (2019)</th>
<th>Year 2 (2020)</th>
<th>Year 3 (2021)</th>
<th>Total Cost USD</th>
<th>Total Cost DKK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 MLE agencies in Ghana and Nigeria respectively have the knowledge, capacity and capability to conduct arrests at sea and prepare cases for prosecution</td>
<td>1,924,000</td>
<td>1,924,000</td>
<td>1,937,000</td>
<td>890,000</td>
<td>5,785,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 The knowledge on law of the sea and legal aspects of procedures on water including evidence collection, VBSS and hand-over procedures strengthened among maritime teams at both a national and regional level.</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>520,000</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>1,820,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1: The effective response to crimes at sea under MMCCs in zone E and zone F strengthened through guidance and conducted training by the embedded MLE advisors.</td>
<td>455,000</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>845,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The actual annual disbursement for Output 1.1 may change if alterations to the work plan are made. Any such changes to annual disbursements will be flagged in the biannual reporting.
The budget does not include any **unallocated funds** or contingency. Any decisions relating to possible access to the Danish GoG MSP's unallocated budget (which is held by the Embassy of Denmark in Accra) will be made by the Embassy in consultation with UNODC. Any such changes will be in accordance with the engagements objectives.

Once details of proposed additional activities have been identified, the approval process (see under management below) will be based on a short project proposal that outlines the purpose, rationale, modalities, links to existing activities, risks and expected results.

**Management arrangement**

The following management arrangement will apply with the aim to ensure adequate dialogue and timely decisions in regard to this engagement. The engagement forms part of the GoG MSP and as such will utilise the strategic management arrangements established for the programme. These are described in the GoG MSP Programme Document and include a **Local Advisory Group** that will meet regularly in Accra and include the other implementing partners of the GoG MSP. UNODC will be a member of this group.

**Overall programme management.** The Embassy of Denmark in Accra will be responsible for managing the overall programme and for reporting to the PSF Steering Group. The Embassy will be assisted in this task by an M&E Coordinator (collocated with the KAIPTC in Accra).

The Embassy of Denmark in Abuja is another important stakeholder and will engage with UNODC in relation to activities in Nigeria.

**Engagement management.** The engagement will be managed by UNODC as the implementing partner in accordance with this PSED and the project outline attached at Annex A. (The latter will be updated during the start up phase and, following the agreement of the Embassy of Denmark in Accra, UNODC will implement the updated project plan that is approved).

The engagement falls under the overall UNODC management and coordination of the UNODC Regional Office for West and Central Africa in Senegal (ROSEN) and implementation of activities in Nigeria will be managed with the UNODC Country Office for Nigeria (CONIG).

UNODC will recruit a project coordinator who will have responsibility for project implementation and will be based in Accra, Ghana. The main areas of responsibility for this person will be to coordinate the maritime law enforcement advisors, liaise with national counterparts, organize training courses and sea exercises, presenting donor reports as well as coordinating programming with management in the MMCCs and the ICC. The project

---

9 The Project Support Cost is a standard UNODC charge as a percentage of direct costs to cover central administration, strategic planning, resource mobilisation, donor relations, M&E, etc.
coordinator will be reporting to the Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) Coordinator in Abuja responsible for managing the implementation of all activities in the Atlantic Ocean region. The project coordinator will be cost-shared with another project.

The engagement will draw upon two maritime law enforcement advisors (one in Nigeria and one in Ghana) who will provide daily technical/legal advice and capacity development guidance to national counterparts as well as taking a leading role in implementing substantive training, and exercises (including on water). The two advisors will be recruited by UNODC through an open competition and they will be embedded in partner organisations (e.g. the Nigerian Navy and the Ghana Maritime Police or Ghana Navy) so that they also complement other legal advisors provided through UNODC as part of other partner programmes. The two advisors will spend a total of 30 months in post over the 33 months of the programme.

In addition to the Abuja office, GMCP has a Management and Analysis team based at UNODC headquarters in Vienna which supports GMCP implementation with financial and administrative monitoring and reporting.

The Danish Embassies in Abuja and Accra will also follow developments on the engagement and participate in project meetings in Nigeria to the degree feasible.

In addition to the funding included for this engagement, Denmark will recruit and provide the services of an M&E Coordinator who will be located at KAIPTC in Accra. This person will support UNODC to monitor and report on its activities (and the Coordinator will perform a similar function with regard to the other engagements in the programme).

Financial Management

The financial management of this engagement is delegated to UNODC, which will also monitor activities undertaken. The engagement will utilise UNODC’s financial management arrangements.

UNODC shall receive and manage the funds from the Embassy of Denmark in Accra and submit an annual certified financial report to the Embassy. The financial reporting may use UNODC’s reporting formats provided these allow the Embassy to monitor progress against the agreed budget line level (as set out in the budget above).

In the event of the need for a reallocation between budget lines, the agreement of the Embassy of Denmark in Accra will be sought.

Any unspent balance or any savings of project funds shall be returned to the Embassy of Denmark in Accra together with any interest accrued from deposit of Danish funds.

Denmark has a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption and all suspected cases must be reported. This requires that strict measures must be in place to minimise the risk of corruption or misappropriation of funds and any suspected case of corruption or misappropriation of funds related to the programme must immediately report to the Danish MFA regardless of whether or not the funds involved are Danish funds, and regardless whether the case has been successfully handled or not. Failing satisfactory implementation of the above, the Danish support may be withdrawn and a claim for refund of monies previously transferred may be made, and, in case of gross negligence, mismanagement or abuse, legal redress may be sought.
Due regard to cost effectiveness will be applied by UNODC during implementation. This includes travel arrangements, where flights will be economy class.

**Reporting frequency and format**

A biannual narrative progress report for PSE 1 will be prepared by UNODC and presented to the Embassy of Denmark in Accra and other key stakeholders. UNODC will be supported in this by the M&E Coordinator attached to the programme, as described above.

*Table 3: Results and financial reporting schedule*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 September 2019</td>
<td>Narrative report and budget monitoring report for Q2 prepared by UNODC and submitted to the Programme Coordinator at the Embassy of Denmark in Accra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 2020</td>
<td>Narrative report and budget monitoring report for Q3 and Q4 prepared by UNODC and submitted to the Programme Coordinator at the Embassy of Denmark in Accra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April 2020</td>
<td>Annual reporting Year 1 submitted by RDE Accra to the PSF Secretariat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September 2020</td>
<td>Narrative report and (budget monitoring report) for Q1 and Q2 prepared by UNODC and submitted to the Programme Coordinator at the Embassy of Denmark in Accra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 2021</td>
<td>Narrative report and budget monitoring report for Q3 and Q4 prepared by UNODC and submitted to the Programme Coordinator at the Embassy of Denmark in Accra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April 2021</td>
<td>Annual reporting Year 2 submitted by RDE Accra to the PSF Secretariat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September 2021</td>
<td>Narrative report and (budget monitoring report) for Q1 and Q2 prepared by UNODC and submitted to the Programme Coordinator at the Embassy of Denmark in Accra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 2022</td>
<td>Narrative report and (budget monitoring report) for Q3 and Q4 prepared by UNODC and submitted to the Programme Coordinator at the Embassy of Denmark in Accra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April 2022</td>
<td>Annual reporting Year 3 submitted by RDE Accra to the PSF Secretariat.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reports will follow UNODC’s reporting standards and enable the Embassy of Denmark in Accra to monitor the results being achieved against the annual targets at output level and outcome level. It will include updates to the risk log with mitigation measures, and any evaluation or review reports prepared over the period. The reports will also highlight key successes achieved, and analyse their potential for sustainability and possible scaling up. The biannual reports will also provide a short analysis of the specific constraints encountered over a given period and the manner in which these constraints were resolved.

The annual report from UNODC will be used by the M&E Coordinator to prepare an annual report to the PSF Steering Committee in Copenhagen using PSF reporting formats.

The reports will include updates on financial disbursements against the budget lines in the UNODC project plan at Annex A.

**Sustainability and exit**
The engagement will contribute to the sustainability of maritime security support in general through its focus on cohesive and joined up inter agency management of legal aspects of maritime security in Ghana and Nigeria, thereby increasing the knowledge and networks of maritime security actors on legal matters (such as evidence collection) at institutional and individual levels. Sustainability will be optimised through ensuring that the right personnel are involved in activities and that UNODC’s activities are relevant and practical, thus their utilisation (uptake) will be an important factor. Attention will be paid to the interaction between the engagement and national stakeholders so that activities are relevant and outputs are utilisable.

The engagement is based on a strong mentoring and training element, which is an effective way to transfer and entrench skills in maritime law enforcement and criminal justice. By investing in the maritime law enforcement agencies concerned through training and embedded advisors, they should be in a more independent position to operate on their own by the closing of this project period. It is important to secure counterparts’ buy-in and ownership from the very beginning of project implementation.

Progress will also be monitored through the research produced through PSE 3 (KAIPTC – research) which will continually assess developments within maritime security and will thus be in a position to assess the degree to which uptake has been achieved. UNODC is encouraged to maintain close links with KAIPTC in this regard.

Monitoring and Evaluation
UNODC will provide day-to-day monitoring of the activities for which they are responsible. The monitoring will feed into the reporting arrangements described above. The M&E Coordinator will be able to assist UNODC in monitoring and reporting.

Monitoring will include assessment of any changes in the context, risks and assumptions. It will focus on three main components, namely: (i) financial and input monitoring (e.g. expenditure against budget); (ii) physical monitoring (e.g. timely implementation of activities against work plan, such as provision of training and mentoring etc.); and (iii) the preliminary results achieved and the response of target groups (e.g. application/use of knowledge/skills, new operating procedures, as well as counterpart satisfaction with the quality of support provided).

The main tools used to undertake effective project monitoring include: (i) the project design documents/financing agreements, including agreed outputs, outcomes and indicators; (ii) annual costed work plans; (iii) various data collection tools, both quantitative and qualitative; (iv) results based reporting formats; and (v) on-going consultation and review mechanisms, involving implementing partners and target groups.

A Mid Term Review (MTR) will be held in early 2020 and this will assess the engagement’s progress, opportunities and challenges alongside other parts of the GoG MSP. The MTR will report and make recommendations that can include adjustments to the engagement.

Public Diplomacy
In relation to communication, UNODC will promote the achievements of PSE 1 as agreed with the Embassy of Denmark in Accra and taking due account of the national sensitivities that may
surround activities in Ghana and Nigeria. A communications framework is included in Annex 7 of the GoG MSP Programme Document. These inputs will be supported by the M&E Coordinator as described in the GoG MSP communication framework.

**Prerequisites**
None

**Signatures**

…………………………….                                          …………………………….
For UNODC For the Embassy of Denmark in Accra

Date: Date:
## PROJECT PROPOSAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requesting Organization</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>UN Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Title</th>
<th>Strengthening the maritime law enforcement response to piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>33 Months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Starting Date</td>
<td>April 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Ghana and Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Area</td>
<td>Maritime Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget requested</td>
<td>$1,930,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Brief Description

UNODC’s Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) works worldwide to support states in addressing maritime crime and foster international cooperation among states to address shared challenges in tackling crimes that are often of a transnational nature.

Under the new Danish Maritime Security framework for West Africa, this proposal seeks to strengthen the maritime law enforcement (MLE) capacity in Ghana and Nigeria in their response to piracy and maritime crime. This is part of a broader UNODC, GMCP approach in improving the criminal justice response to transnational organized crime at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, including Ghana and Nigeria. The focus will be on placing maritime law enforcement advisors within national maritime law enforcement agencies (tentatively the Nigerian Navy command and the Ghana Maritime Police or the Ghana Navy). The purpose of these two advisors is to strengthen the national maritime law enforcement capacity both at sea and land, as well as further strengthen the inter-agency coordination and cooperation with the overall aim of reaching prosecution of piracy and maritime offences. The support will also promote Ghana and Nigeria’s linkage to the existing Multinational Maritime Coordination Centres (zone E and zone F) in the region under the umbrella framework of the Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC). The support thus complements other initiatives to strengthen the legal framework in the two countries and interaction between maritime agencies at the national and regional level.

### Situation Analysis

With more than 90% of global trade carried out by sea, the economic effect of maritime crime is a heavy burden on affected nations that rely on shipping and maritime trade activity. The Gulf of Guinea is a major hub for maritime criminality and has over the recent years experienced an escalation of piracy and armed robbery at sea incidents. Existing law enforcement agencies and
judicial institutions in the region are not currently equipped and capable enough to respond properly to crime at sea and very few incidents result in arrests, investigations, prosecutions and trials. West Africa has experienced a change in the modus operandi of attacks at sea, with more kidnappings for ransom, with 21 such incidents in 2017 versus 18 in 2016, this according to Oceans Beyond Piracy 2017 annual report. Further, they estimated the total costs of piracy to a $ 818.1 million, which shows that deterring piracy in West Africa remains a significant and persistent cost to both regional and international stakeholders, with regional spending on law enforcement and naval patrols increased by $ 13.2 mill in 2017. The region has seen several attacks in Nigerian waters but also a few recent incidents of attacks at anchorage areas in Benin waters and into Ghana, as well as further down to Gabon. In total, 97 piracy and robbery incidents occurred at sea in 2017, targeting tankers, bulk carriers, containers, cargo ships, offshore supply vessels, and tug boats. These vessels were either steaming, anchored, or drifting. The majority of these incidents were in international waters, but many occurred in national waters as well.

The lack of prosecutions related to incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea continues to undermine efforts to combat piracy. It is important for the region to change this trend and ensure that there is no impunity to attacks at sea. The reason most countries in West Africa are still not at prosecution stage is due to limited maritime capacities for law enforcement agencies. Further, the absence of robust legal frameworks, the insufficient effectiveness of domestic justice systems, and other factors inhibit the legal finish of prosecutions related to criminal activities at sea. This is emphasized by the fact that to date, there have been no successful prosecutions for maritime piracy in West Africa.

UNODC, GMCP has been promoting legal reform and training prosecutors on law of the sea and maritime crime matters both in Ghana and Nigeria, as part of the former US funded legal reform programme (2015 – 2017), as well as under the UK funded programme in support to strengthen the criminal justice system in response to maritime crime in both Ghana and Nigeria (2017 – March 2019). The support has comprised of legal assessments conducted with regard to piracy and maritime offences, establishing legal frameworks and support to developing solid legislation in line with the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other international maritime instruments. Further, prosecutors and judges have been trained in law of the sea and have taken part in case work and mock trials. This legal reform work will continue under the up-coming EU SWAIMS programme (2019 – 2022), with which this proposal is closely coordinated so that the support is complementary. In addition, UNODC, GMCP has been embedding maritime law enforcement advisors who have been supporting national maritime law enforcement agencies in strengthening their institutional frameworks, standard operating procedures, operational capacities and knowledge in response to maritime offences occurring in their waters. For Ghana, the advisor has been embedded within the Ghana Marine Police. In Nigeria, the MLE advisor has taken a more coordinating role being based within the UNODC Office in Lagos but focusing on supporting several MLE agencies through training, coordination and support to the Nigerian Harmonized Standard Operating Procedures on Arrest, Detention and Prosecution in Nigeria’s Maritime Environment (HSOPs, 2016). In addition to the MLE advisor, GMCP has placed a legal advisor within the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Justice to guide the Ministry on the current Bill on Suppression of Piracy and other Maritime Offences before the Nigerian National Assembly, as well as training federal prosecutors in law of the sea and prepare a core maritime crime group for prosecutions. The UK funded work in Ghana and Nigeria is currently running until March 2019. This proposal aims to continue the capacity building in maritime law enforcement work, which is identified as a current gap when it comes to a criminal justice response to piracy and maritime crime.
The experience is that embedded advisor work is the more sustainable approach as it allows for daily follow up and cooperation with key national counterparts that take part in the response to maritime crime. There is still a way to go to have fully trained and specialized teams among federal prosecutors and judges to take on piracy cases, but focus will be on more training and case work through organized mock trials (training under the EU funded SWAIMS programme and mock trials under the US, INL funded programme). There is further a need to have key national agencies work closer together in order to secure a coordinated process to reach prosecutions, that applies from sea to land including arrests, collection of evidence, investigations and preparations for prosecution. This proposal focuses on strengthening the sea response and hand-over to land element, by placing embedded advisors to work with relevant maritime law enforcement agencies in Ghana and Nigeria respectively. In addition, the mentors will help promote a proper response at sea. The proposal further contributes to the cross-agency requirement which was an outcome of one of the workshops on inter-agency cooperation which UNODC, GMCP together with IMO organized in fall 2018. These are also areas identified by UNODC as currently not covered by any other main actor in the region. Moreover, most efforts are regionally focused and not approaching national capacity building as this proposal.

This proposal falls well within the overall GMCP support framework for the Gulf of Guinea region in combating piracy and maritime crime, which comprises of a legal reform framework under the EU funded SWAIMS programme (see below), as well as facilitating regional coordination and cooperation under the Yaoundé maritime security architecture. In addition, there is a need for complementing this approach with a maritime law enforcement component which strengthens the criminal justice response and contributes to the overall aim of reaching prosecutions of piracy and maritime crime. This proposal contributes to completing the full criminal justice response, from sea to court and will complement the inputs from other donors, including EU SWAIMS.

**Relevant programming in Ghana**

GMCP has been supporting the Ghana Marine Police (GMP) for a two year period (from April 2016 to March 2018) including embedding a maritime legal and law enforcement expert to work with the maritime unit on a daily basis in support of strengthening their mandate, sea operations, knowledge on law of the sea and coordination with other national agencies involved in responding to maritime offences. This work has strengthened GMP’s position versus other national maritime agencies and also shown some concrete results related to arrests on trafficking in people cases, as well as boarding and related investigations conducted on suspicion of piracy. The embedded advisor has focused on inter-agency cooperation and training of trainers within the GMP. The same embedded advisor is back for a shorter period, currently on contract until end of February 2019. This proposal aims at continuing the work started with regard to capacity building in maritime law enforcement and with focus on inter-agency cooperation and sea response to maritime offences. GMCP has further contracted a retired legal officer from the Ghana Navy to act as a liaison to the existing Ghanaian maritime law enforcement agencies and legal departments, in an effort to strengthen the criminal justice response to maritime crime. This work is for a shorter period of six months and creates the baseline for further work under this proposal. GMCP’s current programming in Ghana with regard to strengthening the maritime law enforcement response to piracy and maritime crime will end in March 2019 and this proposal thus includes initiatives to continue the mentioned work started and to further strengthening Ghana’s ability to properly tackle maritime crime challenges, with main focus on agency coordination, knowledge building and sea response.
On the judicial side, GMPC has been providing assistance to Ghana since 2016, including a legal reform programme focused on developing a legal framework on piracy and other maritime offences, as well as capacity building in prosecutors and judges through training on the law of the sea. Currently, GMCP is working to help finalizing the existing draft Maritime Offences bill. This proposal will ensure that all maritime law enforcement efforts and activities are well coordinated and complementary to the support provided to the legal and judicial part of the criminal justice response to maritime crime in Ghana.

Ghana has recently developed a maritime security strategy under their National Maritime Security Committee. This strategy is pending adaptation, and Ghana would benefit from support to implement such a strategy and ensure that all relevant maritime law enforcement and legal agencies involved in maritime security are coordinated and cooperating. UNODC, GMCP has been working with the Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA) to finalize the draft Maritime Offences Bill and will, in cooperation with IMO, focus on supporting maritime law enforcement agencies in implementing the maritime security strategy as part of a broader support to strengthening Ghana’s response to piracy and maritime crime. This proposal complements these efforts and falls under the broader umbrella of the maritime security strategy.

As part of this proposal the main targeted maritime law enforcement agencies for support in Ghana would be the Navy, GMA and GMP.

**The Ghana Maritime Authority, (GMA)** is a governmental institution operating under the Ministry of Transport. GMA was established by an act of parliament, i.e. the [Ghana Maritime Authority Act 2002, (Act 630)](https://www.legislation.gov.gh/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=630). The GMA mission is to ensure the provision of safe, secure and efficient shipping services and the protection of the marine environment from ship source pollution. The GMA is also charged with overseeing the training, engagement and welfare of Ghanaian seafarers. GMA’s functions revolve around Ghana’s Port State Control and Flag State implementation activities to make sure that all foreign ships that berth in Ghanaian ports are seaworthy. GMA is charged with ensuring that all vessels including fishing vessels which fly the Ghana flag comply with safety regulations for operational purposes. Detailed functions include: Implement the provisions of the [Ghana Shipping Act, 2003, (Act 645)](https://www.legislation.gov.gh/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=645), including assisting civil authorities such as the [Ghana Police](https://www.police.gh/), the [Volta River Authority](https://www.vra.gov.gh/), the [Electoral Commission](https://www.election.org.gh/), [Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority](https://www.gpha.gov.gh/). The maritime security strategy and the mentioned Maritime Offences Bill, are under the lead of GMA and part of the Ghana National Maritime Security Committee.

**The Ghana Police Service** (under which falls the GMP) receives its mandate by way of two major pieces of Ghanaian legislation. The [Constitution of the Republic of Ghana](https://www.legislation.gov.gh/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=26), at Article 190, established the GPS as one of the public services of Ghana. Further, Article 200(3) mandates that “the Police Service shall be equipped and maintained to perform its traditional role of maintaining law and order”. In addition to the general authority for law enforcement by the GPS as set out in the Constitution and the Police Services Act, the following legislation and policies specifically effect the mandate and jurisdiction with respect to maritime matters:

- Ghana Criminal Code 1960 (Act 29)
- Ghana Maritime Zones Delimitation Act 1986 (P.N.D.C.L. 159)
- Fisheries Act 2002 (Act 625)
- Ghana Maritime Security Act, 2004 (Act 675)
- Ghana Shipping (Protection of Offshore Operation and Assets) Regulations 2012
The Ghana Navy (GN) is formed under the Constitution of Ghana 1992. Its military doctrine and stated mission is to provide defence of Ghana and its territorial waters, fishery protection, exclusive economic zone, and internal security on Lake Volta. Its roles and functions include:

- The monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing activities
- Maritime Presence in the West African Waters and Naval Support in the Region and Crisis Areas when requested
- Surveillance, Effective Patrol and Control of Ghana’s Territorial Waters and Economic Zone
- Evacuation operations of Ghanaian and other nationals from troubled spots
- Fighting and checking criminal activities such as piracy/armed robbery at sea, smuggling of illicit drugs, stowaways and dissident activities
- Disaster and humanitarian relief operations, search and rescue, and other mercy missions at sea
- Assisting civil authorities such as the Ghana Police, the Volta River Authority, the Electoral Commission, Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority

It would be important to ensure proper coordination between the abovementioned agencies, all involved in the response to maritime offences.

As for specific requests for support, Ghana Marine Police has requested GMCP to continue the assistance based on the embedded advisor programme. GMCP further facilitated a successful sea exercise on simulated drugs inspection including the Ghanaian Navy, Ghana Police and the Italian Navy, and based on this exercise there was a genuine interest from Ghana’s side in supporting more of such cross-agency sea training. The embedded MLE advisor in Ghana, together with the GMCP liaison officer, will be in a position to strengthen the partnership with key counterparts. GMCP will as well formalize any cooperation with an exchange of letters for full Government buy-in of implementation of the project proposal. GMCP has also been working with both the GMA and the MoJ to enhance the work on the pending Maritime Offences bill, so all baseline work should have been established for continued support to Ghana in strengthening their support to maritime crime.

Relevant programming in Nigeria

As part of the regional approach in tackling maritime crime, GMCP has been implementing a legal reform against piracy and other maritime offences in Nigeria, with the overall aim of preparing the country for prosecution of such crimes. Their legal framework has been assessed and legislation drafted. The Suppression of Piracy and Other Maritime Offences Bill is now awaiting passage by the National Legislature, after being introduced to the senate by President Muhammadu Buhari in October 2018. Further, prosecutors and judges have been trained in the penal law element of the law of the sea, including establishing a maritime crime group among federal prosecutors ready to take on piracy cases when eventually the bill has been passed. Further assistance in implementing such legislation will be required. GMCP has placed an advisor within the Federal Ministry of Justice, Directorate of Public Prosecutions, as well as a maritime law enforcement advisor to work with and coordinate the different maritime law enforcement agencies involved in tackling maritime crime in Nigeria. The main focus of the maritime law enforcement advisor has been to get involved with the secretariat of the Nigerian HSOPs. Currently the funding for the two embedded advisors will expire in March 2019, and GMCP is aiming at continuing the support to the FMoJ/DPP with potential continued UK support and with this proposal to fill the gap of capacity building in
maritime law enforcement, including support through an embedded MLE advisor.

GMCP also organized a mock trial in 2018 as part of the US Navy led OBANGAME Express exercise 2018 in cooperation with Interpol and which took the case scenario and operation at sea to a simulated trial where evidence collected got tested for admissibility and the case tested against the draft bill which is up for review and approval by the National Assembly. This was one piloted mock trial which has received further support and new mock trials will be implemented in both Nigeria and Ghana in 2019 and 2020. The mock trial exercises have multiple functions including a capacity building element, for maritime law enforcement, prosecutors and judges, as well as strengthening the cooperation and coordination among the same agencies and allow for testing of the current (or up-coming) legislation on piracy and maritime crime. This activity supports the Danish approach for strengthening military cooperation and coordination at sea.

While Nigeria is now demonstrating a higher level of political commitment to the fight against piracy, armed robbery and other types of maritime crime, shown through media coverage of both priority and funding put into the maritime security domain, there is a lack of actual arrests on suspicion of piracy as well as follow on prosecutions and convictions. Moreover, the draft piracy legislation is yet to be passed. Therefore, there is a need to continue the support started by GMCP and the relevant maritime law enforcement agencies in Nigeria for UNODC, GMCP to work with would include the Navy, Nigerian Maritime and Safety Administration (NIMASA), the Police (Maritime Unit) and the Nigeria Drugs Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA – maritime unit).

Nigerian Navy
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1 (4) of the Armed Forces Act Cap A20 LFN 2004, the Navy is to work closely with other agencies in the discharge of its duties. Commanders and OICs of ships/boats shall ensure that appropriate procedures for arrest of vessels are complied with. The Nigerian Navy is comprised of the Naval Headquarters (administrative in Abuja), the Western Naval Command, the Eastern Naval Command and the Central Navy Command, in addition to the Naval Training Command. The Navy has military and constabulary roles including the oil and gas sector of Nigeria.

Nigerian Police
The Nigerian Police Force is established and empowered to arrest, investigate, detain and prosecute under Section 214 and 215 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (supra).

Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA)
NIMASA was established for the promotion and regulation of maritime safety, security, marine pollution and Maritime Labour. It was established by the NIMASA Act 2007. The core responsibility of NIMASA is implementation of the Merchant Shipping Act 2007, and the Coastal and Inland Shipping (CABOTAGE) Act 2003. NIMASA provides search and rescue services. They further carry out air and coastal surveillance and generally perform any duty for ensuring maritime safety and security and matters incidental thereto.

The Nigerian National Drugs Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA, Marine Unit)
The Marine Unit is charged with the responsibilities of monitoring the movement of goods and persons on Nigeria waterways and search of any suspicious craft. The Marine Unit shall maintain surveillance in harbor and dock areas. They shall further be responsible for detecting consignments suspected of containing narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances coming into or out of Nigeria jetties/terminals and coastal areas.
As for specific request for support, GMCP has through its embedded maritime law enforcement advisor established some good work with the NDLEA, NIMASA and the Navy and focal points have been appointed. The baseline has been created for continued work in this area. In 2018, GMCP had a meeting with the secretariat to the HSOPs and the agreement was for GMCP to present available technical assistance at an up-coming (dates to be determined) stakeholders conference for the HSOPS with the aim of giving GMCP a role in the implementation committee meetings on a regular basis. The latter is for this proposal to build on and take forward. Moreover, GMCP has been working directly with the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Justice, Directorate for Public Prosecutions through the embedded legal advisor and a core Maritime Crime Group is about to be set up in preparation for piracy and maritime crime prosecutions. This proposal will make sure that the maritime law enforcement technical assistance is closely coordinated with the support provided to the FMoJ for a full criminal justice response to piracy and maritime crime. The FMoJ has requested continued support. The current GMCP embedded advisors in Nigeria will continue to strengthen the partnership with counterparts, and GMCP will as well formalize any cooperation with an exchange of letters for full Government buy-in of implementation of the project proposal.

### Justification for UNODC involvement

UNODC is mandated to support the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Trafficking in Persons Protocol), the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (Smuggling of Migrants Protocol) and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol). UNODC also assists Member States to implement the various illicit narcotics treaties, the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the nineteen counter-terrorism treaties. In order to pursue the ratification and implementation of these treaties, UNODC has been mandated, through a series of Resolutions issued by the General Assembly, the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ), the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and the Security Council, to provide technical assistance to Member States relating to all aspects of countering transnational crime and terrorism, including effective border security. GMCP has extensive experience in providing technical assistance to states in Eastern Africa prosecuting piracy, through a full criminal justice support from hand-over of suspects, detention, investigation, preparation for prosecutions, trial support and prison reform. Approx. 400 piracy suspects have been prosecuted through the criminal justice system in Kenya, Mauritius and Seychelles. GMCP draws upon this experience for its engagements in West Africa.

GMCP has established relationships, including cooperation agreements, with agencies from Ghana and Nigeria. As such, GMCP has developed extensive knowledge of the wider crime and criminal justice situation in the region and has strong cooperation links with relevant authorities and partner organizations at the national level, including with the Ministries of Justice, Maritime Authorities, Navies and Police within the framework set by GMCP.

This proposal falls well within the strategies and agreement made between the ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC with regard to tackling the maritime crime threat in the region under the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and coordination by the Inter-regional Coordination Center (ICC). The approach further aligns with the African Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) of the African Union and the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS). The UN Security Council through Resolution 2018 (2011) welcomed the intention to convene a summit of Gulf of Guinea Heads of State in
order to consider a comprehensive response in the region and encouraged the States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) to develop a comprehensive strategy, including through:

(a) The development of domestic law and regulations, where these are not in place, criminalizing piracy and armed robbery at sea;
(b) The development of a regional framework to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea, including information sharing and operational coordination mechanisms in the region.

Moreover, in Resolution 2039 (2012), the UNSC urged States of the region of the Gulf of Guinea to take prompt action, at national and regional levels with the support of the international community where able, and by mutual agreement, to develop and implement national maritime security strategies, including for the establishment of a legal framework for the prevention, and repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as prosecution of persons engaging in those crimes, and punishment of those convicted of those crimes and encouraged regional cooperation in this regard.

Previous support and experience gained

GMCP has been implementing legal reform on piracy and other maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea since 2015. The support has continued in both Ghana and Nigeria with UK funding which will end in March 2019 and has focused on embedding legal advisors and maritime law enforcement advisors to strengthen their maritime security framework in response to piracy and maritime crime. The technical assistance through embedded advisors has proven to be successful as it allows for daily interaction with key maritime agencies and further strengthens institutional knowledge and skills through training and focus on coordination with other agencies. Implementation has showed that the process is slow but that both Ghana and Nigeria are at a stage of soon passing legislation, they have created the knowledge base on maritime law in preparation for prosecutions and acknowledged the need for strengthened coordination among key agencies. What is needed to take forward is to ensure that maritime law enforcement is better suited to conduct visit – board – search and seizures, and further conduct arrests as a first response to maritime crime at sea. In order to strengthen that capacity it is important to focus on coordination among domestic agencies involved in getting such cases in for investigation and prosecution as well as regional coordination and cooperation, including sharing of information and joint response, as most of these cases are crossing borders. As part of a regional approach, GMCP is currently supporting the ICC with an embedded legal advisor within their Division for Legal Affairs and Judicial Cooperation. This support will continue under the EU funded SWAIMS programme as of 2019. In addition, the GMCP is supporting the ICC with an embedded training advisor under their Division for Training and Practice.

Donor Mapping (see also table of donors)

GMCP is well coordinated with other partners involved in maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, including joint programming with the IMO (current programming in Ghana and Nigeria in support to criminal justice system, up to March 2019) and Interpol (INL funded mock trials for 2019 - 2020).

EU funded Support to West Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy programme (SWAIMS)
GMCP will start implementation of continued support to legal reform on piracy and other maritime offences under the EU funded SWAIMS programme for ECOWAS states, expected to start implementation early 2019. The latter will take legal reform on piracy and maritime crime forward including legal assessments and drafting of legislation in countries which have not received previous support and follow up on passing of legislation, or implementation of passed legislation in pilot countries GMCP has been working in. The SWAIMS programme further includes capacity building for prosecutors and judges; cooperation with other prosecuting states; support to potential handover of suspected pirates; support to drafting of Standard Operating Procedures for prosecutors and maritime law enforcement; drafting of Memorandum of Agreement between countries on operations at sea and hand-over to prosecuting states; drafting of a Manual on evidence collection for admissibility in different court systems; and, support to future potential piracy trials. The SWAIMS programme to be implemented by UNODC, GMCP is focusing on the legal and judicial side of the response to piracy and other maritime offences and this proposal will complement the approach of supporting the criminal justice systems by filling the maritime law enforcement gap. The SWAIMS programme is further comprised of other areas of implementation including (to be implemented by other agencies):

- **Strengthened integrated maritime governance, policies, laws and systems to support maritime security.** The aim of the actions is to build or strengthen maritime policies and administrative structures to ensure that maritime security is benefitting from clear and streamlined organizational linkages, from the political level, through to the strategic, administrative and operational levels. This component will not be in conflict with this proposal as it is focusing on establishing the framework set up for solid maritime security policies and strategies in line with the Yaoundé architecture, including assessments and surveys, maritime governance etc.

- **A criminal data-sharing database is developed.** The purpose is to provide means to record, share and access historical information about piracy events treated by law enforcement agencies. These actions will focus primarily on GoG Zone E, as Zone E is the pilot Zone and due to the importance of illicit maritime activities in that part of the Gulf of Guinea. The component is aimed at strengthening information sharing in order to identify criminal networks through the creation of a database. There are no overlapping areas between these activities and this proposal, but the work on supporting the MMCC Zone E and when operational can feed information into this database when set up.

- **Illicit financial circuits generated by maritime crime are assessed.** The aim of this action is to improve information on the financial circuits and flows resulting from maritime criminal activities, including their clandestine money laundering networks. The key action consists of a comprehensive survey. There is no overlap between this component and the proposal.

- **Operational response and management of the rule of law at sea are improved through the supply of fast response and forensic equipment.** The aim of this action is to improve the capacity of law enforcement bodies to respond to maritime incidents, including environmental crimes and smuggling of protected spices; and (2) improve the capacity at sea of law enforcement officers to facilitate prosecution of perpetrators through collection of on-site evidence. These objectives will be achieved by supplying rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIBs) and providing associated training and capacity building on fleet maintenance, fleet management and operational issues related to the use of RHIBs for law enforcement purposes. This component is relevant for the proposal but does not represent any duplication as the main focus of the action is to provide RHIBs and training law enforcement entities on how to use the boats and maintain them. Assuming the action is being implemented in Ghana and Nigeria, the maritime law enforcement advisors under
this proposal should ensure cooperation with CAMOES/CICL as implementing partners with the aim of coordinating training and ensure use of the mentioned RHIBs.

- **Regional operational training is strengthened.** This action will focus on providing support to specific activities/institutions based on requested and assessed needs in order to boost regional cooperation by helping financially and technically the main pillars of the mutual regional capacity: ICC (Inter-regional Coordination Centre) in Yaoundé, ISMI (Institut de Sécurité Maritime Interregional) in Abidjan, RMU (Regional Maritime University) in Accra, CRESMAO and MMCCs of Zone E – G. The action is focusing on strengthening existing regional training institutions and does not represent any duplication of conflict with this proposal, though some of the maritime law enforcement training and support can be coordinated with the efforts under this action focusing on the MMCCs.

- **Coordination with the private sector and participation of civil society are improved.** This action will focus on developing the involvement of the private sector and civil society in fighting maritime insecurity, and develop steps to coordinate that involvement better. There is no overlap between this action and the proposal.

- **An equipment facility for local needs is established.** This action will aim to fill gaps in the provision of equipment to meet local needs associated with the Yaoundé architecture. This is a procurement component and does not conflict with the proposal.

**EU funded Gulf of Guinea Interregional Network (GoGIN)**

GoGIN is a programme focusing on contributing to improving safety and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through supporting the implementation of the Summit conclusions and the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the empowerment of the regional architecture. The aim is to ensure effective implementation of cross-sectoral information sharing, steering and coordination mechanisms between all relevant state actors at a regional level. The programme has two specific objectives: 1) Support the development of an interregional technical and human network allowing cross-regional and inter-sectoral maritime information sharing, and 2) Improve regional capacity for dialogue, coordination and steering of activities in the field of States’ action at sea, through providing active support to the development of the architecture of Yaoundé. The first tool is the creation of a technical network based on internet technologies so that centers can interact with each other. GoGIN further develop a human network through convening regular working sessions with stakeholders from the region so they know each other, understand each other’s needs and functions. Further they are organizing maritime security cases and establishing crisis response teams. The latter includes regularly leading large naval exercises involving the national marines from the different countries in the Gulf of Guinea and aims at gaining coordination between civilian and military entities involved in the maritime sector, through a dedicated crisis structure. GoGIN also received Danish funding to implement legal assessments in support of legal frameworks, similar to what GMCP is implementing. This led to a cooperation between GoGIN and GMCP in implementing the legal assessments together, and further coordinate relevant activities such as training workshops in the region. An agreement was signed between the two parties and an implementation matrix/action plan developed which reflects on GMCP - SWAIMS implementation. When it comes to the mentioned GoGIN supported crisis teams and exercises there is full coordination between GoGIN and GMCP. As outlined above, GoGIN has a regional focus and will not conflict with the bilateral support under this proposal. When there are regional elements under this proposal (such as support to Zone E and Zone F), GMCP will make sure to inform and coordinate with GoGIN.

The U.K. is currently funding GMCP programming in Ghana and Nigeria in support to their criminal justice response to piracy and maritime crime. The programme activities include
encouraging passing of piracy legislation, training in prosecutors and judges and coordination and cooperation between national agencies. Further a legal advisor and a maritime law enforcement advisor continue to support Nigeria. In Ghana a maritime law enforcement advisor is embedded within the Ghana Marine Police (under Japanese funding expiring in March 2019) and a liaison officer has been engaged on contract to focus on coordinating the different maritime law enforcement agencies and linking this up to the legal response to maritime offences. This creates the baselines for the continued proposed work under this proposal, as the current activities under UK funding in Ghana and Nigeria will end in March 2019. A new proposal to the UK is focusing on continuing the legal advisor support to Nigeria.

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has provided funding to support a legal advisor with the ICC in Cameroon and its Division for Legal Affairs and Judicial Cooperation. The legal advisor has worked to increase coordination and communication between maritime agencies in the region and to follow up on the initiated legal reform on piracy and maritime crime. The Norwegian funded legal advisor post ends in December 2018. Under the mentioned EU SWAIMS programme, GMCP has included a legal advisor post within the ICC which will take this first initiative forward and focus on regional coordination among legal focal points, follow up on piracy legislation and support training in law of the sea and maritime matters within a regional context. GMCP has further received funds from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to continue supporting the ICC by embedding a training advisor within the ICC Division for Training and Practice.

The US Department of State/INL will assist five Gulf of Guinea states in conducting mock trials, testing legal frameworks, and simulating piracy cases. This will occur under US led naval operations in the region under OBANGAME Express, in coordination with AFRICOM, NAVAF and Interpol. These exercises are expected to occur throughout 2019 and 2020, and fits well with the military cooperation approach under the Danish framework. The US Department of State, African Bureau is supporting GMCP to conduct case management assessments of the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Justice / Division for Public Prosecutions and the Togolese justice system.

Bilateral interventions also frequently address operational training and/or provisions of operational equipment (both at sea and on land) – the US and France are most active in this regard, but other donors as well. In particular, the US African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) aims to build maritime security capacity through real world combined law enforcement operations and comprises both training in operational exercises, and steps to strengthen legal and institutional frameworks. The mentioned AMLEP exercises are on an ad-hoc basis and GMCP will ensure to coordinate training activities with them, if and when relevant.

This proposal takes all the other programme initiatives into consideration and identifies a gap when it comes to maritime law enforcement, which needs to be filled in order to ensure a full criminal justice response to maritime crime in Ghana and Nigeria. The current maritime law enforcement activities in the two countries are, for the time being, limited to March 2019. If the latter were to be extended, GMCP will ensure the activities are aligned with the activities in this proposal which focuses on building on existing initiatives by taking capacity building and coordination and cooperation further.

This proposal will be implemented in complementarity and coordination with the above initiatives so that possible duplications of support with donors can be avoided.

**Proposed Outcomes and Outputs**

**Objective:** Ghana and Nigeria have a solid and comprehensive response to maritime
Outcome 1: The maritime law enforcement response to crimes at sea has improved in Ghana and Nigeria.

Building on some of the already established work GMCP has done on supporting MLE agencies in Nigeria and Ghana through embedded MLE advisors, this proposal continues that work and focuses on training with the purpose of creating a pool of expertise in each country with regard to handling maritime crime cases. GMCP focuses on training civilians in maritime law enforcement functions (non military).

Output 1.1: MLE agencies in Ghana and Nigeria respectively have the knowledge, capacity and capability to conduct arrests at sea and prepare cases for prosecution

This output will include one advisor per country to be based within an identified maritime law enforcement agency. For Ghana this is likely to start by continued support to Ghana Maritime Police with focus on coordination with the Navy, and potentially placing the embedded advisor with the Navy at a later stage, in coordination with the Ghana Maritime Authority. For Nigeria the advisor could be embedded within the Navy as they are the main agency involved in the first response to crime at sea. One of the tasks of the advisor would be to support the HSOPs Committee. The purpose of these two advisors is to strengthen the national maritime law enforcement capacity both at sea and land, as well as further strengthen the inter-agency coordination and cooperation with the overall aim of reaching prosecution of piracy and maritime offences. The term per advisor will be a total of 30 months for a three years implementation period (2019 – 2021). Both countries have shown appreciation for the support received so far through embedded advisors and there is still a need to continue the advisory work.

Output 1.2: The knowledge on law of the sea and legal aspects of procedures on water including evidence collection, VBSS and hand-over procedures strengthened among maritime teams at both a national and regional level.

These training series will include class room theory, case work and on water practice, which will be facilitated by the national navy and other maritime law enforcement agencies with the support of GMCP. The national agencies will provide the vessels and training teams, while GMCP will provide fuel for the specific exercises and the teachers. The boarding scenarios (including VBSS: visit - board – search – seize) will start with theory on land and later move to actual demonstration and practice at sea. Ideally these exercises and training should see joint agency operations for coordination and sharing of information purposes. The advisors under output 1.1 will be in charge of teaching and implementing the training. The sea exercise component of the training is based on the assumption that key partner agencies, most likely the Navy, will provide a vessel(s) and GMCP will provide fuel for the exercise.

Outcome 2: Coordination and cooperation among the states in the region increased through support to the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) and the Multi Maritime Coordination Centres (MMCCs) under zone E and F.

This outcome focuses on strengthening the cooperation and coordination between countries that
fall under the existing zone E (Benin, Niger, Nigeria and Togo) and zone F (Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) and their operationalization. The MMCCs are run out of Cotonou, Benin for zone E and Accra, Ghana for zone F. Their set up is in place with regard to venue, equipment and in principle rotating staffing comprised of representatives from the relevant countries’ maritime law enforcement or navies, but both centres would benefit from support to be fully operational and well functioning. A solid legal framework is a key aspect of this as piracy and maritime crime are offences across borders and transnational in nature, and therefore require countries in the region to be coordinated in their response to tackle the challenges faced in the region. The latter aspect is expected to be provided by UNODC through the legal advisor to the ICC funded by EU SWAIMS. Additional support will then be provided through the Danish programme in making the framework operational and testing its legal arrangements at MMCC level. First step in this operational support will be to conduct a gap and needs assessment in order to establish what kind of assistance the centres would benefit from.

Output 2.1: Legal aspects of joint sea operations under zone E and zone F strengthened through conducted training with the involvement and support of the embedded MLE advisors.

This output will have the maritime law enforcement advisors support coordinated land and sea response specifically targeted to the two zones, E and F, through tailored training based on a gap and needs assessment to be conducted at the beginning of the project in direct communication with the management of the MMCC centres. The activities will further be coordinated with the GMCP legal advisor at the ICC under the EU SWAIMS programme (also via UNODC) who will be working on strengthening the legal framework, including the legal agreements for zone E and zone F joint operations.

The precise scope of this output will be defined by the MLE advisors, in close cooperation with two MMCC centres and the ICC with the aim to ensure full legal operability of the Centres. This output is further expanding the national capacity building work under Outcome 1 to a regional level.

Compliance with applicable international law, including international human rights law

Human rights-based approach

UNODC has a well-considered position regarding the promotion and protection of human rights. UNODC’s human rights-based approach refers to the UN-wide adoption of a human rights-based approach to development cooperation and technical assistance programming as per the ‘United Nations Agencies Statement of Common Understanding on the Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation’. UNODC is currently developing standardized guidelines for the implementation of requirements under the HRDDP.

Each of the activities receiving Danish support under the strategic partnership with the UNODC will specify risks and mitigation measures related to human rights and UNODC responsibilities to address these, including the risk of Danish funding contributing to death penalty. UNODC, as part of the UN Secretariat, opposes the death penalty in all circumstances and encourages every country to join a moratorium on its use and to eventually abolish this practice. As for the current pending legislation on piracy in both Ghana and Nigeria, GMCP has ensured that the death penalty has been taken out and is not reflected in the suggested bills.
With regard to particularly human trafficking and smuggling, the engagement will look into legal victim/survivor protection support in particular when it comes to women and children. This will contribute to the implementation of the UNODC mandate regarding United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Trafficking in Persons Protocol). UNODC also mitigates the more general risk of human rights violations in the course of prosecutions through its interventions.

All GMCP project proposals are drafted following international law provisions and standards described in the Manual drafted by the GMCP named “Maritime Crime: A Manual for Criminal Justice Practitioners”, with its separate chapter on Human Rights. Consequently, the projects are implemented and monitored having tailored modules that contemplate the delivery of capacity building activities, including in-depth training courses in accordance with the rule of law and human rights.

**Gender Issues**
GMCP strives to ensure adequate female representation amongst its trainers and to encourage states to extend all training opportunities to female staff, including in this capacity building proposal.

### RISK MANAGEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Description</th>
<th>Likelihood (High, Medium, Low)</th>
<th>Severity (High, Medium, Low)</th>
<th>Mitigation Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human rights violations by UNODC counterparts</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Human rights elements and a human rights-based approach are mainstreamed in all programming and programme activities. Effective vetting of criminal justice practitioners to be trained. Consultation with other UN entities, including OHCHR. See above Human Rights chapter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High turnover in Member States’ institutions</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>UNODC will secure agreements with concerned institutions to ensure that the staff trained under the auspices of the programme stay in place for an adequate amount of time and perform the tasks for which they were trained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in government priorities (also relevant for the elections coming up in Nigeria)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Programme staff will continuously engage with policy makers and government agencies to ensure their commitment and support in the implementation of this project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional memory is not integrated and too</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Continued follow-up with and training of focal points in the partner institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Description</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Risk Mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duplication of efforts due to the many actors present in the region, who may decide to implement the same activities being carried out by the GMCP.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>GMCP takes part in several coordination fora including the G7+ Friends of Gulf of Guinea (FoGG). The work of GMCP officers in the field has highlighted that no other similar projects are envisaged at the moment from other stakeholders. GMCP is based in the field and can easily coordinate with other partners on the ground. Also mitigated by effective communication and coordination between UNODC and other UN agencies and partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of buy-in/appetite to accept the advice being offered by GMCP</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>This risk is mitigated by the network which has been built over the last years by GMCP. The GMCP advisors are cooperating with focal points known to UNODC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of cooperation from regional partner organizations</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>GMCP has on-going programming in the region including advisors embedded within the ICC and posts in country where CRESMAO is based, which will ease work with the institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS**

**Project Management Mechanisms and Structure**

The project falls under the overall UNODC management and coordination of the UNODC Regional Office for West and Central Africa in Senegal (ROSEN) and implementation of activities in Nigeria will be coordinated and managed by the UNODC Country Office for Nigeria (CONIG). The Global Maritime Crime Programme falls under the Justice Section and the Division for Operations of UNODC. GMCP is the only UNODC global programme which is managed from the field, and its headquarters is currently in Colombo, Sri Lanka under the leadership of the Head of the GMCP. As activities in this project proposal focus on the Gulf of Guinea they will be under the management and responsibility of the Atlantic Ocean team based out of Abuja, Nigeria. A project coordinator will be recruited in charge of the project implementation and based in Accra, Ghana (TBD). The main area of responsibility will be to coordinate the maritime law enforcement advisors, liaise with national counterparts, organize training courses and sea exercises, presenting donor reports as well as coordinating programming with management in the MMCCs and the ICC. The project coordinator will be reporting to the Programme Coordinator in Abuja responsible for managing the implementation of all activities in the Atlantic Ocean region. The project coordinator will be cost-shared with another project. The maritime law enforcement advisors mentioned under Output 1.1 will be focusing on providing daily advice and guidance to national counterparts as well as taking a leading role in implementing substantive training, exercises and sea operations. GMCP
has a Management and Analysis team based at UNODC headquarters in Vienna which supports GMCP implementation with financial and administrative monitoring and reporting. GMCP will explore the possibility of developing a donor coordination mechanism for Gulf of Guinea maritime security activities.

**Sustainability**

The project is based on a strong mentoring and training element which, in UNODC’s experience, is the most effective way to transfer and entrench skills in maritime law enforcement and criminal justice. The main aim of GMCP’s work is to develop a full criminal justice response to maritime crimes, by securing the baseline through a maritime security strategy, legislation and maritime capability and capacity. UNODC brings solid experience in responding to maritime crime and will join forces in supporting regional counterparts in improving their current maritime security framework in response to piracy and maritime offences. The project is targeting MLE institutions and existing regional mechanisms in order to strengthen their capacity in responding to maritime crime. By investing in these entities through training and embedded advisors, they should be in a more independent position to operate on their own by the closing of this project period. It is important to secure counterparts’ buy-in and ownership from the very beginning of project implementation. Denmark isn’t the only donor in this field, and further support and funding if necessary could conceivably be sought from other funding partners.

**Monitoring and Reporting**

Monitoring of this project will focus on three main components, namely: (i) financial and input monitoring (e.g. expenditure against budget); (ii) physical monitoring (e.g. timely implementation of activities against work plan, such as provision of training and mentoring etc.); and (iii) the preliminary results achieved and the response of target groups (e.g. application/use of knowledge/skills, new operating procedures, as well as counterpart satisfaction with the quality of support provided). The main tools used to undertake effective project monitoring include: (i) the project design documents/financing agreements, including agreed outputs, outcomes and indicators; (ii) annual costed work plans; (iii) various data collection tools, both quantitative and qualitative; (iv) results based reporting formats; and (v) on-going consultation and review mechanisms, involving implementing partners and target groups. UNODC monitoring mechanisms are exercised on an ongoing basis through procedural practices and the presence of UNODC staff in the region. Fortnightly updates are distributed by email to all relevant partners and those interested in the Global Maritime Crime Programme. Narrative progress reports are produced semi-annually and annually.

The project includes advisors who will be based within the target entities and who will be in a position to report back on implementation and progress made. In addition, the project falls under the management of a project coordinator who will be monitoring the project implementation closely, including site visits.

**Evaluations**

UNODC focuses its evaluations on the criteria of: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, partnerships and coordination, and gender and human rights. All UNODC
evaluations are carried out under the oversight of the Independent Evaluation Unit (IEU) of UNODC Headquarters in Vienna, which provides technical support and quality assurance throughout the process. IEU clears the Terms of References, the selection of the evaluation consultant/s, the inception and final reports.

The GMCP has been subject to two in-depth evaluations; one in 2013 and one in 2015. Both evaluations were carried out by an external, independent evaluator together with the IEU and found the programme to perform at a high level against all indicators. If granted, the present contribution will equally be subject to IEU evaluation the next of which is scheduled for Q4 2019.

Regular interaction with the Danish delegations in both Abuja and Accra will be ensured by the project coordinator, as well as visits to Copenhagen to brief Ministry focal points of project implementation and achievements.

UNODC delivers narrative and certified financial project reports on an annual basis. In addition, Annual and Semi Annual Narrative Progress Reports are produced and made available to donors. Donors are further kept abreast with project progress and implementation through the distributed Fortnightly Updates, the annual brochure, and regular visits to view on-going activities in the field.

**Next steps**

Following approval by the Danish authorities in April 2019, the next step in preparation for implementation of the project will be to exchange letters of agreement with key national counterparts, including Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Justice. The letters will outline the framework for cooperation described in this proposal and secure agreement to the host agency and terms of reference of the two technical advisors. In parallel, GMCP will develop detailed implementation plans with the national counterparts outlining the key outputs and activities to be undertaken. It is expected that these aspects will be clarified by mid-2019 and enable full implementation to begin immediately thereafter.

As mentioned above, the aim is to have the current embedded advisors to focus on strengthening partnerships with MLE agencies, so by the time of potential implementation of this project proposal (from April 2019) the request for specific UNODC support in the areas described will have been received. Already at this stage GMCP is working with the Nigerian counterparts in supporting both NDLEA and the Navy in a training series based on a specific request from NDLEA. During the implementation of training, further partnerships with key MLE agencies will be established and this will be fed into the detailed activity planning. For Ghana, a national liaison officer is currently engaged on contract under the UK funded project to ensure better synergies between MLE agencies and the MOJ, as well as encourage closer partnerships for cross-agency implementation.

**Budget (DKK)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Year 1 (2019)</th>
<th>Year 2 (2020)</th>
<th>Year 3 (2021)</th>
<th>Total Cost USD</th>
<th>Total Cost DKK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


30
MLE agencies in Ghana and Nigeria respectively have the knowledge, capacity and capability to conduct arrests at sea and prepare cases for prosecution. The knowledge on law of the sea and legal aspects of procedures on water including evidence collection, VBSS and hand-over procedures strengthened among maritime teams at both a national and regional level.

The effective response to crimes at sea under MMCCs in zone E and zone F strengthened through guidance and conducted training by the embedded MLE advisors.

1.1 MLE agencies in Ghana and Nigeria respectively have the knowledge, capacity and capability to conduct arrests at sea and prepare cases for prosecution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Year 1 (2019)</th>
<th>Year 2 (2020)</th>
<th>Year 3 (2021)</th>
<th>Total Cost USD</th>
<th>Total Cost DKK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 MLE agencies in Ghana and Nigeria respectively have the knowledge,</td>
<td>296,000</td>
<td>296,000</td>
<td>298,000</td>
<td>890,000</td>
<td>5,785,000³⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capacity and capability to conduct arrests at sea and prepare cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for prosecution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 The knowledge on law of the sea and legal aspects of procedures on</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>1,820,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>water including evidence collection, VBSS and hand-over procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strengthened among maritime teams at both a national and regional level.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The actual disbursement may change if alterations to the work plan are made. Any such changes to annual disbursements will be flagged in the biannual reporting.

1 USD=6.503 DKK

Budget USD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Year 1 (2019)</th>
<th>Year 2 (2020)</th>
<th>Year 3 (2021)</th>
<th>Total Cost USD</th>
<th>Total Cost DKK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 MLE agencies in Ghana and Nigeria respectively have the knowledge,</td>
<td>296,000</td>
<td>296,000</td>
<td>298,000</td>
<td>890,000</td>
<td>5,785,000³⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capacity and capability to conduct arrests at sea and prepare cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for prosecution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 The knowledge on law of the sea and legal aspects of procedures on</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>1,820,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>water including evidence collection, VBSS and hand-over procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strengthened among maritime teams at both a national and regional level.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 The actual disbursement may change if alterations to the work plan are made. Any such changes to annual disbursements will be flagged in the biannual reporting.

11 The actual disbursement may change if alterations to the work plan are made. Any such changes to annual disbursements will be flagged in the biannual reporting.
2.1: The effective response to crimes at sea under MMCCs in zone E and zone F strengthened through guidance and conducted training by the embedded MLE advisors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Programme Coordinator</th>
<th>National Programme Officer / admin support</th>
<th>Travel staff</th>
<th>Sub-total</th>
<th>Project Support Costs 13%</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>532,000</td>
<td>69,150</td>
<td>601,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>601,500</td>
<td>78,200</td>
<td>679,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>574,500</td>
<td>74,700</td>
<td>649,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>108,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>1,708,000</td>
<td>222,000</td>
<td>1,930,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12,546,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 2.2 UNODC Logical Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title: Strengthening the maritime law enforcement response to piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea – Ghana and Nigeria</th>
<th>Sub programme in Strategic Framework: Justice</th>
<th>Region/Country: Gulf of Guinea (Ghana and Nigeria)</th>
<th>Project Number / Code:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicators to be read in conjunction with other relevant logframes</td>
<td>Date: 1 January 2019</td>
<td>Duration: 36 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Relationship with Country/Regional/Thematic Programmes:
Regional Programme for West and Central Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Objective: Ghana and Nigeria have a solid and comprehensive response to maritime threats in place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghanaian and Nigerian maritime law enforcement agencies report greater capacity to respond to maritime crime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 1.1: MLE agencies in Ghana and Number of arrests conducted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MLE advisors on contract</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 1: The maritime law enforcement response to crimes at sea has improved in Ghana and Nigeria.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States show increased knowledge and capacity in response to maritime crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of arrests and prosecutions initiated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Baseline:** Few arrests and no prosecutions

**Year:** 2018

**Target:** 10 arrests and 5 prosecutions initiated per country

**Year:** 2021

**Means of Verification**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting from evaluation consultant through oversight of the Independent Evaluation Unit of the UNODC headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reporting from the embedded advisors in Ghana and Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National statistics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Risks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member states not engaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

12 Global Maritime Crime Programme GLOX99, Outcome 6: GoG States have capacity to carry out effective prevention and prosecution of maritime crimes within a sound rule of law framework. Number of supported states with effective legal framework in place to counter maritime crime. Baseline: 2/ Target: 10

EU SWAIMS, SO2: Laws, policies, MOAs for prosecution and adjudication of maritime crimes are developed, strengthened, adopted. 1.2.6 Number of cases supported by means of interpreters, foreign witness support, legal representation, court technical support, repatriations. Target: At least four trials in Nigeria and in Togo, at least six trials overall in other countries.

Regional Programme for West and Central Africa. Outcome 3: National authorities more effectively prevent and counter maritime crime and piracy in line with human rights principles and UN standards. Number and name of countries that have developed and operationalized legal instruments, action plans, policies and comprehensive strategies to prevent and counter maritime crime and piracy. Baseline: 6 countries, target: 10 countries.
Nigeria respectively have the knowledge, capacity and capability to conduct arrests at sea and prepare cases for prosecution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities relating to output 1.1</th>
<th>Activities relating to Output 1.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Output 1.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of prepared cases for prosecution</td>
<td>The knowledge on law of the sea and legal aspects of procedures on water including evidence collection, VBSS and hand-over procedures strengthened among maritime teams at both a national and regional level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline:</strong> Lack of specialized MLE officers and knowledge on law of the sea</td>
<td><strong>Baseline:</strong> Few MLE officers have the knowledge on maritime crime and LoS matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year:</strong> 2018</td>
<td><strong>Year:</strong> 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target:</strong> A specialized maritime crime team developed</td>
<td><strong>Target:</strong> A specialized maritime crime team are confident in conducting boarding procedures, collect evidence and the legal aspects of the activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year 2019:</strong> Team established and advisors trained in theory</td>
<td><strong>Year 2018:</strong> Team familiar with process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year 2020:</strong> Team operational and conducting sea operations with results</td>
<td><strong>Year 2019:</strong> One VBSS training conducted and team familiar with process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year 2020:</strong> Conducted ten arrests and prepared five cases for prosecution</td>
<td><strong>Year 2020:</strong> Two VBSS training courses conducted and team conducting them without assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities relating to output 1.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Activities relating to Output 1.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.1 Contract MLE advisor in Ghana</td>
<td>1.2.1 Hold VBSS training series in Ghana x 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.2 Contract MLE advisor in Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Outcome 2:

**Coordination and cooperation among the states in the region increased through support to the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) and the Multi Maritime Coordination Centres (MMCCs) under zone E and F**

| | 1.2.2 Hold VBSS training series in Nigeria x 3  
1.2.3 Hold a regional training on sea operations in each of the countries Ghana and Nigeria |
| --- | --- |
| Member states in zones E and F coordinated with each other when responding to maritime crime  
Number of interdictions and arrests at sea | Reporting from member states  
Active use of the MMCCs |
| **Baseline:** Little coordination among regional entities and MMCCs not operational  
**Year:** 2018 | **Lack of cooperation interest** |
| **Target:** MMCCs fully operational and states conducting joint operations  
**Year 2019:** Seminars conducted  
**Year 2020:** A few joint operations conducted and MMCCs responsive  
**Year 2021:** 3 arrests conducted due to joint operations |**Output 2.1:**

**Legal aspects of joint sea activities under zone E and zone F strengthened through conducted training with the involvement and support of the embedded MLE advisors.**

| | Zone E and F participated in joint sea operations  
Zone E and F operational  
Assessments conducted |
| --- | --- |
| **Baseline:** Zone E and Zone F not operational  
**Year:** 2018 | Reporting from embedded MLE advisors  
Not the right people nominated for sea response and joint operations |
| **Target:** Zone E and Zone F fully functional  
**Year 2019:** Needs assessments conducted for the two zones  
**Year 2020:** Joint operations training conducted  
**Year 2021:** Three arrests based on joint operations |

### Activities relating to Output 2.2

- 2.2.1 Contract an expert to assess the needs for capacity support of zone E
- 2.2.2 Contract an expert to assess the needs for capacity support of zone F
- 2.2.3 Provide capacity building support to zone E to ensure efficient and effective operations
- 2.2.4 Provide capacity building support to zone F to ensure efficient and effective operations
## Appendix B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Legal reform including legal assessments, strengthening legal frameworks and legislation, capacity building in prosecutors and judges, development of SOPs and MOAs, support to piracy trials. Legal advisor posts in ICC, Yaoundé and Abidjan, Ivory Coast</td>
<td>ECOWAS region</td>
<td>2019 - 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Support to the ICC by embedding a training advisor within the Division for Training and Practice, including training series on MLE and legal matters in support of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct.</td>
<td>Gulf of Guinea, Post within the ICC, Yaoundé, Cameroon</td>
<td>2019 - 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Support to maritime law enforcement cooperation in West Africa with a coordination mentor involved working from Ghana (but with focus up the West African coast including Liberia and Senegal – (currently a proposal)</td>
<td>GoG (mentor in Ghana)</td>
<td>April 2019 – March 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Support in strengthening criminal justice response to piracy and maritime offences, through embedded legal advisor and MLE advisors to focus on legal frameworks, capacity building in prosecutors and law enforcement, coordination and cooperation among national agencies involved in tackling maritime offences</td>
<td>Ghana and Nigeria</td>
<td>March 2019 (any new proposals to the UK will be tailored to complement this proposal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Conduct assessments of the case management system within the DPP/FMoJ in order to support a full fledges case management system</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>March 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organize mock trials related to the US led Navy exercises in the GoG region for 2019 – 2020. This programme strengthens inter-agency cooperation, allows to test evidence collected during the exercises, trains prosecutors, judges and law enforcement and encourages regional cooperation. This project should be well coordinated with the military cooperation focus in the region under the Danish maritime security framework</td>
<td>Ghana and Nigeria (in addition to Benin, Ivory Coast and Togo)</td>
<td>2019 - 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme

Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Document

PSED 2 – Strengthening strategic approaches to maritime security in Nigeria and Ghana (inception phase)(IMO)

Introduction
The present peace and stabilisation engagement document provides the objectives and management arrangements for the peace and stabilisation cooperation concerning Danish support to Strengthened strategic approaches to maritime security in Nigeria and Ghana. The Danish support is part of the support provided through Denmark’s Peace and Stabilisation Fund as part of the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme (GoG MSP) and will be implemented by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). This is an ODA compatible contribution to the programme from Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds.

The engagement is based on the understanding that further work is necessary to develop and outline technical support arrangements for maritime authorities in Ghana and Nigeria regarding their maritime security strategies. It therefore envisages a two step process: step one (this engagement) will provide scoping and development of a detailed project proposal (by September 2019). Step two concerns the implementation of the proposal and work plan developed during step one and with the full agreement and of key stakeholders in the two countries. This will be the subject of a new engagement document (PSED) and approval in late 2019/early 2020 once the details for this are clear and following a technical review of the proposal.

Parties
The parties are:
- Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, represented by the Danish Embassy in Accra, and
- The International Maritime Organisation (IMO)

Documentation
“The Documentation” refers to the partner documentation and other relevant documentation for the supported intervention. This comprises the GoG MSP Programme Document and the background note for PSE 2. The latter has been prepared by IMO and is attached at Annex A to this PSED.

The engagement is a direct contribution to the Danish Government’s new Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019-2020, which inter alia reiterates Denmark’s commitment to a rules-based international society, democratic values, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), international responses to conflict. Other relevant Danish documentation includes the revised PSF Guidelines (October 2018) and the Priority Paper outlining the Danish priorities in combatting piracy and other kinds of maritime crime (December 2018).

Contribution
The Danish Embassy in Accra commits to an initial contribution of DKK 1,52 million for the period April 2019 to September 2019 (6 months). This is intended to provide the basis for a more detailed work plan agreed with key cooperation partners in Ghana and Nigeria for the following 27 months.
until end 2021. The latter will be the subject of a separate engagement document (and approval) once the details are ready in late 2019/early 2020. The total funding available for the full 33 month period is DKK 6,0 million.

**Strategic considerations and justification**

Piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea is a significant threat to regional and international shipping, with a significant number of incidents (95 in 2016 and 97 in 2017) occurring in international and territorial waters (particularly in the waters around Nigeria). Incidents include piracy and theft of property (including illegal oil bunkering), kidnap for ransom, illegal fishing, and drug trafficking. Enabling factors include the presence of criminal syndicates coupled with national legal systems, law enforcement and maritime authorities that are ill-equipped to respond to these threats at sea and on land. Maritime law enforcement (MLE) capacities lack sufficient operating capacity and/or readiness and operate with a weak Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). This makes it difficult for maritime authorities to ensure safe passage and anchorage for international shipping.

MDA in the Gulf of Guinea can be promoted through effective exchange and use of the maritime data available, including through enhanced responses from military and civil law enforcement actors in line with international commitments and the regional structures now developing. The latter derive from the overarching regional strategy provided by ECOWAS (the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy – EIMS), which is itself consistent with the AU Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS), and responds also to relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs 2018 and 2039). Given the cross border nature of maritime crime, ECOWAS also cooperates with ECCAS in Central Africa and the Gulf of Guinea Commission via the so-called Yaoundé process, which has the aim of ensuring that the Gulf of Guinea is covered by a coherent maritime governance and operational response.

The regional architecture currently being established is based on an Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC) in Yaoundé, two regional maritime operation centres (one in West Africa (called CRESMAO in Abidjan) and one in Central Africa (called CRESMAC in Point Noire), a series of Multinational Maritime Cooperation Centres (MMCCs) based on a zonal approach through which coastal states are grouped into five zones. The zones most relevant to this engagement are zones E and F (which include Ghana and Nigeria). The MMCCs are serviced by national Maritime Operation Centres (MOCs). The overall purpose of this arrangement is to provide a mechanism whereby maritime information can be passed from one state to another so that operational responses to illegal activity, environmental threats and other incidents that may arise can be coordinated and made more effective. However, it is recognised that further efforts are needed to make the arrangement fully functional. Inter alia, this also requires further development of national maritime security mechanisms and more effective and efficient interaction between them.

Various partners are assisting the region to develop the maritime security architecture and strengthen the regional and national response to maritime crime. Of particular relevance to this engagement is the support also being provided by UNODC to strengthen the rule of law through improved legislation and its application (partly through this Danish programme but also via the much larger EU SWAIMS

---

1 According to Oceans Beyond Piracy, the number of incidents in the Gulf of Guinea now significantly exceed those occurring off the Horn of Africa 97 incidents compared to 54 in 2017)  
3 See, for example, Lindskov & Nordby, This section also builds upon observations gained through interviews during the formulation mission in October 2018.  
4 The zones most relevant for PSE 4 are zones E (that includes Nigeria) and F (that includes Ghana). The MMCCs for these zones are located in Benin and Ghana respectively.
and GOGIN programmes). IMO will therefore ensure that UNODC (and EU) are fully informed of the Danish support so that the various initiatives are complementary.

The justification for the engagement is that the national (and regional level) initiatives that are now emerging in response to the increase in piracy and other forms of maritime crime need to draw from strong inter-agency cooperation at national level. The engagement will directly support international priorities, such as UNSCR 2039 and the AU and ECOWAS integrated maritime strategies, all of which emphasise the importance of these aspects. Inter alia, national maritime security strategies are expected to provide a comprehensive framework linking maritime law enforcement with the judicial processes required to prosecute alleged maritime criminals. They will ease the introduction of common standards across government and provide a basis for external linkages to like-minded countries within the region (as foreseen in the Yaoundé process).

Both Nigeria and Ghana have expressed an interest in IMO’s assistance to support the further development and roll out of strategies for strengthening the security in their waters, although the precise details of this collaboration have yet to be fully agreed and will need to take account of the steps that have already been taken. In Ghana, the text of a maritime security strategy has been agreed by the members of the National Maritime Security Committee (NMSC) and is awaiting adoption. It is envisaged that IMO’s assistance through this engagement will assist the NMSC to incorporate the draft strategy in the new integrated maritime strategy that is expected to be adopted by June 2019, and also assist the development of an implementation plan and the initial implementation itself.

In Nigeria, there is a need to build upon the 2014 “table top” exercise that demonstrated the importance of holistic and cohesive approaches to maritime security. IMO subsequently provided an ISPS training package to NIMASA and contributed to an inter-agency workshop (conducted with UNODC in 2018), which provided a starting point for the development of a maritime security strategy. Arising from this workshop was also a proposal to operationalize the Maritime Operations Control Centre under the Office of the National Security Advisor to act as a permanent interagency body with desk officers from each agency for monitoring and coordinating maritime operations. These developments offer scope for facilitating greater progress towards the UN and regional goals for effective inter-agency maritime security arrangements, which is the aim of the engagement.

The engagement has been designed so that it is fully aligned with key Danish and international frameworks relating to maritime security. It is a concrete deliverable in relation to the Priority Paper outlining the Danish priorities in combatting piracy and other kinds of maritime crime from 2019 and beyond. The paper’s objectives concerning the Gulf of Guinea are: (a) strengthening maritime governance in Nigeria and Ghana, including by assisting their legal frameworks and ability to investigate and prosecute maritime crime; (b) promoting regional cooperation and coordination; and (c) strengthening the ability of national and regional authorities to monitor the maritime domain and respond to emerging threats.

The engagement is also a direct contribution to the Danish Government’s new Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019-2020, which inter alia reiterates Denmark’s commitment to a rules-based international society, democratic values, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), international responses to conflict. Inter alia, the strategy notes that support will be provided through the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) to the Gulf of Guinea. In this regard, the PSF’s priorities include countering piracy and maritime crime through a focus on capacity development of relevant authorities, information collection and dissemination, harmonisation of laws, rules and strategies concerning countering and prosecution of maritime crime, including in the Gulf of Guinea.

---

5 International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS)
6 Priority paper for the Danish efforts to combat piracy and other types of maritime crime, 2019-2022
7 Internal Danish MFA/MoD/Moj note Prioriteringen af Freds og Stabiliseringsfonden efter 2017
Engagement partner

This engagement document differentiates between implementing partners and cooperation partners. The sole implementing partner will be the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) as described in this PSED and at Annex A.

IMO is the UN’s specialised agency dealing with maritime safety, security and environmental performance of international shipping. Its main role is to create a regulatory framework for the shipping industry that is fair and effective, universally adopted and universally implemented. As part of this, IMO has progressively become more involved in countering piracy in various parts of the world, including the Gulf of Guinea, based upon its oversight role in relation to the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). IMO is a membership organisation and currently has 174 members, including Gulf of Guinea littoral states. The engagement will take the form of an earmarked contribution to IMO’s International Maritime Security Trust Fund (IMS TF), which is managed from IMO’s headquarters in London.

The IMST Fund was originated from Resolution 5 of the SOLAS Conference of December 2002, which adopted a new Chapter, namely chapter XI-2 on special measures to enhance maritime security. In Resolution 5, paragraph 4, the Conference invites the Secretary General to give early consideration to establishing a Maritime Security Trust Fund for the purpose of providing a dedicated source of financial support for maritime security technical co-operation activities and, in particular, for providing support for national initiatives in developing countries to strengthen their maritime security infrastructure and measures.

IMST is a multi-donor trust fund, established under IMO Financial Rules and Regulations, under Rule 107.1 “Extra-budgetary funding agreements” which states that “Provisions for the receipt, management, reporting and disbursement of all extra-budgetary contributions other than those made directly to Multi-donor Trust Funds shall be stated in written agreements between the Organization and the donor”.

As part of its implementation role, IMO will cooperate with a range of national, regional and international stakeholders (i.e. cooperation partners). Important national counterparts in Nigeria include the Nigerian Maritime and Safety Administration (NIMASA), Nigerian Navy, the Police (Maritime Unit), the Ministry of Justice and the Nigeria Drugs Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA – maritime unit). In Ghana, national counterparts are: the Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA), the Ghanaian Navy, the Ghana Police Service, and Ministry of Justice. Other cooperation partners include international agencies (esp. the UN Office on Drugs and Crime - UNODC); regional bodies such as ECOWAS and the ICC; and other development partners (esp. EU, U.S., UK, France and Germany).

Theory of Change and assumptions

The theory of change for PSE 2 is that if the capacities, interests and needs of the main maritime security authorities in Ghana and Nigeria are understood and feed into the development of a concrete, relevant and accepted work plan, and if support is then provided to enhance the policy coordination and operational linkages between national maritime agencies and if this takes place within the overall framework provided by national strategic frameworks (that integrate national capacities and responsibilities), then the greater coordination and stronger legal basis provided will enable the key maritime actors to respond to maritime security threats more effectively and ensure due process regarding areas such as prosecution of alleged maritime criminals, leading also to improved levels of maritime safety, stronger regional cooperation, and reduced maritime crime. A key part of this theory
The engagement builds upon the key assumption that stronger inter-agency cooperation mechanisms at national and regional level will help facilitate improvements in maritime law enforcement responses to maritime crime, including stronger judicial processes. This assumption reflects good international practice. And is strongly recommended by recent UN, AU, ECOWAS and ICC documents.

Other programmatic assumptions are that there is sufficient institutional buy-in and ownership from relevant maritime agencies in Ghana and Nigeria (notably GMA, NIMASA, the two navies and other law enforcement and justice stakeholders) to agree on a Whole of Government approach. There are indications that stakeholders are moving in this direction. The engagement will therefore utilise a mix of approaches, including political dialogue to generate the traction and political buy-in required for a robust Danish contribution via IMO. The engagement’s two step approach is also designed to reflect the need to build up consensus on the way ahead and thereby strengthen its chances of success.

A further important assumption is that IMO has sufficient convening power and leverage to engage with the respective actors. On this point, it should be noted that the approaches described are within IMO’s international mandate and that both countries are IMO members and there is an existing cooperation with regard to ISPS standards. IMO will need to build upon this and there will be a need to ensure the engagement is well targeted. To facilitate this, the engagement includes a short inception phase during which the current state of play will be discussed and concrete activities to strengthen it using international support developed. The proposed implementation modality thereafter will utilise embedded advisors and practical, multi-agency exercises backed up by high-level dialogue from IMO will help secure this. Similarly, IMO’s close cooperation with UNODC should have positive synergy effects for the engagement. These aspects will be further described in the Inception Report and work plan for the remaining implementation period (late 2019 – end 2021).

**PSED Results framework**

The objective of the peace and stabilisation cooperation among the parties is: *Strengthened strategic approaches to maritime security in Nigeria and Ghana.*

This peace and stabilisation engagement will strengthen the development of sustainable and cohesive institutional arrangements for maritime security through enhancing the strategic basis for decision-making and the practical interaction between relevant actors, including the national maritime authorities, navies, maritime police and other law enforcement and justice actors. The engagement will build upon the existing mandate and contacts of IMO and the leadership of national authorities in the two countries.

The focus of activities will primarily be on supporting the introduction of the maritime strategies now being developed in Ghana and Nigeria and their anchoring within a robust framework for inter-agency cooperation.

The engagement in 2019 has a single output:

**Output 1: Understanding of pre-conditions for strengthened and more strategic approach to the maritime domain in Nigeria and Ghana enhanced.** This will have a particular focus on maritime safety and security and provide concrete and actionable recommendations regarding the latter. It will mainly comprise up-to-date background and concrete options for future IMO support, key partners/actors, including international actors. The main deliverables will be (a) an Inception Report describing the progress reached by the
Ghanaian and Nigerian maritime authorities concerning their maritime strategies and implementation and proposals for technical advisory support from IMO including key milestones, objectives, targets etc. that can provide a solid basis for agreement with maritime agencies in Nigeria and Ghana relating to the objectives of the project. The report will include details of the strategies under development/and approved, the key agencies involved and their roles, implementation plans, partners, linkages to the regional (ICC) architecture etc. Relevant human rights and gender aspects will also be covered. (b) Agreed work plan between IMO and lead agencies in Nigeria and Ghana regarding downstream advisory support to be supported by Denmark through IMO. The work plan will include (but not be limited by) the details provided in Annex A and the outline attached at Annex B to this PSED. The project proposal and work plan will be subject to a separate technical appraisal that will be arranged by the Danish Embassy in Accra in Autumn 2019.

As such, this engagement complements the three other engagements comprising the GoG MSP and the programme’s other implementing partners will be involved in the engagement’s activities.

For Danish reporting purposes the following key outcome and output indicators have been selected to document progress:

*Table 1: Engagement results framework*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project objective</th>
<th>Strengthened strategic approaches to maritime security in Nigeria and Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact indicator</td>
<td>Ghanaian and Nigerian maritime authorities respond to maritime crime based on clear inter-agency arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>2018 Comprehensive and joined up national maritime security architectures in Ghana &amp; Nigeria not yet in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year</td>
<td>2021 National architectures in Ghana and Nigeria underpinned by maritime security strategies and arrangements for coordinating actions between agencies based on comparative advantage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Outcome 1**

Collaboration amongst departments and agencies with an interest in maritime security so as to encourage a multi-agency approach for the robust implementation of national, regional and international maritime security measures strengthened.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome indicator</th>
<th>Status on production and approval of maritime strategies in (a) Ghana and (b) Nigeria. Status on agreement on implementation plans involving all key agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>2018 No approved inter agency maritime strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year</td>
<td>2021 Strategies in both countries approved and inter-agency collaboration taking place</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Output 1.1**

*Understanding of pre-conditions for strengthened and more strategic approach to the maritime domain in Nigeria and Ghana enhanced.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output Indicator</th>
<th>Scoping assessment report and agreed framework for support to main maritime agencies in Ghana and Nigeria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>2018 Variable level of knowledge amongst international partners and weak basis for direct support to maritime authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year</td>
<td>2019 Scoping assessment complete and agreement with GMA and NIMASA on detailed work plan for Danish support through IMO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Progress towards the outcome and output targets set out in the result framework above will be regularly monitored by IMO. Progress will be reported through the PSF reporting format. Further outputs will be defined as part of output 1.1 and will be included in a further submission for approval.
Should additional Danish financial contributions be made via the GoG MSP unallocated funds to this engagement (see Programme Document) the details will be added to the results framework. These will include indicators and targets.

**Risk management**

Key risks and risk management arrangements are described in the GoG MSP Programme Document and in the PSE 2 background document at Annex A.

There is a contextual risk that changes occur in government priorities with the result that institutional arrangements promoted by the engagement become less relevant. To counter this risk, the technical advisors and IMO HQ staff will continuously engage with policy makers and government agencies in Ghana and Nigeria to ensure their commitment and support in the implementation of the engagement and early warning of any changes.

There is a programmatic risk that IMO is unable to generate sufficient practical buy-in from relevant counterpart institution in one or both countries to enable the technical advisors to be successfully attached. To mitigate this risk, the engagement utilises an inception phase (Output 1) designed to generate a robust understanding of the institutional context, the needs and capacities, and opportunities for assistance. As part of this process, a counterpart institution in both countries will be identified.

In addition, there are downstream programmatic risks that institutional memory is not integrated and/or is too fragmented for a sustainable and independent management after completion. To mitigate this risk, IMO will ensure continued follow-up with and training of focal points in the partner institutions. There is also a risk that high turnover in partner institutions causes the results to be short-lived. To mitigate this, IMO will secure agreements with concerned institutions to ensure that the staff trained stay in place for an adequate amount of time and perform the tasks for which they were trained. The use of embedded advisors will (a) provide early warning of possible problems and (b) provide good opportunities for dialogue to resolve them.

**Financial risks** are regarded as low as funds will be managed directly by IMO.

Risks will be monitored regularly by IMO and reported in biannual narrative reporting.

**Inputs/budget**

The Danish Embassy in Accra will provide a total of DKK 1,52 million in ODA funds to the engagement over the period April 2019 – September 2019 (6 months) based upon the budget below.

*Table 2: Budget (DKK)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1: Scoping assessments (DKK)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert(s) to conduct missions to Ghana and Nigeria to meet with key stakeholders including development partners to undertake scoping assessments (Fees for preparatory work, field and report writing) – 180 days (total)</td>
<td>655,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Travel (2 round trips) x 2 consultants\(^8\) 130,000
DSA (2 round trips) x 2 consultants\(^9\) 78,000
Printing and sundries 6,500

20% of P4 Salary (London) for project direction 327,000
35% of G5 salary (London) for project administration 140,000
Travel IMO Staff x 1 75,000
DSA IMO Staff x 1 40,000
5% Supporting cost (Charge by IMO FS) 72,575

**TOTAL OUTPUT 1:** 1,524,075
**TOTAL YEAR 1:** 1,524,075

Note: Any unused funds will be reimbursed to the Danish Embassy in Accra upon completion of the engagement, unless otherwise decided. Travel and DSA costs will be reduced proportionately if only a single consultant is assigned. IMO will ensure that cost-effectiveness is prioritised, including in relation to travel. All flights will be by economy class.

There are no unallocated funds attached to this engagement. However, upon agreement of the mapping assessment and work plan for October 2019-December 2021, additional funds will be made available, subject to relevant Danish approvals. The total funds available will not exceed DKK 6,0 million for the full period April 2019 – December 2021.

Once details of proposed additional activities have been identified, the approval process (see under management below) will be based on a revised project proposal that outlines the purpose, rationale, modalities, links to existing activities, risks and expected results.

**M&E Coordinator**
In addition to the funding included for this engagement, Denmark is planning to recruit and provide the services of an M&E Coordinator who will be located at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra. This coordinator will support GoG MSP implementing partners, including IMO, to monitor and report on the engagements under their responsibility.

**Management arrangement**
The following management arrangement will apply with the aim to ensure adequate dialogue and timely decisions in regard to this PSED. The engagement forms part of the GoG MSP and as such will utilise the strategic management arrangements established for the programme. These are described in the GoG MSP Programme Document and include a **Local Advisory Group** that will meet regularly in Accra and include the other implementing partners of the GoG MSP. IMO will be a member of this group.

---

\(^8\) Budget reduced proportionately if only one consultant is used
\(^9\) Budget reduced proportionately if only one consultant is used
Overall programme management. The Danish Embassy in Accra will be responsible for managing the overall programme and for reporting to the PSF Steering Group in Copenhagen. The Danish Embassy in Abuja will assist in supporting activities in Nigeria.

Engagement management. The engagement will be managed by IMO through its Sub-Division for Security and Facilitation and consist primarily of technical assistance to undertake the institutional assessment as Output 1 (see above).

The technical advisor(s) will have appropriate experience within the area of maritime security, including inter agency cooperation and law enforcement and able to work effectively with different government agencies within an interest in maritime domain in Nigeria and Ghana respectively. The advisors will be identified through competitive recruitment according to IMO’s procedures. IMO has a pool of pre-approved consultants. Once a request for technical cooperation is received, a recruitment request needs to be submitted to a Panel of Recruitment. The Panel constitutes of members of all IMO divisions and is chaired by the Director of Technical Cooperation Division.

The advisor(s) will be supported by IMO in London, supplemented by IMO field missions as appropriate. IMO London will assume responsibility for managing the project, including political interaction with key stakeholders to ensure the delivery and ownership of project objectives. The support will not involve the provision or procurement of equipment.

The Danish Embassy in Abuja will also follow developments on the engagement and participate in project meetings in Nigeria to the degree feasible.

Financial Management

The financial management of this engagement is delegated to IMO, which will also monitor activities undertaken. The engagement will utilise IMO’s financial management arrangements via its International Maritime Security Trust Fund. Expenditure will take due account of the need to ensure cost-effectiveness, including in relation to duty travel and accommodation.

Reporting frequency and format

In relation to this inception phase, a short, interim progress report for PSE 2 will be prepared by IMO and presented to the Danish Embassy in Accra in August 2019. The report may utilise IMO reporting formats. The report will include updates on financial disbursements against the budget lines in PSE 2.

Other than this progress report, the engagement’s main output will take the form of an Inception Report outlining the findings of the scoping study as described in Output 1 above and including a detailed proposal for implementation. Guidance for what this should include is at Annex B.

A further financial report providing the financial position upon completion of the inception phase will be provided in March 2020, or earlier if the Danish support is not continued beyond the inception phase.

Sustainability and exit

The engagement will provide the basis to contribute to the sustainability of maritime security support in general through its focus on cohesive and joined up inter agency management of maritime security in Ghana and Nigeria, thereby increasing the knowledge and networks of maritime security actors at institutional and individual levels. Sustainability will be optimised through ensuring that the right personnel are involved in activities and that IMO’s activities are relevant and practical, thus their
utilisation (uptake) will be an important factor. Attention will be paid to the interaction between the engagement and national stakeholders so that activities are relevant and results are utilisable. Inter alia, this will be monitored through the research produced through PSE 3 (KAIPTC – research) will continually assess developments within maritime security and will thus be in a position to assess the degree to which uptake has been achieved. IMO is encouraged to maintain close links with KAIPTC in this regard.

**Monitoring and Evaluation**

IMO will provide day-to-day monitoring of the activities for which they are responsible. The monitoring will feed into the reporting arrangements described above. The M&E Coordinator will be able to assist IMO in monitoring and reporting.

Monitoring will include assessment of any changes in the context, risks and assumptions.

**Public Diplomacy**

In relation to communication, IMO will agree a line to take regarding the engagement with the Danish Embassy in Accra taking into account that the present engagement is essentially an inception phase without concrete deliverables in Ghana and Nigeria. A more comprehensive approach to public diplomacy will be developed for the subsequent engagement in 2020 and 2021.

**Prerequisites**

None

**Signatures**

For IMO For the Danish Embassy in Accra

Date…………………… Date……………………
Strengthening strategic approaches to maritime security in Nigeria and Ghana

Project proposal

Introduction

This project proposal by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) offers a realistic approach to supporting efforts to enhance effective maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, in support of an open, free and secure maritime domain. Within this regional context, the focus is on development and effective implementation of national strategies in two countries in the region - Ghana and Nigeria – with a view to addressing some of the challenges (for example piracy and armed robbery against ships). It will also demonstrate the benefits of success to other States in the region through development of best practices – African initiatives to support African opportunities.

The proposal takes its outset in the recognition that cohesive and coordinated approaches are required in the maritime domain, both at national level through a whole-of-government, multidisciplinary strategy and on an inter-regional or zonal basis. This is based on the logic that the maritime domain is multi-faceted and that multiple agencies and groups have an interest in its management. Also, for a regional approach to be effective, it needs solid foundations at the national level.

The proposal involves an earmarked Danish contribution to IMO’s International Maritime Security Trust Fund in support of a targeted West and Central Africa maritime security project that will channel technical assistance to the development and implementation of maritime security strategies in Nigeria and Ghana between 2019-2021 in line with the countries’ work to implement not only United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2039(2012) and the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, but will also support the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) through the effective implementation of wider initiatives such as the African Integrated Maritime Strategy for 2050 (AIMS 2050), the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS), the African Maritime Transport Charter and the aspirations of the 2018 Sustainable Blue Economy Conference, held in Nairobi.

The proposal is milestone based and includes review points giving the opportunity for adjustment following the initial scoping assessment activity (see below). Its implementation will need to recognise that progress is likely to proceed at different speeds in the two countries and may require different levels of effort and support from IMO Headquarters. The support will involve the assignment of two technical experts as well as IMO political leadership.

The proposal is based on the understanding that further work is necessary to understand the status of work in Ghana and Nigeria regarding the finalisation and roll-out of their maritime security strategies. It therefore envisages a two step process: step one will provide a scoping of a detailed project proposal (by the end of September 2019). Step two concerns the implementation of the work plan developed during step one and with the full engagement of key stakeholders in the two countries.
About IMO

IMO – the International Maritime Organization – is the United Nations specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine and atmospheric pollution by ships. IMO’s work supports the UN SDGs. Because of the international nature of the shipping industry, it has long been recognized that action to improve safety in maritime operations is more effective if carried out at the international level rather than by individual countries acting unilaterally and without co-ordination.

In the early 2000s, maritime security became a major focus for the Organization. The overall objectives are summed up in the IMO slogan: **safe, secure and efficient shipping on clean oceans**. IMO currently has 174 Member States and three Associate Members. Its governing body, the Assembly, meets once every two years. Between sessions, the Council, consisting of 40 Member Governments elected by the Assembly, acts as IMO’s governing body. IMO is a technical organization and most of its work is carried out in a number of committees and sub-committees.

All the technical bodies of IMO, and the IMO Assembly, are open to participation by all Member Governments on an equal basis. The IMO Secretariat is headed by the Secretary-General, who is assisted by a staff of some 300 international civil servants. The Secretary-General is appointed by the Council, with the approval of the Assembly.

IMO has promoted the adoption of some 50 conventions and protocols and adopted more than 1,000 codes and recommendations concerning maritime safety and security, the prevention of pollution and related matters. One of the most important and far reaching of these is the **International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code)**. Among its requirements are that Governments should undertake risk assessments to establish the level of security threat in their ports and that both ships and ports should appoint dedicated security officers and have formal security plans drawn up and approved by their Governments. IMO has adopted other maritime security instruments including recommendations on security measures for passenger ferries on international voyages shorter than 24 hours, and on security measures for ports; guidelines on the allocation of responsibilities to seek the successful resolution of stowaway cases, and guidelines for the prevention and suppression of the smuggling of drugs, psychotropic substances and precursor chemicals on ships engaged in international maritime traffic.

Background

The increase in illicit maritime activity including illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU), trafficking of drugs, weapons, people and wildlife products, oil theft and incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in West Africa over the past two decades, as well as the threat of maritime terrorism, have led to an increased focus on the effectiveness of rule of law arrangements at sea and on land.\(^\text{10}\) This includes the operational capabilities required to deter, prevent, respond and manage incidents and to prosecute the alleged criminals involved. It is recognised that the maritime domain is multi-faceted, with opportunities offered by maritime trade, sustainable fisheries, and extraction of seabed resources, all of which need to be protected. Navigational safety, the safety of vessels and their crew and the protection of the marine environment also need to be taken into account.

\(^\text{10}\) West Africa has experienced a change in the modus operandi of attacks at sea, with more kidnappings for ransom, with 21 such incidents in 2017 versus 18 in 2016, Oceans Beyond Piracy 2017 annual report
UNSCR 2039(2012), inter alia, urges States in the Gulf of Guinea to develop and implement national maritime security strategies, including for the establishment of a legal framework for the prevention, and repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea and the prosecution of persons engaging in these crimes.

Both AIMS and EIMS take a multi-sectoral and integrated approach, for which key building blocks will be the existence of an appropriate, realistic and comprehensive maritime strategy at national level involving relevant agencies, such as ministries of defence, justice and transport and their related agencies. With its focus on West Africa, EIMS urges an approach that involves “all major actors, including civil society and media organisations, the local population, the academic and research communities and any other relevant actors, before the formulation of legislative guidance within the maritime domain.” It also urges member States to “strengthen the national capacities to detect, investigate, prosecute and adjudicate piracy and armed robbery at sea cases, and establish/improve national asset seizure, confiscation and management systems”.11

Also at the regional level, the Yaoundé Code of Conduct (2013) prioritises the development of national legislation, practice and procedures to safeguard maritime trade (Art. 4) and national arrangements to facilitate coordinated, effective and timely information flows (e.g. via focal points) (Art. 11).

IMO has also support the establishment of the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC). The Centre was formally opened in Cameroon in September 2014 and provides a means for establishing cooperation, coordination and communication between the Member States of ECOWAS, ECCAS and GCC at the strategic level, including the exchange of information on a range of issues, namely, best practice and cooperation on strengthening capability, together with countering piracy, armed robbery and other illicit activities at sea.

The ICC is tasked to promote programmes to build the capacities of the civilian and military personnel of the regions in maritime law enforcement, coordinate training and practices; facilitate information exchange among navies of the Member States; promote the harmonization of texts on maritime law enforcement including those relating to the fight against piracy, armed robbery, other illicit acts committed at sea, such as maritime pollution; and ensuring protection of the environment.

A safe and secure maritime domain is essential for international sea borne trade, job and wealth creation as well as sustainable utilization of blue economy resources. There is need for states and non-state actors to work together to secure the maritime domain. This was recognized at the Global Sustainable Blue Economy Conference held 26-28 November 2018 in Nairobi, Kenya, at which Maritime Security Safety and Regulatory Enforcement was a major theme, and the objectives of related sessions were to:

- Identify effective ways of promoting coordination among states and security agencies;
- Discuss legal and institutional frameworks needed to address various existing maritime threats;
- Assess the preparedness of the maritime industry to anticipate, adapt and respond to challenges presented by increasingly dynamic maritime threats; and
- Identify effective detection, response and enforcement mechanisms for enhancing the health, safety and protection of maritime zones.

11 EIMS, p10 & p13
In response to the rise of piracy and armed robbery incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, and emanating from the aspirations of IMO Resolution A.1069(28) on Prevention and Suppression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activity in the Gulf of Guinea, in 2014 IMO launched a West and Central Africa Maritime Security Strategy aimed at assisting States in the region with strengthening their maritime security implementation. Since then, IMO has been conducting capacity building activities in the region under a programme that includes table top exercises, seminars and maritime-security related training. The main focus has been institutional capacity building, with a focus on interagency cooperation and strong legislative and policy foundations.

In Nigeria, various steps have been taken to initiate a stronger inter-agency approach to maritime security and the maritime domain, including through the development of standard operating procedures. Anti-piracy legislation has been prepared and is now awaiting approval by parliament. In 2016, Nigeria has also introduced Harmonised Standard Operating Procedures (HSOPs) on arrest, detention and prosecution of vessels and persons in Nigeria’s jurisdictional water. It provides a consolidated guideline for those responsible for, or undertaking any enforcement related activities.

In addition to IMO table top exercises and a programme of training events related to implementation of IMO’s Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security, in September 2018 IMO and UNODC jointly organized a workshop on inter-agency cooperation, coordination and collaboration to examine how maritime law enforcement and legal agencies could strengthen their interaction in order to reach to prosecution of piracy and maritime offences. This included the main Nigerian maritime agencies (NIMASA, the Nigerian Navy and the Federal Ministry of Justice (MoJ)). *Inter alia,* the seminar recommended the embedding of MoJ liaison lawyers into the Nigerian Navy’s Commands to ensure timely involvement of prosecutors in investigations and to expedite prosecutions. It also recommended operationalization of the Maritime Operations Control Centre under the Office of the National Security Advisor to act as a permanent interagency body with desk officers from each agency for monitoring and coordinating maritime operations. Ideally, these and other functions need to be linked within a coherent national strategy and implementation plan. Nigeria does not have an official strategy in place yet. Supporting the initiation, development and subsequent operationalization of such a strategy is a key objective for IMO through this proposal.

In Ghana, following an IMO table top exercise in 2012, a multi-agency National Maritime Security Committee (NMSC), chaired by Ghana Maritime Authority, was reestablished. Subsequently, and with long-term engagement by an IMO consultant, the NMSC articulated and drafted its maritime security strategy. This document is still under consideration by the Ghanaian authorities and has yet to be formally adopted. In the meantime, Ghana has, with the United States taken steps to develop a wider integrated maritime strategy. While the security strategy is complete, it is understood that approval is now needed on the integrated strategy (expected mid 2019), following which some adjustment of the security strategy may be required. Once these steps have been taken, the strategies will require operationalization and it is here that the IMO support under this proposal will be focused. A draft Ghana Maritime Crime bill is also awaiting approval.

The key maritime agencies in Ghana are the Ghanaian Navy, the Ghanaian Maritime Agency (GMA), the maritime police, Environment Protection Agency, Fisheries Commission, Ghana Immigration Service, Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, Ghana Police Service, Ghana Ports and Habours Authority, Ghana Revenue Authority.
Justification

A well-functioning and secure maritime transport system are essential for sustainable economic growth. An efficient maritime sector, including ports, shipping, law enforcement, and maritime administration can greatly assist in this. By developing trade by sea, improving port infrastructure and efficiency, nurturing national shipping lines and promoting seafaring as a career, managing and protecting fisheries, securing offshore energy production, and creating the stable conditions that encourage investment and tourism, the prospects of achieving sustainable economic growth, food security, employment, prosperity and stability throughout the developing world will be greatly enhanced.

On the other hand, and against a backdrop of population increase, climate change, youth unemployment, increasing violent extremism and challenges to food security through unsustainable levels of IUU unemployment, the failure to secure and develop the maritime sector and capitalize on the opportunities will almost certainly lead to increased instability and uncontrolled mixed migration.

One of the main challenges in the region is that many of the crimes committed at sea occur within States’ territorial waters and unlike piracy (as defined in UNCLOS Art. 101), are therefore outside of the jurisdiction of other States. States therefore need not only robust national legal systems to prosecute alleged offenders, the also need effective strategies for cooperation with their neighbours on a bilateral or multilateral/zonal basis. This observation underpins UNSCR 2039, AIMS and EIMS, and the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and this provides a central justification for the proposal.

A strategic approach to maritime development, underpinned by good maritime security and national and regional level, is therefore essential and in everybody’s interest, including governments, citizens, the private sector (and international shipping). Regional agreements, including the Yaoundé Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy, armed robbery against ships, and illicit maritime activity in West Africa are important steps but they need to be augmented at the national level by cohesive national arrangements.

Both Nigeria and Ghana are taking steps to introduce coordinated and multi-agency approaches to the maritime domain in line with international standards. Ghana is somewhat further forward than Nigeria. However, the waters off Nigeria are host to the majority of piracy and armed robbery at sea incidents and, while Nigerian capacities to respond are increasing, the country still lacks appropriate legislation, structures and capacity to prevent, manage and prosecute incidents. The development and implementation of maritime strategies (that include wholly or in part a security dimension) will be crucial to meeting their needs and will strengthen the national and regional response.

Both Nigeria and Ghana have expressed interest in receiving IMO’s assistance to strengthen the security in their waters thus supporting their sustainable maritime development. In relation to the implementation of maritime security strategies, IMO’s assistance will be further clarified and detailed during the initial phase of the support described below, which recognises that Ghana and Nigeria are at different points in the process.

Project objective and initial outputs

The project’s overall objective is to: assist Ghana and Nigeria to develop, adopt, embrace and implement effective national maritime security strategies.
The project’s outcome will be: *Collaboration amongst departments and agencies with an interest in maritime security so as to encourage a multi-agency approach for the robust implementation of national, regional and international maritime security measures strengthened.*

The project is expected to have several outputs and a number of these have yet to be developed as they are dependent upon the outcome of a scoping assessment (output 1).

- **Output 1**: Understanding of pre-conditions for strengthened and more strategic approach to the maritime domain in Nigeria and Ghana enhanced. This will have a particular focus on maritime safety and security and provide concrete and actionable recommendations regarding the latter. It will mainly comprise mapping of context, progress made to date, key challenges and potential mitigation, concrete options for future support, key partners/actors, including international. The main deliverables will be (a) Scoping assessment report and draft work plan/way ahead including key milestones, objectives, targets etc. that can provide a solid basis for agreement with maritime agencies in Nigeria and Ghana relating to the objectives of the project. (b) Agreed work plan between IMO and lead agencies in Nigeria and Ghana regarding advisory support. This is further described below.

- **Outputs 2-5+** (to be developed). These outputs will depend upon the results of the mapping assessment and the work plan reflecting input with the main maritime authorities involved.

The project approach is described in the section below in more detail.

**Proposed project approach**

IMO envisages a step-by-step approach that is fully anchored in cooperation and engagement with the key national agencies concerned. At the present time, the details of this require defining by IMO in consultation with the main maritime authorities in Ghana and Nigeria. The scoping assessment undertaken during a 6 month inception phase will be the mechanism for achieving this and will build upon the contacts that IMO already has with the authorities concerned and with other development partners. The scoping assessment will be undertaken by suitably qualified consultant(s) and will lead to the development of a detailed and operational project implementation plan in consultation with the authorities in the two countries which will be the basis for subsequent implementation, as described below.

The project will be anchored in a central maritime agency in each country, this being an agency with appropriate mandate to promote inter-agency cooperation and coordination within the maritime domain.

In Ghana, the main partner is expected to be the Ghana Maritime Authority but will be contingent upon engagement with the Ghana Navy, National Security Advisor, Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Transport, as well as specialized agencies addressing ports, environment, oil production etc.

In Nigeria, it is likely that the lead agency will be the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), but progress will be contingent upon engagement with the Nigerian Navy, National Security Advisor, Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Transport, as well as specialized agencies addressing ports, environment, oil production etc.
Progress is likely to proceed at different speeds in the two countries and may require different levels of effort and support from IMO Headquarters. The scoping assessment will take account of such differences. The key steps will involve:

1) **Inception Phase** – Scoping assessments and development of project plans. The inception phase will consist of:

- IMO led missions to Ghana and Nigeria, engagement with Ghanaian and Nigerian officials in other locations and fora, and engagement with other development partners (UNODC, INTERPOL, United States, European Union etc) to gain a full understanding Ghana’s and Nigeria’s current positions, attitudes, capabilities and actions taken to date with respect to the approval and implementation of their national maritime security strategies.

- These assessments will also seek to gauge the level of Ghana’s and Nigeria’s engagement with and support received from other development partners (for example the United States and the European Union) with a view to avoiding duplication of effort and conflict of interests.

- The assessments will have a particular focus on sustainable maritime security, and maritime law enforcement, in order to provide concrete and actionable recommendations for further support through IMO.

The assessment will involve relevant maritime authorities in the two countries and will reflect a clear assessment of their interests, needs and capacities in relation to finalisation of the maritime strategies and their subsequent implementation. The aim will be to ensure full visibility of issues relating to implementation and identify areas where external assistance is relevant and desired. They will assist the authorities and development partners to avoid duplication and promote complementarity and synergies within an overall inter-agency approach to maritime security.

The scoping assessment will result in an Inception Report providing:

- A description and assessment of context, progress made to date, interest and capacities, key challenges and potential mitigation, concrete options for future support, key partners/actors, including international.

- A draft work plan/way ahead including key milestones, objectives, targets etc. that can provide a solid basis for agreement with maritime agencies in Nigeria and Ghana relating to the objectives of the project (see outline of implementation phase below). The assessment will involve the main maritime agencies

- A draft agreement between IMO and Denmark regarding the outputs of the mapping assessment and proposed way ahead, including project proposal to be supported during phase 2 (implementation)

- A draft agreement between IMO and a relevant maritime agency (such as NIMASA) in Nigeria and in Ghana (such as GMA) regarding advisory support and the modalities for providing it (e.g. through expert technical advisors, training courses etc.)
For further details please see Annex B.

2) Implementation phase – technical support from IMO to implementation of the maritime security strategies (tbd), after September 2019. **Preliminary considerations** in this regard are:

- Implementation will be based upon the agreed proposals, tailored framework plan and timeline for further assistance by IMO to Ghana and Nigeria resulting from the Inception Phase (Output 1). The goal will be to develop, adopt and implement their national maritime security strategies, such as help to establish national level committees, standard operating procedures, etc.

- Expected key content: technical assistance to enable completion and operationalization of maritime strategies, including guidance regarding institutional arrangements as per approved project proposal to be funded by Denmark between October 2019-December 2021.

- Expected key deliverables: to include mentoring and technical assistance concerning strategy implementation; legislative, infrastructure, training and equipment needs; and roles and responsibilities of all key maritime stakeholders; and taking ownership of the plan of action so that the receiving State calls in and coordinates assistance from investors and the international community.

The technical advisors will be supported by the IMO Secretariat in London, supplemented by IMO field missions as appropriate. IMO London will assume responsibility for managing the project, including political interaction with key stakeholders to ensure the delivery and ownership of project objectives.

The Danish support will not involve the provision or procurement of equipment.

The support will involve IMO staff costs, facilitation of meetings, workshops and seminars and related travel, communication with key personal of each recipient country, as well as instructions to the advisors.

**Complementarity and synergies**

In order for the programme to be effective and sustainable, it must be “owned” and bought into by the recipient State. IMO has a long tradition of close cooperation with other UN agencies plans and programmes. IMO support will therefore be provided in close cooperation with other development partners (UNODC, INTERPOL, United States, European Union etc.) where it is appropriate to do so and at the expressed request of the host State. However the coordination authority must be the recipient State.

The advisors will be in regular contact with the Danish Embassies in Abuja and Accra (as well as IMO HQ in London).

**Risks and risk management**

A precondition for the support is the agreement of the Ghanaian and Nigerian authorities concerned and, prior to this, an agreement between IMO and Denmark regarding the way forward. Outputs 2-
5+ will be based on the findings of the assessment from Output 1 and will include formal agreement to continue and a detailed plan for this.

In addition, there are a number of risks that need to be taken into account and monitored

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk factor</th>
<th>Likelihood (1 to 5)</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Risk response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of buy-in/appetite to accept the support being offered and inability of IMO to engage sufficiently with authorities in Ghana and Nigeria</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>This risk reflects the recent difficulties experienced by IMO to follow up with maritime authorities on on-going initiatives. However, it is at odds with political signals that authorities would welcome further support. Risk mitigation therefore must consist of (initially) high level IMO interaction with proposed partners to ensure that their views are taken into account and practical measures put in place to facilitate the cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of buy-in/appetite to accept the advice being offered or to take part in coordination meetings</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>This risk is mitigated by the network which has been built over the last years by IMO. The advisors would cooperate with focal points known to IMO. Furthermore IMO is the collective will of its Member States and the Secretariat works for its Member States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duplication of efforts due to the many actors present in the region, who may decide to implement the same activities being carried out by IMO.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>If this programme is to be successful and sustainable, the coordination of assistance will need to be controlled by the recipient States, consistent with the overall strategy detailed above. In the interim, this concern will be mitigated by IMO and Denmark sharing the proposal with key international partners and organizations and consulting with the Embassies in Accra and Abuja. IMO will ensure coordination with other UN agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover in key personnel</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>The aim is to develop a strategy that is adopted at national level and that ascribes responsibilities to departments not individuals. In the interim, this risk will be mitigated by continuous communication with the Permanent Representatives at IMO. Both Ghana, GMA and Nigeria, NIMASA, are often at the IMO HQ attending Committees sessions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security situation in Nigeria</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>IMO will monitor the situation with United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Project management**

The project will be managed by IMO’s Sub-Division for Security and Facilitation at its headquarters in London. IMO will assign a qualified programme manager to oversee the project and to act as focal point for liaison and contacts with Danish, Ghanaian and Nigerian stakeholders.

IMO will participate in project events (including missions to West Africa) as required to ensure a successful project outcome.

The technical assistance will be provided by technical advisors with appropriate high-level experience of strategy development and implementation of effective maritime governance at national level. Such experts will be able to demonstrate expertise within the area of maritime security, including inter agency cooperation and law enforcement and able to work effectively with different government agencies within an interest in maritime domain in Nigeria and Ghana respectively. The advisors will be identified through competitive recruitment according to IMO’s procedures. IMO has a pool of pre-approved consultants. Once a request for technical cooperation is received, a recruitment request needs to be submitted to a Panel of Recruitment. The Panel constitutes of members of all IMO divisions and it is chaired by the Director of Technical Cooperation Division.

Danish funding will be channelled through IMO’s International Maritime Security Trust Fund (IMS TF), which is a multi-donor trust fund with contributions from international donors. IMO is responsible for all funding channelled through the IMS TF. The IMS TF operates in accordance with IMO regulations using the global procurement and auditing systems of IMO.

Denmark will strive for full alignment to IMO rules and procedures. As the funding is provided through a joint funding mechanism, Denmark will accept joint reporting accordingly. However, this will need to be augmented in this particular case with biannual reporting on the activities being supported.

Denmark will earmark funds provided through IMS TF towards the maritime security strategy work in Ghana and Nigeria.

The funding provision will be provided against IMO project workplans and budgets for all of the output areas including targets and indicators and, based on this, request for a transfer of funds from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry will transfer funds on an annual basis.

Accounting will follow the IMO system of accounting in accordance with International Accounting Standards (IAS/IPSAS). The authorisation of disbursements/expenditures will follow the existing IMO procedures. When procurement is required, it will be undertaken using IMO procurement rules. Audit of the Danish funds will be included in the scope of work for IMO’s external auditors and in accordance with the trust fund regulations.

The project implementation will be continuously assessed.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) will be in accordance with IMO Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) guidelines, and will thus follow the overall M&E framework for the IMS TF. For this specific engagement, the IMO will also monitor project implementation separately against the outline provided in this proposal.

---

12 IAS issued by the International Accounting Standards Board.
In addition, IMO reports to Member States through the ITCP (Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme).

**Budget**

The budget for Output 1 is shown below. Information for additional outputs will be provided once these are agreed and will reflect in a revised and updated version of this proposal. The overall budget for output 1 and any additional outputs plus management costs will not exceed DKK 6,0 million.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1: Scoping assessments (DKK)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert(s) to conduct missions to Ghana and Nigeria to meet with key stakeholders including development partners to undertake scoping assessments (Fees for preparatory work, field and report writing) – 180 days (total)</td>
<td>655,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel (2 round trips) x 2 consultants</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA (2 round trips) x 2 consultants</td>
<td>78,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing and sundries</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20% of P4 Salary (London) for project direction</td>
<td>327,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35% of G5 salary (London) for project administration</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel IMO Staff x 1</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA IMO Staff x 1</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% Supporting cost (Charge by IMO FS)</td>
<td>72,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL OUTPUT 1:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,524,075</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL YEAR 1:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,524,075</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

13 Budget reduced proportionately if only one consultant is used
14 Budget reduced proportionately if only one consultant is used
Annex B

Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) – overview of project document/concept note contents

The following is intended as a rough guide to the sort of information that is expected to be included in the supporting documentation for a programme to be funded by the PSF. It will feed into the Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Document (PSED) and the overall Programme Document for the programme as a whole.

An overview of the principles guiding PSF programming is attached at Annex 1.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Engagement overview: XXXX

Introduction
Brief introduction explaining what it is we intend to do and when

Background
Brief contextual background, key actors, political economy, national plans, conflict etc. relevant to the engagement, other donor activities

Justification
Explains why the action is proposed and what the theory of change is (i.e its logic and why we think it will produce the results expected). Include also the main assumptions/preconditions for change that are anticipated.

Include also linkages to international/national policies & strategies and possible synergies/cooperation with other partners and previous support.

Previous support and experience gained
Outline of previous support (if any) and lessons learned

Project / programme overview
Outline of main objectives and how they will be achieved

Outline expected outcomes and outputs that will produce them. Provide brief background/rationale for choice of each outcome. Mention key activities / inputs leading to the outputs. Mention contributing inputs from other partners, if relevant.

Mention key partners and other important stakeholders with which the engagement will interact. What role do we expect from them?

Nb. This section is intended to provide a narrative description of the key results. See also the attached result framework format and notes at Annex A.15

15 Nb. For UN agencies, standard results frameworks can be used provided the results, baselines and indicators are available for all years.
Implementation plan
Describes how the engagement will be implemented, who does what and when. Outline possibilities for adaptive programming (i.e. flexibility) to scale up or down according to developments.

Management
Describe management arrangements at HQ and field level. Include also financial management.

Monitoring and reporting
Describe how the engagement will be monitored and the reporting arrangements (to Danish authorities, other stakeholders). This should include opportunities for review/evaluation.

Sustainability and exit
Describe how the engagement will build capacity that maintains its contribution after the engagement has stopped.

Risks
Describe key contextual, programmatic and institutional risks, how they will be monitored and managed and what the mitigating actions might be.

Budget
Provide an output based budget in DKK covering all years and showing programme and management costs/overheads etc. Management costs should be under 13% of the total.
**Annex A: Outline of results framework**

Note: There may be one or more outcomes. Each outcome may have one or more outputs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>[The short-term and medium term effects of the engagement’s outputs on the target group]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome indicator</td>
<td>[Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement or to reflect the changes connected to an intervention]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>[Situation prior to engagement activities]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year</td>
<td>[Intended situation by the end of engagement (phase)]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>[Short-term result in the form of goods and services which result from an engagement activity]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output indicator</td>
<td>[Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement or to reflect the changes connected to an intervention]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>[Situation prior to engagement activity]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 1</td>
<td>[Intended situation after first year of implementation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 2</td>
<td>[Intended situation after two years of implementation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 3</td>
<td>[Intended situation after three years of implementation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 4</td>
<td>[Intended situation after three years of implementation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>[Short-term result in the form of goods and services which result from an engagement activity]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output indicator</td>
<td>[Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement or to reflect the changes connected to an intervention]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>[Situation prior to engagement activity]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 1</td>
<td>[Intended situation after first year of implementation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 2</td>
<td>[Intended situation after two years of implementation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 3</td>
<td>[Intended situation after three years of implementation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 4</td>
<td>[Intended situation after three years of implementation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>[Short-term result in the form of goods and services which result from an engagement activity]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output indicator</td>
<td>[Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement or to reflect the changes connected to an intervention]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>[Situation prior to engagement activity]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 1</td>
<td>[Intended situation after first year of implementation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 2</td>
<td>[Intended situation after two years of implementation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 3</td>
<td>[Intended situation after three years of implementation]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 4</td>
<td>[Intended situation after three years of implementation]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme

Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Document

PSED 3 – Enhancing regional research, capacity building and convening of stakeholders towards a safer maritime domain in the Gulf of Guinea (KAIPTC)

Introduction
The present peace and stabilisation engagement document provides the objectives and management arrangements for the peace and stabilisation cooperation concerning Danish support to Strengthened regional and national approaches to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. This has a focus particularly on Gulf of Guinea maritime security institutions and countries, particularly those within Zones E and F, between 2019 – 2021 as agreed between the parties specified below. The Danish support is part of the support provided through Denmark’s Peace and Stabilisation Fund as part of the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme (GoG MSP) and will be implemented by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana. This is an ODA compatible contribution to the programme from Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds.

Parties
The parties are:
- Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, represented by the Danish Embassy in Accra, and
- The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre (KAIPTC), Accra

Documentation
“The Documentation” refers to the partner documentation and other relevant documentation for the supported intervention. This comprises the GoG MSP Programme Document and the background note for PSE 3. The latter has been prepared by KAIPTC. This is found at Annex A to this PSED.

The engagement is a direct contribution to the Danish Government’s new Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019-2020, which inter alia reiterates Denmark’s commitment to a rules-based international society, democratic values, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), international responses to conflict.

Other relevant Danish documentation includes the revised PSF Guidelines (October 2018) and the Priority Paper outlining the Danish priorities in combatting piracy and other kinds of maritime crime (December 2018). From KAIPTC’s side, the Centre has MOUs with the Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC), which is the cornerstone of the Yaoundé process, and with ECOWAS, and these documents will help facilitate KAIPTC’s engagement with these important stakeholders.

Contribution
The Danish Embassy in Accra commits to a contribution to the engagement of DKK 7,5 million for the period April 2019 to December 2021.
Strategic considerations and justification

Piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea is a significant threat to regional and international shipping, with a significant number of incidents (95 in 2016 and 97 in 2017) occurring in international and territorial waters (particularly in the waters around Nigeria).\textsuperscript{1} Incidents include piracy and theft of property (including illegal oil bunkering), kidnap for ransom, illegal fishing, and drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{2} Enabling factors include the presence of criminal syndicates coupled with national legal systems, law enforcement and maritime authorities that are ill-equipped to respond to these threats at sea and on land. Maritime law enforcement (MLE) capacities lack sufficient operating capacity and/or readiness and operate with a weak Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).\textsuperscript{3} This makes it difficult for maritime authorities to ensure safe passage and anchorage for international shipping.

Responses to piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea can be promoted through more effective use of the assets and mechanisms available and/or now developing, including through enhanced responses from military and civil law enforcement actors in line with international commitments and the regional structures now developing. The latter derive from the overarching regional strategy provided by ECOWAS (the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy – EIMS), which is itself consistent with the AU Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS), and responds also to relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs 2018 and 2039). Given the cross border nature of maritime crime, ECOWAS also cooperates with ECCAS in Central Africa and the Gulf of Guinea Commission via the so-called Yaoundé process, which has the aim of ensuring that the Gulf of Guinea is covered by a coherent maritime governance and operational response.

The regional architecture currently being established is based on an Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC) in Yaoundé, two regional maritime operation centres (CRESMAO in Abidjan and CRESMAC in Point Noire), a series of Multinational Maritime Cooperation Centres (MMCCs) based on a zonal approach through which coastal states are grouped into five zones.\textsuperscript{4} The zones most relevant to this engagement are zones E and F (which include Ghana and Nigeria). The MMCCs are serviced by national Maritime Operation Centres (MOCs). The overall purpose of this arrangement is to provide a mechanism whereby maritime information can be passed from one state to another so that operational and judicial responses to illegal activity, environmental threats and other incidents that may arise can be coordinated and made more effective. However, it is recognised that further efforts are needed to make the arrangements fully functional. Inter alia, this also requires further development of national maritime security mechanisms and more effective and efficient interaction between them. Assisting this process through the provision of tailored research products, dialogue and training is the key rationale for this engagement. At the present time, research and dialogue opportunities focusing on key issues and enabling factors is limited.

Various partners are assisting the region to develop the maritime security architecture and strengthen the regional and national response to maritime crime. Of particular relevance to this engagement is the support being provided by IMO, UNODC and the EU (partly through this Danish programme but also via the much larger EU SWAIMS and GOGIN programmes).

---

\textsuperscript{1} According to Oceans Beyond Piracy, the number of incidents in the Gulf of Guinea now significantly exceed those occurring off the Horn of Africa (97 incidents compared to 54 in 2017).

\textsuperscript{2} The State of Maritime Piracy, 2017, Oceans Beyond Piracy.

\textsuperscript{3} See, for example, Lindskov & Nordby. This section also builds upon observations gained through interviews during the formulation mission in October 2018.

\textsuperscript{4} The zones most relevant for PSE 4 are zones E (that includes Nigeria) and F (that includes Ghana). The MMCCs for these zones are located in Benin and Ghana respectively.
At the operational level, the United States Naval Forces Africa (US NAVAF) and several likeminded countries (including Denmark) cooperate through an exercise series called OBANGAME EXPRESS, which enables coastal states to practice a wide range of MDA and operational responses. Other like-minded partners supporting maritime security developments in the Gulf of Guinea include the UK and France. Germany (GiZ) is supporting ECOWAS in its regional role.

The justification for the engagement rests upon a recognition that the national and regional level initiatives that are now emerging in response to the increase in piracy and other forms of maritime crime, on the one hand, and the international and regional maritime security-related norms to which countries in the Gulf of Guinea have signed up to, on the other, require reinforcing. There is also room for innovative thinking in relation to the connectivity between national agencies and regional structures (such as the ICC, CRESMAO and MMCCs). This can draw from good practice emerging, such as Nigeria’s Harmonized Standard Operating Procedures on Arrest, Detention and Prosecution (HSOPs, 2016) and Ghana’s National Maritime Security Committee (NMSC). Seeking to promote greater understanding of effective responses to piracy and armed robbery at sea and more evidence based decision-making, this engagement will provide opportunities for key stakeholders to meet and agree appropriate steps to enhancing the national and regional architecture described above. The engagement will ensure that these partners as well as regional and national counterparts are involved in its activities.

The engagement has been designed so that it is fully aligned with key Danish and international frameworks relating to maritime security. It is a concrete deliverable in relation to the Priority Paper outlining the Danish priorities in combating piracy and other kinds of maritime crime from 2019 and beyond. The paper’s objectives concerning the Gulf of Guinea are: (a) strengthening maritime governance in Nigeria and Ghana, including by assisting their legal frameworks and ability to investigate and prosecute maritime crime; (b) promoting regional cooperation and coordination; and (c) strengthening the ability of national and regional authorities to monitor the maritime domain and respond to emerging threats. The engagement is also a direct contribution to the Danish Government’s new Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019-2020, which inter alia reiterates Denmark’s commitment to a rules-based international society, democratic values, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), international responses to conflict. Inter alia, the strategy notes that support will be provided through the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) to the Gulf of Guinea. In this regard, the PSF’s priorities include countering piracy and maritime crime through a focus on capacity development of relevant authorities, information collection and dissemination, harmonisation of laws, rules and strategies concerning countering and prosecution of maritime crime, including in the Gulf of Guinea.6

**Engagement partners**

This engagement document differentiates between implementing partners and cooperation partners. The sole implementing partner will be the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre (KAIPTC) as described in this PSED and at Annex A.

As part of its implementation role, KAIPTC will cooperate with a range of national, regional and international stakeholders (i.e. cooperation partners). These include maritime agencies and other maritime actors in Ghana and Nigeria (and to a lesser extent counterparts in other Gulf of Guinea states); international agencies (esp. the International Maritime Organisation – IMO and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime – UNODC); regional bodies such as ECOWAS and the ICC; other development partners (esp. EU, U.S., UK, France and Germany); other research institutes (such as the Institute for

---

6 Priority paper for the Danish efforts to combat piracy and other types of maritime crime, 2019-2022
6 Internal Danish MFA/MoD/MoJ note Prioriteringen af Frdes og Stabiliseringsfonden efter 2017
Security Studies, University of Stellenbosch, the Danish Institute for International Studies, and the Danish Defence College); and the private sector (e.g. shipping companies). These cooperation partners will participate in the engagement activities as relevant but will not have any direct implementation role.

KAIPTC, which is based in Accra, is a regional leader in terms of its applied research on peace and security issues and its capacity to assemble and engage relevant actors to address particular thematic challenges. It joins two other peacekeeping training centres in West Africa through a memorandum of understanding (MoU) as the official training Centres of Excellence of ECOWAS for operational level capacity development in support of peace and security interventions. The KAIPTC also recently signed a similar MoU with the AU, strengthening its visibility, goodwill and operational leverage across the African continent. Additionally, the KAIPTC has been organizing maritime piracy-related courses with varied emphasis and supported by different development partners since 2006. The Centre currently conducts foundational training in maritime security and transnational organized crime with support from Germany for practitioners in the Gulf of Guinea countries. This underscores the already targeted leverage of the KAIPTC in the policy and practitioner community in the maritime domain particularly in the Gulf of Guinea. And in 2018 it also agreed an MOU with the ICC, thereby underlining its role in promoting maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The Centre’s unique mix of research, convening power and training capacities will be utilised in the maritime domain in partnership with ECOWAS and the ICC to assemble actors for targeted dialogue while developing skill sets and exploring the issues by way of applied research in the hope that decisions and transformative skill sets emanating from such processes will help to ensure a safer maritime domain in the Gulf of Guinea. Finally, KAIPTC has a solid and well-established relationship with Denmark, including the Danish Embassy in Accra, not least as a previous partner in the Africa Programme for Peace (APP).

Theory of Change and assumptions

The theory of change is that the development of research-based knowledge products concerning key policy and operational maritime security issues can serve as a basis for institutionalizing a convening platform for regular and meaningful dialogue where ideas can be explored and collaborative and consensus-based decisions taken amongst relevant maritime authorities and experts. It is also expected that this knowledge can form the basis for capacity development activities enhancing institutional and practitioner skill-sets to respond to the challenges in the maritime domain. This will lead to stronger, more cohesive and effective national and regional approaches to maritime security and an enhanced rate of implementation of the Yaoundé process with positive effects also for the uptake of the other engagements in this programme.

Key assumptions underpinning this approach are that KAIPTC has sufficient convening power to gather relevant experts and officials and that they are willing to contribute to reaching consensus on solutions that will be implemented within national and regional structures. In this respect, the choice of KAIPTC is strategic given the institution’s solid international and regional reputation and links to the Ghanaian Government, ECOWAS and ICC, amongst others. Previous Danish cooperation with KAIPTC indicates that the Centre will be able to meet these assumptions provided that the choice of research, dialogue and capacity development themes is regarded as relevant by national and regional stakeholders. In order to ensure this, the engagement will include provision for regular consultation between KAIPTC and key stakeholders (through a steering committee mechanism) so that needs and interests are fed into the process. The close Danish interaction through other parts of the GoG MSP will also contribute to ensuring this local anchoring and utility of the engagement’s outputs.
PSED Results framework

The objective of the peace and stabilisation cooperation among the parties is: *Strengthened regional and national approaches to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.*

The engagement will strengthen the development of sustainable and holistic approaches and institutional arrangements for maritime security through enhancing the evidence base for decision-making, the knowledge of maritime security actors, and the practical interaction between relevant actors involved in maritime security. As such, it adds value to the other engagements in the Danish GoG MSP as well as wider national and international efforts. The engagement will build upon the MOUs that KAIPTC has with ECOWAS, the AU and the ICC, as well as its relationship with the Ghanaian Government and international actors, including Danish actors.

The focus of activities will primarily be on strengthening the introduction of the Yaoundé architecture described above, including at the national level. This means that it can be expected to pick up issues and themes covered by the other engagements in the Danish GoG MSP and generate further momentum and traction on them and thereby enhancing their national and regional impact.

While the most relevant zones for Denmark are zones E and F as these include Nigeria and Ghana respectively (and with Nigeria being a particular focus for maritime crime), it will also engage where relevant with countries from elsewhere in the Gulf of Guinea.

The engagement has three outputs:

a. **Output 1 - Research-based Knowledge Products as basis for dialogue** will deliver knowledge products to highlight key maritime security issues and thereby endeavour to raise the level of awareness at a policy, technical and operational level. Research will explore such issues as: mapping needs, responses and actors; mapping national and regional maritime legal and policy texts; reviewing and projecting implementation requirements of specific regional and legal and policy documents; exploring the nature and dimensions of piracy, robbery and crime at sea, including gender aspects; and maritime-related prosecutions etc. The precise research agenda will be determined following consultations with expert stakeholders and also technical level workshops. The research will lead to the production of policy papers that frame the issues for dialogue to ensure focused discussions in an iterative way.

b. **Output 2 - A platform for Dialogue Series** drawing from the research, KAIPTC will establish a platform for regular dialogues among international and national actors as well as with ECOWAS, ECCAS, GGC etc. at policy and technical level. The dialogues will also serve as a strategy for connecting the actors in the GoG countries and the sub-regional arrangements and drawing from the Yaoundé Code of Conduct which tasks Member-States to establish national maritime security committees.

c. **Output 3 - Capacity development of maritime security practitioners** will consist of training courses driven by research outputs of the project to ensure that targeted specialized professional competencies are developed to support the implementation of national and regional maritime security policies. Once again, actual training topics shall be identified through consultations and guided by project research outputs and related consensus decisions emerging from project dialogue platforms. This is expected to include an “Advanced Maritime Security Course” building on the existing foundational maritime security course.
already organized at the KAIPTC. The training is expected to primarily focus on non-military competences (e.g. legal and policy framework on maritime security).

For Danish reporting purposes the following key outcome and output indicators have been selected to document progress. Data for reporting against indicators will be provided through an annual research product from KAIPTC assessing the degree of implementation of the Yaoundé architecture and national arrangements.

**Table 1: Engagement results framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement objective</th>
<th>Strengthened regional and national approaches to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact indicator</td>
<td>Status of implementation of the Yaoundé architecture, in particular in zones E and F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year 2018</td>
<td>ICC partially operational; Zonal infrastructure partially established (MMCCs established but not yet fully staffed or operational); national architectures (esp. Ghana &amp; Nigeria) largely siloed &amp; ineffective legal framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 2021</td>
<td>ICC has operational capacity; zones E &amp; F functional with MDA &amp; interaction between national MOCs; national architectures in Ghana and Nigeria underpinned by inter-agency SOPs &amp; anti-piracy laws.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Enhanced joined-up responses of maritime security practitioners to shared threats to maritime security in the GoG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome indicator</td>
<td>Number of regional maritime security decisions adopted by consultative platforms of the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year 2019</td>
<td>No functional operational mechanism coordinating national and regional efforts towards concerted responses to maritime insecurity in the GoG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 2021</td>
<td>At the end of project: at least, five (5) key national and regional decisions on maritime security informed by consensus decisions taken on the platform of this project</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 1</th>
<th>Relevant and regular knowledge management products on the maritime domain in West Africa produced and disseminated to key actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output Indicator</td>
<td>Number of knowledge products produced and disseminated Frequency of project research products utilized in maritime security dialogues amongst actors in the GoG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year 2019</td>
<td>Zero (0) field-based publications; Zero (0) research paper on issues around maritime security in Gulf of Guinea produced; and One (1) conference report published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 1 2019</td>
<td>3 research papers produced and published; and One (1) conference report published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 2 2020</td>
<td>6 research papers on issues around maritime security in Gulf of Guinea produced; and One (1) conference report published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 3 2021</td>
<td>Two (2) conference report published</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 2</th>
<th>A platform for regular dialogues on maritime security issues among regional maritime security actors established</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output indicator</td>
<td>Number of regional dialogues on safer maritime domain held Number and type of project network platforms utilized by maritime security actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year 2019</td>
<td>No stakeholder platform for dialogue on maritime security in Gulf of Guinea established</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Progress towards the outcome and output targets set out in the result framework above will be regularly monitored by KAIPTC. Progress will be reported through KAIPTC’s own reporting formats.

**Start up.** KAIPTC will produce a detailed project implementation plan for the above outputs following programme approval and prior to commitment of any funds. This project plan will follow the structure of the results framework and provide further details of when and how implementation will take place. Production of the implementation plan will take into account input from key stakeholders; for example, concerning research topics and dialogue themes. The implementation plan will be subject to approval by the Danish Embassy in Accra.

**Risk management**

Key risks and risk management arrangements are described in the GoG MSP Programme Document and in the PSE 3 background document at Annex A.

The main risks concerning this engagement are programmatic (although derived partly from contextual factors, such as weak coordination and competition over resources). There is a risk that the national uptake of the outputs will be less than envisaged, which will have a negative effect on the achievement of the outcome. A weaker than expected uptake would be a consequence of internal disagreement over priorities and weak institutional and personnel capacity. These aspects have informed the choice of activities and outputs – and should thus be mitigated through the engagement itself. For example, means of strengthening national coordination is a topic that could feature within the dialogue series.

There is also a risk that national stakeholders will not nominate suitable staff for dialogue events and/or course participants. This would have the effect of reducing the value of such activities and thus their outcome. To mitigate this risk, KAIPTC will set clear standards regarding participation and will monitor their application. KAIPTC will draw upon its national and regional stakeholders (esp. ECOWAS and ICC) to promote the correct level of participation. Similarly, there is a risk that staff rotation will weaken the value added by activities – and similar mitigating steps will be taken.

Contextual and programmatic risks will be monitored regularly by the KAIPTC and reported in biannual narrative reporting. The GoG MSP Mid Term Review in early/mid 2020 will provide an opportunity to reassess engagement risks.

As the engagement entails transfers of funds to KAIPTC, there is a possibility that there might be misuse of funds. Such financial risks will be mitigated through strict adherence to KAIPTC’s own rules for financial management and through regular financial reporting that will be monitored by the Danish Embassy in Accra. KAIPTC’s financial management conform with the procedures of the International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In addition, KAIPTC’s internal audit procedures are modelled on the International Auditing Standards (IAS) and the engagement will be subject to annual external audits.

Inputs/budget
The Danish Embassy in Accra will provide a total of DKK 7,5 million in ODA funds to the engagement over the period April 2019 – December 2021 (33 months) based upon the budget below.

Table 2: Budget (DKK M)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output 1 - research</td>
<td>0,38</td>
<td>0,41</td>
<td>0,14</td>
<td>0,93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2 – dialogue events</td>
<td>0,99</td>
<td>0,69</td>
<td>0,11</td>
<td>1,79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 3 – training courses</td>
<td>0,12</td>
<td>1,01</td>
<td>1,01</td>
<td>2,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project coordinator (1)</td>
<td>0,19</td>
<td>0,19</td>
<td>0,19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project officer (x2)</td>
<td>0,23</td>
<td>0,23</td>
<td>0,23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steering committee mtgs</td>
<td>0,07</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0,07</td>
<td>0,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications and visibility strategy</td>
<td>0,02</td>
<td>0,03</td>
<td>0,03</td>
<td>0,06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative support/contribution to KAIPTC</td>
<td>0,33</td>
<td>0,33</td>
<td>0,33</td>
<td>0,99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>0,03</td>
<td>0,05</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>0,08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,35</td>
<td>2,94</td>
<td>2,21</td>
<td>7,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The engagement includes a minor contingency of unallocated funds (DKK 0,085 M), which will be used for minor additional activities contributing to the engagement’s overall goals or adjustments in already agreed activities. The approval process (see also under management below) requires a short explanatory note that outlines the purpose, rationale, modalities, links to existing activities, risks and expected results. This will be submitted to the Danish Embassy for approval before any commitment is entered into.

Should further additional Danish financial contributions be made via the GoG MSP unallocated funds (see Programme Document) the details will be added to the results framework and implementation plan. These will include indicators and targets.

Management arrangement
The following management arrangement will apply with the aim to ensure adequate dialogue and timely decisions in regard to this PSED. The engagement forms part of the GoG MSP and as such will utilise the strategic management arrangements established for the programme. These are described in the GoG MSP Programme Document and include a Local Advisory Group that will meet regularly in
Accra and include the other implementing partners of the GoG MSP. KAIPTC will be a member of this group.

**Overall programme management.** The Danish Embassy in Accra will be responsible for managing the overall programme and for reporting to the PSF Steering Group. The services of an M&E Coordinator (see below) will be enlisted to help facilitate this.

**Engagement management.** The engagement will be managed by KAIPTC as the implementing partner. The engagement will be anchored in the Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research (FAAR). The engagement will be managed in a manner that reflects best practice in project management and that is transparent and accountable. It will thus utilise annual work plans and report against these as well as against the engagement’s results framework.

The engagement will draw from a small project team comprising a project coordinator, two project officers and a financial assistant, as described at annex A. Short term staff may also be recruited for particular activities and their inputs will be based upon clear terms of reference.

To ensure the fullest possible stakeholder anchoring of the engagement’s implementation and results, KAIPTC will establish a **Steering Committee** comprising senior representatives from KAIPTC and cooperation partners such as ECOWAS, ECCAS, ICC in Cameroon, the Danish Embassy in Accra, the ECOWAS Coordination Centre in Cote d’Ivoire (i.e. CRESMAO) and other relevant actors where necessary. The committee shall consider and approve annual proposals from the project team including commitments to set activities, narrative and financial reporting, monitoring and evaluation, gender, communications and financial audits of project activities and disbursements. The Steering Committee will meet at least once a year.

The Danish Embassy in Abuja will follow developments on the engagement and participate in project meetings to the degree feasible.

**Financial Management**

Both parties will strive for alignment of the Danish support to the implementing partner existing rules and procedures, while adhering to the minimum requirements as stipulated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Guidelines for Financial Management for Development Cooperation that must be considered an integral part of this PSED.

The financial management of this engagement is delegated to KAIPTC, which will also monitor activities undertaken. The engagement will utilise KAIPTC’s financial management arrangements, which accord with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International Accounting Standards (IAS). KAIPTC shall receive and manage the funds from the Danish Embassy and submit biannual and annual financial reports to the Embassy according to the same level of detail as the PSE 3 budget.

In the event of the need for a reallocation between budget lines, the agreement of the Danish Embassy in Accra will be sought.

Any unspent balance or any savings of project funds shall be returned to the Danish Embassy in Accra together with any interest accrued from deposit of Danish funds.

Denmark has a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption and all suspected cases must be reported. This requires that strict measures must be in place to minimise the risk of corruption or misappropriation of funds and any suspected case of corruption or misappropriation of funds related to the programme...
must immediately report to the Danish MFA regardless of whether or not the funds involved are Danish funds, and regardless whether the case has been successfully handled or not. Failing satisfactory implementation of the above, the Danish support may be withdrawn and a claim for refund of monies previously transferred may be made, and, in case of gross negligence, mismanagement or abuse, legal redress may be sought.

**Reporting frequency and format**

A biannual progress report for PSE 3 will be prepared by KAIPTC and presented to the Danish Embassy in Accra and other key stakeholders according to the schedule in Table 3 below. KAIPTC will utilise its own reporting formats for this.

The reports should include progress data showing the results achieved against pre-defined annual targets at the output level, the annual project quality rating summary, an updated risk log with mitigation measures, and any evaluation or review reports prepared over the period. The reports will also highlight key successes achieved, and analyse their potential for sustainability and possible scaling up. The bi-annual reports will also provide a short analysis of the specific constraints encountered over a given period and the manner in which these constraints were resolved.

The Danish Embassy in Accra will present the results of the engagement to the PSF Steering Committee using the standard PSF reporting format and according to the schedule for PSF reporting. The GoG MSP M&E Coordinator will take responsibility for completing this report based on the data provided in the KAIPTC reporting.

The reports will include updates on financial disbursements against the budget lines in PSE 3.

**Table 3: Results and financial reporting schedule**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Report Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 September 2019</td>
<td>Narrative report and budget monitoring report for Q2 prepared by KAIPTC and submitted to the Programme Coordinator at the Danish Embassy in Accra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 2020</td>
<td>Narrative report and budget monitoring report for Q3 and Q4 prepared by KAIPTC and submitted to the Programme Coordinator at the Danish Embassy in Accra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April 2020</td>
<td>Annual reporting Year 1 submitted by RDE Accra to the PSF Secretariat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September 2020</td>
<td>Narrative report and budget monitoring report for Q1 and Q2 prepared by KAIPTC and submitted to the Programme Coordinator at the Danish Embassy in Accra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 2021</td>
<td>Narrative report and budget monitoring report for Q3 and Q4 prepared by KAIPTC and submitted to the Programme Coordinator at the Danish Embassy in Accra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April 2021</td>
<td>Annual reporting Year 2 submitted by RDE Accra to the PSF Secretariat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September 2021</td>
<td>Narrative report and budget monitoring report for Q1 and Q2 prepared by KAIPTC and submitted to the Programme Coordinator at the Danish Embassy in Accra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 2022</td>
<td>Narrative report and budget monitoring report for Q3 and Q4 prepared by KAIPTC and submitted to the Programme Coordinator at the Danish Embassy in Accra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April 2022</td>
<td>Annual reporting Year 3 submitted by RDE Accra to the PSF Secretariat.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sustainability and exit**

The engagement will contribute to the sustainability of maritime security support in general through its focus on applied research, dialogue and capacity development, thereby increasing the knowledge and networks of maritime security actors at institutional and individual levels. This includes the ICC and national authorities. Sustainability will be optimised through ensuring that the right personnel are
involved in activities and that KAIPTC’s activities are relevant and practical, thus their utilisation (uptake) will be an important factor. Attention will be paid to the selection of participants at dialogue sessions and for capacity development so that they reflect the topics being discussed. The approaches used will also be practical, so that subsequent utilisation is maximised. Inter alia, this will be monitored through the research will continually assess developments within maritime security and will thus be in a position to assess the degree to which uptake has been achieved.

The sustainability of capacity development provided through this engagement will also be promoted through the pedagogical approaches used by KAIPTC’s trainers, which encourages counterparts to learn and practice relevant skill sets and pass this knowledge on to colleagues not able to participate in the trainings. Progress in these regards will be monitored and reported in the regular narrative reports.

**Monitoring and Evaluation**

KAIPTC will provide day-to-day monitoring of the activities for which they are responsible. The monitoring will feed into the reporting arrangements described above. Monitoring will include assessment of any changes in the context, risks and assumptions.

A Mid Term Review (MTR) will be held in early 2020 and this will assess the engagement’s progress, opportunities and challenges alongside other parts of the GoG MSP. The MTR will report and make recommendations that can include adjustments to the engagement.

In addition to the funding included for this engagement, Denmark will recruit and provide the services of an M&E Coordinator who will be located at KAIPTC. In relation to PSE 3, the person will support KAIPTC to monitor and report on its activities and the Coordinator will perform a similar function with regard to the other engagements in the programme.

While the M&E function is paramount, it has been agreed that the person appointed will also utilise his/her time supporting KAIPTC in the provision of maritime security training (i.e. output 3 of this engagement) alongside other members of the KAIPTC project team.

Funding for this position is held by the Danish Embassy in Accra. Terms of Reference for the advisor are attached at Annex B.

In a related arrangement, the Danish Ministry of Defence intends to provide technical support to the ICC in Yaoundé, Cameroon through direct assistance to the KAIPTC. The nature of the assistance to ICC via KAIPTC including the expected results and terms of reference shall be further discussed between the KAIPTC and the office of the Danish Defence Attaché in Abuja.

Funding for above additional engagement is held by the Office of the Defense Attaché in Abuja, Nigeria and process shall unfold under PSE 4 of the Danish MSP.

The Danish Embassy in Accra shall have the right to carry out any technical or financial mission that is considered necessary to monitor the implementation of the programme. After the termination of the programme support the Danish Embassy reserves the right to carry out an evaluation in accordance with this article.

**Public Diplomacy**
In relation to communication, KAIPTC will promote the achievements of PSE 3 as agreed with the Danish Embassy in Accra and taking due account of the national sensitivities that may surround activities in Ghana and Nigeria. A communications framework is included in Annex 7 of the GoG MSP Programme Document.

These inputs will be supported by the M&E Coordinator as described in the GoG MSP communication framework.

**Prerequisites**

None

**Signatures**

For KAIPTC For the Danish Embassy in Accra

Date: Date:
Annex A

Danish Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme, Phase 2, 2019-2021

PSE 3

KAIPTC (15.3.2019)

Project Proposal for Denmark:
Title: “Enhancing regional research, capacity building and convening of stakeholders towards a safer maritime domain in Africa”

1. Introduction

This project proposal seeks to implement a series of activities that promotes a safer maritime security domain in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) by working with relevant actors to manage the challenges arising from maritime insecurity in the GoG. It unfolds in the context of separate memorandum of understandings (MoU) between the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) on one hand, and a number of regional multilateral agencies such as the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Inter-Regional Coordination Centre (ICC) for the Implementation of maritime safety and security strategy in the Gulf of Guinea. These MoUs raises the leverage and convening power of the KAIPTC with the above-mentioned agencies and their constituent Member-States.

The project shall produce knowledge products as a basis for meaningful dialogue and capacity building within the GoG maritime domain. Additionally, it will collaborate with the relevant programmes of such key actors as the African Union (AU), ECOWAS, the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) and ICC in Yaoundé, Cameroon and its collaborative maritime security infrastructure in ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) countries. Indeed, much of the project activities shall be dedicated to supporting the start-up phase of the ICC which is framed as an autonomous operational structure to implement the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of 2013 and by extension, positioned to liaise with all the above-mentioned actors to ensure safety and security in the GoG. In doing so, the project shall further collaborate with other international actors with the requisite knowledge as well as notable regional and international experts. Examples of such key actors include the Danish Defense Academy, the maritime research community in Denmark, the Stellenbosch University in South Africa, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), International Maritime Organization (IMO), European Union (EU), INTERPOL, the private sector and other bilateral and multilateral actors.

The significance of the blue economy is immense. For example, it requires a reframing of the oceans as a development space, making it imperative for countries to incorporate the value of the oceans/sea into national economic decision making. However, particularly in
Africa, the oceans and for that matter, what is supposed to be a “blue economy”, is also a source of rising insecurity that threatens international trade and livelihoods along the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). Here, capacity deficits, incoherent and uncoordinated structures and programmes underpinned by governance ineptitudes, combine to allow criminal networks to emerge with little official disruption to their activities.

Contemporary international maritime law makes distinction between two acts of violence at sea: (a) piracy (i.e. perpetrated on the high seas); and (b) armed robbery at sea (depending on the maritime zone in which the act was perpetrated). To these could be added, criminal acts against economic, military and security infrastructures at sea often conducted by criminal networks. In this regard, the threat of piracy and their modes of attack remain ever-present for international shipping companies, crews, cargo owners and marine insurers in the Gulf of Guinea. Particularly, the upsurge of illegal activities in the West and Central African waters of the GoG peaked between 2010 and 2015. However, the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) October 2017 report (this Report covers 1 Jan-30 Sept 2017) advised that vessels... “continue to be vigilant and maintain strict anti-piracy/robbery watches and measures” especially, off-shore Nigeria.

2. Background

In spite of the above, many African countries are failing to ensure safe and secure conditions for those working and living off the oceans. Tracts of the sea off the East, West, Central and North Africa are often labelled lawless. Illegal fishing, sea piracy and armed robbery, drug and human smuggling have assumed staggering proportions. Countries most vulnerable to piracy in West Africa include especially Nigeria, but also, Sierra Leone, Guinea – Bissau, Guinea, Ghana, Benin and the Gambia and in Central Africa – Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe.

The operations of the pirates in the region are characterized by high levels of violence, with reported cases of armed attacks on ships with automatic weapons in which crew members lose their lives. These increases in number and extent of violence have gradually become a cause of concern for states, security analysts and persons and organizations engaged in maritime commerce. Certainly, the implications on the cost of sea-based trade cannot be under-estimated as insurers of containers jack up premiums in a region that pursues greater trade relations with the rest of the world through sea-based transport.

Faced with heightened incidences of piracy that crippled its free-port economy, President of Benin, Thomas Boni Yaya, with the support of France and the United States of America (USA), pursued the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to adopt Resolution 2018 in 2011. The Resolution urged ECOWAS, ECCAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) to fight against acts of piracy and armed theft at sea through concerted action, particularly, by setting up bilateral or regional maritime patrols. Again in 2012, UNSC adopted Resolution 2039 on 29 Feb 2012, urging GoG States to work through multilateral channels established under Resolution 2018 towards convening a summit to draft a regional strategy in the fight against piracy in collaboration with the African Union. An experts meeting in Benin in March 2012 adopted a draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between ECCAS, GGC and ECOWAS on safety and security in the West and
Central African maritime space. A draft code of conduct for suppression of acts of piracy, robbery on ships and illegal maritime activities in West and Central Africa was proposed. Finally, the meeting recommended drafting a common declaration by ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC member states on the implementation of a regional framework for maritime security and safety in the GoG.

In June 2013, in response to Resolution 2039, a Summit of Heads of State and Government of ECCAS, ECOWAS and the GGC on safety and security in the maritime space of Central Africa and West Africa, was held in Yaoundé, Cameroon. At that Summit, the ICC was established, charged with enhancing activities geared towards cooperation, coordination, synchronization, and systems interoperability as well as the implementation of the regional strategy on safety and security within the Central and West African common maritime space. So far, it has developed a “unique strategy framework” to deal with criminality at sea, safety, security, development and governance dimensions, by seeking to: develop the capabilities of both the civilian and military personnel of the regions in maritime law enforcement; Coordinate training and practices; Facilitate information exchange among the navies of the Member States; and promote the harmonization of texts on maritime law enforcement including those relating to the fight against piracy, armed robbery, other illicit acts committed at sea including sea pollution and ensure the protection of the environment.

However, until recently, efforts within ECCAS appeared more developed than those in ECOWAS in the GoG. For example, ECCAS had institutionalized the ECCAS maritime initiative in 2009 by creating the Regional Coordination Centre for the Maritime Security of Central Africa (CRESMAC) in Pointe-Noire, the Congo. CRESMAC is to aggregate the various military and civilian capacities of member-states and leveraging on these capacities to create an integrated maritime security strategy which would respond to emerging challenges. Within the above context, and for security purposes, ECCAS divided the Central African segment of the GoG into three (i.e. zones A, B, and D) stretching from Angola to the border with Nigeria. Zone D in particular, covers Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe – the area within ECCAS hardest hit by incidences of piracy.

The ECOWAS segment of the GoG has evolved quite rapidly since 2015. Indeed, the ECOWAS maritime domain (EMD) comprises 11 of the 15 ECOWAS Member States with a 2,868 nautical mile coastline on the Atlantic Ocean providing resources which include oil and gas exploration, fishing grounds which account for most of their foreign earnings. The main concerns relate to over-exploitation of marine resources, rapid degradation of the marine environment through pollution, coastal erosion, piracy, armed robbery at sea, smuggling, drug and human trafficking, IUU fishing and illegal migration. Since 2015, ECOWAS has set up its coordination structures with the coordination headquarters in Cote d’Ivoire and grouped its member-states into three divisions. Each division has a zonal bureau that supports the coordination Centre in Cote d’Ivoire. Operationalization of the

---

7. This comprises the adjacent Atlantic Ocean, islands, estuaries, lagoons, archipelagos, deltas, wetlands, creeks, coral reefs, mangrove forests, sandy beaches and dunes, as well as inland waterways such as lakes, rivers, falls, dams and streams, which are the lifeblood of the Community.
zonal bureaus is evolving. Equipment supplies to the bureaus in Ghana, Benin and Cape Verde is on course.

3. **Project Overview and theory of change (i.e. process and intervention logic)**

This proposal seeks to introduce an integrated intervention aimed at identifying and addressing threats to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through three interrelated sets of activities; namely:

a. Development of research-based knowledge products as a basis for;
b. Institutionalizing a convening platform for regular and meaningful dialogue where collaborative and consensus-based decisions shall be implemented at national and regional levels with the aid of;
c. Capacity development activities enhancing institutional and practitioner skill-sets to respond to the challenges in the maritime domain.

In doing so, the project will be implemented in collaboration with relevant regional actors such as ECOWAS and ECCAS, allied institutions and agencies such as the AU, the GGC and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and their related strategies and structures.

At the end of the project, the KAIPTC envisions the existence of enhanced joined-up responses of maritime security practitioners to shared threats to maritime security in the GoG. In this regard, the project anticipates the realization of an established community of critical maritime security practitioners and a collaborative platform including relevant knowledge products for addressing threats to maritime insecurity in the GoG in line with the recommendations of the Yaoundé CoC, ECOWAS EIMS and Lomé Charter of the AU.

4. **Justification**

The challenges in the GoG maritime domain constitutes both a security issue but also a development issue. Addressing the issues will not only be beneficial to emerging economies along the GoG, it will also protect global marine transportation and some of the activities that sustain livelihoods and households particularly in densely populated coastal areas along the shores of the GoG.

Secondly, given the rate of piracy attacks in the GoG, the expectation is that policing of that space could have been better. Indeed national and regional level initiatives are emerging in response to international maritime security-related norms inherent in the set of protocols to which African countries along the GoG have signed up to. However, such national and regional responses are, at best, incoherent and uncoordinated. For example, the case of Ghana which is generally rated favourably in the context of its other African peers is such that the structures regulating the maritime industry have little organic relationship with the structures of the maritime security sector. Indeed, within the maritime security sector in Ghana, the relationship among the relevant agencies such as the navy, police and the intelligence agencies could have been strengthened. Moreover, the relationship between the uncoordinated national maritime security agencies on one hand, and the emerging multilateral maritime security bodies, deserves better. Furthermore, consensus is required over the responsibilities of each of the actors over such important
but non-core maritime security issues as fishing and robbery at sea. The situation could be worst in many African countries along the GoG with limited capacities.

Therefore, a deeper understanding of the issues as well as commitment to the demands of the evolving regional and international response mechanisms is required to transmit the ideals on paper into practical realities. Thus, channels for identification and articulation of appropriate options appear lacking and where such channels exist, they are yet to be formalized and maximized.

In effect, the project will galvanize disparate avenues, channels and options towards a sustained response to the challenges to security in the maritime domain in the GoG by building technical and institutional capacities while promoting shared understandings and collaborative decision-making within the context of managing maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea.

5. Intervention logic
The objective of the project is to contribute to Strengthened regional approaches to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

The project has the outcome of Enhanced joined up responses of maritime security practitioners to shared threats to maritime security in the GoG.

This will be met through three outputs as described below:

a. Output 1: Research-based Knowledge Products as basis for dialogue: This pillar of the project relates to the creation and generation of knowledge products through research to form the basis of activities of the other two project pillars (i.e. dialogue and capacity building). Accordingly, the project shall work with experts and practitioners in the GoG maritime domain through consultations and expert workshops to frame the core research topics to be pursued. Already, some of the independent African and international specialists envisaged include the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa, the Danish Defence Academy and the experts from the maritime research community in Denmark, the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) in Ghana among many other African and international think-tanks. Among other themes:

The research component will explore such issues as:

- mapping needs, responses and actors;
- mapping national and regional maritime legal and policy texts;
- reviewing and projecting implementation requirements of specific regional and legal and policy documents;
- exploring the nature and dimensions of piracy, robbery and crime at sea;
- gender aspects of maritime security
- maritime-related prosecutions and case disposal successes and challenges;
- sea-based environmental degradation;
the blue economy; cooperative responses including joint patrols, the emerging national navies and coastguards dedicated to preventing violence at sea;
gender dimensions of maritime security;
the evolving maritime security architecture in the Gulf of Guinea; and
identification of trends in the maritime domain and threat assessments etc.

The project shall conduct the above activities through a combination of consultations with experts, stakeholders and also, through technical level workshops. Out of the above consultations, the project shall prioritize these broad set of topics in order to focus and pursue in-depth investigations into the selected topics.

The above studies would lead to the production of policy papers that frame the issues for dialogue to ensure focused discussions in an iterative way. The knowledge products of the project shall be developed and disseminated to the network of the project stakeholders. Additionally, the KAIPTC shall use products of the project, to participate in wider but relevant international fora where policies around maritime security are decided and develop tools for data gathering by the maritime domain state actors.

In regard to the above, a web page shall be created for the project and dedicated to the electronic publication of project activities with combined logos of KAIPTC, Denmark and other relevant actors. The web page shall, therefore, host key elements and products of the project including project objectives and pillars but also, project brochures and project research products, and project activity reports on the regular dialogues, photographs from major events including the involvement of high profile personalities in project activities. The research pillar will also strengthen the capacity development component of the project as explained below;

b. **Output 2 - A convening platform for dialogue series:** Under this output area, the KAIPTC will establish a platform for regular dialogues among international and national actors as well as with ECOWAS, ECCAS, GGC and other relevant regional economic communities (RECs) of the Africa Union (AU) for ensuring awareness of and effective management of the maritime security domain in Africa. The dialogues shall include specific events for policy level actors but also, technical level dialogues involving operational level practitioners. These shall be delivered in a way that ensures linkages and in a way that feeds into the objectives of the project. Furthermore, the regular dialogues shall be informed by the results of the knowledge products of the project. The dialogues will also serve as a strategy for connecting the actors in the GoG countries and the sub-regional arrangements of ECOWAS and ECCAS as explained above.

- The approach resonates with the key responsibilities in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct which tasks Member-States to establish national maritime security committees. It also aligns with one of the core priorities of the ICC which seeks to work with Member-States to implement the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and in so doing, establish its visibility and presence at the national level. Such structural
presence of the ICC at the national level would enhance the ability of the ICC to pursue real-time communications with Member-States and with sub-regional maritime security arrangements.

- Consequently, one of the main kick-off activities of the project could take the form of a forum for national maritime security actors under the auspices of the ICC and in cooperation with such technical stakeholders as the International Migration Organization (IMO), International Maritime Organization, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Police Organization (INTERPOL) as well as other international actors such as the Danish Defence Academy and the Stellenbosch University in South Africa. Thus, the dialogue platform will facilitate shared identification of emerging threats, capacity gaps, and response options including national and international statutory demands and/or obligations and best practices. The project dialogue platform will also facilitate planning ahead or forecasting where necessary.

- Additionally, the project shall create electronic networking platforms to further the discussion of new ideas that could shape the further implementation of the project. The involvement of ECOWAS and the ICC provides impetus for drawing in the ECCAS and the GGC which is critical to the implementation of maritime security interventions in the GoG; and

**Output 3 – Professional maritime security capacity developed**: Finally, the third output of the project relates to sustained professional capacity development training courses driven by research outputs of the project to ensure that targeted specialized professional competencies are developed to support the implementation of national and regional maritime security policies. Once again, actual training topics shall be identified through consultations and guided by project research outputs and related consensus decisions emerging from project dialogue platforms.

- One of the envisioned training courses of the project will be the “Advanced Maritime Security Course” building on the foundational maritime security course currently organized by the KAIPTC. Thus, the current foundational course at the KAIPTC is organized once a year for operational level security sector practitioners and mid-career staff officers in the maritime industry of ECOWAS countries. Furthermore, the KAIPTC has been organizing maritime piracy-related courses with varied emphasis and supported by different development partners since 2006. The Centre’s current foundational maritime security and transnational organized crime course is supported by Germany for practitioners in the Gulf of Guinea countries. This underscores the already targeted leverage of the KAIPTC in the policy and practitioner community in the maritime domain particularly in the Gulf of Guinea.

- The proposed aim of the advanced maritime security course is to enhance professionalism through the sharing of specialized knowledge while fostering collaboration among state and non-state actors in the maritime domain in Africa. The course is proposed to target Government, Regional organizations (e.g. ECOWAS, AU, Economic Community of Central African States -ECCAS etc.),
Maritime Law Enforcement, private sector including shipping lines, shippers councils, shippers associations etc.)

- The course shall evolve from a thorough needs assessment and extensive consultations with critical stakeholders. Finally, in line with the established course design traditions of the KAIPTC, a forum of frontline subject matter experts shall define the outline and key thematic components of the course that will target core professional competencies, skill sets and attitudes in the maritime domain such as: Safety of Vessels; Safety of Sea lanes or sea lines of communications; Threats to maritime security; Monitoring systems (e.g. AIS, VTMIS etc.) and sea lane surveillance techniques; Maritime Communications equipment; Maritime rapid deployment force as framed within the ECOWAS maritime zones; Legal and policy framework on maritime security; Sea pollution control; and International humanitarian law.

6. Implementation plan

   a. Lead implementer: The project is designed to be implemented by the KAIPTC Conflict Management Programme of the Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research (FAAR). In other words, the KAIPTC shall collaborate with other national, regional and international actors located in the countries along the Gulf of Guinea and their Sahelien neighbours.

   b. Governance, Financial Accountability and Reporting contexts: In a nutshell, the KAIPTC will be responsible for reporting to the Government of Denmark and the project stakeholders represented on the project steering committee on the implementation of the project.

      i. The project budget of 7.5 million Kroner from the Government of Denmark shall be used to support direct implementation of this project at the KAIPTC. Thus, the KAIPTC shall receive and manage the funds from the Government of Denmark and submit biannual and annual financial reports to Denmark and the project steering committee. Financial and narrative reports prepared by KAIPTC after each project activity shall be consolidated into biannual project reports and shared with the Government of Denmark and the project Steering Committee. The financial reporting procedures of the KAIPTC conform to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Results and lessons learned from the biannual reports shall guide the further input of Denmark and the other project stakeholders to the subsequent work of the project team.

      ii. Furthermore, in adhering to prudent corporate governance principles, the KAIPTC shall subject the project to regular internal audits as well as annual independent external audits. The Centre’s internal auditing procedures are modelled on the International Auditing Standards (IAS).
iii. Finally, a mid-term evaluation will be conducted after 18 months into the implementation of the project using the normal KAIPTC assessment and evaluation methodology and a final evaluation will be undertaken by the monitoring and evaluation unit of the KAIPTC. The evaluation exercises will recommend the next lines of focus in the relations between KAIPTC and Denmark. Thus, the KAIPTC shall submit project reports (e.g. mid-terms and final reports) to the Danish Embassy in Accra and any surplus funds shall be managed in accordance with applicable Danish regulations.

c. Management Arrangements: The project shall be managed in a way that reflects best practice in project management, recognizing the need for transparency and accountability in the disbursement of project resources and acknowledging the depth and diversity of activities and the expansive actor perspectives and interests. Accordingly, the following management arrangements shall govern the project:

i. Personnel: the project shall be managed on a daily basis, by a team of three (3) full-time project staff supported by a part-time project financial assistant:

- A project coordinator (i.e. the Head of Conflict Management Programme who shall report directly to the Director, Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research at the KAIPTC) who shall lead in the design and implementation of the core activities of the project including the design of and implementation of monitoring and evaluation, risk management, sustainability and exit plans;

- Two Project Officers who shall support the project coordinator in the execution of the project; and

- Project financial assistant who shall spend part of his/her time, maintaining the finances of the project.

Additionally, depending on the intensity of specific project events, short-term support staff may be hired for the duration of such specific events but the cost of the short-term and personnel and the financial assistant shall be incorporated into the bulk indicative cost of the key activities of the project. Together, the project personnel shall set the project agenda and ensure that all planning tools and reporting obligations of the KAIPTC are met. From an internal KAIPTC perspective, the Director of FAAR shall be the entry point through which project-level decisions shall be transmitted to the Executive Management Committee of the KAIPTC and for that matter, integration of project activities into the wider KAIPTC scheme of activities. It shall be the responsibility of the project team to liaise with all project partners and ensure that all project targets are met; and

ii. Steering committee: The project implementation arrangements shall be led by a steering committee constituted by senior representatives from the KAIPTC and all identifiable relevant partners such as
ECOWAS, ECCAS, ICC in Cameroon, the Embassy of Denmark in Ghana, the ECOWAS coordination Centre in Cote d'Ivoire (i.e. CRESMAO) and other relevant actors where necessary. The committee shall consider and approve annual proposals from the project team including commitments to set activities, narrative and financial reporting, monitoring and evaluation, gender, communications and financial audits of project activities and disbursements.

7. **Previous support and experience gained**

Denmark has supported the KAIPTC under a joint financing arrangement (JFA) with Sweden and Norway between 2009 and 2017. The stated arrangement enabled the KAIPTC to implement its budget with pooled funds from the JFA. While it allowed the KAIPTC to identify context-specific issues and financed them, the scope of activities eligible for support under the previous arrangement was limitless. As a result, funds were not tied to particular thematic activities. The current proposal already identifies earmarked activities to which Danish funds will be applied. It directly associates Denmark with specific transformations in a critical security sector issue area such as the maritime security domain. In doing so, Denmark, through this proposal, shall be contributing to shaping the wider security and stabilization efforts in the Gulf of Guinea.

Furthermore, as a Centre that believes in the principle of collaboration, the KAIPTC in collaboration with several other partners has developed tremendous experience that can benefit the implementation of this project. For example, Between 2008 and 2010, the KAIPTC implemented a capacity development programme on small arms on behalf of ECOWAS, training security sector practitioners along with government and civil society actors on the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons their Ammunition and Other Related Material adopted in June 2006. The evaluation of that project emphasized the remarkable role of the project in deepening national level understanding but also, promoting national commitment to implement the above-mentioned convention. Similar collaborative efforts occurred between 2015 and 2017 with the government of the United States of America which resulted in a project that prepared the ground for 29 African countries beyond the jurisdiction of ECOWAS, to establish disaster management structures to anchor national responses to subsequent humanitarian crisis.

On the theme of maritime security, the centre in collaboration with other development partners including, Japan, UNDP, USA and Switzerland have cumulatively developed over 250 capacities in Africa through training since 2006. Thus, the Centre’s track record and leverage in these collaborative efforts is very potent.

Finally, the research outfit at the KAIPTC has been generating and influencing policy while using the expertise of its staff to support implementation of training courses and education programmes as well as preparation of technical background papers for regional and international policy processes. For example, the KAIPTC research team supported the conduct of a regional study on clashes between farmers and herders across West Africa together with similar centres in Mali and Nigeria for the Heads of State and Governments of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which used the study to
decide on the strategic policy direction on tackling the transhumance issue in its December 2016 summit. Again, a member of staff of the Department explored the relationship between the United Nations and the African Union on behalf of the UN Secretary-General in 2012. Another member of staff of the Department facilitated the preparation of Liberia’s national security strategy at the request of the UN mission in Liberia. Again, staff of the department contributed background papers that led to the establishment of the West Africa Drugs Commission by the late Mr. Kofi Annan. Generally, the KAIPTC research outfit produces cutting-edge papers published electronically but more especially, in leading international journals and book projects of globally renowned publishers. The expertise and network of KAIPTC in cutting-edge research shall be at the disposal of this project.

8. Sustainability and exit

To ensure sustainability, therefore, the project seeks to enhance the effectiveness of related maritime security endeavours including collaborations with regional and international actors including the Danish programme to tackle major gaps and implementation issues requiring an agency, inter-agency and regional approaches. In this regard, the project will encourage the countries along the GoG to gradually incorporate research-based knowledge products, decisions taken at project dialogue platforms and utilize skill-sets from project capacity development courses, to advance the fight against maritime insecurity in the GoG. Ultimately, the project aims to support the start-up phase of the ICC in order for the ICC to continue to support regional and national maritime security infrastructure beyond the life-span of the project. In doing so, the project will further enhance confidence-building through its dialogue platform to foster trusting relationships among the littoral states along the GoG. The project will, therefore, contribute to promoting shared understanding of the shared insecurity threats that face the GoG while showing the value of a sustainable collaborative mechanism for dealing such threats.

9. Risks

The design and implementation of this project is underpinned by the assumption that the sub-regions of ECOWAS and ECCAS will continue to enjoy relative peace and commitment by countries located along the GoG to facilitate smooth implementation. However, the issue of poor national uptake of regional norms and practices is real and remains a potential obstacle to this project. Against, the above back background, there is the challenge of countries nominating appropriate calibre of professionals to participate in regional and international dialogues and last but not least, the systemic challenge of national personnel rotation often informed by the wider national public service needs rather than sector-based rotations. Each of the above-mentioned risks has a tendency to undermine the implementation of this project.

However, the ICC, for example, is set up as a multi-national operational structure mandated to work with the operational agencies at the national level directly and also, coordinating a regional maritime security presence directly at the regional and national levels. The KAIPTC already has an MoU with the ICC as well as ECOWAS and the African Union. The Centre’s leverage in working with the participating countries is potent. In the meantime, the KAIPTC intends to establish a project implementation coordination platform in the form of a project steering committee using its prior relationships with
ECOWAS and for that matter, its member-states and the ICC to ensure that all relevant stakeholders are accessible but also, commit to the implementation of the project.

The risk and risk mitigation matrix of the project is presented below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>s/l</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Mitigation Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>GoG countries fail to commit to project implementation</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>KAIPTC MoU with ICC compels member states to cooperate. Project will among others, develop tools that will enhance national level compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Appropriate national personnel accessing project activities</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>Through project fora and technical workshops, decision-makers at national level shall be conscientized to nominate appropriate personnel for project activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rotation of national personnel sometimes away from maritime-related duties that denies opportunities for applying knowledge gained from project</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>This factor is systemic and remains a challenge to all projects in Africa. The response option is to keep developing capacity while engaging decision makers through the foras of the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Continued cooperation among implementing partners and collaborators</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>The introduction of representative steering committee will ensure transparency and collective supervision of project activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Change of leadership at KAIPTC</td>
<td>very</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>Newly assigned executives will be thoroughly briefed about the project, its objectives and relationships with partners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. KAIPTC’s credentials
The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) is a regional leader in terms of its collaborative capacity to assemble and engage relevant actors to address particular thematic challenges. It joins two other peacekeeping training centres in West Africa through a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to become the official training Centre of excellence of ECOWAS for operational level capacity development in support of the peace and security interventions of ECOWAS in West Africa. The KAIPTC recently signed a similar MoU with the AU, strengthening its visibility, goodwill and operational leverage across the African continent. For example, the Centre has hosted the West Africa Drugs Commission (WACD), the Women Peace and Security Institute (WPSI). Additionally, the Centre implemented the Regional Small Arms and Light Weapons Training Programme which developed the capacities of thousands of national small arms and light weapons practitioners in West Africa in collaboration with ECOWAS, UNDP and the Government of Japan. These interventions involved complex management arrangements and extensive consultations with stakeholders similar to what is envisaged by this project, In other words, the Centre’s collaborative capacity is still available and can be deployed in the maritime domain in partnership with ECOWAS and the African Union to assemble actors for targeted dialogue while developing skill sets and exploring the issues by way of applied research to ensure a safer maritime domain in Africa.

11. Results framework

The results framework below outlines the series and synergies of activities that this project shall undertake. It is, however, important to mention that the outputs from the activities in the framework below together with the wider KAIPTC research output shall inter alia, provide the basis for monitoring the results of this project.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Enhanced joined-up responses of maritime security practitioners to shared threats to maritime security in the GoG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome indicator</td>
<td>Number of regional maritime security decisions adopted by consultative platforms of the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 1</th>
<th>Relevant and regular knowledge management products on the maritime domain in West Africa produced and disseminated to key actors in the maritime security domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output Indicator</td>
<td>Number of knowledge products produced and disseminated Frequency of project research products utilized in maritime security dialogues amongst actors in the GoG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One (1) conference report published

3 desk research papers on issues around maritime security in Gulf of Guinea produced; and
One (1) conference report published

A platform for regular dialogues on maritime security issues among regional maritime security actors established

Number of regional dialogues on safer maritime domain held
Number and type of project network platforms utilized by maritime security actors

Baseline Year 2019
No stakeholder platform for dialogue on maritime security in Gulf of Guinea exist

Target Year 1 2019
One (1) regional symposia and two (2) rotating technical meetings held

Target Year 2 2020
One (1) regional symposia and one (1) rotating technical meetings held

Output 3
Capacities of at least 180 maritime domain specialists developed in responding to threats to maritime security in the GoG each year for over five (5) years

Percentage of maritime domain specialists trained out of the total who reported an increase in knowledge and skills

Baseline Year 2019
250 maritime security practitioners trained by KAIPTC since 2006 to date

Target Year 1 2019
One course review session conducted to develop capacity development training content for the project

Target Year 2 2020
Capacities of 310 maritime security specialists enhanced

Target Year 3 2021
Capacities of 370 maritime security specialists enhanced

Project governance mechanisms, including project monitoring, risk management and sustainability plans, developed and implemented by KAIPTC

Project governance mechanisms established and agreed upon

12. Budget (Danish Kroner)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No/S L</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Budget(DKK) to UDS=6.4</th>
<th>2019 (DKK)</th>
<th>2020 (DKK)</th>
<th>2021 (DKK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Output 1</td>
<td>2 field data-based research papers per year for 3 years</td>
<td>598,400.00</td>
<td>256,000.00</td>
<td>262,400.00</td>
<td>80,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 desk research papers over 3 years</td>
<td>144,000.00</td>
<td>64,000.00</td>
<td>80,000.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 conference reports produced and published</td>
<td>192,000.00</td>
<td>64,000.00</td>
<td>64,000.00</td>
<td>64,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Year 1</td>
<td>Year 2</td>
<td>Year 3</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>Output 2:</strong> 2 symposia over 3 years</td>
<td>723,398.40</td>
<td>361,699.20</td>
<td>361,699.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 rotating technical meetings over 3 years</td>
<td>613,440.00</td>
<td>408,960.00</td>
<td>204,480.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>consultative visits for follow-up and networking over 3 years</td>
<td>452,800.00</td>
<td>220,000.00</td>
<td>122,800.00</td>
<td>110,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>Output 3:</strong> 2 KAIPTC maritime security training courses over 3 years</td>
<td>1,472,000.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>736,000.00</td>
<td>736,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 mobile training courses over 3 years</td>
<td>551,219.20</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>275,609.60</td>
<td>275,609.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 course review session per year</td>
<td>122,998.40</td>
<td>122,998.40</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>Effective and transparent project governance mechanisms developed and implem</strong></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Project coordinator (1)</td>
<td>1,267,200.00</td>
<td>192,000.00</td>
<td>192,000.00</td>
<td>192,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Project officer (2)</td>
<td>230,400.00</td>
<td>230,400.00</td>
<td>230,400.00</td>
<td>230,400.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Steering committee 2 meetings a year for 3 years</td>
<td>143,000.00</td>
<td>71,500.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>71,500.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>96,000.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>96,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Communication strategy</td>
<td>64,000.00</td>
<td>19,200.00</td>
<td>32,000.00</td>
<td>12,800.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Administrative support/contribution to KAIPTC</td>
<td>975,000.00</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>325,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>84,544.00</td>
<td>52,544.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>32,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td><strong>Total (Danish Krone)</strong></td>
<td>7,500,000.00</td>
<td>2,335,757.60</td>
<td>2,938,932.80</td>
<td>2,225,309.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex B

NOTE: TO BE RECRUITED BY THE DANISH EMBASSY IN ACCRA

ToR - MONITORING AND EVALUATION COORDINATOR (DANISH MARITIME SECURITY PROGRAMME IN THE GULF OF GUINEA)

Client: Government of Denmark

Location: Accra, Ghana with periodic travel within West Africa required.

Background:
These Terms of Reference relate to the position of Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator and Maritime Security Course Director for the Danish Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme (GoG MSP) 2019-2021. The programme is the second phase of Danish support to strengthening regional capabilities and capacities for maritime domain awareness (MDA) and response as well as a longer-term institutional strengthening of maritime governance. The programme is funded through the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF), which draws from both Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs sources.

The overall objective of the support is *enhanced regional maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through more capable maritime and law enforcement institutions at national and regional level*. It builds on Denmark’s current and previous diplomatic, stabilisation, and development engagement in the region and has been designed to complement Denmark’s other channels of support between 2019-2021 (36 months). The programme further strengthens Denmark’s contribution to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. It also reinforces Denmark’s commitment to stability, the rule of law and human rights.

The programme has been designed around four interlinked peace and stabilisation engagements:

- **Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 1** – strengthened maritime law response to piracy (through UNODC). This is primarily a civil engagement and concerns the development and introduction of relevant maritime crime legislation in Nigeria and Ghana.
- **Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 2** – maritime strategies in place and operational (through IMO). This is primarily a civil engagement and concerns the development and introduction of relevant strategic documentation and inter-agency cooperation on maritime security in Nigeria and Ghana.
- **Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 3** – research informed dialogue and capacity development strengthens maritime security (through the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre – KAIPTC). This will be implemented in Ghana but with a focus on relevant agencies within Gulf of Guinea countries as well as regional and international partners.
- **Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 4** – maritime operational planning and response enhanced to counter piracy (via Danish defence). This is primarily a military engagement and will be implemented in Nigeria and Ghana as well as at sea within the Gulf of Guinea.

This programme has been prepared in accordance with Denmark’s Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) Guidelines (October 2018). Inter alia, these guidelines set out the characteristics of PSF programmes and the general management arrangements that must apply. The latter are also described in the GoG
MSP Programme Document, its annexes and its four Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Documents (PSEDs).

**Purpose of the post:** The post is designed to fulfil two functions:

a) Under the overall management of the Danish Embassy in Accra, the coordinator will coordinate all aspects of monitoring, assessment and reporting of Danish supported maritime security interventions in the Gulf of Guinea as represented in the GoG MSP and by the four engagement areas set out above. In so doing, the coordinator will liaise with implementing partners and other actors (as required). The implementing partners have the primary responsibility for monitoring and reporting on the implementation of their projects under the programme and will utilize their own reporting formats for this and the timelines as set out in the PSEDs. The coordinator's role is to coordinate and supervise the biannual reporting, assist partners where necessary, and ensure that reporting meets the standards for PSF programmes. Based on this reporting from partners, the M&E Coordinator will prepare an annual report in PSF reporting format and submit this to the Embassy of Denmark in Accra.

b) Under the supervision of the Director, Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research at the KAIPTC, the incumbent will prepare regular technical background papers and coordinate the design and implementation of an advanced and tailor-made maritime security capacity development course for the littoral states along the Gulf of Guinea and the immediate land locked countries on behalf of the Danish Embassy and the KAIPTC and in the wider context of synergizing and strengthening institutions and professional competencies towards the implementation of relevant national regional maritime security strategies.

**Required competencies:**

For (a):

a. Demonstrable project management and monitoring skills and techniques especially, experience in managing regional peace and security projects.

b. Proven organizational skills in coordinating activities and resources.

c. Excellent drafting skills, including the ability to draft reports with objectivity and independent judgment.

d. Confidentiality and a high degree of tact and ability to build and maintain effective working relationships with internal and external stakeholders, at all levels.

e. Ability to work under pressure and to tight deadlines.

f. Ability to work as part of a team in an international cross cultural context.

g. Meticulous attention to detail, whilst maintaining an awareness of general policy directions and priorities of Denmark’s interventions in the Gulf of Guinea.

h. Excellent ability to draft and edit technical texts and present complex issues orally in a clear manner.

i. Demonstrated ability to multitask and to work under pressure to tight deadlines, whilst maintaining accurate high quality work.

j. Good interpersonal skills and ability to build and maintain effective relationships.

For (b):

a. Demonstrable ability to manage capacity development courses within international project management contexts.

b. Ability to prepare technical background papers on maritime security issues.

c. Ability to work in complex multi-cultural environments in Africa.
d. Proven skills and familiarity with peace and security research in Africa.

**Professional Experience**

a. Minimum seven years of progressively responsible experience working in a multi-cultural environment in the peace and security sector in West Africa.

b. Demonstrable experience of maritime security operations and planning.

c. At least five years of progressively responsible professional experience managing and reporting on regional projects and/or programmes in Africa involving also international donors.

d. Demonstrated experience of monitoring and reporting on international projects in accordance with results based management (RBM) principles, including output and outcome based reporting, monitoring and assessment of changes in assumptions and risks, theory of change etc.

e. Experience in organizing and participating in international meetings related to peace and security broadly and particularly, maritime security.

f. Experience with facilitating and presenting technical training courses at a senior level.

g. Working experience of international conventions. General knowledge of the maritime sector with personal network into national security sector practitioner community in Africa.

**Education**

Graduate degree in the social sciences / political science from a recognized university. Other additional and relevant certificates or commensurate experience is an asset.

**Language skills**

Complete written and oral proficiency in English. Working knowledge of French and Portuguese will be an asset.

**Other knowledge and skills.**

Participation in the development of project monitoring systems and related documentation and procedures. Good working knowledge of standard MS Office applications.

**MAIN DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

**For (a):**

1. Coordinate the monitoring and reporting of the Danish GoG MSP in close consultation with the Danish Embassies in Accra and Abuja and with programme implementing partners.

2. Based on the reports from implementing partners, prepare annual reports using PSF formats on programme implementation and submit to the Embassy of Denmark in Accra.

3. Develop and implement a framework for gathering, storing, analyzing and disseminating programme-related information.

4. Maintain and update the Programme implementation database, incorporating data on relevant projects and projects under implementation based on the four engagement’s results frameworks.

5. Analyze and evaluate relevant data to ensure achievements of objectives and develop presentations and written reports on overall programme implementation in accordance with PSF Guidelines and the programme’s management set up.

6. Ensure that data related to Danish-supported programmes in the Gulf of Guinea is accurate. This will involve supporting implementing partners with monitoring of implementation using the indicators included at engagement level.

7. Carry out other related duties as may be assigned by the Danish Embassy in Accra.
For (b)

1. Serve as a course director for an advanced maritime security course at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre.
2. Coordinate the organization of the above-mentioned course with relevant internal and external stakeholders.
3. Establish a database of maritime security subject matter experts for use by the Danish Maritime Security Programme and the related courses at the KAIPTC.
4. Prepare technical background papers on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea for specific meetings of maritime stakeholders.
5. Facilitate on maritime security capacity development courses at the KAIPTC.
6. Undertake any additional tasks to be agreed upon jointly by the Danish Embassy in Accra and the KAIPTC

In the event of any clash between these two sets of responsibilities, those described at (a) will take precedence.

Management
The coordinator will report to the Deputy Head of Mission at the Danish Embassy in Accra for both (a) and (b). Additionally, in relation to (b), the coordinator will act under the day-to-day supervision of the Director FAAR at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC).

Location
The coordinator will be allocated office space at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra.

Periodic travel to other countries in West Africa
Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme

Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Document

PSED 4 - Danish support to strengthened national and regional maritime law response to piracy

Introduction

The present peace and stabilisation engagement document provides the objectives and management arrangements for the peace and stabilisation cooperation concerning Danish support to *Strengthened national and regional maritime law response to piracy*. This has a focus particularly on Ghana and Nigeria between 2019 – 2021 as agreed between the parties specified below. The Danish support is part of the support provided through the Peace and Stabilisation Fund as part of the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme (GoG MSP) and will be implemented by Defence Command Denmark (DCD) and its subordinate authorities. It is a non-ODA contribution to the programme from Danish Ministry of Defence funds.

Parties

The parties are:

- Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, represented by the Danish Embassy in Accra
- The Danish Ministry of Defence, and
- The Defence Command Denmark

Defence Command Denmark is the primary implementing partner and will instruct subordinate entities under its authority within the Danish defence system to implement the contributions as set out in this PSED.

Documentation

“The Documentation” refers to the partner documentation and other relevant documentation for the supported intervention. This comprises the GoG MSP Programme Document and the background note for PSE 4. The latter has been prepared by Defence Command Denmark, together with the Danish Maritime Military Advisor based in Abuja, Nigeria. This is found at Annex A to this PSED.

The engagement is a direct contribution to the Danish Government’s new *Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019-2020*, which inter alia reiterates Denmark’s commitment to a rules-based international society, democratic values, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), international responses to conflict. Other relevant Danish documentation includes the revised *PSF Guidelines* (October 2018) and the *Priority Paper outlining the Danish priorities in combatting piracy and other kinds of maritime crime, 2019-2022* (December 2018).

Contribution

The Danish Ministry of Defence commits to a contribution to the engagement of DKK 16 million for the period January 2019 to December 2021.
Strategic considerations and justification

Piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea is a significant threat to regional and international shipping, with a significant number of incidents (95 in 2016 and 97 in 2017) occurring in international and territorial waters (particularly in the waters around Nigeria). Incidents include piracy and theft of property (including illegal oil bunkering), kidnap for ransom, illegal fishing, and drug trafficking. Enabling factors include the presence of criminal syndicates coupled with national legal systems, law enforcement and maritime authorities that are ill-equipped to respond to these threats at sea and on land. Naval forces and maritime law enforcement (MLE) capacities lack sufficient operating capacity and/or readiness and operate with a weak Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). This makes it difficult for maritime authorities to ensure safe passage and anchorage for international shipping.

MDA in the Gulf of Guinea can be promoted through effective exchange and use of the maritime data available, including through enhanced responses from military and civil law enforcement actors in line with international commitments and the regional structures now developing. The latter derive from the overarching regional strategy provided by ECOWAS (the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy – EIMS), which is itself consistent with the AU Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS), and responds also to relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs 2018 and 2039). Given the cross border nature of maritime crime, ECOWAS also cooperates with ECCAS in Central Africa and the Gulf of Guinea Commission via the so-called Yaoundé process, which has the aim of ensuring that the Gulf of Guinea is covered by a coherent maritime governance and operational response.

The regional architecture currently being established is based on an Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC in Yaoundé), two regional maritime operation centres (one in West Africa called CRESMAO in Abidjan and one in Central Africa called CRESMAC in Point Noire), a series of Multinational Maritime Cooperation Centres (MMCCs) based on a zonal approach through which coastal states are grouped into five zones. The zones most relevant to this engagement are zones E and F (which include Ghana and Nigeria). The MMCCs are serviced by national Maritime Operation Centres (MOCs). The overall purpose of this arrangement is to provide a mechanism whereby maritime information can be passed from one state to another so that operational responses to illegal activity, environmental threats and other incidents that may arise can be coordinated and made more effective.

Aside from coordination, operational responses at sea need to be able to operate in opposed and unopposed situations, and military/law enforcement personnel must have the required skills and equipment to board, search and seize vessels. Boarding needs to be in line with international standards, including human rights standards, and be able to secure forensic evidence that can later be used in prosecution. A key issue here is that training for such units should reflect expected deployment priorities (i.e. that the right people are trained and will be used in a boarding and search role). Likewise, it is important that such units fit within an integrated maritime structure with standards for command and control and linkages to law enforcement agencies/prosecution systems.

---

1 According to Oceans Beyond Piracy, the number of incidents in the Gulf of Guinea now significantly exceed those occurring off the Horn of Africa (97 incidents compared to 54 in 2017)
3 See, for example, Lindskov & Nordby, This section also builds upon observations gained through interviews during the formulation mission in October 2018.
4 The zones most relevant for PSE 4 are zones E (that includes Nigeria) and F (that includes Ghana). The MMCCs for these zones are located in Benin and Ghana respectively.
Various partners are assisting the region to develop the maritime security architecture and strengthen the regional and national response to maritime crime. Of particular relevance to this engagement is the support being provided by the United States Naval Forces Africa (US NAVAF) and several likeminded countries through a capacity building series called OBANGAME EXPRESS, which enables coastal states to develop and practice a wide range of MDA and operational responses. Other like-minded partners supporting maritime security developments in the Gulf of Guinea include the UK and France. Part of the UK’s military support to Nigeria is directed towards improving the Nigerian Navy’s effectiveness and support has also been provided to Nigerian maritime special forces. French support includes training linked to the regular French naval presence in the region. The implementation of this engagement will be closely coordinated with these partners.

The Danish support reflects a number of Danish military strengths and experiences from past operational support to the countries’ maritime law enforcement capacities. Inter alia, the Danish Navy has contributed to OBANGAME EXPRESS in various maritime operations centres. The Naval Staff conducted Maritime Operations Planning Courses in 2017 and 2018 to improve the ability of coastal states to plan maritime operations – jointly as well as nationally. The Danish Naval Staff was responsible for the academic and educational part of the courses, while US NAVAF was responsible for the logistical and administrative framework.

Also, the Danish Special Operations Command provided education and training support in 2016 and 2017 (pilot project) and 2018, covering staff methodology, law of war, evidence collection as well as technical and tactical training in boarding, close combat, crime scene investigation, extended first aid, tactical sanitation and landing. The training was also provided during OBANGAME EXPRESS in Cameroon. The approach to these activities has been that Denmark has supplied most of the instructors and the US has supplied logistics. The level of activity has been adjusted continuously and over the period of the engagement a group of Cameroon instructors have been trained who during the last two events have been acting as instructors with support from Danish instructors in previously taught disciplines. The inputs have had positive results in terms of an increasing ability among local instructors and lessons learned will be drawn from in the implementation of this engagement.

The engagement has been designed so that it is fully aligned with key Danish and international frameworks relating to maritime security. It is a concrete deliverable in relation to the Priority Paper outlining the Danish priorities in combating piracy and other kinds of maritime crime from 2019 and beyond. The paper’s objectives concerning the Gulf of Guinea are: (a) strengthening maritime governance in Nigeria and Ghana, including by assisting their legal frameworks and ability to investigate and prosecute maritime crime; (b) promoting regional cooperation and coordination; and (c) strengthening the ability of national and regional authorities to monitor the maritime domain and respond to emerging threats. The engagement is also a direct contribution to the Danish Government’s new Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019-2020, which inter alia reiterates Denmark’s commitment to a rules-based international society, democratic values, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), international responses to conflict. Inter alia, the strategy notes that support will be provided through the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) to the Gulf of Guinea. In this regard, the PSF’s priorities include countering piracy and maritime crime through a focus on capacity development of relevant authorities, information collection and dissemination, harmonisation of laws, rules and strategies concerning countering and prosecution of maritime crime, including in the Gulf of Guinea.

---

5 Priority paper for the Danish efforts to combat piracy and other types of maritime crime, 2019-2022
6 Internal Danish MFA/MoD/MoJ note Prioriteringen af Freds og Stabiliseringsfonden efter 2017
Engagement partners
The engagement will be directly implemented by the Danish Defence Command, alongside subordinate entities under its authority within the Danish defence system. The latter include the Royal Danish Navy for Outcome 1 and the Special Operational Command (SOKOM) for Outcome 2.

The engagement will also involve close cooperation with a number of cooperation partners, particularly US NAVAF. The latter has demonstrated its commitment and ability to manage complex multi-participant exercises over a number of years and, as described above, this will continue to provide the primary operational framework for the engagement.

Other potential cooperation partners for SOKOM and the Royal Danish Navy include the US, the UK’s military training team in Nigeria (BMATT Nigeria) and the Kofi Annan International Peace keeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). All have sufficient capacity in the region to cooperate with Danish defence entities. Their potential role is described in the background note at Annex A.

PSED Results framework
This peace and stabilisation engagement will strengthen the operational capacity of Gulf of Guinea countries to monitor and mitigate security threats in the maritime domain and contribute to maritime governance, including rule of law (e.g. through strengthening forensic evidence collection). The focus of activities will primarily be on Ghana and Nigeria, although for some activities a wider group of countries may be represented. In terms of the Yaoundé architecture described above, this means that the most relevant zones for Denmark are zones E and F as these include Nigeria and Ghana respectively. The rationale for selecting Ghana and Nigeria is the extensive diplomatic, development and commercial linkages they have with Denmark, the existing civil maritime linkages (in the case of Ghana especially) and the extent of the maritime security threat (in the case of Nigeria).

The engagement focuses on (a) maritime operational planning training and practice with the aim to ensure a more effective utilisation of the maritime situation picture leading to timely decision making as part of Maritime Domain Awareness7 (MDA) and (b) Boarding procedures and practice to strengthen boarding, search and seizure skills, human rights observance, Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) and Tactical Exploration Operation (TEO). The intention is to provide a linked process that both enhances operational capacities and the ability to plan for their employment through joining up with other partners and utilising Danish Navy capacities in relation to (a) and Danish maritime special forces (SOF) in relation to (b). The engagement also includes minor unattributed funds (DKK 1,0 million) and funding for the Danish maritime military adviser in Abuja. The latter are also described in this document.

The above focus is in line with the Priority paper for the Danish efforts to combat piracy and other types of maritime crime. As stated in the paper, the overall objective of Denmark’s efforts to combat piracy and maritime crime is to reduce the threat stemming from these issues in order to protect Danish interests and seafarers as well as international shipping, including in the Gulf of Guinea.

Objectives and engagement content

---

7 Maritime Domain Awareness is defined by the International Maritime Organization as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment. MDA involves the potential for early identification of any threat at sea, which is important for a state’s ability to take action proactively. Consequently, MDA plays an important role in combatting piracy and armed robbery at sea.
The objective of the cooperation among the parties is *Strengthened national and regional maritime law response to piracy* with a focus particularly on Ghana and Nigeria between 2019 – 2021.

The theory of change is that *if* operational planning procedures are developed promoting effective and efficient interaction between national, zonal and regional centres, and that relevant personnel are trained in their use, and *if* operational capabilities amongst maritime law enforcement personnel relating to vessel boarding and search are enhanced (in both opposed and unopposed situations), then* the Nigerian and Ghanaian maritime law enforcement agencies will use these improved procedures and capacities to effectively respond to maritime incidents (including piracy and robbery at sea) will improve leading to a more cohesive response to incidents, including cases that transit from one country’s territorial waters to another, and responses that are more effective and founded on the application of the rule of law and in line with international standards, and the collection of evidence that can be used in possible prosecution, ultimately leading to an increase in prosecutions and contributing to a reduction in such incidents and safer passage for local and international shipping.

**Assumptions** include that suitable West African maritime law enforcement units are available to be trained and that Denmark has a framework within which to fit (i.e. from a partner country e.g. U.S. via OBANGAME EXPRESS). DCD and the Danish Maritime Military Adviser in Abuja have been in regular contact with UNNAVAF during the formulation process and there is a good level of confidence that arrangements will be in place when required. It is expected that anti-piracy parts of the exercise will be most relevant for zones E and F and especially Nigeria (due to the high piracy threat) and that a more effective operational response will enhance prosecutions and also have a deterrent effect. This is in line with the philosophy behind the Yaoundé process and UNSC resolutions on counter piracy efforts.

It is also assumed that suitable units are available to be trained on boarding and that Danish instructors have a framework within which to fit (i.e. from a partner country, e.g. U.S, UK). Again, the high profile of OBANGAME EXPRESS amongst the Ghanaian and Nigerian governments and other regional governments will contribute to ensuring that the required personnel are in place when needed. The intention is to engage Danish maritime special operations forces in a particular part of the training.

The engagement has two outcomes and includes also funding for the Maritime Military Advisor based in Abuja (and who also functions as defence attaché to Nigeria). In addition, there are minor unallocated funds that will be disbursed in support of the two outcomes once further details have been clarified. These aspects are set out below:

**Outcome 1** is *Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness capacity, cooperation and interoperability amongst West African coastal states.*

- This will be achieved through Danish participation in the US NAVAF managed exercise series OBANGAME EXPRESS, with military units, which will promote more effective use of the maritime domain awareness data available, including its communication from one country to the next in a manner that is cohesive and useful. This contribution will take the form of training to ensure that participants from Gulf of Guinea countries have the basic knowledge and skills necessary to act as maritime planning staff officers at a tactical and operational level, in a multinational maritime context or component (e.g. CTF 8 or CTG 9) where English is the

---

8 Commander Task Force.
9 Commander Task Group.
The activities will focus on Zone E (that includes Nigeria) and Zone F (that includes Ghana). The MMCCs for these zones are located in Benin and Ghana respectively. An important facilitator for the training will be the production of suitable training material based upon standard operating procedures (SOPs), which will require involvement of the ICC, CRESMAO and MMCCs. These SOPs will be one of the engagement’s deliverables.

Denmark’s contribution to this outcome area will be provided by Danish Navy experts with relevant operational experience in MDA and in planning and exercises who will be deployed to the region during the exercise and course period. Denmark will also contribute to the development of the SOP and training material, which may require additional visits to the region. This support will be coordinated by the Maritime Military Adviser in Abuja in consultation with the ICC, US NAVAF, and Danish authorities.

**Outcome 2** is *Capacity of Nigerian and Ghanaian maritime law enforcement agencies to respond to piracy and armed robbery at sea enhanced in line with international standards and rule of law.*

- This outcome foresees a continuation of Danish special operations forces training of local partner units from Nigeria and Ghana under OBANGAME EXPRESS. The precise details for this will be decided in conjunction with US NAVAF and other partners during the regular exercise planning meetings. The overall theme of the exercises and education is planning, coordination and execution of operations in order to expand partner units' ability to self-educate and practice their own units and soldiers to take care of maritime security. The support will use the following steps: Assess, Train, Advise, Assist (ATTA) and at a later stage could include Accompany (ATTA (A)).

- The Danish contribution to this outcome area will be provided by Denmark’s Special Operations Command (SOCOM). The precise arrangements will be coordinated with the Maritime Military Adviser in conjunction with relevant national authorities in Ghana and Nigeria, partners, Defence Command Denmark and other Danish Defence authorities. The support will be provided through two activity streams; (a) via exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS (also referred to as part 1) and (b) through a joint (or possibly bilateral) contribution to advanced training (also referred to as part 2):

  a. In relation to (a), the technical and tactical training to be provided via OBANGAME EXPRESS is typically conducted for approx. 20-30 students. Subjects are identified during the planning conferences in dialogue with the African units concerned.

  b. In relation to (b), the intention is to collaborate with the US or UK following a concrete field assessment in Nigeria or Ghana. The purpose of the activity will be threefold: 1) To gain experience in training the units in an existing framework, 2) To continue and focus capacity building implemented during the capacity building exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS and 3) Provide Danish Capacity Building in Nigeria and/or Ghana. Further details of these aspects are provided in the sub-project document at annex A.
The Maritime Military Advisor, Abuja. The Advisor also acts as Defence Attaché to Nigeria (and is also expected to be accredited to Ghana and ECOWAS in the future). As such, the Advisor is part of the staff complement at the Danish Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria and is posted under the Special Attaché Order and administratively under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Danish Ministry of Defence as an employer. The Danish Ministry of Defence therefore pays a settlement fee to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which covers the administrative costs.

The Adviser’s main task is to follow military and defence and security policy developments in Nigeria, Ghana and the region closely, including with particular focus on maritime safety and security. The Advisor also ensures knowledge of how general political and economic developments affect security policy and are embodied in defence policies and keeps the Ministry of Defence and subordinate authorities informed about defence-related and security policy issues, especially maritime issues. In relation to the GoG MSP, the Adviser will provide local management of PSE 4 and support the other engagements. Terms of Reference for the Advisor are attached at annex to the PSE 4 background note.

Engagement results framework

Defence Command Denmark will base the actual support on progress attained in the implementation of the engagement as described in the documentation. Overall progress will be measured through the results framework for the engagement, which has been prepared by Defence Command Denmark.

For reporting purposes the following key outcome and output indicators have been selected to document progress:

**Table 1: Engagement results framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project objective</th>
<th>Strengthened national and regional maritime law response to piracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact Indicator</td>
<td>Degree or change in operational response on land and at sea (as assessed by KAIPTC research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year</td>
<td>2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 1</th>
<th>Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness capacity, cooperation and interoperability amongst West African coastal states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome indicator</td>
<td>Extent and quality of MDA, especially operation planning and decision making, along with regional/national interaction leading to operational response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year</td>
<td>2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 1</th>
<th>ICC and West African coastal states under CRESMAO have agreed tactical procedures to ensure communication and coordination of operational planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Output indicator | Status and usage of a “West African Regional planning process” based on the “6-
stage tactical estimate process”, which is a joint operations planning tool that consists of procedures, explanations, examples and templates for operational planning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 2</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICC has developed relevant training material for maritime operation planning based upon agreed SOP on operational planning process and information sharing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existence of training material (curriculum) based upon agreed SOP for operational planning process and information sharing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 3</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional (and national) capacity to provide training in maritime operational planning enhanced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At least 5 trainers (TTT) p.a. trained in Maritime Operational Planning using SOPs/curriculum as part of cooperation with partner (i.e. US NAF), ICC invite, plan and execute courses in Maritime Operations planning. Courses at zonal level with participants from national MOC, MMCC and RMMCC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 2</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of Nigerian and Ghanaian maritime law enforcement agencies to respond to piracy and armed robbery at sea enhanced in line with international standards and rule of law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extent and quality (response time, quality of boarding and evidence collection) of regional/national response to piracy, robbery at sea and other maritime security incidents increased as evaluated by Danish military units participating in exercises as OBANGAME EXPRESS through an exercise reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 1</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian and Ghanaian navy and law enforcement agencies trained up to Level 3 vessel boarding operations and related aspects (e.g. securing evidence, human rights) as part of a rule of law-based response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited operational response.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Draft ICC SOP operational planning process produced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>ICC SOP for operational planning approved and in use; Draft ICC SOP operational information sharing produced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>ICC SOP for operational planning process and information sharing in use</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Basic training by ICC/member states undertaken based on generic SOP “6-stage tactical estimate process”, draft curriculum prepared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Course material developed and handed over to the ICC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>In use for ICC training amongst zonal MMCC &amp; CRESMAO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>DNK, US NAVAF and other partners support (logistics, instructors etc.) the Maritime Operations Planning Workshop (MOPW) (conducted as a course)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>DNK, US NAVAF and other partners support and mentor (logistics, instructors etc.) the MOPW course (workshop)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>ICC/state instructors provide training (DNK as observer/QA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Progress towards the outcome and output targets set out in the result framework above will be regularly monitored by the implementing units concerned, Defence Command Denmark and the Maritime Military Advisor in Abuja. Progress will be reported through Danish defence project reporting arrangements as well as via the PSF reporting format.

As additional contributions are made via the unallocated funds the details will be added to the results framework. These will include indicators and targets.

**Risk management**

Key risks and risk management arrangements are described in the GoG MSP Programme Document and in the PSED 4 background document.

There is a risk that the regional bodies and Yaoundé Code of Conduct signatory countries will lack the political will to coordinate, collaborate and share information (this would underline the basis for joint operational planning).

There is also a risk that the joint framework arrangements needed to facilitate a Danish contribution will prove more difficult to interact with – or take longer to identify - than expected. To mitigate this, Denmark will participate in exercise planning conferences and engage bilaterally with partners (U.S, UK etc.). A pre-condition for activities under outcome 2 is expected to be an “activity agreement” with the relevant Nigeria and Ghana authorities and/or the US or other partner involved that can provide a suitable legal and practical framework for the cooperation. These aspects will be clarified by Defence Command Denmark prior to any formal commitment.  

There is a reputational risk that Nigerian and/or Ghanaian military personnel trained in boarding are not able to utilise the training effectively. In the worst case, this could mean that personnel concerned do not fully abide by international standards, including human rights. This will be mitigated through the selection procedures managed by the US and by follow up monitoring of the training.

There is also a risk that planned training events involving Danish instructors will be cancelled. While this cannot be excluded, it will be mitigated through close participation by the Danish Military Maritime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output indicator</th>
<th>Number of NIG and GH trainers trained (Train-The-Trainers) by Danish instructors within an international capacity building framework at international standards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 1</td>
<td>2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 2</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 3</td>
<td>2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 Annual targets for Outcome 2, Output 1 will be finally set during 2019 as details of the training process become clearer.

11 It cannot be ruled out that Denmark can initiate Part 2 alone if the opportunity arises. However, this will require a bilateral activity agreement with the individual recipient countries (MIL / MIL discussions) and assessment of the financial conditions by completing Part 2 alone.
Advisor (and other Danish actors as appropriate) in exercise planning events, so that early notice is received.

Financial risks are regarded as minimal as there will not be any transfers of funds outside of the Danish defence.

Risks will be monitored regularly by the Defence Command Denmark and reported in yearly narrative reporting. The GoG MSP Mid Term Review in early/mid 2020 will provide an opportunity to reassess engagement risks.

Inputs/budget
The Danish MoD will provide a total of DKK 16 million in non-ODA funds to the engagement over the period January 2019 – December 2021 (36 months) based upon the budget below.

Table 2: Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 1 – Maritime Domain Awareness</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.1 ICC Work Shop SOP</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.2 Regional curriculum development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.3 Training, Mentoring and Evaluation of MOPW at one MOC/MMCC planning staff</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Mentoring at one MOC/MMCC (MDA and SOF Operation)</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC MOPW GoG</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 2 – Operational Response</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>2,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1 and Outcome 2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBANGAME EXPRESS IPE/MPE/FPE</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host OE MPE in 2020 or 2021</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime Advisor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Salary</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tariff to MoFA</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (tbc)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- RDDC</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mentor ICC</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- UK/USN programme</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12 Might be back to back with WS on SOP operational planning in 2019
13 If possible partners are identified in 2019 training carried out in 20-21.
14 KAIPTC to confirm or PSE 3
**Other funds** will be used for additional activities contributing to the engagement’s overall goals and will be in line with either of the engagement’s two outcomes. These include the possibility of supporting the ICC with a short term training adviser (anchored in KAIPTC); supporting maritime operational planning training at KAIPTC using non-ODA funds; Denmark acting as host nation for an OBANGAME EXPRESS main planning conference in 2020 or 2021; and minor funding to take advantage of possibilities for joint support activities with close allies. These possibilities require further discussion with partners that will be undertaken by the Maritime Military Adviser and Defence Command Denmark during 2019. Once details of proposed additional activities have been identified, the approval process (see under management below) will be based on a short project proposal that outlines the purpose, rationale, modalities, links to existing activities, risks and expected results.

**Management arrangement**

The following management arrangement will apply with the aim to ensure adequate dialogue and timely decisions in regard to this PSED. The engagement forms part of the GoG MSP and as such will utilise the strategic management arrangements established for the programme. These are described in the GoG MSP Programme Document.

**Overall programme management.** The Danish Embassy in Accra will be responsible for oversight of the overall programme and for reporting to the PSF Steering Committee.

The Embassy will be assisted in this by an M&E Coordinator, who will be located at KAIPTC in Accra. The M&E Coordinator has overall responsibility for assisting GoG MSP implementing partners (including DCD for PSE 4). ToR for the position are included at Annex 10 to the GoG MSP Programme Document.

**Engagement management.** The engagement will be managed by Defence Command Denmark. The day-to-day management will rest with the Maritime Military Advisor in Abuja in close cooperation with Defence Command Denmark, especially on financial issues. The Advisor will also participate in the Local Advisory Group (see Programme Document, Annex 12), which is a mechanism for coordinating GoG MSP implementing partners, and will meet biannually at the Danish Embassy in Accra.

Outcome 1 will be implemented by the Royal Danish Navy Command, based at Airbase Karup in Denmark, and Outcome 2 will be implemented by the Danish Special Operations Command (SOCOM), based at Airbase Aalborg in Denmark, both of which will operate under the guidance of the Maritime Military Adviser and instructions from Defence Command Denmark.

Decisions to initiate an activity from the unallocated funds will be made by Defence Command Denmark in consultation with the Ministry of Defence and the Maritime Military Advisor. They will be reported to the Danish Embassy in Accra and an updated engagement document will be issued.

The Maritime Military Advisor will ensure that the engagement is managed in a way that maximises opportunities for synergies with other programmes, including programmes supported by other like-minded partners.

The Danish Ministry of Defence, the Danish Defence Command and the Danish Embassy in Abuja will follow developments on the engagement and participate in project meetings to the degree feasible.
Financial Management

The financial management of this engagement is delegated to the Defence Command Denmark (DCD) who will also monitor activities undertaken. The engagement will utilise DMoD/DCD financial management arrangements. All activities and therefore financial means are all within the Danish Defence.

Implementing Danish military commands and units, which have delegated responsibility to manage their activities, will make financial reports to Defence Command Denmark in accordance with the relevant defence guidelines. The financial reports will be forwarded to the Maritime Military Advisor, who will compile a consolidated report in line with the PSF guidelines.

Reporting frequency and format

A biannual progress report for PSED 4 will be prepared by the Maritime Military Adviser and presented to the Danish Embassy in Accra and other key stakeholders (such as Danish Ministry of Defence and Defence Command). The Advisor will be supported in this by the M&E Coordinator attached to the programme and who is based in Accra (see Programme Document, Annex 10).

The reports will follow PSF reporting guidelines and consist of progress data showing the results achieved against pre-defined annual targets at the output level, the annual project quality rating summary, an updated risk log with mitigation measures, and any evaluation or review reports prepared over the period. The reports will also highlight key successes achieved, and analyse their potential for sustainability and possible scaling up. The bi-annual reports will also provide a short analysis of the specific constraints encountered over a given period and the manner in which these constraints were resolved.

The results achieved will be reported to the PSF Steering Committee using the standard PSF reporting guidelines by the Danish Embassy in Accra according to the schedule for PSF reporting.

The reports will include updates on financial disbursements against the budget lines in PSED 4.

Table 3: Results and financial reporting schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 August 2019</td>
<td>Narrative report and budget monitoring report for Q1 and Q2 prepared by the Maritime Military Adviser and submitted to the Programme Coordinator at the Danish Embassy in Accra. Inputs from implementing entities to be provided to the adviser to facilitate this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 February 2020</td>
<td>Narrative report and budget monitoring report for Q3 and Q4 prepared by the Maritime Military Adviser and submitted to the Programme Coordinator at the Danish Embassy in Accra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 2020</td>
<td>Annual reporting for Year 1 submitted by RDE Accra to the PSF Secretariat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 August 2020</td>
<td>Narrative report and budget monitoring report for Q1 and Q2 prepared by the Maritime Military Adviser and submitted to the Programme Coordinator at the Danish Embassy in Accra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 February 2021</td>
<td>Narrative report and budget monitoring report for Q3 and Q4 prepared by the Maritime Military Adviser and submitted to the Programme Coordinator at the Danish Embassy in Accra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 2021</td>
<td>Annual reporting for Year 2 submitted by RDE Accra to the PSF Secretariat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 August 2021</td>
<td>Narrative report and budget monitoring report for Q1 and Q2 prepared by the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sustainability and exit
The sustainability of capacity development provided through this engagement will be promoted through the pedagogical approaches used by the Danish military trainers, which encourage counterparts to learn and practice relevant skill sets and develop a cadre of instructors able to continue the training (training of trainers). Sustainability will also be promoted through the engagement’s synergies with other parts of the GoG MSP, notably PSE 1 (UNODC – legal support), which aim to strengthen the application of legislation in piracy cases. PSE 1 has linkages both to boarding and search capacities and the operation of the regional centres (MMCCs) that support Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). As part of the political dialogue with Ghana and Nigeria counterparts, DCD and the Danish Embassies in Accra and Abuja will underline the importance of ensuring national capacities are institutionalised to ensure that capacity is not lost upon Danish exit. Progress in these regards will be reported in the regular narrative reports.

Monitoring and Evaluation
SOCUM and Danish Navy personnel implementing the engagement in the region will provide day-to-day monitoring of the activities for which they are responsible. The monitoring will feed into the reporting arrangements described above.

Monitoring will include assessment of any changes in the context, risks and assumptions.

A Mid Term Review (MTR) will be held in early/mid 2020 and this will assess the engagement’s progress, opportunities and challenges alongside other parts of the GoG MSP. The MTR will report and make recommendations that can include adjustments to the engagement and come up with recommendations for Danish extension of or exit from the programme.

Public Diplomacy
In relation to external communication, the Defence Command Denmark and the Maritime Military Adviser will promote the activities and achievements of PSED 4 by for example use of external media, such as active posture on social media, writing articles, promoting activities at events like Danish Maritime Days and other conferences, contributing to content to the ministries websites etc. Activities and achievements should also communicated to the parliamentary parties that have signed up to the Danish Defence Agreement. Communication regarding the overall project should, when possible, be coordinated with the Ministry of Defence.

These inputs will also be supported by the M&E Coordinator in Accra as described in the GoG MSP communication plan (please see Annex 7 to the Programme Document).

Prerequisites
None
Annex A

Danish Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme, Phase 2, 2019-2021

PSE 4 – Maritime Domain Awareness and Operational Response

Background note prepared by Defence Command Denmark

Introduction
PSE 4 aims to strengthen the operational capacity of Gulf of Guinea countries to monitor and mitigate security threats in the maritime domain and contribute to maritime governance, including rule of law (e.g. though strengthening forensic evidence collection). It will focus on (a) maritime operational planning training and practice with the aim to ensure a more effective utilisation of the maritime situation picture leading to timely decision making as part of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and (b) Boarding procedures and practice to strengthen boarding, search and seizure skills, human rights observance, Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) and Tactical Exploration Operation (TEO). The intention is to provide a linked process that both enhances operational capacities and the ability to plan for their employment through joining up with other partners and utilising Danish Navy capacities in relation to (a) and Danish maritime special forces (SOF) in relation to (b). The engagement includes minor unattributed funds (DKK 1,0 million) and funding for the Danish maritime military adviser in Abuja. The latter are also described in this document.

PSE 4 is in line with the Strategy for the Danish Anti-Piracy Effort 2015-2018 and its successor, the Priority paper for the Danish efforts to combat piracy and other types of maritime crime, 2019-2022. The paper outlines Denmark's strategic priorities for combating piracy and other types of maritime crime from 2019-2022. As stated in the paper, the overall objective of Denmark's efforts to combat piracy and maritime crime is to reduce the threat stemming from these issues in order to protect Danish interests and seafarers as well as international shipping, including in the Gulf of Guinea.

Background
PSE 4 assumes that MDA in West Africa can be promoted through effective exchange and use of the maritime data available, including through enhanced responses from military and civil law enforcement actors in line with international commitments and the regional structures now developing. The latter derive from the overarching regional strategy provided by ECOWAS (the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy – EIMS), which is itself consistent with the AU Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS), and responds also to relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs 2018 and 2039). Given the cross border nature of maritime crime, ECOWAS also cooperates with ECCAS in Central Africa and

---

15 Maritime Domain Awareness is defined by the International Maritime Organization as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment. MDA involves the potential for early identification of any threat at sea, which is important for a state's ability to take action proactively. Consequently, MDA plays an important role in combatting piracy and armed robbery at sea.
the Gulf of Guinea Commission via the so-called Yaoundé process, which has the aim of ensuring that the Gulf of Guinea is covered by a coherent maritime governance and operational response.

The 2013 Yaoundé Code of Conduct focuses on six pillars: (1) common information management; (2) local surveillance measures; (3) legal and functional harmonisation of maritime operations; (4) self-financing through a Community tax; (5) purchase and maintenance of equipment dedicated to the strategy; and (6) the institutionalization of a maritime conference for Central Africa. In support of the operational aspects of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, a regional architecture is being established based on an Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC in Yaoundé, two regional maritime operation centres (one in West Africa (called CRESMAO in Abidjan) and one in Central Africa (called CRESMAC in Point Noire), a series of Multinational Maritime Cooperation Centres (MMCC) based on a zonal approach through which coastal states are grouped into five zones. The MMCC are serviced by national Maritime Operation Centre (MOC). The overall purpose of this arrangement is to provide a mechanism whereby maritime information can be passed to neighbouring states and responses to illegal activity, environmental threats and other incidents that may arise can be coordinated. As states’ territorial waters and economic zones can easily be transited and as states’ capacity to respond operationally varies, it is recognized that a regional approach is required.

The Inter Regional Coordination Centre (ICC), which is in the process of being fully established, has been given the task of coordinating this work but there is still some way to go and the capacity varies greatly from one country to another, as does the nature of the maritime threat. International support is being provided through the G7++ FOGG (Friends of Gulf of Guinea) initiative but this has yet to translate into a robust and coordinated arrangement. In the absence of this, international partners are helping to promote key capacities, including in terms of maritime governance (EU, IMO, UNODC) and operations (US, France, UK). In relation to the former, the EU’s GOGIN programme seeks to help develop the Yaoundé architecture and will shortly be joined by further EU support through the programme: Support to West Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (SWAIMS). In relation to the latter, United States Naval Forces Africa (US NAVAF) and several likeminded countries and African partner states have regularly held an exercise series called OBANGAME EXPRESS, which enables coastal states to practice a wide range of MDA and operational responses. France also provides operational training through its regional naval presence and other activities like the exercise NEMO series. Likewise, the UK supports primarily on-shore training of maritime capabilities.

West African coastal states’ naval and coastguard capabilities are generally low outside of territorial waters. Coverage improves in proximity to the coastline and, where applicable, to offshore installations. Other operational constraints include low standards of operational readiness of military and civil maritime vessels and crews. This can be due to poor maintenance and shortages of basic materials, such as fuel. The effect of this varies, but generally, it reduces the number and readiness of vessels able to go to sea.

Ghana’s navy has received notable upgrades since the discovery of offshore oil deposits. Ghana Navy has several newer patrol vessels and has plans to purchase additional vessels. Four small patrol boats were commissioned last year (donated by China). The operations pattern is primarily focused on the protection of the off shore industries and try to have 24/7 coverage of the large western oil fields. As for the eastern part of its The Territorial Water (TTW) patrols are conducted but on an irregular basis.

---

16 The zones most relevant for PSE 4 are zones E (that includes Nigeria) and F (that includes Ghana). The MMCCs for these zones are located in Benin and Ghana respectively.

17 The Territorial Waters is a belt of coastal waters extending at most 12 nautical miles from the baseline (usually the mean low-water mark) of a coastal state. The territorial sea is regarded as the sovereign territory of the state, although foreign
Nigeria's navy is by far the largest in the region and has a relatively large number of assets available. These include patrol boats for riverine operations throughout the Niger Delta as well as larger ships for offshore operations. Nevertheless, the navy has long suffered from a lack of funding and is currently stretched by operations against crude oil theft and insurgent operations in the Niger Delta. Moreover, many vessels are not or barely operational. Security agencies are likely to continue to focus their efforts on inshore operations related to the challenges of oil theft in the short term. They have four Ocean Patrol Vessels (OPV) and a variety of Fast Attack boats active and three reserve ships plus a larger number of small gunboats and zodiacs. Even though operations continue to be hampered by a lack of intelligence, operational readiness and training (basic to advanced), capabilities are improving and the Nigerian Navy is increasingly likely to mobilise a vessel or respond to incidents if a naval vessel is in the general vicinity.

**Previous Danish support and lessons learned**

Denmark has since 2016 had a maritime security engagement in West Africa – the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme (2016-2018), funded via the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF). The programme included two engagements: supporting (a) the EU GOGIN programme and (b) port security through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) West Africa Trust Fund. Since 2016 the Danish Defence has also implemented a number of ad-hoc activities:

In relation to operational planning:

- The Danish Navy has contributed to the exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS series in various maritime operations centers. The Naval Staff conducted Maritime Operations Planning Courses in 2017 and 2018 to improve the ability of the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea to plan maritime operations - in cooperation with the other coastal states in the region, as well as nationally. The courses were planned, prepared and implemented in collaboration with US NAVAF, the Interregional Coordination Center (ICC) and in 2018 the French Navy. The Danish naval staff has been responsible for the academic and educational part of the courses, while US NAVAF has been responsible for the logistical and administrative framework. The activity was done in 2017 at ICC in Cameroon but has in 2018 been finalized on board the French helicopter carrier MISTRAL. The course included participation of approx. 30 West African naval and coast guard personnel from 19 countries. In 2018 personnel from ICC and instructor students, who were the course participants from the previous course, were involved in the planning and implementation of the course, in order to support regional ownership and build instructor capabilities, and to better take into account regional needs and wishes. This has clearly demonstrated that the concept has proved effective and should be used in the future.

- In relation to ECOWAS, Danish Ministry of Defence funds were used to fill a gap in GiZ support to ECOWAS/ICC which is promoting the operationalization of the Multinational Maritime Cooperation Centre (MMCC) in Zone E (Benin) and Zone F (Ghana), the regional multinational center (CRESMAO) in Côte d'Ivoire and most recently Zone G (Capo Verde). Denmark provided funding for the construction and installation of an HF/MF mast at the Cape Verde Center and installation of the German sponsored radio equipment.

In relation to operational response:

ships (military and civilian) are allowed innocent passage through it, or transit passage for straits; this sovereignty also extends to the airspace over and seabed below.
• The Danish Special Operations Command provided education and training support in 2016 (pilot project), 2017 and 2018, covering staff methodology, law of war, evidence collection as well as technical and tactical training in boarding, close combat, crime scene investigation, extended first aid, tactical sanitation and landing. The training has been provided during OBANGAME EXPRESS in Cameroon in partnership with the United States, the Netherlands and Norway. Since 2016, this initiative has included around 214 participants from the Nigerian Navy Special Boat Service (NN SBS), Cameroon's Battalion Intervention Rapid (BIR), Cameroon’s Compagnie des Palmeurs et Nageurs (COPALCO) and Compagnie Special de Protection de L'Societe National de Reffinerie (CSPS).

• Danish maritime Special Forces have collaborated with the United States Marine Corps Forces, Europe and Africa, and their Security Cooperation Engagement Plan with Cameroon Naval Infantry and conducted education and training of Cameroon’s Compagnie des Palmeurs et Nageurs (COPALCO) in 2016, 2017 and 2018. The activity initially included education and training in combat swimming and landing over the beach procedure and in 2018 also entry/boarding as well as navigation. The approach to these activities has been that Denmark has supplied most of the instructors and the US has supplied logistics. The level of activity has been adjusted continuously and over the period of the engagement a group of Cameroon instructors have been trained who during the last two events have been acting as instructors with support from Danish instructors in previously taught disciplines. All efforts contribute to the ability of the units to professionally interfere with maritime criminal activities in the Gulf of Guinea. The engagements have had positive results in terms of an increasing ability among local instructors.

Overview of the proposed support in 2019-2021
This engagement has the objective that the Capacity of regional actors to respond to piracy, robbery at sea and other threats to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea strengthened. It will utilise Danish Defence resources to contribute to this objective in two specific areas:

• Outcome 1: Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness capacity (MDA), cooperation and interoperability amongst West African coastal states. Denmark will contribute to this through the provision of technical support to increasing operational planning capacities of West African coastal states via the exercise series OBANGAME EXPRESS.

• Outcome 2: Capacity of Nigerian and Ghanaian maritime law enforcement agencies to respond to piracy and armed robbery at sea enhanced in line with international standards and rule of law. Denmark will contribute to this outcome through the provision of specialist training in Boarding procedures through (a) OBANGAME EXPRESS and (b) joint support to more advanced training of Nigerian and Ghanaian personnel jointly with partners, such as UK and/or US.

It should be noted that discussions are continuing with close partners on parts of this engagement and that its final form will need to take account of these partners’ final plans. The engagement will be updated accordingly as a result.

Vetting of training audience will be done by the US in activities conducted in the framework of the US such as OBANGAME EXPRESS and the Maritime Operations Planning Courses. Activities outside
partner vetting framework have to be included in the preparation phase and vetting approved by Defence Command Denmark.

**Justification for continued Danish support**

Regarding operational planning and MDA, there is a need to promote effective use of the data that is available. One key contributor to this is through the development and use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) based on standards & data requirements so that Maritime Operational Centre (MOC), Multinational Maritime Cooperation Centre (MMCC) etc. can talk to one another in real time. It is important that national MOC and MMCC can interoperate so that response can be coordinated between countries (e.g. hot pursuit).

Currently only the MMCC in Zone D (in Cameroun) has reached full operational capability, while the pilot MMCC in Zone E (Benin) has an initial operational capability and the MMCC in Zone F (Ghana) has been established and equipped but still only manned by Ghanaians. Interoperability and cooperation between the MMCC are therefore at the moment on a minimum level and primarily consists of irregular telephone communication. At this stage, no real time Maritime Situation Picture is exchanged between the MMCC. Maritime Operational Planning is not yet underway at Zone level due to the lack of procedures, agreements between Zone members and institutionalised planning tools. This severely limits the possibility for joint operational responses in relation to threats that transit from one country’s territorial waters to another.

The theory of change is that if procedures are developed promoting effective and efficient interaction between national, zonal and regional centres, and that relevant personnel are trained in their use, then the effectiveness of responses to maritime incidents (including piracy and robbery at sea) will improve leading to a more cohesive response to incidents, including cases that transit from one country’s territorial waters to another or in cases where a country lacks timely and sufficient responses, ultimately leading to a reduction in such incidents thereby facilitating safer international sea-borne trade and economic growth.

Assumptions and pre-conditions are that suitable West African units are available to be trained and that Denmark has a framework within which to fit (i.e. from a partner country e.g. US via OBANGAME EXPRESS). It is also important that the ICC take ownership and develops its training coordination role with MMCC/CRESMAO etc. It is ICC plus national instructor capacities that will be trained through the Danish engagement. A further assumption is that West African coastal states civil and military maritime platforms have at least a minimum of operational readiness.

Regarding response, all countries in the Gulf of Guinea have operational effectiveness constraints resulting from weak command and control, poorly maintained platforms, training and logistics affecting their operational readiness and capacity. Personnel are frequently rotated and it appears relatively rare that they train and operate as formed units for a sustained period. In Nigeria, this is to some extent mitigated through the use of Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSO) where civil maritime escorts operate with military personnel on board for a fee that is paid by shipping/oil companies. While providing greater effectiveness, such solutions are controversial as there appear to be unclear rules of engagement and the initiative diverts trained manpower resources away from regular Nigerian Navy platforms.

As noted above, piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea shows an increasing tendency towards violent attacks, including hijacking and kidnapping. In such cases, law enforcement units need
to be able to adopt appropriate responses. Opposed boarding requires military/law enforcement personnel with required skills and equipment. A key issue here is that training for such units should reflect expected deployment priorities (i.e. that the right people are trained and will be used in a boarding and search role). Likewise, it is important that such units fit within an integrated maritime structure with standards for command and control and linkages to law enforcement agencies/prosecution systems. If Denmark assists through training boarding personnel, it will also be necessary to include training in human rights safeguards.

While Special Forces would be a suitable option for boarding operations, it is understood that in most cases ships’ crews are used in this role and that the level of competence varies. Embarked guards, whether supplied by private security companies or by government security forces, are unlikely to be an effective deterrent against determined attackers seeking to kidnap crew members or hijack vessels for the purpose of cargo theft. Attackers have successfully boarded vessels defended by embarked detachments in the past. They have killed members of the protection details, caused damage to the vessel in addition to crew members having been killed or injured in the crossfire. There is thus a need to strengthen Boarding capacities also in opposed boarding situations.

From a legal perspective, it is essential that boarding operations protect and collect evidence that can later be used during prosecution. From a human rights perspective, it is important that boarding take place with regard to ensuring the human rights of individuals and that Rules of Engagement (RoE) take this aspect into account.

The theory of change for a Danish contribution to operational response is that if operational capabilities relating to vessel boarding and search are enhanced (in both opposed and unopposed situations), then national civil and military responses will be strengthened (including coordination between them), leading to an improvement in the apprehension of persons and vessels suspected of illegal activity, operations that are founded on the application of the rule of law and in line with international standards, and the collection of evidence that can be used in possible prosecution.

Assumptions and pre-conditions relating to response include that such (special) units are available to be trained and that Denmark has a framework within which to fit (i.e. from a partner country, e.g. US, UK). In the case of US NAVAF OBANGAME EXPRESS, the aim will be to engage Danish maritime SOF in a particular part of the training. It is expected that anti-piracy parts of the exercise will be most relevant for zones E and F – e.g., Nigeria. It is also expected that OBANGAME EXPRESS 2019 will involve training in Nigeria and in 2020 in Ghana. Denmark will work for response training in the same place each year (e.g. at Nigeria Joint Maritime Security Training Center (JMSTC) in Lagos).

**Overview of Outcome 1 – Operational planning capacity enhanced**

The results expected from Outcome 1 are set out below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 1</th>
<th>Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness capacity, cooperation and interoperability amongst West African coastal states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome indicator</td>
<td>Extent and quality of MDA, especially operation planning and decision making, along with regional/national interaction leading to operational response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>Limited real time sharing of MDA data 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year</td>
<td>Coastal states in Zones E, F &amp; G access and share MDA data and utilise it effectively in operational planning (as tested in multilateral maritime security exercises) 2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Output 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output indicator</th>
<th>ICC and West African coastal states under CRESMAO have agreed tactical procedures to ensure communication and coordination of operational planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output indicator</td>
<td>Status and usage of a “West African Regional planning process” based on the “6-stage tactical estimate process”, which is a joint operations planning tool that consists of procedures, explanations, examples and templates for operational planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 1</td>
<td>2019 Draft ICC SOP operational planning process produced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 2</td>
<td>2020 ICC SOP for operational planning approved and in use; Draft ICC SOP operational information sharing produced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 3</td>
<td>2021 ICC SOP for operational planning process and information sharing in use</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Output 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output indicator</th>
<th>ICC has developed relevant training material for maritime operation planning based upon agreed SOP on operational planning process and information sharing.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>2018 None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 1</td>
<td>2019 Basic training by ICC/member states undertaken based on generic SOP “6-stage tactical estimate process”, draft curriculum prepared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 2</td>
<td>2020 Course material developed and handed over to the ICC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 3</td>
<td>2021 In use for ICC training amongst zonal MMCC &amp; CRESMAO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Output 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output indicator</th>
<th>Regional (and national) capacity to provide training in maritime operational planning enhanced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Year</td>
<td>2018 DNK, US NAVAF and FRA are in full (logistics, instructors etc.) providing the course (workshop)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 1</td>
<td>2019 DNK, US NAVAF and other partners support (logistics, instructors etc.) the Maritime Operations Planning Workshop (MOPW) (conducted as a course)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 2</td>
<td>2020 DNK, US NAVAF and other partners support and mentor (logistics, instructors etc.) the MOPW course (workshop)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Year 3</td>
<td>2021 ICC/state instructors provide training (DNK as observer/QA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Danish contribution to operational planning through the exercise series OBANGAME EXPRESS will promote more effective use of the maritime domain awareness data available, including its communication from one country to the next in a manner that is cohesive and useful. This contribution will take the form of training to ensure participants have the basic knowledge and skills necessary to act as maritime planning staff officers at a tactical and operational level, in a multinational maritime context or component (e.g. CTF\(^{18}\) or CTG\(^{19}\)) where English is the working language. In addition, it will provide participants with the opportunity of building relationships and networks across countries, in order to enhance the level of trust and cooperation between the coastal states in the region.

The exercise is designed to address identified technical needs amongst participants. OBANGAME EXPRESS pursues its goal by creating realistic scenarios around a hijacked vessel or a vessel involved in unlawful act. Maritime Operation Centres are challenged to properly identify the

\(^{18}\) Commander Task force.
\(^{19}\) Commander Task Group.
incident and share the information with the other Maritime Operation Centres along the coast. The maritime forces of the individual countries are also challenged in their allocated zones as well as their ability to find and secure evidence to subsequently prosecute illegal activity. The education uses exercises in boarding procedures and techniques (see outcome 2). At the same time, emphasis is placed on assessing and improving the response units' response capacity for maritime intervention as well as planning operations and coordination with Maritime Operations Centres. Finally the aim is to build training units in order that the units can then pass on learned technical and tactical skills to their own units. In this way, the exercise provides linkages between MOCs, MMCCs, CRESMAO and the ICC. It will strengthen the ICC’s role in establishing a common system linking national and regional capacities.

This engagement will focus on the prioritised zones of the overall programme being zone E (that includes Nigeria) and F (that includes Ghana). The MMCCs for these zones are located in Benin and Ghana respectively. The perspective of the engagement is both national-, multinational- and regional. An important facilitator for the training will be the production of suitable training material based upon standard operating procedures (SOPs), which will require involvement of the ICC, CRESMAO and MMCCs.

Denmark’s contribution to this outcome area will be provided by Danish Navy experts with relevant operational experience in MDA and in planning and exercises who will be deployed to the region during the exercise and course period. Denmark will also contribute to the development of the SOP and training material, which may require additional visits to the region. This support will be coordinated by the Maritime Military Adviser in consultation with the ICC, US NAVAF, and Danish authorities.

**Overview of Outcome 2 – Operational responses enhanced**

The results expected from Outcome 2 are set out below. Nb. Precise targets will be set following further discussions amongst partners during 2019.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 2</th>
<th>Capacity of Nigerian and Ghanaian maritime law enforcement agencies to respond to piracy and armed robbery at sea enhanced in line with international standards and rule of law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome indicator</td>
<td>Extent and quality (response time, quality of boarding and evidence collection) of regional/national response to piracy, robbery at sea and other maritime security incidents increased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 1</th>
<th>Nigerian and Ghanaian navy and law enforcement agencies trained in vessel boarding and related aspects (eg securing evidence, human rights) as part of a rule of law-based response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output indicator</td>
<td>Number NIG and GH trainers trained (Train-The-Trainers) by Danish instructors within an international capacity building framework at international standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This outcome area foresees a continuation of Danish special operations forces training of local partner units from Nigeria and Ghana under OBANGAME EXPRESS. The precise details for this will be decided in conjunction with US NAVAF and other partners during the regular exercise planning meetings. Between the annual exercises, the Special Operations Command monitors the needs of the units for further training, including "train-the-trainer" within Boarding procedures and techniques. The overall theme of the exercises and education is planning, coordination and execution of operations in order to expand partner units' ability to self-educate and practice their own units and soldiers to take care of maritime security. The engagement will use the following steps: Assess, Train, Advise, Assist (ATAA) and at a later stage could include Accompany (ATTA (A)).

The support is expected to:

- Contribute to the development of a training unit at the Nigerian Navy and / or Ghana Navy and / or other law enforcement agencies in order for the units to then pass on learned technical and tactical skills to its own units and soldiers.
- Enhance the ability of staff officers to plan and carry out operations according to the teaching staffed methodology.
- Strengthen the ability of the staff to comply with the Rule of Law and to act in and out of national waters.
- Strengthen the ability of specialists and units to carry out boarding according to the unit’s Standard Operational Procedures.

It is planned that the support will be provided by the Danish Defence through two activity streams; (a) via exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS (also referred to as part 1) and (b) through a joint (or possibly bilateral) contribution to advanced training (also referred to as part 2).

In relation to (a), OBANGAME EXPRESS is carried out each year according to a model using instructor support for staff duty, technical and tactical training and a final exercise. Activity planning takes place at the planning conferences in close strategic and tactical collaboration with partners such as the United States and the Netherlands.

The technical and tactical training is typically conducted for approx. 20-30 students from various African countries including the Nigerian Navy Special Boat Service and Ghana Navy. Subjects are identified during the planning conferences in dialogue with the African units and are typically in the areas of boarding, close quarter combat, first aid and movement against designated targets. Elements of pioneer service and investigation using evidence are included as an integral part of the relevant topics. Principle of legal certainty, correct execution of official duty, humanitarian law and international law are introduced and emphasized in teaching, both in staff and in tactical training. Education in staff duty is typically conducted for 18 instructor students. The education consists of a theoretical review of each element in the planning process, followed by a practical group assignment.

The education in staffing duty ends with the completion of a full planning cycle with a command briefing by the students as a whole staff. Education in staff duty and tactical education concludes with an exercise part where the instructors test and observe the cooperation between staff and units in the ability to conduct operations.

In relation to (b), the intention is to collaborate with the US or UK following a concrete field assessment in Nigeria or Ghana. The purpose of the activity is threefold: 1) To gain experience in training the units in an existing framework, 2) To continue and focus capacity building implemented
during the capacity building exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS and 3) Provide Danish Capacity Building in Nigeria and / or Ghana.

Being concerned with more advanced training, this part may include instructor capacity in close quarter battle, tactical sanitation, boarding, basic military skills, and law of war. All disciplines complement the education efforts annually delivered to the unit during its annual participation in OBANGAME EXPRESS.

- A pre-condition for this activity could be a legal agreement with Nigeria and Ghana, as well as US or other partner's engagement programming with the Nigerian or Ghanaian partners that can provide a suitable framework. In this respect, it is relevant that UK and US have delayed further training and support for the Nigerian Navy Special Boat Service (NN SBS) until the latter's tasks, organization and method of insertion in operations have been clarified by the Nigerian Navy Staff. For these reasons, Danish capacity building of NN SBS could therefore not be undertaken in 2018 and it remains unclear exactly when realistic arrangements will be in place to facilitate it in the near future, except during exercises as the frame. For the time-being, the UK (British Military Advisory and Training Team - BMATT) is focusing on the Nigerian Navy ships and is only delivering boat handling to the NN SBS. Based on the outstanding’s and considerations consultation with other partners regarding joint engagement programming with the Nigerian or Ghanaian units will be done and it is expected that the outcome will be activity agreement with individual recipient countries and partners.

The Danish contribution to this outcome area will be provided by SOCOM. The precise arrangements will be coordinated with the Maritime Military Adviser in conjunction with relevant national authorities in Ghana and Nigeria, partners, Defence Command Denmark and other Danish Defence authorities.

Indicative activities for Outcome 1 and 2 see Annex 2.

**Military Maritime Adviser, Abuja**

The Maritime Military Advisor also acts as Defence Attaché to Nigeria (and is also expected to be accredited to Ghana and ECOWAS in the future). As such, the Advisor is part of the overall staff at the Danish Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria and is posted under the Special Attaché Order and administratively under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Danish Defence as an employer. The Danish Defence therefore pays a settlement fee to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which covers the administrative costs relating to the Maritime Military Advisor.

The Adviser’s main task is to follow military and defence and security policy developments in Nigeria, Ghana and the region closely, including with particular focus on maritime safety and security. The Advisor also ensures knowledge of how general political and economic developments affect security policy and are embodied in defence policies. The Adviser keeps the Ministry of Defence and subordinate authorities informed about defence-related and security policy issues, especially maritime, provide assistance to the defence authorities, in the host country Nigeria, regional organizations such as

---

20 It cannot be ruled out that Denmark can initiate Part 2 alone if the opportunity arises. However, this will require a bilateral activity agreement with the individual recipient countries (MIL / MIL discussions) and assessment of the financial conditions by completing Part 2 alone.
ICC, ECOWAS and ECCAS, and act as link, and provide appropriate support to relevant individuals and delegations in connection with meetings, courses and the like in Nigeria and, if possible, in other parts of West Africa, and serves as an adviser on defence matters to the Embassy and other Danish embassies/representations in the Gulf of Guinea area. A further key role for the Advisor is to liaise with Nigerian authorities and other partners, including international partners, and to gather knowledge, assess and report on the conditions in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea in order to advise both military and civilian partners in relation to maritime security in the region. This includes in relation to the current Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme.21

Unattributed funds
Given the unpredictability of the current planning environment, PSE 4 includes minor unallocated funds in order to enable the engagement to complete not yet finalised arrangements (e.g. in relation to outcomes 1 and 2 above) and to exploit emerging windows of opportunity in line with the engagement objectives. The amount of unattributed funds will be DKK 1,0 million over the three years.

Decisions to commit funds to an activity will be made by Defence Command Denmark in collaboration with the Danish Embassy in Accra, the Danish Ministry of Defence and the Maritime Military Adviser. Activities under the unattributed funds that might be actuated will be transferred into the results framework of PSE 4 format.

At the present time, possible initiatives include:

- **Establish basis for operational planning needs.** This activity envisages that the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC) supports the implementing partner for Engagement 3 in conducting an annual regional seminar to establish a firm basis for operational planning. Participants will be officials, navies, coast guards/maritime police etc. This activity will be developed further during 2019 once the implementer for PSE 3 is clear.

- **Training Adviser from KAIPTC to ICC.** Denmark has received an official request to send a Training Adviser/Mentor to ICC for 6 months to provide training expertise to and share experiences with the Head of Training Division of the Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC) in its support to Member States in fighting maritime crimes and ensuring maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea Region, and to offer standardized and harmonized training to maritime professionals. It is envisaged that KAIPTC will be the implementing partner providing the expert. This gives the engagement regional ownership and legitimacy. KAIPTC and ICC have signed a MoU that specifically supports this type of engagement. In order to pursue this further, consultations are required with ICC and KAIPTC and will be undertaken in 2019.

- **Denmark Host Nation for OBANGAME EXPRESS Main Planning Event in 2020 or 2021.** Denmark has offered US NAVAF, who is responsible for the planning of OBANGAME EXPRESS, to host the Main Planning Event in 2020 or 2021. US NAVAF have agreed to pass this offer to USAFRICOM who makes the decision. It is expected that the go/no go will be available early in 2019. One purpose of this engagement is to demonstrate Denmark’s full support and give African maritime actors a possibility to learn and see more of Danish solutions to maritime issues. This activity awaits approval by US NAVAF/AFRICOM, which is expected in early 2019.

21 Terms of reference for the Maritime Military Advisor are attached at annex 3.
• **UK Navy/BMATT, USN or French Navy cooperation that may arise.** Denmark has engaged with France, US NAVAF and the UK/BMATT to identify areas of cooperation. No concrete activities have been identified yet but it is still possible that FR, US or UK will engage in a program with either Nigerian Navy or Ghana Navy and Denmark can join. It is expected that possible US identified projects will be available in early 2019. As for the UK there is no indication of when they will be able to offer joint projects. France has offered Denmark to participate in their Nemo exercises, but the terms must be investigated further (aim, focus, geographic etc.). All potential partners are fully aware of the offer from Denmark to cooperate and support their possible emerging activities with the Nigerian Navy and/or Ghanaian Navy. This engagement awaits further discussions with France, US NAVAF and the UK (BMATT Nigeria).

**Management**

PSE 4 will have a close programmatic follow up by Defence Command Denmark and Ministry of Defence (especially through the Maritime Military Advisor). The day-to-day management will rest with the Maritime Military Advisor in close cooperation with Defence Command Denmark, especially on financial issues. The Advisor will refer to the Programme owner, which is Embassy in Accra, Ghana and will support the Programme owner in relation to the overall Programme implementation. The Maritime Military Advisor will be Project Manager for PSE 4.

• Outcome 1 will be implemented by the Royal Danish Navy Command
• Outcome 2 will be implemented by SOCOM

Reporting will be done by the implementing entity on each Outcome to the Project Manager utilising the PSF M & E reporting directive/form. The Project Manager will generate a consolidated report for PSE 4 in accordance with PSF M&E reporting directive/form to the Programme owner. Before submitting the report to the Programme owner the Project Manager will consult the Defence Command Denmark. Reporting will be done in accordance with the reporting instructions laid out in the overall Programme Document or when initiated by the Programme owner.

Financial input to all PSE 4 Reports will be generated by the implementing entities via Defence Command Denmark to the Project Manager. Decisions to initiate an activity from the unattributed funds will be made by the Defence Command Denmark in consultation with the Ministry of Defence and the Project Manager for PSE 4 and reported to the Programme owner and an updated PSE 4 will be issued.

**Budget (DKK M)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.1</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.2</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,322</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1.3</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2.1</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>2,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

22 Might be back to back with Work Shop on SOP operational planning in 2019
A more detailed budget is attached at Annex 1.

**Risks**

Improving maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea presents a range of risks, including corrupt practices, security, and cross-country cooperation challenges, which the Programme will need to take into consideration. These are concerned with:

- Lack of will of the regional bodies and Yaoundé Code of Conduct signatory countries to coordinate, collaborate and share information.
- Lack of will of the countries and regional organisations in the Gulf of Guinea region to move the Yaoundé Code of Conduct process forward and allocate the required resources to the operationalisation of the agreed structure including zonal and regional centres.
- Insufficient donor coordination. In spite of the G7-based forum in place coordination with other development partner initiatives needs to be prioritised and closely monitored.
- Delays building a network in the region, including with potential donors and government partners take time. For Denmark, especially in Nigeria, this necessitates working through or with partners in order to ensure implementation within the programme period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contextual Risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Context: Gulf of Guinea</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk factor</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Background to assessment</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Background to assessment</th>
<th>Risk response if applicable/potential effect on development cooperation in context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yaoundé process delayed limiting the ability of ensuring MDA and cooperation on response in programme period</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>All countries have agreed to the implementation of the Yaoundé process. While full process may not be enabled, zonal, regional centres and ICC are established and 5/8 have reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC).</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>Support to zone E, zone F, ICC and ECOWAS will ensure a minimum MDA while Yaoundé is being built</td>
<td>Continue financial support and policy dialogue with Yaoundé partners and through membership in G7++FoGG to emphasise need for Yaoundé implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific risk of lack of involvement of Nigeria and in cooperation with neighbours</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Nigeria is improving its involvement and are under pressure from its neighbours to stay committed but at a very slow pace</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Support to zone E, zone F, ICC and ECOWAS will have positive impact on Nigeria</td>
<td>Priority given to zone E, zone F, ICC and ECOWAS and Nigerian Maritime Governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Programmatic Risks |

---

23 Pending approval of the MoD otherwise 15.
### Title: Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk factor</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Background to assessment of likelihood</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Background to assessment of potential impact</th>
<th>Risk response</th>
<th>Combined residual risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program not fully coordinated with other initiatives in GoG</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>The range of initiatives and implementing entities in the region is massive and no formal coordinating forum</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>Denmark and implementing partners are actively engaged in coordination and harmonisation</td>
<td>Closely monitor implementation and continue dialogue with G7++FoGG and other forums to emphasise need for coordination and harmonisation</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners in Yaoundé do not provide needed funding for implementation</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>All partners have signed and agreed to Yaoundé process. First budget for ICC has been approved by ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC.</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Non-donor funding needed for centres to reach Final Operational Capability (FOC) and ensure sustainability</td>
<td>Continue financial support and policy dialogue with Yaoundé partners and through membership in G7++FoGG to emphasise need for Yaoundé implementation</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy and SOCOM can not deliver support due to other engagements</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Both have relatively small contributions and that might be covered by reservists.</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Outcome 1 output 3 will not be accomplished.</td>
<td>Re-allocate funding within the PSE.</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US NAVAF change priority – no support for MOPW - OE terminated</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>US NAVAF have already indicated that this is a priority.</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana and/or Nigeria training in Outcome 2 Output 1 Part 2 not initiated</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>US NAVAF have identified training gaps and needs from the two countries.</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>Denmark and partners are actively engaged in coordination and harmonisation</td>
<td>Part 1 of Outcome 2 Output 1 will be adjusted up</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing Agreements covering safety and legal aspect protecting personnel implementing engagements not negotiated and signed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Using Note Verbal exchange or Part 1 of Outcome 2 Output 1 will be adjusted up</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Institutional Risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk factor</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Background to assessment of likelihood</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Background to assessment of potential impact</th>
<th>Risk response</th>
<th>Combined residual risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Risks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program not fully coordinated with other initiatives in GoG</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>The range of initiatives and implementing entities in the region is massive and no formal coordinating forum</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>Denmark and implementing partners are actively engaged in coordination and harmonisation</td>
<td>Closely monitor implementation and continue dialogue with G7++FoGG and other forums to emphasise need for coordination and harmonisation</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partners in Yaoundé do not provide needed funding for implementation</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>All partners have signed and agreed to Yaoundé process. First budget for ICC has been approved by ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC.</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Non-donor funding needed for centres to reach Final Operational Capability (FOC) and ensure sustainability</td>
<td>Continue financial support and policy dialogue with Yaoundé partners and through membership in G7++FoGG to emphasise need for Yaoundé implementation</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy and SOCOM can not deliver support due to other engagements</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Both have relatively small contributions and that might be covered by reservists.</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Outcome 1 output 3 will not be accomplished.</td>
<td>Re-allocate funding within the PSE.</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US NAVAF change priority – no support for MOPW - OE terminated</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>US NAVAF have already indicated that this is a priority.</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana and/or Nigeria training in Outcome 2 Output 1 Part 2 not initiated</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>US NAVAF have identified training gaps and needs from the two countries.</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>Denmark and partners are actively engaged in coordination and harmonisation</td>
<td>Part 1 of Outcome 2 Output 1 will be adjusted up</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing Agreements covering safety and legal aspect protecting personnel implementing engagements not negotiated and signed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Using Note Verbal exchange or Part 1 of Outcome 2 Output 1 will be adjusted up</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Institutional Risks**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Minor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementing partners in general have a long tracked record of cooperation with Denmark and the risk therefore unlikely but some partners might shift priority and focus affecting some engagements, specially defence engagements</td>
<td>Implementing partners, based on a long tracked record of cooperation, in time and in a flexible will mitigate allowing Denmark to respond in cooperation with the implementing partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark will in close cooperation with the implementing partners re-plan activities within and in line with the scope of the engagement</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX 1

### Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 1 - MDA</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC Work Shop SOP</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,324</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional curriculum development</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training, Mentoring and Evaluation of MOPW at one MOC/MMCC planning staff</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Mentoring at one MOC/MMCC (MDA and SOF Operation)</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC MOPW GoG</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome 2 - RESPONSE</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 2.1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boarding Training (ITT)(VBBS) and Evaluation with international partner using Obangame Express</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 1</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part 2</td>
<td>0,425</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1 and Outcome 2 Planning conferences</strong></td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBANGAME EXPRESS</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPE/MPE/FPE</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host OE MPE in 2020 or 2021</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maritime Advisor</strong></td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>9,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Salary</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tariff to MoFA</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unallocated</strong></td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- RDDC</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mentor ICC</td>
<td>0,126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK/USN programme</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>5,6</td>
<td>5,1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

24 Might be back to back with WS on SOP operational planning in 2019
25 If possible partners are identified in 2019 training carried out in 20-21.
26 KAIPTC to confirm or PSE 3
Annex 2

Activity plan Outcome 1

**Output 1:** Indicative activities:
2019: Danish Navy conduct an ICC Work Shop with ICC to draft the ICC SOP for maritime operational planning.
2020: Danish Navy conduct an ICC Work Shop with ICC to draft the ICC SOP for maritime information sharing.

**Output 2:** Activities:
2019: Danish Navy support ICC in development of West African Regional curriculum (conducted in connection with MOPW)
2020: Danish Navy support ICC in development of West African Regional curriculum (conducted in connection with MOPW)
2021: Danish Navy conduct an ICC Work Shop with ICC to finalize and hand over the MOPW GOG course including curriculum.

**Output 3:** Indicative activities:

2019:
Obangame Express 2019: Danish Navy conduct - Training, Mentoring and Evaluation of MOPW at one MOC/MMCC planning staff
Obangame Express 2019: Danish Navy conduct - Training and mentoring at one MOC/MMCC (MDA/Maritime Operations Planning) – Danish Navy/SOCOM - Training and mentoring at one MOC/MMCC (SOF Operation)
Danish Navy support MOPW GoG 2019 incl. TTT of regional instructors using draft ICC SOP for maritime operational planning.

2020
Obangame Express 2020: Danish Navy conduct - Training, Mentoring and Evaluation of MOPW at one MOC/MMCC planning staff
Obangame Express 2020: Danish Navy conduct - Training and mentoring at one MOC/MMCC (MDA/Maritime Operations Planning) – Danish Navy/SOCOM - Training and mentoring at one MOC/MMCC (SOF Operation)
Danish Navy support and mentor MOPW GoG 2020 incl. TTT of regional instructors using ICC SOP for maritime operational planning.

2021
Obangame Express 2021: Danish Navy conduct - Training, Mentoring and Evaluation of MOPW at one MOC/MMCC planning staff
Obangame Express 2021: Danish Navy conduct - Training and mentoring at one MOC/MMCC (MDA/Maritime Operations Planning) – Danish Navy/SOCOM - Training and mentoring at one MOC/MMCC (SOF Operation)
Danish Navy mentor and observe ICC MOPW GoG 2021 incl. TTT of regional instructors using ICC SOP for maritime operational planning.
Activity plan Outcome 2

Output 1 Part 1: Indicative activities:

2019: SOCOM conduct Boarding Training (TTT and Evaluation with international partner using Obangame Express 2019 and iaw. with the exercise setup, scenarios and objectives.

2020: SOCOM conduct Boarding Training (TTT) and Evaluation with international partner using Obangame Express 2020 and iaw. with the exercise setup, scenarios and objectives.

Output 1 Part 2: Indicative activities:

2019:
• Obtain experience of training the partners in an existing frame statement.
• Consultation with other partners regarding joint engagement programming with the Nigerian or Ghanaian units.
• Possibility of bilateral activity agreement with individual recipient countries (MIL / MIL discussions) as well as assessment of economic conditions by completing Part 2 alone (in parallel with consultation with other partners).

2020:
• Improve and focus capacity building completed during capacity building exercises OBANGAME EXPRESS
• Provide Danish capacity building in Nigeria and / or Ghana, where the Danish program has its primary focus area

2021:
• Improve and focus capacity building completed during capacity building exercises OBANGAME EXPRESS
• Provide Danish capacity building in Nigeria and / or Ghana, where the Danish program has its primary focus area
Annex 3

Terms of Reference – Maritime Military Advisor to West Africa

Military Maritime Adviser
The Maritime Military Advisor also acts as Defense Attache to Nigeria and, in the long run, also Ghana and ECOWAS.

The Maritime Military Advisor is part of the overall staff at the Danish Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria.

The Maritime Military Advisor is posted under the Special Attache Order and administratively under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Defence Forces as an employer. The Defence Forces therefore pays a settlement fee to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which covers the administrative costs relating to the Maritime Military Advisor.

Denmark's defense cooperation with Nigeria was strengthened in 2017 by the posting of a maritime military adviser accredited as a Defense Attache to Nigeria at the Embassy in Abuja. The background for the establishment of the post is the Danish anti-pirate strategy 2015-2018 and a concerted effort through the theme program "Support for maritime security in Gulf of Guinea" under the Peace and Stabilization Fund (Phase I expired in 2018). Maritime cooperation is therefore the core of Danish-Nigerian defense cooperation and the advisor's work in the region as a whole. The maritime military adviser's main task is to follow military and defense and security policy developments in Nigeria, Ghana and the region closely, including with particular focus on maritime safety and security. The advisor should continuously ensure knowledge of how general political and economic developments affect security policy and are embodied in defense policies. The adviser's task is to keep the Ministry of Defense and the underlying authorities informed about defense-related and security policy issues, especially maritime, provide assistance to the defense authorities, to the host country of Nigeria, regional organizations such as ECOWAS and ECCAS, and act as link, and provide appropriate support to relevant individuals and delegations in connection with meetings, courses and the like in the host country and, if possible, in other parts of West Africa, serve as an adviser on defense matters to the embassy/representation and an advisor in maritime military matters to other Danish embassies/representations in the GoG area.

The maritime military adviser will first and foremost establish a network in the region where the primary cooperation partners are expected to be Nigerian authorities, partners at the Ghana embassy, the EU, international partners such as the US, UK, FR, SP, PO, GE, international organizations such as UN, ECOWAS, the Interregional Coordination Center (Yaounde) and the maritime centers in the region under the Yaounde Code of Conduct. The primary task is to gather knowledge, assess and report on the conditions in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea in order to advise both military and civilian partners in relation to maritime security in the region.

The adviser will contribute to the implementation of the entire Peace and Stabilization Fund's program: Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea Phase II. The advisor will be Project Officer for Engagement 4 and coordinate / manage the implementation with implementing authorities.

Specific tasks, but are not limited to:
In relation to the Ministry of Defense
- Routine and special reporting to the Ministry of Defense and the defense authorities about events, trends and other observations of military and intelligence significance for Denmark.
• Routine and special reporting on the organization, implementation and development of Danish PSF projects.
• Routine analysis and status assessments on relevant parts of the Nigerian security architecture. Participate actively in the exchange of information and analyzes on current security policy issues in Nigeria between other defense attaches, military personnel and other relevant persons and institutions / organizations in Abuja and, if possible, in other parts of the region.

In relation to the Defense Command
• act as POC in the region for Danish cooperation between Denmark, France, Spain, Portugal according to “four nations paper”
• act as local coordinator and project officer for Danish maritime projects under the Defence Forces in the framework of PSF in West Africa.

In relation to the host country
• Take care of the relationship with national Nigerian military authorities at strategic level (MoD)
• Take care of the connection with national Nigerian military authorities at the operational level
  Maintain the connection with National Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NMASA) at strategic level
• Maintain the connection with relevant national Nigerian maritime authorities

Operational tasks
• Take care of the connection with any deployed Danish forces in the area.
• At the request of the Ministry of Defense and the Defense Command, support in specific operational tasks in the region such as reconnaissance, discussion of agreements, etc.
• Provide appropriate support for the Danish maritime industry in Nigeria and, if possible, in other parts of the region.

In relation to the embassy
• Advise and inform the ambassador of Denmark's security policy efforts in Nigeria.
• Observe and report on topics of interest in the performance of Denmark's security policy engagement in Nigeria.
• Observe and report on regional security policy issues of particular interest in the performance of Denmark's security policy engagement in Nigeria and the region.
• Contribute to the embassy's performance of the overall Danish engagement efforts in Nigeria, including monitoring the defense's share of Danish efforts, reporting on results and development as well as advice the embassy on military options for support for the efforts.

In relation to other Danish embassies / representations in the GoG area
• Contribute to the embassies / representations overall Danish maritime efforts, including monitoring the defense's share of Danish efforts, reporting on results and development as well as advice on military options for support for the efforts.

In relation to the implementation of the Peace and Stabilization Fund Program: Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea Phase II
• Participate in the implementation, where the embassy in Accra, is the program manager under the PSF.
• Participation also takes place through activities by implementing partners.
• Participate, as Denmark's military representative, in the G7 ++ FOGG cooperation, including, if applicable, working groups as part of the Danish delegation under the auspices of the MoFA.
• Take care of the daily coordination and management of implementing PSE 4 as responsible project officer for PSE 4.
• Contributes in solving stabilization tasks in relation to the overall program.

In the framework of the Open for Business initiative, the advisor, in cooperation with regional trade departments, must support the development of industrial cooperation between Denmark and relevant countries in West Africa. The advisor will also support Danish delegations from the entire Ministry of Defense in the preparation and conduct of visits, meetings, discussions and participation in major exhibitions and events, etc.
Annex 1: Context Analysis

1. Overall development challenges, opportunities and risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Briefly summarise the key conclusions from the analyses consulted and their implications for the programme regarding each of the following points:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- General development challenges including poverty, equality/inequality, national development plan/poverty reduction strategy, humanitarian assessment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Gulf of Guinea (GoG)\(^1\) faces multiple and complex challenges. Most notably in relation to social and economic development, governance (including corruption), environmental pressures, human rights and security (including terrorism, civil unrest, piracy).\(^2\)

A recent report of the UN Secretary General on West Africa and the Sahel (June 2018) highlights serious concerns about security in a number of countries, particularly Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria and the Niger. It notes that violent conflicts between nomadic herders and sedentary agrarian communities increased in frequency, intensity, complexity and geographic scope throughout the Sahel. But also asymmetrical terrorist attacks were carried out against national and international security forces, local authorities and civilians in a number of countries, notably Burkina Faso, Mali, the Niger and Nigeria. Violent extremist armed groups continued to harass civilians, carry out targeted abductions or killings of suspected informants or local representatives of States, burn down schools and threaten teaching staff. Piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea is also highlighted as an increasing risk, with criminal groups resorting to hostage taking. Drug smuggling and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, carried out partly by terrorist groups, poses serious challenges in the subregion.\(^3\)

The report also underlines that the growing threat of cross border armed groups and transnational organized crime continued to be compounded by weak State institutions and the inadequate provision of public services. While there were some advances, 2018 saw both peaceful political transitions (Liberia and Sierra Leone) but also contested politics in other countries (Guinea, Niger and Togo). February 2019 will see Presidential elections in Nigeria and Senegal. The report notes that while macroeconomic growth has generally improved, it has not yet translated into the implementation of meaningful democratic reforms.\(^4\)

UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) highlights that all countries in the region rank below top 100 and with considerable differences between them. Where e.g. Gabon ranks 110 with a HDI score of 0.702, Togo is only ranked 165 out of 189 countries with a score of 0.503.\(^5\) This indicates that the life expectancy, the educational system and the economic development in the region is well below average on a global scale. Significant income inequalities exist between cities and rural areas,

---

1 GoG Basin countries: Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe, Congo Republic, DR Congo, Angola
4 Ibid
5 Human Development Index 2018
and the most striking example is probably Nigeria. Statistics show substantial differences in Nigeria between the Federal States in the North-East, for example, and those in the South-West, both in terms of incomes, education and health indicators.  

Governance indicators vary. Whereas Ghana and Benin rank above average on a global scale, when considering e.g. voice and accountability, Equatorial Guinea scores very poorly and has even worsened in the past decade. Gabon has also worsened in this period, while Nigeria and Togo have improved, though from a level below average. Ghana provides an interesting example of an ambitious attempt being made to fight inequality with their regionalization policy, which aims to develop the north of the country in order to achieve real progress in school enrolment, access to healthcare and support for local economic activities. However, inequality is is rising, as documented by the most recent assessments of living standards.

The humanitarian situation in parts of West Africa and the Sahel remains critical, mainly due to food insecurity, forced displacements and chronic vulnerability to external shocks. In the Lake Chad basin area, which has been affected by extreme climatic conditions, 4 million people are currently classified as facing food insecurity. Across the Sahel, some 6.9 million people, 3.7 million of them in north-eastern Nigeria alone, are in food crisis. Insecurity in certain areas is also causing people to migrate in certain areas, mostly in the Sahel.

An assessment of the human rights situation and gender in the Gulf of Guinea (and Ghana and Nigeria in particular) is included in section 3 below.

- Development in key economic indicators: GDP, economic growth, employment, domestic resource mobilisation, etc.

The African Development Bank (March 2018) noted that overall economic growth in the subregion should reach 3.6% in 2018 and 3.8% in 2019 due to an increase in oil and agricultural production and the rising prices of some natural resources. Benin, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone and Togo are projected to grow at a rate of 5% or more. With the exception of Nigeria, all West African countries, with the exception of Nigeria, became signatories to the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement in Kigali on 21 March 2018. Nigeria is considered to be the economic epicentre in the Gulf of Guinea due to the importance of its economy and its large population. The centrality of oil in the economy offers a great potential but is also seen as cause of some of the problems, not only in Nigeria, but in the region as a whole. Oil extraction – and oil spilling – leads to a continuous degradation of the coastal environment which hampers fishing and agriculture by making land infertile.

There are considerable differences in GDP and GNI between the countries in the region. While Equatorial Guinea and Gabon have the highest Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in Africa (USD 19,513 and USD 16,413 respectively), most of the other countries, and in particular Togo and Benin, rank very low on a global scale (USD 1,453 and USD 2,061). The availability of natural

---

6 Ibid
7 Worldwide Governance Indicators 2007-2017
9 Ghana Living Standards Survey Round 7, August 2018
10 UNSG report, June 2018
11 UNSG report, June 2018
14 Human Development Index 2018
resources is key in explaining the considerable regional GNI differences, but it is by no means a guarantee of a well-functioning economy and society as a whole.

The Nigerian economy, being the key driver for the region overall, grew at a rate of 7% during the last decade, however, in the same period unemployment has doubled and Nigeria’s youth unemployment figures have been reported as being the worst in Sub-Saharan Africa. So despite a considerable level of economic activity and opportunity, Nigeria has not managed to incorporate its entire population. The level of youth unemployment rates across the region is high and this incentivises criminal activities such as oil theft, armed robberies or trafficking as they can be the only sustainable financial opportunities available. The challenge for most of the countries is to create a sustainable and inclusive economy, which is not overly dependent on oil and other natural resources.

Growth in West Africa trade is closely linked to increases in the region’s ability to facilitate it – and has reportedly fuelled an increasing reliance on container handling leading to congestion at key ports where infrastructure is approaching its capacity limit. To improve the performance of their terminal operations, West African governments have increasingly turned to foreign firms, Bolloré (France) and APM terminals (Denmark), that now handle three-quarters of all containers passing through the region’s ports. Ports such as Lomé, Tema (Ghana), Lekki (Nigeria) and Abidjan have been enhanced to cater for deeper draft vessels. The effect of this is reported to have been an increase in effectiveness, albeit with an increase also in operating costs. As discussed further below, there is also a link between the ability to effectively handle maritime traffic and security (piracy/armed robbery) issues.

- Status and progress in relation to SDGs, in particular those that are special priorities for Denmark.

Several of the Sustainable Development Goals are relevant to this programme, notably SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), SDG 17 (partnerships), and indirectly to SDG 14 (Life below water). The programme will also complement efforts towards SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth), and SDG 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure).

Only a few of the GoG countries (Benin, Nigeria and Togo) have published the recommended voluntary review of the SDG implementation so far. Ghana among others has declared that it will produce the review in 2019, while a number of countries have not provided any information.

Nigeria published its voluntary review in 2017, and according to the report, one of the main obstacles for Nigeria in achieving the SDGs has been the economic recession and humanitarian crisis in the Northeast of the country. Nigeria is relying heavily on the oil and gas sector, which have suffered from declining prices, and its agricultural production has also experienced low productivity due to e.g. climate changes.

One of the highlighted indicators in the report in relation to SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions) shows that 72.5% of Nigeria’s prison population was un-sentenced in 2015. The ambition is to reduce that number to 48.35% in 2020, before reaching the 0% target in 2030. This

---

15 Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) 2014
16 Chatham House 2013
17 West Africa is Expanding its Maritime Ports to Accommodate Growing Container Trade, U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), May 2018
18 Implementation of the SDGs – A National Voluntary Review, Nigeria 2017
19 Ibid
implies that Nigeria will need a massive investment in the justice system to facilitate a timely and fair trial for all.

Gender equality (SDG 5) is also a big challenge in Nigeria where 33.5% of women and girls older than 15 confront cases of violence and abuse and where only 24.8% of women between 15-49 make their own informed decision about sexual relations and reproductive health.20 The gender imbalances are reflected in the maritime area. Women, for example, play a major role in fisheries value chains and are thus disproportionately affected by illegal fishing that removes or reduces their livelihoods.21

Ghana is yet to produce an updated national report on the SDG implementation, which is expected in 2019. In 2012, Ghana published a national assessment on the achievement of sustainable goals ahead of the Rio+20 conference. The report showed progress in SDG 4 e.g. primary and secondary school enrolment. It also showed a decrease in poverty (SDG 1), but with a growing inequality. Furthermore, the report pointed towards unemployment as an increasing challenge in Ghana, especially among the youth population.22

- Political economy, including drivers of change (political, institutional, economic) (e.g. political will, CSO space, role of opposition, level of donor funding to government expenses, level of corruption, foreign investment, remittances, role of diaspora, youth, gender, discovery of natural resources or impact of climate change etc.)

The region’s political economy is influenced by the interplay between governance factors and economic interests. Shortcomings in terms of justice and rule of law contribute to a culture of impunity. In this section, we draw from the World Governance Indicators to illustrate where some of the key stress points lie in the political economy of the two focus countries.

World Governance Indicators show considerable differences in the governance of the two countries with Ghana outperforming Nigeria in all aspects.23 Historically, Ghana has performed quite well on a global scale when it comes to fighting corruption. Ghana has however seen a decline in its performance since 2014 (from a score of 48 to 40 on T.I.’s CPI), but is still way ahead of most of their GoG counterparts where Nigeria scores 27.24

On other governance indicators, Ghana has consistently maintained a positive rule of law score since 2011, Ghana is currently scored 0.13 in its rule of law. Nigeria has performed (relatively) quite well in this WGI, was sitting at its highest score to date in 2017 sitting at -0.87.25

Ghana has experienced steady improvement in scoring on Voice and Accountability since 2000, where it began at a score of 0.07 and in 2017 is at 0.59, consistently outperforming Nigeria who has never had a positive WGI score on this indicator. Alternatively, Nigeria’s scores have fluctuated since 2000, experiencing a steady improvement since 2009, until recently where in the final year of scoring, they again decreased to -0.34.

---

20 Ibid
21 Women in Maritime, Discussion Paper, May 2018, Laura Burroughs, Sasha Egorova, Emina Šadić, Kelsey Soeth
23 Worldwide Governance Indicators 2007-2017
24 Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index 2012-2017
25 The WGI uses scoring between -2.5 to +2.5, with higher values corresponding to a superior performance on the indicator, or better governance.
Ghana’s score for Political Stability and Absence of Violence peaked in 2011 with a score of 0.17 where it then experienced decline most years with the exception of 2015. It currently sits at 0.09, placing it still well above Nigeria who has again, never experienced a positive WGI score on this indicator. Nigeria currently sits at a score of -1.94, with small fluctuations in its score since 2000, but has never risen above -1.46.

Ghana’s Government Effectiveness score has recently improved to -0.11 in 2017, after experiencing a 14-year period of consistent decline until 2015. Nigeria has been much more unstable, consistently fluctuating between improvement and decline since 2013. In the last year of data 2017, this score improved from -1.09 to -0.96.

Ghana has seen a decline in its regulatory quality since 2010 (0.12), currently possessing at a score of -0.14. Nigeria performs its best in this category although very minimal improvement has been seen in recent years. The 2017 score (-0.89) was an improvement from the previous year but a decline from its peak score (-0.66) in 2013. The annual Ease of Doing Business survey has seen a slight improvement in Ghana from an index of 120 in 2017 to 114 in 2018. This compares well with other African countries, including Nigeria (which scored 146 out of 190 countries globally in 2018).

In Nigeria, this is demonstrated by oil governance, where the Nigerian government subsidises fuel imports keeping prices at around one-third of its price in neighbouring countries, which reportedly also incentivises oil smuggling into neighbouring countries. While the oil sector in Nigeria is responsible for 90% of exports, 80% of government revenue and 40% of GDP, the oil industry provides employment to only two to three percent of the population. In that sense oil dependency neither compensates local communities through increased livelihood opportunities, nor incentivises the state to invest in sectors offering more employment opportunities.

The risk of this construction is that the governing elites tend to become more detached from their citizens because the state does not rely on their taxation. This has several potential effects such as: an increased authoritarianism of the political system, and turning politics into a rent-redistribution mechanism. However, these mechanisms depend on the quality of institutions before the natural resources are discovered and political coalitions. In that sense, GoG countries are often presented as the ‘worst-case scenario’ among resource wealthy states inasmuch as the politics of many of these states was already dysfunctional before oil discovery, which has only ‘exacerbated previous shortcomings and created new ones’.

Ghana is a newer oil producer, but potentially with some of the same inherent challenges where rivalry among political coalitions seem to undermine the tangible benefits.

Both Nigeria and Ghana are members of ECOWAS, which essentially is an economic and political union with the ambition of promoting economic cooperation and regional integration as a tool for an accelerated development of the West African economy. ECOWAS is regarded as a positive factor in the political economy of the region, although its impact is perhaps more declaratory than practical.

In relation to maritime security governance, both Ghana and Nigeria have a number of government

---

26 https://tradingeconomics.com/
27 UNODC 2013
29 Ibid
30 “Party Politics and the Political Economy of Ghana’s Oil”, Mohan 2017
31 www.ecowas.int
and private sector stakeholders (with leading agencies being the Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA) and the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA)) but the degree of inter-agency interaction is in need of strengthening (which is one of the goals of the present programme). A key goal here will be to coordinate the different interests and capacities of the stakeholders involved. In Ghana, a National Maritime Security Committee has been established and this provides a possible nucleus for more substantive inter-agency coordination. In Nigeria, such a body has yet to develop, although a possibility exists through operationalization of the Maritime Operations Control Centre under the Office of the National Security Advisor.

**List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:**

See footnotes

**Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?**

PSE 3 will provide research, including on the political economy of maritime security

---

### 2. Fragility, conflict, migration and resilience

**Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:**

- Situation with regards to peace and stability based on conflict analysis and fragility assessments highlighting key drivers of conflict and fragility, protection and resilience, organised transnational crime and illicit money flows and how conflict and fragility affect inclusive private sector development and women and youth

This section concentrates on maritime security related issues, these being the focus of the programme.

**Piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea is a significant threat to regional and international shipping,** with a significant number of incidents (95 in 2016 and 97 in 2017) occurring in international and territorial waters (particularly in the waters around Nigeria).\(^{32}\) Incidents include piracy and theft of property (including illegal oil bunkering), kidnap for ransom, illegal fishing, and drug trafficking.\(^{33}\) Such incidents have a variety of security and economic costs that affect international trade. However, there are also implications for local communities. Illegal fishing, for example, depletes the fish stock and thereby reduces local revenues. There are also risks of environmental pollution arising inter alia from oil spillage. Reported cases of piracy off the coast of Nigeria indicate that actual and attempted attacks predominantly occur while the vessels concerned are steaming (and to a lesser extent are at anchor).\(^{34}\)

While piracy and armed robbery at sea take place off-shore, their drivers or root causes are predominantly land-based and include unemployment and lack of alternative livelihood options, particularly amongst youth and around the Niger Delta.\(^{35}\) Demographic pressures are expected to

\(^{32}\) According to Oceans Beyond Piracy, the number of incidents in the Gulf of Guinea now significantly exceed those occurring off the Horn of Africa 97 incidents compared to 54 in 2017


\(^{34}\) International Maritime Bureau, 2018

exacerbate this situation if combined with continued political and economic marginalisation. The black market for oil in West Africa provides an incentive for targeting vessels carrying petroleum products. Previously, there have been indications that some piracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea may have been politically motivated “as a form of protest”, although this now seems less certain and analysis suggests that illicit gain is the most common incentive. Criminal activity is both facilitated by endemic corruption and helps to fuel it.

Enabling factors include the presence of criminal syndicates coupled with national legal systems, law enforcement and maritime authorities that are ill-equipped to respond to these threats at sea and on land. Naval forces and maritime law enforcement (MLE) capacities lack sufficient operating capacity and/or readiness and operate with a weak Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). This makes it difficult for maritime authorities to ensure safe passage and anchorage for international shipping.

In response, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria have each established “secure zones” near major ports. These are clearly demarcated areas where ships can anchor to wait for a berth or conduct ship-to-ship (STS) cargo transfers, although reports indicate that attacks also occur in these zones. The costs of utilising these secure zones falls to the shipping companies. In addition, off the coast of Nigeria, the Nigerian Navy responds to requests for assistance. Also private maritime security companies are providing (for a fee) escort services using private vessels with Nigerian armed forces personnel on board. Nonetheless, attacks continue to occur, most recently concerning a Danish chartered vessel.

Naval and coastguard capabilities are generally low outside of territorial waters. Coverage improves in proximity to the coastline and where there are offshore installations such as oil platforms. Operational constraints include low standards of operational readiness of military and civil maritime vessels and crews. This can be due to poor maintenance and shortages of basic materials, such as fuel. The effect of this varies, but generally, it reduces the number and readiness of vessels able to put to sea.

Ghana’s navy has received notable upgrades since the discovery of offshore oil deposits. It has received several newer patrol vessels and there are plans to purchase additional vessels. Four small patrol boats were commissioned last year (donated by China). The operations pattern is primarily focused on the protection of the off shore industries and the Navy tries to have 24/7 coverage of the large western oil fields. In eastern territorial waters, patrols are conducted on an irregular basis.

Nigeria’s navy is by far the largest in the region and has a relatively large number of assets available, including patrol boats for riverine operations throughout the Niger Delta as well as larger ships for offshore operations. Nevertheless, the navy has long suffered from a lack of funding and is currently stretched by operations against crude oil theft and insurgent operations in the Niger Delta. Moreover, many vessels are not or barely operational. Security agencies are likely to continue to focus their efforts on inshore operations related to the challenges of oil theft in the short term. They have four ocean patrol vessels and a verity of fast attack boats (in addition to three reserve ships plus a larger number of small gunboats and zodiacs). Although operations continue to be hampered by a

---

36 Maritime security and development in Africa, Ukrit Trolle Smed, CMS, University of Copenhagen, 2015
38 See, for example, Lindskov & Nordby, This section also builds upon observations gained through interviews during the formulation mission in October 2018.
39 Oceans Beyond Piracy
40 Most recently, the hijack of the Maersk chartered ship Pomerenia Sky on 27 October during which 11 seamen were reportedly kidnapped. www.shippingwatch.dk
lack of intelligence, operational readiness and training (basic to advanced), capabilities are improving and the Nigerian Navy is increasingly likely to mobilise a vessel or respond to incidents if a naval vessel is in the general vicinity.

In the relatively few cases where suspected illegal operators have been apprehended, national legal and judicial systems lack the legal basis and/or capacity to ensure due process and prosecution. In the MT Maximus (2016) case, alleged pirates were arrested by the Nigerian authorities, but the lack of a specific piracy law in Nigeria meant that they could not be prosecuted for piracy.  

- Identifying on-going stabilisation/development and resilience efforts and the potential for establishing partnerships and alliances with national, regional and other international partners in order to maximise effects of the engagements.

The region is developing a cooperation architecture to respond to the piracy threat and institutional weaknesses described above. UN Security Council Resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012) urged regional states to increase their anti-piracy cooperation, develop and implement national maritime security strategies, establish legal frameworks, develop and implement transnational and trans-regional coordination centres, and encouraged international partners to support these efforts. Steps towards this are being taken through the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the African Union and ECOWAS integrated maritime strategies (AIMS and EIMS). These cover a range of maritime issues, including the blue economy (trade, fishing etc.), environmental protection, disaster management, legal matters, as well as maritime security.

The 2013 Yaoundé Code of Conduct focuses on six pillars: (1) common information management; (2) local surveillance measures; (3) legal and functional harmonisation of maritime operations; (4) self-financing through a Community tax; (5) purchase and maintenance of equipment dedicated to the strategy; and (6) the institutionalization of a maritime conference for Central Africa.

The AU’s maritime strategy (AIMS) document notes a number of maritime domain threats, including: transnational organized crime (such as money laundering, trafficking in arms, drugs and people, piracy and armed robbery at sea, illegal oil bunkering, maritime terrorism); illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing - IUU Fishing - and overfishing; environmental crimes; natural disasters, environmental degradation and climate change. It also notes a range of weaknesses, including in relation to communications, legal frameworks, absent or poorly maintained aids to navigation and modern hydrographic surveys. In relation to piracy and armed robbery at sea, the AU encourages its members to promote (a) burden sharing, (b) tracking financial flows, (c) sharing and reporting relevant information; (d) interdicting ships and/or aircraft suspected of engaging in piracy or armed robbery against ships; (e) apprehension and prosecution of persons committing or attempting to commit piracy or armed robbery against ships, and (f) facilitating proper care for individuals subjected to piracy/armed robbery at sea.  

ECOWAS’ strategy (EIMS) identifies the major challenges to the maritime domain and offers a set of comprehensive priority actions that should be undertaken at the national and regional level. It addresses five strategic objectives: (a) Strengthening maritime governance; (b) Maritime security and safety; (c) Maritime environmental management; (d) Optimising the ECOWAS maritime economy; and (f) Promoting maritime awareness and research. Inter alia, it notes the importance of criminal justice responses based on a solid foundation of the rule of law, the need for coordination and

---

41 Oceans Beyond Piracy
cooperation, and effective governance. These need to cover policy directives or regulations, supported with standard operating procedures (SOP), compliance monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to ensure effective national implementation, and strengthened criminal justice enforcement regimes at national level on maritime matters.

ECOWAS’s efforts to provide a framework for strengthening maritime security (as with ECCAS to the south) need to be seen in the context of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA). As regional economic communities (RECs), both ECOWAS and ECCAS contribute to APSA and AGA by strengthening sub-regional cooperation on key security and governance issues, including countering piracy, strengthening governance and the rule of law. ECOWAS’ Integrated Maritime Strategy provides a vehicle for this.

In support of the operational aspects of Yaoundé, a regional architecture is being established based on an Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC in Yaoundé, two regional maritime operation centres (one in West Africa (called CRESMAO in Abidjan) and one in Central Africa), a series of multinational maritime cooperation centres (MMCCs) based on a zonal approach through which coastal states are grouped into six zones. The MMCCs are linked to national Maritime Operation Centres (MOCs) in each country. The overall purpose of this arrangement is to provide a mechanism whereby maritime information can be passed to neighbouring states and responses to illegal activity, environmental threats and other incidents that may arise can be coordinated. As states’ territorial waters and economic zones can easily be transited and as states’ capacity to respond operationally varies, it is recognized that a regional approach is required.

- Issues and concerns of relevance to Danish interest in the area of security and migration.

In summary, Denmark has a direct interest in promoting maritime security in the region as an incentive to international trade (with a significant proportion of trade being via Danish operated vessels and through ports with Danish commercial interests) and thereby also reducing the risks to shipping companies and seafarers (including Danish). From a development perspective, Denmark has an interest in complementing other Danish development engagements and stimulating economic and social development and good governance. Stronger, regionally owned maritime security arrangements will contributing to reducing trafficking in drugs, weapons and people; reducing corruption and organised crime; and pressures leading to migration.

- Identify where Denmark has comparative advantages that may lead to more effective and efficient programming and better results including where Denmark may contribute with deployment of specific expertise and capacities.

Denmark’s comparative advantages concerning maritime security lie within the synergies available from combining security, trade and growth initiatives, significant private sector involvements (Danish shipping industry), and political dialogue. Danish private sector involvement (APM) in key container ports raises Denmark’s profile in the sector. There are synergies with Danish Strategic Sector Cooperation (SSC) with Ghana, where GMA is the Ghanaian counterpart. The good cooperation here (the SSC is now entering a second phase) provides political and practical advantages for the support through the GoG MSP.

43 The zones most relevant for PSE 4 are zones E (that includes Nigeria) and F (that includes Ghana). The MMCCs for these zones are located in Benin and Ghana respectively.
The Danish defence has some existing experience from cooperation with like minded partners in the areas of boarding and operational planning that can be drawn from in this programme. There are political dialogue advantages available in Ghana and Nigeria due to the presence of the Danish Embassies in Accra and Abuja.

- Considerations regarding the humanitarian situation, migration, refugee and displacement issues, including the need to integrate humanitarian-development linkages and long term strategies

The programme is unlikely to have a direct impact on the humanitarian or migration situation.

- Relevant issues and considerations related to radicalisation and violent extremism and the potential for Danish engagement to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE)

The programme is unlikely to have a direct impact on radicalisation and violent extremism. A strengthened law enforcement and justice sector that operates in line with international standards (including human rights) will contribute to improved governance and thereby reducing corruption and other governance weaknesses that underpin drivers of extremism, although these effects are likely to be relatively minor.

**List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:**

See footnotes

**Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?**

PSE 3 will provide research, including on the political economy of maritime security

### 3. Assessment of human rights situation (HRBA) and gender

**Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:**

The HRBA Guidance Note may provide further guidance, or hrbaportal.org

**Human Right Standards (international, regional and national legislation)**

While none of the countries in the region have specific anti-piracy legislation (providing inter alia for legal due process and human rights protections), several are in the process of developing it, including Ghana and Nigeria. UNODC is playing a significant role in supporting Ghana and Nigeria in relation to ensuring human rights compliance of its draft anti-piracy legislation, including in relation to ensuring that the death penalty is excluded.

Human rights at sea are otherwise covered by other national and international human rights safeguards. Reports indicate a generally mixed record with respect to human rights observance. In the following, the focus is on Ghana and Nigeria.

---

44 The purpose of the analysis is to facilitate and strengthen the application of the Human Rights Based Approach, and integrate gender in Danish development cooperation. The analysis should identify the main human rights issues in respect of social and economic rights, cultural rights, and civil and political rights. Gender is an integral part of all three categories.
Regarding Nigeria, the most recent U.S. State Department assessment notes that the most significant human rights issues included extrajudicial and arbitrary killings; disappearances and arbitrary detentions; torture, particularly in detention facilities, including sexual exploitation and abuse; use of children by some security elements, looting, and destruction of property; civilian detentions in military facilities, often based on flimsy evidence; denial of fair public trial; executive influence on the judiciary; infringement on citizens' privacy rights; restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and movement; official corruption; lack of accountability in cases involving violence against women and children, including female genital mutilation/cutting and sexual exploitation of children; trafficking in persons; early and forced marriages; criminalization of status and same-sex sexual conduct based on sexual orientation and gender identity; and forced and bonded labour. It notes that the government took steps to investigate alleged abuses but few steps to prosecute officials who committed violations, whether in the security forces or elsewhere in the government. Impunity remained widespread at all levels of government.

Regarding Ghana, the State Department reported that the most significant human rights issues included excessive use of force by police, including torture Resulting in death and injuries; rape by police; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; assault on and harassment of journalists; corruption in all branches of government; lack of accountability in cases of violence against women and children, including female genital mutilation/cutting; early and forced marriage; sexual exploitation of children; infanticide of children with disabilities; trafficking in persons; criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct, though rarely enforced; and exploitative child labor, including forced child labor. It notes that the government took steps to prosecute and punish officials who committed abuses, whether in the security forces or elsewhere in the government, but impunity remained a problem.

**Universal Periodic Review**

Nigeria’s most recent UPR was in 2013 following which the government accepted 172 recommendations and promised to examine 34 recommendations and rejected 10. The issues with the largest number of recommendations included international instruments, rights of the child, Women rights, the death penalty, and the right to education. Nigeria rejected ten recommendations concerning decriminalization of offences relating to sexual orientation or gender identity. Rejected recommendations are mainly concerning decriminalization of offences relating to sexual orientation or gender identity.

Ghana’s most recent UPR was in 2017 following which the government accepted 212 of the 241 recommendations. The issues with the largest number of recommendations included the death penalty, international instruments, rights of the child, torture and women’s rights. Similar to Nigeria, rejected recommendations are mainly concerning decriminalization of offences relating to sexual orientation or gender identity.

**Identify key rights holders in the programme**

Rights holders in relation to this programme include seafarers and other individuals on board vessels operating in the Gulf of Guinea. A second group of rights holders are persons engaging in criminal activity (piracy and armed robbery), who have rights in relation to their safety and due legal process.

---

45 Report on Human Rights in Nigeria, U.S. State Department, 2017

46 Report on Human Rights in Ghana, U.S. State Department, 2017
once apprehended. A third group of rights holders are citizens in Gulf of Guinea countries. The
programme is expected to primarily focus on the first two groups through strengthening law
enforcement and justice within the maritime sector.

Identify key **duty bearers** in the programme

The main duty bearers are governmental maritime agencies (GMA and NIMASA) and maritime law
enforcement, including military (Ghanaian navy and Nigerian Navy), coastguard and police. A third
group of duty bearers are national justice actors, who have the responsibility to ensure the right to a
fair trial and legal process.

**Human Rights Principles (PANT)**

**Participation**
- The focus of the programme lies some distance away from the ordinary citizens although scope
to engage them will be included in programme activities were relevant. This could be in relation
to certain communication and dialogue activities (PSE 3). And it will be relevant that
developments within PSE 1 and 2 also take opportunities to engage more broadly (e.g. in relation
to new legal measures and maritime strategies). The main barriers to this participation are (a) the
technical nature of the engagements and (b) lack of experience of official stakeholders in
communicating with a broader public. The programme will, however, use its implementing
partners to assist in this respect. Contacts with NGOs that are engaged in teh sector will be one
means to achieve this.

**Accountability**
- The programme will promote the accountability of duty bearers (PSE 1 and 2) and also those
convicted of undertaking maritime crime (PSE 1). On the former, regular reporting on maritime
security results achieved and work in progress will be prioritised – and facilitated through teh
development of maritime strategies and action plans.

**Non-discrimination**
- The programme will be implemented in a manner that is non-discriminatory and non-
discrimination will be highlighted were appropriate in the engagements (particularly PSE 1 and
PSE 2)

**Transparency**
- See under accountability. The programme includes various possibilities to promote transparency
– particularly PSE 2 and PSE 3, where dialogue events will be open to a wider audience where
this is feasible and the results will be communicated to the broader public.

**Gender**
- Maritime law enforcement is a largely male dominated work area. The programme will promote
gender equality and women’s empowerment to the degree to which women are involved in
maritime law enforcement agencies and capacity development. Sources indicate that women are
primarily affected through their major role in fisheries value chains – thus illegal fishing that
removes or reduces this role is likely to have a negative effect on their livelihoods.\(^47\) The
programme’s impact here will be indirect – by protecting legitimate fishing through improved law
enforcement, women’s role in the fishing industry on land and their livelihoods will be promoted.

---

\(^47\) *Women in Maritime, Discussion Paper*, May 2018, Laura Burroughs, Sasha Egorova, Emina Šadić, Kelsey Soeth
Youth
- Youth are indirect beneficiaries of the programme (as a reduction in piracy and armed robbery at sea will reduce the risk that youth get involved in such activities) and it will be important that maritime strategies – under PSE 2 (in particular) - include approaches to youth. Youth aspects could also be included within PSE 3 (research and dialogue).

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

Relevant references and guidance may include:

- Universal Period Review (UPR) processes and analysis (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/Documentation.aspx)
- OHCHR country reports (www.ohchr.org)
- EU Human Rights Strategies
- Human Rights periodic reporting and Treaty Bodies monitoring of human rights in member states (www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx)
  http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/MasterCalendar.aspx?Type=Session &Lang=En
- International and regional human rights and HRBA principles and HRBA Guidance Note of 2013
- Danish Institute of Human Rights (DIHR) Guide to understand the interlinkages between human rights and the SDGs (http://sdg.humanrights.dk)

Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?

4. Inclusive sustainable growth, climate change and environment

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

- The programme is expected to have indirect benefits for sustainable growth through increasing safety for seafarers and thereby also facilitating easier maritime trade and access to the blue economy. It is not expected to have effects for climate change. It will have indirect benefits for the ability of coastal states to better manage maritime environment challenges, including possible pollution from oil spillage and negative effects from illegal fishing.

- The programme does not, however, include concrete activities in relation to these areas.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

See footnotes

If this initial assessment shows that further work will be needed during the formulation phase, please list how and when will it be done?

Growth and environmental aspects may be included amongst the research areas for PSE 3.

5. Capacity of public sector, public financial management and corruption
**Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:**

- The maritime law enforcement agencies have shortcomings in relation to their capacity for policy making, enforcement and service delivery – in particular concerning their ability to take multi-agency approaches which are a pre-requisite for progress within maritime security. This assessment partly provides the rationale for supporting the concerned institutions in relation to their strategic planning (PSE 1) and operations (PSE 4), including in relation to legal process (PSE 1).

- Due to its focus on maritime security, the programme will not directly work on PFM issues.

- Corruption within the maritime sector is regarded as a contributing factor to piracy, armed robbery at sea, illegal fishing etc. However, with the limited funds available, and given the difficulty of adopting an effective anti-corruption programme in this area due to the vested interests and number of actors concerned, the programme will not address it directly.

**List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:**

See footnotes

**Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?**

Corruption risks may be included amongst the research areas for PSE 3.

---

### 6. Matching with Danish strengths and interests, engaging Danish actors, seeking synergy

**Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identify:</th>
<th>All four PSEs involve risks relating possible lack of uptake/traction amongst local counterparts. The impact of these will vary but are likely to include delays and the need for political dialogue, should they occur.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- where we have the most at stake – interests and values,</td>
<td>The use of advisors (all PSEs) is both a mechanism for channelling external (incl. DK) expertise and mitigating the above risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- where we can (have) influence through strategic use of positions of strength, expertise and experience, and</td>
<td>DK will pursue an active partnership at political level and via the technical experts. The partnership with UN agencies adds additional weight to these capacities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- where we see that Denmark can play a role through active partnerships for a common aim/agenda or see the need for Denmark to take lead in pushing an agenda forward.</td>
<td>The programme will strengthen DK’s commitment to the blue economy in which the Danish private sector has a significant stake (both at sea and on land). The programme will thereby strengthen the DK embassies work in this area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| - Brief mapping of areas where there is potential for increased commercial engagement, trade relations and investment as well as involvement of Danish local and central authorities, civil society organisations and academia. | Donor coordination is weak and ad-hoc. DK is advocating for stronger arrangements, incl. via the G7++FOGG. |
| - Assessment of the donor landscape and coordination, and opportunities for Denmark to deliver results through partners including | |
through multilaterals and EU; The programme adds weight to these efforts.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

See footnotes

Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?

List additional studies that will be carried out as part of the preparation phase, including studies that will be carried out jointly with others or by partners / other donors.

7. Stakeholder analysis

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

- Who are the stakeholders that may be interested in or affected by the programme, including donors?
- The key regional stakeholders are: ECOWAS, ICC and the other elements of the Yaoundé architecture. National stakeholders include the national maritime agencies (GMA and NIMASA), the Ghanaian and Nigerian navies, coastguards and police, and ministries of justice/prosecution services, defence, trade and transport.
- Key donors are: EU, U.S, UK, France, and Germany
- Key multilateral actors are: IMO, UNODC and INTERPOL.
- Who are the key stakeholders and what are their main interests, capacity and contributions?
- As described above. Capacities of regional and national entities vary and are often determined by the resources made available by national budgets. These are deficient and an aspect highlighted during dialogue meetings (eg G7++). In general, coastal states contribute with manpower and basic infrastructure (offices). But as the most recent G7++FOGG meeting shows, these contributions are far from adequate and greater effort is required.
- How do the stakeholders (in this programme context) communicate, coordinate, and cooperate?
- Improving these aspects is the rationale for the Yaoundé architecture (and the arrangements for the MNCCs, MOCs etc). There is a critical need to strengthen the implementation of the architecture so that national and regional authorities are better connected. PSE 2, PSE 3 and PSE 4 will contribute to this goal.
- Who is the lead stakeholder and is it a homogenous group or are there divisions within the group?
- The lead stakeholders at national level are generally the national maritime agencies (i.e. GMA and NIMASA), the navy/coastguard, and ministries of defence, justice, trade and justice. It is widely acknowledged that inter-agency relations need to be strengthened as there is a tendency to operate in silos. At the regional level, the lead stakeholders are ECOWAS/ECCAS and the ICC. Likewise, relationships here should also be strengthened.
- How have key stakeholders been involved during the preparation and formulation process?
- The Danish maritime advisors have had contact with ECOWAS and ICC (ECOWAS was also consulted during the formulation mission).
- In Ghana, the formulation team also meet twice with the GMA and also with the Ghanaian Navy. Both were informed about the overall programme framework and input from these meetings has been included in the programme design.

- Contacts with NIMASA and the Nigerian Navy were not possible during formulation, although in January 2019, the Danish Ambassador met with DG NIMASA and outlined the overall programme framework, which the Director General welcomed.

- The detailed aspects will be further developed by IMO and UNODC following programme approval. IMO and UNODC are already engaged in supporting the two countries in their respective areas of focus and the programme will build upon this as well as their formal mandates.

- Which stakeholders are likely to support the programme and who, if any, are likely to hinder the programme? (Who stands to gain and who stands to loose?)

- The regional and national stakeholders (duty bearers) are expected to support the programme as they have interests in strengthening their capacity. It is possible that PSE 1 and PSE 2 could be affected by inter-agency competition, but this is not directed at the programme per se. These aspects will however be closely monitored, including through the programme’s TA.

- What are potential strategies (approaches, methods, etc.) for engaging key stakeholders?

- The programme’s strategy in these respects are:
  - Implementing agencies (esp. IMO and UNODC) will continue their efforts to engage stakeholders and as part of this will seek agreement to (a) the overall scope of the engagements (this has already been largely done in Ghana and also partly in Nigeria) and (b) the concrete input areas and modalities envisaged. This will be part of an inception phase for both engagements. PSE 3 will launch following programme approval with an initial research that will enable the development of a detailed plan for further research and dialogue activities and associated training. PSE 4 will start in February (pre-approval of PSED 4) so that Danish defence can initiate its activities with local counterparts and with close partners.
  - The Danish embassies (through the maritime advisors) will be in regular contact with regional and national stakeholders as well as with like-minded partners in Ghana and Nigeria.
  - During implementation, the technical advisors hired by UNODC and IMO will be embedded within national stakeholders or, if this is not feasible on a permanent basis, they will have regular contacts.
  - PSE 3 will include a dialogue platform through which key stakeholders will regularly meet and discuss maritime security issues. This will provide an important mechanism for raising and exploring concrete thematic issues.

- Which stakeholders offer the best overall prospects in terms of possible partnerships and why? The most useful partnerships are expected to be with GMA and NIMASA as these institutions have the overall mandate for maritime safety and contacts with other agencies, including law enforcement and the justice machinery.

**List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:**

Information gained from formulation mission and subsequent contacts with proposed implementing partners.
Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?

The political economy of maritime security will be included amongst the possible research areas in PSE 3.
Annex 2: Partners

1. Summary of stakeholder analysis

The Gulf of Guinea is generally regarded as lacking in robust institutions capable of taking a lead in countering maritime security threats, including piracy. At the regional level, there are a number of initiatives to establish a uniform architecture – the so called Yaoundé process - for establishing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and coordinating operational responses. The is important given that criminals can move from one country’s territorial waters to another. A structure under the Inter-Regional Coordinating Centre (ICC) in Cameroun is developing and is described in Annex 1. The intention is that national capacities (navies, maritime police/coastguard, maritime authorities etc.) will link to this. But further efforts are required and form the justification for the current programme.

Ghana’s navy has received notable upgrades since the discovery of offshore oil deposits. It has received several newer patrol vessels and there are plans to purchase additional vessels. Four small patrol boats were commissioned last year (donated by China). The operations pattern is primarily focused on the protection of the off shore industries and the Navy tries to have 24/7 coverage of the large western oil fields. In eastern territorial waters, patrols are conducted on an irregular basis.

Nigeria’s navy is by far the largest in the region and has a relatively large number of assets available, including patrol boats for riverine operations throughout the Niger Delta as well as larger ships for offshore operations. Nevertheless, the navy has long suffered from a lack of funding and is currently stretched by operations against crude oil theft and insurgent operations in the Niger Delta. Moreover, many vessels are not or barely operational. Security agencies are likely to continue to focus their efforts on inshore operations related to the challenges of oil theft in the short term. They have four ocean patrol vessels and a verity of fast attack boats (in addition to three reserve ships plus a larger number of small gunboats and zodiacs). Although operations continue to be hampered by a lack of intelligence, operational readiness and training (basic to advanced), capabilities are improving and the Nigerian Navy is increasingly likely to mobilise a vessel or respond to incidents if a naval vessel is in the general vicinity.

Both Nigeria and Ghana have established civil maritime authorities (NIMASA and GMA) and these are expected to be included at the core of national architectures in due course. National maritime strategies and legislation are also developing, albeit with some way to go before they can be operationalized. In the relatively few cases where suspected illegal operators have been apprehended, national legal and judicial systems lack the legal basis and/or capacity to ensure due process and prosecution.
Contributing to these developments are a range of international partners, including the EU, U.S., UK, France, and Denmark, Norway, Germany, and the Netherlands. UN agencies, particularly UNODC and IMO are also active.

The EU’s GOGIN programme, which Denmark has supported previously, has utilised a small permanent field presence (via Expertise France) and this has enabled it to make some gains in developing coordination structures at the regional and zonal level (see figure 2.2), although their actual impact may be limited while the institutions concerned remain only partially staffed. The EU is also preparing to introduce a €29 million programme of support called SWAIMS, which will include substantial capacity development for maritime law enforcement, amongst other areas. Inter alia, the implementing partners (notably UNODC and IMO) will ensure that the Danish support under this programme will be fully harmonised with SWAIMS.

GIZ is supporting ECOWAS’ links to the Yaoundé architecture, including through the provision of equipment to CRESMAO and the MMCCs. The U.S., UK and France are primarily providing operational training support. A significant U.S. contribution is provided by the OBANGAME EXPRESS exercise series. Part of the UK’s military support to Nigeria is directed towards improving the Nigerian Navy’s effectiveness and support has also been provided to Nigerian maritime special forces. French support includes training linked to the regular French naval presence in the Gulf of Guinea.

Amongst international organisations, UNODC acts as an implementing agency in relation to the key area of legal capacity building. INTERPOL is supporting mechanisms whereby West African police forces can more easily share information relating to criminal activity. IMO supports states’ compliance with international agreements, such as SOLAS and the ISPS Code, but it is also positioning itself to take a leading role in the development of national maritime security strategies.¹

At the policy level, international political support is being provided through the G7++ Gulf of Guinea initiative but this has yet to translate into a robust operational arrangement for coordination of capacity development support. Denmark is a member of the G7++ Friends of Gulf of Guinea arrangement, which meets annually, and includes also representatives from the shipping and offshore industries.

2. Criteria for selecting programme partners

The partner selection has been based on the following criteria:

- **Known and trusted partners.** IMO and UNODC are both specialised UN agencies with whom Denmark has cooperated previously. IMO was an implementing partner for the previous phase (port security) and has a formal mandate in relation to UNCLOS. Inter alia, IMO has conducted audits of port safety and security in both Nigeria and Ghana and the organisation is very well known amongst national maritime agencies and regional maritime institutions. UNODC has a major role in relation

¹ The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code is an amendment to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention (1974) on minimum security arrangements for ships, ports, and government agencies.
to legal reforms in various areas and is currently providing support to Nigeria through an embedded advisor. Denmark has partnered with UNODC in various contexts, including counter terrorism. Both agencies are represented in the region (UNODC in Abuja and IMO in Accra). In relation to PSE 3, KAIPTC has been a long-standing Danish partner through the Africa Programme for Peace (APP). It is a well-respected research and training institution with strong links to the Ghanaian Government, to ECOWAS, and the ICC.

- **Ability to deliver in difficult contexts** concerns the extent to which partners in the past have been able to deliver results in areas with weak or complicated bureaucracies and whether the partner has the capacity to ensure monitoring and risk management in this environment. The partners will need to operate in Nigeria (Abuja and Lagos), which presents some security risks, although these are assessed to be manageable. Achieving sustainable results in Nigeria and Ghana is perhaps the greatest concern as the inter-agency systems in both countries are still developing – indeed, this is part of the justification for the programme. But the environment requires partners that have experience in operating in contexts that are less than permissive. In this respect, IMO, UNODC and KAIPTC can all demonstrate this capacity.

- **Partner effectiveness.** UNODC, IMO and KAIPTC all have solid procedures and management capacity. In certain cases, these have been strengthened further; e.g. through tailored arrangements for risk monitoring and in relation to outcome reporting. The programme will also be assisted through the presence in Abuja and Accra of Danish maritime advisors collocated at the embassies.

- **Risk management** concerns the need for partners to have a strong risk management system, which ensures monitoring, management and mitigation of fiduciary as well as programmatic risks. UNODC, IMO and KAIPTC have a solid approach to risk management. Risks concerning PSE 4 will be mitigated through close cooperation with US (and possibly UK and French) assets in the region.

- **Alignment and ownership.** The degree of alignment to relevant Ghanaian, Nigerian and regional institutions is expected to be critical. All the partners are as aligned as possible, although contacts with stakeholders have occasionally been interrupted. To ensure that relations remain strong, regular dialogue meetings (involving the Embassies in Accra and Abuja) will be held to ensure that alignment continues to be strong, thereby strengthening ownership.

3. **Brief presentation of partners**

Please see text in section 2 above for **implementing partners** (UNODC, IMO, KAIPTC and Danish defence) and in section 1 for **cooperation partners** (e.g. the Ghanaian and Nigerian navies, ICC, ECOWAS, GMA and NIMASA, and the respective ministries of justice, and other development partners).

4. **Summary of key partner features**

A summary of the key features of the implementing partners is provided below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner name</th>
<th>Core business</th>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Exit strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime - UNODC</td>
<td>UN specialized agency for drugs and crime prevention, including organized crime, maritime crime, terrorism</td>
<td>Medium importance. The Danish support is a useful supplement to EU funding and funding from other bilaterals in GoG</td>
<td>High. Improvements in the legal system in Nigeria and Ghana is regarded as essential to improve maritime security and is a priority for the Danish programme</td>
<td>Provision of technical assistance, dialogue with cooperation partners, advice to Danish programme management</td>
<td>UNODC has an office in Abuja that enables it to interact with regional authorities, esp Nigerian authorities. Permanent UNODC staff in the region are, however, somewhat stretched. To mitigate this, PSE 1 will include recruitment of a project coordinator (in Accra)</td>
<td>It is very important that the DK contribution is aligned with national plans and harmonized with EU SWAIMS and GoGIN programmes. This will contribute to sustainability and facilitate exit. The project modality focuses on building capacity through embedded advisors, which will also help sustainability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Maritime Organisation - AIM</td>
<td>UN specialized agency for maritime affairs, including maritime security, safety and law of the Sea (UNCLOS), harbor security and safety (ISPS)</td>
<td>Medium importance. The Danish support is a useful supplement to EU funding and funding from other bilaterals in GoG. It will contribute significantly to fulfilling IMO’s wish to play a leading role in relation to maritime strategies and inter-agency cooperation in line</td>
<td>High. Improvements in maritime management in GoG (esp. Nigeria) is regarded as essential to improve maritime security and is a priority for the Danish programme</td>
<td>Provision of technical assistance, dialogue with cooperation partners, advice to Danish programme management</td>
<td>IMO’s capacity in the region is currently weak, which represents a risk to PSE 2. Its regional activities are currently managed out of IMO HQ in London and via a local coordinator in Accra (who has a focus on civil maritime matters). However, IMO has a relevant mandate and experiences active participation in events from Ghanaian and Nigerian authorities</td>
<td>It is very important that the DK contribution is aligned with national plans and harmonized with other donors (eg US, UK, EU). This will contribute to sustainability and facilitate exit. The project modality focuses on building capacity through embedded advisors, which will also help sustainability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre - KAIPTC</strong></td>
<td><strong>Peacekeeping training and research on peace and security issues in West Africa. Acts as Centre of Excellence for ECOWAS. Has MOUs with AU, ECOWAS and ICC that are highly relevant to GoG MSP cooperation. Long standing Danish partner through APP.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Medium importance (high in relation to maritime security). PSE 3 is aligned with all three KAIPTC competence areas – research, dialogue and training.</strong></td>
<td><strong>High. KAIPTC is probably the only institution in West Africa with the specific capacities required.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Provision of research, dialogue facilities and training that relate directly to GoG MSP priorities. Hosting of programme M&amp;E Coordinator.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strong mandate and reputation. Good linkages to regional institutions (ECOWAS, ICC) and national (Ghanaian MoD). Capable and experienced in the core areas required for this programme. Research capacities may require augmenting with external sourcing and this is envisaged as part of the PSE 3 modality.</strong></td>
<td><strong>KAIPTC role directly supports and enhances the effectiveness of the other partners in GoG MSP and will contribute to the overall sustainability of programme results. Investment in training adds to this by strengthening regional capacities in key areas.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Danish defence – Maritime SOF and Danish Navy</strong></td>
<td><strong>National and international security operations according to Danish Government policy.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Low operational importance. Capacity building is a secondary task.</strong></td>
<td><strong>High. PSE 4 relies upon Danish instructors in selected areas and as a political signal.</strong></td>
<td><strong>For PSE 4, will provide Instructors from Maritime Special Forces and Danish Navy</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strong capacity in the technical areas required. Availability subject to other possible operational requirements. Requires cooperation partners (eg US NAVAF) to assist with logistics and training platforms.</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Danish military contribution is harmonized with other cooperation partners (eg US, F, UK) which will contribute to its impact. Sustainability will be promoted through training of trainers modalities so that local capacity is built to carry on training in future.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3 – Summary of Programme Results

Programme objective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Objective</th>
<th>Enhanced regional maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through more capable maritime and law enforcement institutions at national and regional level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Impact Indicator

Growth in use of multi-agency approaches to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea in Gulf of Guinea in relation to (a) Progress in development of regional framework in accordance with the Yaoundé Code of Conduct with contributions from national structures, (b) level of national actions underpinned by maritime strategies, (c) status of legal process to enable prosecution

Baseline | Year | 2018 | (a) Partially implemented – CRESMAO and MMCCs partially operational. Limited interface with national agencies. (b) No national maritime security strategies and no national integrated maritime strategies approved in Nigeria or Ghana (c) No specific anti-piracy laws in place in Nigeria or Ghana

Target | Year | 2021 | (a) CRESMAO and MMCCs all operational with at least minimum capability and inputs from national MOCs with links to national agencies (b) National strategies in place (including maritime security) (c) Anti-piracy legislation approved and in place. Cases being tried.

PSED 1 – Strengthened maritime law enforcement responses to piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea - Nigeria and Ghana (UNODC).

Engagement objective

Ghana and Nigeria have a solid and comprehensive response to maritime threats in place

Impact indicator

Ghanaian and Nigerian maritime law enforcement agencies report greater capacity to respond to maritime crime


Target | Year | 2021 | National architectures in Ghana and Nigeria underpinned by anti-piracy laws and capacity to implement them leading to arrests and prosecution of suspected maritime criminals

Outcome 1

The maritime law enforcement response to crimes at sea has improved in Ghana and Nigeria.

Outcome indicator

Number of arrests and prosecutions

Baseline | Year | 2018 | Few arrests and no prosecutions initiated

Target | Year | 2021 | 10 arrests and 5 prosecutions per country initiated

Output 1.1

MLE agencies in Ghana and Nigeria respectively have the knowledge, capacity and capability to conduct arrests at sea and prepare cases for prosecution

Output Indicator

Number of arrests; Number of prepared cases for prosecution

Baseline | Year | 2018 | Lack of specialized MLE officers and knowledge on law of the sea

Target | Year 1 | 2019 | Specialized maritime crime teams established in Ghana and Nigeria

Target | Year 2 | 2020 | Teams operational and conducting sea operations with results
Target | Year 3 | 2021 | At least ten arrests and five cases for prosecution initiated
---|---|---|---
Output 1.2 | The knowledge on law of the sea and legal aspects of procedures on water including evidence collection, VBSS and hand-over procedures strengthened among maritime teams at both a national and regional level.
Output indicator | Number of trainings conducted; Number of trainees
Baseline | Year | 2018 | Few MLE officers have the knowledge on maritime crime and LoS matters
Target | Year 1 | 2019 | One VBSS training conducted and MLE team familiar with process
Target | Year 2 | 2020 | Two VBSS training courses conducted and team conducting them without assistance
Target | Year 3 | 2021 | At least ten arrests and evidence collected

### Outcome 2

Coordination and cooperation among the states in the region increased through support to the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC) and the Multi Maritime Coordination Centres (MMCCs) under zone E and F.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome indicator</th>
<th>Level of coordination between member states in zones E and F. Number of interdictions and arrests at sea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 2.1</th>
<th>Legal aspects of joint sea activities under zone E and zone F strengthened through conducted training with the involvement and support of the embedded MLE advisors.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome indicator</td>
<td>Degree to which Zone E and F are operational (including legal basis) and participate in joint sea operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PSED 2 – Strengthened strategic approaches to maritime security in Nigeria and Ghana (IMO)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement objective</th>
<th>Strengthened strategic approaches to maritime security in Nigeria and Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact indicator</td>
<td>Ghanaian and Nigerian maritime authorities respond to maritime crime based on clear inter-agency arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Outcome 1 | Collaboration amongst departments and agencies with an interest in maritime security |
So as to encourage a multi-agency approach for the robust implementation of national, regional and international maritime security measures strengthened.

| Outcome indicator | Status on production and approval of maritime strategies in (a) Ghana and (b) Nigeria. Status on agreement on implementation plans involving all key agencies.

| Baseline Year | 2018 | No approved inter agency maritime strategies |
| Target Year | 2021 | Strategies in both countries approved and inter-agency collaboration taking place |

**PSED 3 - Strengthened regional and national approaches to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea (KAIPTC)**

| Engagement objective | Strengthened regional and national approaches to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. |
| Impact indicator | Status of implementation of the Yaoundé architecture, in particular in zones E and F |
| Baseline Year | 2018 | ICC partially operational; Zonal infrastructure partially established (MMCCs established but not yet fully staffed or operational); national architectures (esp. Ghana & Nigeria) largely siloed & ineffective legal framework. |
| Target Year | 2021 | ICC has operational capacity; zones E & F functional with MDA & interaction between national MOCs; national architectures in Ghana and Nigeria underpinned by inter-agency SOPs & anti-piracy laws. |

**Outcome**

Enhanced joined-up responses of maritime security practitioners to shared threats to maritime security in the GoG.

**Outcome indicator**

Number of regional maritime security decisions adopted by consultative platforms of the project.

| Baseline Year | 2019 | No functional operational mechanism coordinating national and regional efforts towards concerted responses to maritime insecurity in the GoG |
| Target Year | 2021 | At the end of project: at least, five (5) key national and regional decisions on maritime security informed by consensus decisions taken on the platform of this project |

**Output 1**

Relevant and regular knowledge management products on the maritime domain in West Africa produced and disseminated to key actors.

**Output Indicator**

Number of knowledge products produced and disseminated Frequency of project research products utilized in maritime security dialogues amongst actors in the GoG.

| Baseline Year | 2019 | Zero (0) field-based publications; |
Zero (0) research paper on issues around maritime security in Gulf of Guinea produced; and
One (1) conference report published

Target Year 1  2019  3 research papers produced and published; and
One (1) conference report published

Target Year 2  2020  6 research papers on issues around maritime security in Gulf of Guinea
produced; and
One (1) conference report published

Target Year 3  2021  Two (2) conference report published

Output 2  A platform for regular dialogues on maritime security issues among regional maritime
security actors established

Output indicator  Number of regional dialogues on safer maritime domain held
Number and type of project network platforms utilized by maritime security actors

Baseline Year  2019  No stakeholder platform for dialogue on maritime security in Gulf of
Guinea exist

Target Year 1  2019  One (1) regional symposia and one (1) rotating technical meetings held

Target Year 2  2020  One (1) regional symposia and one (1) rotating technical meetings held

Target Year 3  2021  One (1) rotating technical meeting held

Output 3  Capacities of at least 180 maritime domain specialists developed in responding to
threats to maritime security in the GoG each year for over five (5) years

Output indicator  Percentage of maritime domain specialists trained out of the total who reported an
increase in knowledge and skills

Baseline Year  2019  250 maritime security practitioners trained by KAIPTC since 2006 to date

Target Year 1  2019  Capacities of 310 maritime security specialists enhanced

Target Year 2  2020  Capacities of 370 maritime security specialists enhanced

Target Year 3  2021  Capacities of 430 maritime security specialists enhanced

PSED 4 – Strengthened national and regional maritime law response to piracy (Danish Defence)

Engagement objective  Strengthened national and regional maritime law response to piracy

Impact Indicator  Degree or change in operational response on land and at sea (as assessed by KAIPTC
research)

Baseline Year  2018  Limited naval/maritime police response leading to apprehension of
maritime criminals

Target Year  2021  Regional navies (esp Nigeria and Ghana) show improved responsiveness
to maritime crime threats (e.g. increase in time at sea, increase in
arrests) [Intended situation by the end of engagement (phase)]

Outcome 1  Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness capacity, cooperation and interoperability
amongst West African coastal states

Outcome indicator  Extent and quality of MDA, especially operation planning and decision making, along
with regional/national interaction leading to operational response

Baseline Year  2018  Limited real time sharing of MDA data

Target Year  2021  Coastal states in Zones E, F & G access and share MDA data and utilise it
effectively in operational planning (as tested in multilateral maritime
security exercises) as evaluated by Danish military units participating in exercises as OBANGAME EXPRESS through an exercise report produced by the participating Danish Military units like SOKOM and the Royal Danish Navy. Also continues observations from the Maritime Military Advisor and other external partners assessment will feed into to the assessment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 1</th>
<th>ICC and West African coastal states under CRESMAO have agreed tactical procedures to ensure communication and coordination of operational planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output indicator</td>
<td>Status and usage of a “West African Regional planning process” based on the “6-stage tactical estimate process”, which is a joint operations planning tool that consists of procedures, explanations, examples and templates for operational planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 2</th>
<th>ICC has developed relevant training material for maritime operation planning based upon agreed SOP on operational planning process and information sharing.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output indicator</td>
<td>Existence of training material (curriculum) based upon agreed SOP for operational planning process and information sharing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 3</th>
<th>Regional (and national) capacity to provide training in maritime operational planning enhanced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output indicator</td>
<td>At least 5 trainers (TTT) p.a. trained in Maritime Operational Planning using SOPs/curriculum as part of cooperation with partner (i.e. US NAF). ICC invite, plan and execute courses in Maritime Operations planning. Courses at zonal level with participants from national MOC, MMCC and RMMCC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcome 2  
Capacity of Nigerian and Ghanaian maritime law enforcement agencies to respond to piracy and armed robbery at sea enhanced in line with international standards and rule of law

Outcome indicator  
Extent and quality (response time, quality of boarding and evidence collection) of regional/national response to piracy, robbery at sea and other maritime security
incidents increased as evaluated by Danish military units participating in exercises as OBANGAME EXPRESS through an exercise reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>Limited operational response.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Nigeria and Ghana respond operationally using trained units in boarding operations as evaluated by Danish military units participating in exercises as OBANGAME EXPRESS and observations from the Maritime Military Advisor and other external partners.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output 1</th>
<th>Nigerian and Ghanaian navy and law enforcement agencies trained up to Level 3 vessel boarding operations and related aspects (e.g. securing evidence, human rights) as part of a rule of law-based response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output indicator</td>
<td>Number of ¹ NIG and GH trainers trained (Train-The-Trainers) by Danish instructors within an international capacity building framework at international standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Year 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Annual targets for Outcome 2, Output 1 will be finally set during 2019 as details of the training process become clearer.
Annex 4 – Budget Summary

GoG MSP summary (DKK M)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>DMD</td>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>DMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSED 1</td>
<td>3,92</td>
<td>4,43</td>
<td>4,20</td>
<td>12,55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSED 2</td>
<td>1,52</td>
<td>2,50</td>
<td>1,98</td>
<td>6,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSED 3</td>
<td>2,38</td>
<td>2,99</td>
<td>2,13</td>
<td>7,50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSED 4</td>
<td>5,30</td>
<td>5,60</td>
<td>5,10</td>
<td>16,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E TA</td>
<td>0,20</td>
<td>0,29</td>
<td>0,29</td>
<td>0,78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>0,15</td>
<td>0,29</td>
<td>0,29</td>
<td>0,73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocated</td>
<td>0,94</td>
<td>1,00</td>
<td>1,94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviews etc.</td>
<td>0,50</td>
<td>0,50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,17</td>
<td>5,30</td>
<td>11,94</td>
<td>9,89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PSED 1 – Strengthened maritime law enforcement responses to piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea - Nigeria and Ghana (UNODC).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Year 1 (2019)</th>
<th>Year 2 (2020)</th>
<th>Year 3 (2021)</th>
<th>Total Cost USD</th>
<th>Total Cost DKK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 MLE agencies in Ghana and Nigeria respectively have the knowledge, capacity and capability to conduct arrests at sea and prepare cases for prosecution</td>
<td>1,924,000</td>
<td>1,924,000</td>
<td>1,937,000</td>
<td>890,000</td>
<td>5,785,000i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 The knowledge on law of the sea and legal aspects of procedures on water including evidence collection, VBSS and hand-over procedures strengthened among maritime teams at both a national and regional level.</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>520,000</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>1,820,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1: The effective response to crimes at sea under MMCCs in zone E and zone F strengthened through guidance and conducted training by the embedded MLE advisors.</td>
<td>455,000</td>
<td>390,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>845,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme Coordinator</td>
<td>539,500</td>
<td>539,500</td>
<td>546,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>1,625,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Programme Officer / admin support</td>
<td>234,000</td>
<td>234,000</td>
<td>234,000</td>
<td>108,000</td>
<td>702,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel staff</td>
<td>110,500</td>
<td>107,250</td>
<td>107,250</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>325,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>3,458,000</td>
<td>3,909,750</td>
<td>3,734,250</td>
<td>1,708,000</td>
<td>11,102,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Support Costs charged @13%2</td>
<td>449,475</td>
<td>508,300</td>
<td>485,550</td>
<td>222,000</td>
<td>1,444,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,907,475</td>
<td>4,418,050</td>
<td>4,219,800</td>
<td>1,930,000</td>
<td>12,546,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The actual annual disbursement for Output 1.1 may change if alterations to the work plan are made. Any such changes to annual disbursements will be flagged in the biannual reporting.

2 The Project Support Cost is a standard UNODC charge as a percentage of direct costs to cover central administration, strategic planning, resource mobilisation, donor relations, M&E, etc.
PSED 2 – Strengthened strategic approaches to maritime security in Nigeria and Ghana (IMO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1: Scoping assessments (DKK)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert(s) to conduct missions to Ghana and Nigeria to meet with key stakeholders including development partners to undertake scoping assessments (Fees for preparatory work, field and report writing) – 180 days (total)</td>
<td>655,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel (2 round trips) x 2 consultants$^3$</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA (2 round trips) x 2 consultants$^4$</td>
<td>78,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing and sundries</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20% of P4 Salary (London) for project direction</td>
<td>327,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35% of G5 salary (London) for project administration</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel IMO Staff x 1</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA IMO Staff x 1</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% Supporting cost (Charge by IMO FS)</td>
<td>72,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL OUTPUT 1:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,524,075</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL YEAR 1:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,524,075</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note that outputs for 2020 and 2021 have yet to be fully defined. The total budget for PSED 2 will not exceed DKK 6,0 M

$^3$ Budget reduced proportionately if only one consultant is used
$^4$ Budget reduced proportionately if only one consultant is used
PSED 3 - Strengthened regional and national approaches to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea (KAIPTC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>Total (DKK M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1 - research</strong></td>
<td>0,38</td>
<td>0,41</td>
<td>0,14</td>
<td>0,93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 2 – dialogue events</strong></td>
<td>0,99</td>
<td>0,69</td>
<td>0,11</td>
<td>1,79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 3 – training courses</strong></td>
<td>0,12</td>
<td>1,01</td>
<td>1,01</td>
<td>2,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project coordinator (1)</td>
<td>0,19</td>
<td>0,19</td>
<td>0,19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project officer (x2)</td>
<td>0,23</td>
<td>0,23</td>
<td>0,23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steering committee mtgs</td>
<td>0,07</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0,07</td>
<td>0,14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications and visibility strategy</td>
<td>0,02</td>
<td>0,03</td>
<td>0,03</td>
<td>0,06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative support/contribution to KAIPTC</td>
<td>0,33</td>
<td>0,33</td>
<td>0,33</td>
<td>0,99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency</td>
<td>0,03</td>
<td>0,05</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>0,08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,35</td>
<td>2,94</td>
<td>2,21</td>
<td>7,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1 – Maritime Domain Awareness</strong></td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>0,8</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC Work Shop SOP</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional curriculum development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 1.3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training, Mentoring and Evaluation of MOPW at one MOC/MMCC planning staff</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Mentoring at one MOC/MMCC (MDA and SOF Operation)</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC MOPW GoG</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 2 – Operational Response</strong></td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>0,9</td>
<td>2,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output 2.1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boarding Training (TTT)(VBBS) and Evaluation with international partner using Obangame Express</td>
<td>Part 1</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>0,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Part 2</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome 1 and Outcome 2</strong></td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBANGAME EXPRESS IPE/MPE/FPE</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host OE MPE in 2020 or 2021</td>
<td></td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td></td>
<td>0,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maritime Advisor</strong></td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>9,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Salary</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td>1,0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tariff to MoFA</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td>2,0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other (tbc)</strong></td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>1,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- RDDC</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td>0,2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mentor ICC</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- UK/USN programme</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>5,3</td>
<td>5,6</td>
<td>5,1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Might be back to back with WS on SOP operational planning in 2019  
6 If possible partners are identified in 2019 training carried out in 20-21.  
7 KAIPTC to confirm or PSE 3
## Annex 5: Risk Management Matrix

### Contextual risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Factor</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Risk response</th>
<th>Residual risk</th>
<th>Background to assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changes in government priorities away from maritime security</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Constant monitoring of the political economy, including at institutional level by the Danish Embassies, IMO, UNODC and KAIPTC drawing also upon EU assessments. Dialogue with government stakeholders (esp. GMA and NIMASA) at senior level in concert with other donors. Development of scenarios &amp; risk responses.</td>
<td>Major risk in the short to medium term.</td>
<td>Currently very difficult to foresee, but the prevailing opinion is that continued incremental progress is likely. A severe deterioration in the political/economic climate will require reassessment of Danish support. This would be undertaken in consultation with other donors (and international actors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further deterioration in maritime security situation in the GoG</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Potentially significant</td>
<td>Political pressure on governments to reduce maritime crime in general and speed up reforms. Complete ICC architecture and quality/speed of operational and legal response. Use PSE 3 to generate further buy-</td>
<td>Major but depends upon extent of escalation. Difficult to predict.</td>
<td>There has been an increasing trend towards off shore attacks off the coast of Nigeria (including kidnap for ransom) and private sector now considering scope for armed guards on board vessels. Lack of legal process has led to impunity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in based upon solid evidence and options.

## Programmatic risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Factor</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Risk response</th>
<th>Residual risk</th>
<th>Background to assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementing partners lack capacity/presence to generate sufficient buy in for engagements</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Include short inception phase / start up phase for PSE 1 and PSE 2 that ensures cooperation partners are fully consulted. DK political dialogue will also be useful. Differentiate between GH and NG so that inputs are focused on context.</td>
<td>Minor, but weak buy-in may also affect implementation. The programme builds upon existing good relations between implementing partners and local stakeholders.</td>
<td>PSEs 1 and 2 require detailed discussion with local stakeholders, although they build upon a solid needs assessment. This means that an inception/start up phase is needed to clarify work plans and generate fully buy-in to them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover in staff at key institutions, including course participants, complicates implementation and reduces impact</td>
<td>Likely to varying degrees</td>
<td>Minor but depends upon individual case</td>
<td>Maintain focus on areas that have political and operational priority and buy-in. Emphasise importance of continuity in staff &amp; reach agreement on this with sending institutions.</td>
<td>Minor. Would lead to delays in the short to medium term if there is significant change/rotation of staff. Key priority areas are likely to remain relevant. Impact depends upon individuals concerned. Nb. Could also be beneficial</td>
<td>Changes in staff may be felt in terms of delays in decision making and adjustments to budgets. The severity will depend upon the concrete situation. It is currently unclear whether the 2019 elections in Nigeria have had an impact on priorities and key counterparts and will need to be assessed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC lacks capacity to fully take a leadership role</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Major (for regional aspects)</td>
<td>Include ICC in programming and support its capacity development and linkages to regional coordination and national structures.</td>
<td>Absence of strong ICC leadership limits the pressure it can place on regional states to fulfil their pledges, eg regarding staffing.</td>
<td>ICC is relatively new and is still building up its role and capacity. The Yaoundé structures require member states to contribute staff, equipment and infrastructure and develop coordination arrangements, including legal arrangements. ICC has a key role in promoting this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Likelihood</td>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government partners lack capacity to implement agreed activities (eg training exercises) and programme progress is thus less strong than expected</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Capacity development support included in all engagements is based on assessment of capacity limitations. Monitoring &amp; tailoring of delivery (via annual work plan) to assessment of possibly shortfalls. Regular dialogue</td>
<td>Long term risks reduced, although it may not be possible to avoid some knock-on effects for speed (and possibly also extent) of implementation. Focus on priority inputs</td>
<td>Institutional capacity is affected also by political will for reform and this may vary according to the area concerned. High staff turnover will further impact negatively on absorption capacity. Shortfalls in this area are foreseen by the mix of national and direct implementation modality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of cooperation between regional organisations (ICC, ECOWAS)</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>Direct DK dialogue with regional organisations. Maintain focus on areas that have political and operational priority and buy-in. Underline importance of cohesive regional approach.</td>
<td>Will reduce the effectiveness of efforts as regional impact of them will be less pronounced. Overall impact may be minor provided national authorities take responsibility and improve performance.</td>
<td>ECOWAS and ICC have yet to develop clear cooperation modalities. This reduces the political pressure they can impose on their membership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudden changes in deployment plans by partners where Danish contributions form integrated elements (PSE 4 only)</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Maintain forward looking dialogue via bilateral informal/formal contacts (DMD/DCD, units) and ensure commitment to early notice of any changes.</td>
<td>Minor but likely to remain as Denmark is a junior partner in a number of engagement areas.</td>
<td>Some other partners have shorter commitment periods (typically one year) and this makes them vulnerable to changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreements allowing deployment of military trainers are not in place</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>Maintain contacts with NG counterparts/other partners and seek completion of agreement. Ensure fall</td>
<td>Minor. Interim arrangements allow temporary presence of DK advisors/trainers.</td>
<td>Interim arrangements allow temporary presence of DK advisors/trainers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Likelihood</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Example</td>
<td>Additional Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From outset and may have implications for deployment of DK personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Back arrangements in place.</td>
<td>Major. The long term nature of most positions should enable candidates to be identified. But it may also prove difficult to find the right match and to attract qualified people to Nigeria. Short term nature of defence positions should make it possible to find replacements, although these will need to fit in with other countries.</td>
<td>The long term nature of the PSED 1 &amp; PSED 2 TA positions and location in Nigeria may prove difficult. For the two locally recruited advisors (M&amp;E and civil maritime), it may be difficult to identify candidates with the correct profiles. For PSE 4, defence assistance is not a priority task for DK armed forces and requires that suitably qualified personnel can be identified and released from other tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not possible to identify suitable candidates for advisory positions</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Danish Embassies and IMO/UNODC to ensure early identification of candidates through existing systems and that rotation arrangements are in place. May need to adjust job descriptions. For PSED 4, DK SOF and other experts considered to be less at risk, except if urgent operational requirements arise elsewhere.</td>
<td>Minor. The long term nature of most positions should enable candidates to be identified. But it may also prove difficult to find the right match and to attract qualified people to Nigeria. Short term nature of defence positions should make it possible to find replacements, although these will need to fit in with other countries.</td>
<td>For the two locally recruited advisors (M&amp;E and civil maritime), it may be difficult to identify candidates with the correct profiles. For PSE 4, defence assistance is not a priority task for DK armed forces and requires that suitably qualified personnel can be identified and released from other tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duplication of effort with other donors</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>Take opportunities to gather like minded partners and share details of cooperation as GoG MSP implementation plans developed. Highlight possible synergies. Use DK advisors at Embassies to generate greater knowledge of what others are doing. Hold regular meetings</td>
<td>Minor as implementing partners are in regular contact with each other, but this is not formalised.</td>
<td>The risk varies but the key actors are connected and this means there is a general overview of which partner is active in which area. A more formalised exchange of information would be useful. Steps taken by the Danish Embassy in Abuja to secure Danish participation in EU SWAIMS SC meetings as an observer will help harmonisation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Institutional risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Factor</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Risk response</th>
<th>Residual risk</th>
<th>Background to assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programme funds or equipment misused or diverted to other use by partners</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Zero tolerance for corruption/fraud. For PSEs 1, 2 &amp; 3 financial procedures set out in SOPs. Regularly reviewed and subject to audit. Cases of corruption/misuse would lead to termination of support.</td>
<td>Limited but cannot be excluded.</td>
<td>The majority of are held and managed by IMO and UNODC, which have sound systems in place. KAIPTC has been a long term and trust partner for DK. PSEs 1, 2 and 3 will have rigorous reporting standards and external monitoring from the M&amp;E Coordinator. PSE 4 funds will be managed by Danish defence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk of inadvertently causing harm – PSE 4 &amp; possibly PSE 1 (Reputational risk for Denmark)</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Risk assessments undertaken. Capacity building provided to raise awareness. Prioritise transparency and accountability. Encourage information flow and monitoring by diverse range of actors.</td>
<td>Limited but cannot be excluded</td>
<td>The risks here primarily concern the recipients of DK support ignoring human rights standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to institutions by Denmark leads to reputational</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>Ensure transparency of Danish support and joint nature with like-minded donors</td>
<td>Limited but cannot be excluded</td>
<td>The Nigerian Armed Forces have been criticised by human rights defenders due to abuses by units in the north. Nigeria does not have mechanisms to ensure human rights monitoring and protection in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
damage due to human rights shortcomings  

| In country support provided to Danish advisors/trainers is insufficient leading to inability to pursue programme objectives and deterioration in relations | Unlikely | Minor | DCD/MMA in Abuja to maintain close dialogue and joint planning with partners and together with close allies (esp US, F, UK). | Minor. Existing experience is that pragmatic solutions can be found enabling support to continue | PSE 4 is dependent upon the good will and interest from counterparts. Thus far, this has been positive. However, there is a risk that it may not be maintained at a level enabling the expected results to be achieved and the tensions emerging could damage the relationship with partners. | relation to international standards. Denmark could face criticism for supporting NG AF that are not seen to be operating effectively to safeguard individual civil and political rights. |
## Annex 6 – List of supplementary materials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Document / Material</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Concept note, phase 2, Gulf of Guinea,</td>
<td>Danish Embassy in Accra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Maritime security and development in Africa, Ukrik Trolle Smed, CMS</td>
<td>University of Copenhagen, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Transnational Organised Crime in West Africa</td>
<td>UNODC, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Priority paper for the Danish efforts to combat piracy and other types of maritime crime, 2019-2022</td>
<td>Danish MFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Denmark as a new security actor in the Gulf of Guinea, Jessica Larsen &amp; Christine Nissen, 2018</td>
<td>DIIS report 2018:08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2019-2020</td>
<td>Danish Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 7: Plan for Communication on GoG MSP

Introduction

This communication framework covers the main arrangements for communication of the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme (GoG MSP)’s implementation and results. This includes liaison between the key Danish actors involved (Danish Embassies in Accra and Abuja, DMFA SSP and AFR departments, DMD, DCD). The framework notes that all the GoG MSP partners have their own communications units and will be able to contribute to communicating results and other forms of dialogue. Given the nature and scope of the programme, it is essential that communication is effectively coordinated amongst the implementing partners.

Purpose

The communication framework serves five purposes:

1) Contribute to strategic communication at political level regarding Denmark’s engagement in the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime domain.

2) Communicate the results to Danish citizens and the private sector (particularly the shipping industry) to ensure transparency and accountability of the use of the Danish development and defence funds.

3) To enhance the knowledge of Danish citizens of the political and societal developments in the Gulf of Guinea, and particularly concerning maritime matters in and off the coast of Nigeria and Ghana.

4) Communicate the programme results to citizens in Nigeria and Ghana and to the two governments (as well as other regional governments and actors) to ensure transparency and accountability of the Danish support.

5) Ensure an informed policy dialogue between the Governments of Denmark, Nigeria and Ghana and with regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the Inter-regional Coordination Centre (ICC), as well as with other cooperation partners.

Public diplomacy opportunities

GoG MSP has expected results that contribute directly to Danish policy priorities in the maritime area, such as reduction in the risks of attack from maritime criminals, safer and more efficient trade and port visits, and strengthened development outcomes from the blue economy. Public diplomacy undertaken by Danish stakeholders could start highlighting specific objectives and results, but also consider the cumulative effect of the Danish support.

The messages will be concise and relate specifically to the specific cases where Denmark or Danish funded partners have played a clear role.

Four types of messages are foreseen:

1) Thematic and policy priority messages where there is specific focus on Danish policy priorities that need to be communicated. This will include specific political messages relating to freedom of the seas and safety of seafarers, littoral states’ responsibilities within their territorial waters and/or
thematic messages related to inter-agency cooperation, anti-piracy legislation and judicial reform, gender, human rights etc. The messages may be timed to be delivered at specific events (e.g. ministerial meetings, FOGG conferences), in which case they will be carefully calibrated according to the issues and the audience and will be coordinate with appropriate departments in the MFA and DMD. **Frequency:** These messages will be produced as required and at the initiative of the MFA/DMD.

2) Basic factual messages concerning the programme and its engagements. This may include messages at engagement/activity launch with information on engagement/activity objectives, partners, funding level etc., as well as information about conclusions of key steps in the engagement or programme cycle. It may also include fact sheets underlining the Danish financial and technical contributions. **Frequency:** MFA AFR/DMD will prepare a format and text for such a fact sheet to coincide with programme launch. Subsequent messaging is expected to coincide with key events/activities.

3) Major achievements will be communicated immediately once documented. This could be Danish contributions to strategic goals or at output level in relation to specific initiatives. It may include individual case stories (personal or topical) that will exemplify the work undertaken in individual engagements (or sub-engagements) under the programme. **Frequency:** The programme should aim at 1-2 stories/reporting per year per engagement. The four engagement implementing partners (i.e., UNODC, IMO, KAIPTC and DCD) shall take responsibility for preparing these and the most appropriate means of dissemination.

5) Responses to crisis situations or negative changes to risk scenarios. Details of such response to be developed by the GoG MSP's Inter-Ministerial Resource Group, which has DMFA, Embassy, DMD and DCD membership. **Frequency:** As required.

**Stakeholder responsibility**

The different stakeholders in the programme will play roles according to their level of engagement and authority in the programme:

1) The two Embassies and MFA departments will agree on common communication efforts. AFR will also provide messaging to the MFA communication department for overall reporting on GoG MSP progress.

2) DMD/DCD. The DMD and DCD will ensure that communication is coordinated amongst the defence actors concerned and, as may be relevant, amongst like minded partners in the region with whom Danish military personnel are cooperating.

3) UNODC, IMO and KAIPTC will coordinate key messages/events with the Danish Embassy in Accra prior to any communication.

**Coordination**

It is essential that communication on the GoG MSP is consistent and accurate. The Inter-Ministerial Resource Group will consider communications opportunities and the messaging required at its regular meetings. At engagement level, all communications initiatives will be considered by the Danish Embassy in Accra prior to release.
## Annex 8 - Process Action Plan (PAP)

### PD and PSED 1, 2 & 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action/product</th>
<th>Deadlines</th>
<th>Responsible/Involved Person and unit</th>
<th>Comment/status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Final project proposals for PSE 1,2 &amp; 3 to be submitted by partners</td>
<td>18-Jan 2019</td>
<td>Tana Copenhagen</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tana Consultant sends full documentation package to RDE Accra</td>
<td>25-Jan</td>
<td>Tana Copenhagen</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deadline for comments send to Tana Copenhagen</td>
<td>28-Jan</td>
<td>RDE Accra</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Documentation send to RDE Accra</td>
<td>31-Jan</td>
<td>Tana Copenhagen</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documentation to SPP</td>
<td>04-Feb</td>
<td>RDE Accra</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk review and interviews in Copenhagen (DCD, MoD, MFA)</td>
<td>4-8-Feb</td>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appraisal field mission, RDE Accra &amp; Abuja</td>
<td>24-Feb-1-Mar</td>
<td>Nordic Consulting Group</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft appraisal report from consultant to SSP</td>
<td>08-Mar</td>
<td>Nordic Consulting Group</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint inputs to appraisal report</td>
<td>13-Mar</td>
<td>MFA/MoD/RDE Accra &amp; Abuja</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalized appraisal report to SSP</td>
<td>15-Mar</td>
<td>Nordic Consulting Group</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised and final programme documentation package</td>
<td>22-Mar</td>
<td>RDE Accra</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finalised programme documentation sent to PSF Secretariat</td>
<td>01-Apr</td>
<td>RDE Accra</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSF Steering Group meeting and approval of programme</td>
<td>08-Apr</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Awaiting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PSED 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action/product</th>
<th>Deadlines</th>
<th>Responsible/Involved Person and unit</th>
<th>Comment/status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Draft PSED 4 and draft PD from to RDE Accra for comments</td>
<td>10-Dec 2018</td>
<td>Tana Copenhagen</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final PSED 4 to RDE Accra</td>
<td>14-Dec</td>
<td>Tana Copenhagen</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward PSED 4 to SSP for Desk appraisal/Quality control</td>
<td>07-Jan 2019</td>
<td>RDE Accra</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk appraisal/quality control completed</td>
<td>11-Jan</td>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk appraisal/quality control recommendations forwarded to the RDE Accra</td>
<td>14-Jan</td>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final PSED 4 to be submitted to Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>30-Jan</td>
<td>Tana Copenhagen</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSED 4 submitted to PSF Secretariat</td>
<td>13-Feb</td>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSED 4 approved in PSF Steering Group</td>
<td>20-Feb</td>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 9: Summary of recommendations (signed)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of (Country) Programme</th>
<th>Gulf of Guinea Maritime Peace and Stabilisation Programme, 2019-2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>File number/F2 reference</td>
<td>F2: 2018-21737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appraisal report date</td>
<td>20th March 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council for Development Policy meeting date</td>
<td>8th April 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary of possible recommendations not followed**

*(to be filled in by the responsible unit)*

The Embassy agrees with all recommendations except no. 6 on *Programme governance and consultation structure*. The Embassy finds that it would be simpler – and incur fewer transaction costs – to gather relevant stakeholders from Nigeria and Ghana at the KAIPTC in the margin of PSE 3’s dialogue events. The possibility to connect and meet via VTC/Skype will further complement the physical meetings.

### Overall conclusion of the appraisal

The independent appraisal concludes that the programme answers to Denmark’s policy priorities for development aid and piracy response in the Gulf of Guinea. The programme selectively focusses on engaging on common Danish strategic and commercial interest as well as regional priorities in enhancing regional maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, in general, and in Nigeria and Ghana in particular.

The programme is compliant with AMG and PSF guidelines, with minor issues recommended to be addressed during programme finalisation. Selected engagements, and implementing partners for these, are reflective of a well-developed intervention logic and Theory of Change. While the results framework needs some revisions to add specificity where possible, overall it is coherent, presents outcomes that can be monitored and states assumptions and risks to achieving these outcomes. The risks management framework presents these risks, explains mitigation measures included in programme design and indicates residual risks.

The programme management arrangements are appropriately scoped, including the proposed recruitment of a Civil Maritime Advisor and a Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor (both local recruitments).

The proposed activities under the programme budget of DKK 30 million ODA allocations are DAC compliant. Budget allotments to PSED 1 (UNODC –legal frameworks – DKK 12.55, 42 per cent), PSED 2 (IMO – maritime strategy and interagency collaboration – DKK 6 million, 20 per cent) and PSED 3 (KAIPTC – research, dialogue and training DKK 7.5 million – 25 per cent) are reasonable. The unallocated amount of DKK 1.94 million (6 per cent) can provide a degree of adaptive programming if duly informed by the planned mid-term review that with benefit could be scheduled early in 2020 in the now 33 months implementation period ending December 2021.

| Recommendations by the appraisal team | Follow up by the responsible unit |
### Annex 9: Summary of recommendations (signed)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic Programme Level:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Development rationale and SDGs</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Explicitly refer to the SDG frameworks of the SSC, IMO and UNODC to clearly state the 'security-to-development-and-trade' logic of the programme concerning the SDGs.

   The Embassy concurs and updated programme documentation now refers to the SDG frameworks in all three ODA engagements in order to highlight the logic of the programme.

2. Opportunities for engaging on a diplomatic track and coordination of activities focussed on the EU SWAIME regional Steering Committee be added to the programme document, the context analysis annex and the PSEDs 1 (UNODC) and 2 (IMO).

   The Embassy concurs and has revisited the engagements and duly stated links to other relevant frameworks such as the EU SWAIME.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordination with the EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adequacy of preparation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. Ensure that there are no discrepancies between the UNODC proposal and the PSED 1 document.

   The Embassy concurs and the UNODC proposal and PSED 1 document have been aligned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender and human rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4. Ensure that considerations on maritime security gender and UNSCR 1325, as well as safeguarding against Danish association with death penalty issues are covered in the final programme document.

   The Embassy concurs and PD and its annexes include additional text on gender. Research on maritime aspects of gender is also now explicitly included in PSED 3 as one of the areas to be examined. PSED 1 notes UNODC’s efforts to ensure that anti-piracy legislation excludes capital punishment. All PSED’s underline the importance of adhering to international standards of human rights.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Inception phase of engagement on maritime strategies through the International Maritime Organisation.
### Annex 9: Summary of recommendations (signed)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[5.] Shorten of the inception phase for PSED 2 (IMO – maritime strategy and interagency collaboration) to 6-month after signing of an agreement with IMO, followed by a technical review conducted by the embassy in consultation with SSP before implementation of the full engagement</td>
<td>The Embassy concurs and inception phase for PSED 2 (IMO) has been shortened in coordination with IMO and budgets reduced accordingly. The PSED states that there will be a technical review of the resulting inception report and proposal once these are ready in QTR 4 of 2019.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Programme governance and consultation structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[6.] Include annual consultations between the embassies and cooperating partners in Nigeria and Ghana to take place as part of the programme governance structure and arrange that such consultations annually rotate between Accra and Abuja.</td>
<td>The Embassy does not agree with this recommendation and points out that that separate consultation meetings with cooperating partners do not represent a cost-effective approach. Instead, the Embassy will arrange to meet relevant stakeholders from Nigeria and Ghana at the KAIPTC during or in the margins of dialogue meetings within the scope of PSE 3.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Monitoring, reporting and review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[7.] Do not require implementing partners to use PSF reporting formats. Instead, arrangement should make sure that M&amp;E advisor can extract information for the mandatory PSF reporting form.</td>
<td>The Embassy concurs with this recommendation and will accept the format used by the individual implementing partners and extract the relevant information needed. The M&amp;E Coordinator will prepare annual reports in PSF format on this basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[8.] The M&amp;E advisor should have ‘supervision’ rather than a ‘support’ role making sure that Implementing Partners report on time.</td>
<td>The Embassy concurs in this recommendation and will add this to the job application when recruiting the M&amp;E Advisor. The Embassy considers nonetheless that advice and support will be necessary as part of the supervision role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[9.] Reduce the number of required narrative reports by Implementing Partners from 3 (three) to 1 (one) per year. Implementing partners should only be required to submit 1 (one) six months report covering the first two quarters of the year and 1 (one) annual report including a full year of implementation The proposed March – September cycle for these reports would be appropriate.</td>
<td>The Embassy concurs and considers that the reporting schedules in the PSED’s already provide for 2 reports from IP’s each year in their own formats and one report annually prepared by the Embassy in PSF format to be submitted to the PSF Secretariat. The March-September cycle has been clarified in the PD and PSED’s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 9: Summary of recommendations (signed)

I hereby confirm that the above-mentioned issues have been addressed properly as part of the appraisal and that the appraisal team has provided the recommendations stated above.

Signed in........................ on the ..................................................

Appraisal Team leader/TQS representative

I hereby confirm that the responsible unit has undertaken the follow-up activities stated above. In cases where recommendations have not been accepted, reasons for this are given either in the table or in the notes enclosed.

Signed in ..................... on the .......................

Head of Unit/Mission

[Signature]

TOVE DEGNBOL
Annex 10

**ToR - MONITORING AND EVALUATION COORDINATOR (DANISH MARITIME SECURITY PROGRAMME IN THE GULF OF GUINEA)**

Client: Government of Denmark

**Location:** Accra, Ghana with periodic travel within West Africa required.

**Background:**
These Terms of Reference relate to the position of Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator and Maritime Security Course Director for the Danish Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme (GoG MSP) 2019-2021. The programme is the second phase of Danish support to strengthening regional capabilities and capacities for maritime domain awareness (MDA) and response as well as a longer-term institutional strengthening of maritime governance. The programme is funded through the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF), which draws from both Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs sources.

The overall objective of the support is *enhanced regional maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through more capable maritime and law enforcement institutions at national and regional level*. It builds on Denmark’s current and previous diplomatic, stabilisation, and development engagement in the region and has been designed to complement Denmark’s other channels of support between 2019-2021 (36 months). The programme further strengthens Denmark’s contribution to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. It also reinforces Denmark’s commitment to stability, the rule of law and human rights.

The programme has been designed around four interlinked peace and stabilisation engagements:

- **Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 1** – strengthened maritime law response to piracy (through UNODC). This is primarily a civil engagement and concerns the development and introduction of relevant maritime crime legislation in Nigeria and Ghana.
- **Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 2** – maritime strategies in place and operational (through IMO). This is primarily a civil engagement and concerns the development and introduction of relevant strategic documentation and inter-agency cooperation on maritime security in Nigeria and Ghana.
- **Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 3** – research informed dialogue and capacity development strengthens maritime security (through the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre – KAIPTC). This will be implemented in Ghana but with a focus on relevant agencies within Gulf of Guinea countries as well as regional and international partners.
- **Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 4** – maritime operational planning and response enhanced to counter piracy (via Danish defence). This is primarily a military engagement and will be implemented in Nigeria and Ghana as well as at sea within the Gulf of Guinea.

This programme has been prepared in accordance with Denmark’s Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) Guidelines (October 2018). Inter alia, these guidelines set out the characteristics of PSF programmes and the general management arrangements that must apply. The latter are also...
described in the GoG MSP Programme Document, its annexes and its four Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Documents (PSEDs).

**Purpose of the post:** The post is designed to fulfill two functions:

a) Under the overall management of the Danish Embassy in Accra, the coordinator will coordinate and supervise all aspects of monitoring, assessment and reporting of Danish supported maritime security interventions in the Gulf of Guinea as represented in the GoG MSP and by the four engagement areas set out above. In so doing, the coordinator will liaise with implementing partners and other actors (as required). The implementing partners have the primary responsibility for monitoring and reporting on the implementation of their projects under the programme and will utilize their own reporting formats for this and following the timelines as set out in the PSEDs. The coordinator’s role is to coordinate and supervise the biannual reporting, assist partners where necessary, and ensure that reporting meets the standards set out for PSF programmes. Based on this reporting from partners, the M&E Coordinator will prepare an annual report in PSF reporting format and submit this to the Embassy of Denmark in Accra.

b) Under the supervision of the Director, Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research at the KAIPTC, the incumbent will prepare regular technical background papers and coordinate the design and implementation of an advanced and tailor-made maritime security capacity development course for the littoral states along the Gulf of Guinea and the immediate land locked countries on behalf of the Danish Embassy and the KAIPTC and in the wider context of synergizing and strengthening institutions and professional competencies towards the implementation of relevant national regional maritime security strategies.

**Required competencies:**

For (a):

a. Demonstrable project management and monitoring skills and techniques especially, experience in managing regional peace and security projects.
b. Proven organizational skills in coordinating activities and resources.
c. Excellent drafting skills, including the ability to draft reports with objectivity and independent judgment.
d. Confidentiality and a high degree of tact and ability to build and maintain effective working relationships with internal and external stakeholders, at all levels.
e. Ability to work under pressure and to tight deadlines.
f. Ability to work as part of a team in an international cross cultural context.
g. Meticulous attention to detail, whilst maintaining an awareness of general policy directions and priorities of Denmark’s interventions in the Gulf of Guinea.
h. Excellent ability to draft and edit technical texts and present complex issues orally in a clear manner.
i. Demonstrated ability to multitask and to work under pressure to tight deadlines, whilst maintaining accurate high quality work.
j. Good interpersonal skills and ability to build and maintain effective relationships.

For (b):

a. Demonstrable ability to manage capacity development courses within international project management contexts.
b. Ability to prepare technical background papers on maritime security issues
c. Ability to work in complex multi-cultural environments in Africa.
d. Proven skills and familiarity with peace and security research in Africa.

Professional Experience
a. Minimum seven years of progressively responsible experience working in a multi-cultural environment in the peace and security sector in West Africa.
b. Demonstrable experience of maritime security operations and planning.
c. At least five years of progressively responsible professional experience managing and reporting on regional projects and/or programmes in Africa involving also international donors.
d. Demonstrated experience of monitoring and reporting on international projects in accordance with results based management (RBM) principles, including output and outcome based reporting, monitoring and assessment of changes in assumptions and risks, theory of change etc.
e. Experience in organizing and participating in international meetings related to peace and security broadly and particularly, maritime security.
f. Experience with facilitating and presenting technical training courses at a senior level.
g. Working experience of international conventions. General knowledge of the maritime sector with personal network into national security sector practitioner community in Africa.

Education
Graduate degree in the social sciences / political science from a recognized university. Other additional and relevant certificates or commensurate experience is an asset.

Language skills
Complete written and oral proficiency in English. Working knowledge of French and Portuguese will be an asset.

Other knowledge and skills.
Participation in the development of project monitoring systems and related documentation and procedures. Good working knowledge of standard MS Office applications.

MAIN DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

For (a):
1. Coordinate the monitoring and reporting of the Danish GoG MSP in close consultation with the Danish Embassies in Accra and Abuja and with programme implementing partners.
2. Based on the reports from implementing partners, prepare annual reports using PSF formats on programme implementation and submit to the Embassy of Denmark in Accra.
3. Develop and implement a framework for gathering, storing, analyzing and disseminating programme-related information.
4. Maintain and update the Programme implementation database, incorporating data on relevant projects and projects under implementation based on the four engagement’s results frameworks.
5. Analyze and evaluate relevant data to ensure achievements of objectives and develop presentations and written reports on overall programme implementation in accordance with PSF Guidelines and the programme’s management set up.
6. Ensure that data related to Danish-supported programmes in the Gulf of Guinea is accurate. This will involve supporting implementing partners with monitoring of implementation using the indicators included at engagement level.
7. Carry out other related duties as may be assigned by the Danish Embassy in Accra.

For (b)

1. Serve as a course director for an advanced maritime security course at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre.
2. Coordinate the organization of the above-mentioned course with relevant internal and external stakeholders.
3. Establish a database of maritime security subject matter experts for use by the Danish Maritime Security Programme and the related courses at the KAIPTC.
4. Prepare technical background papers on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea for specific meetings of maritime stakeholders.
5. Facilitate on maritime security capacity development courses at the KAIPTC.
6. Undertake any additional tasks to be agreed upon jointly by the Danish Embassy in Accra and the KAIPTC

In the event of any clash between these two sets of responsibilities, those described at (a) will take precedence.

Management
The coordinator will report to the Deputy Head of Mission at the Danish Embassy in Accra for both (a) and (b). Additionally, in relation to (b), the coordinator will act under the day-to-day supervision of the Director FAAR at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC).

Location
The coordinator will be allocated office space at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra.

Periodic travel to other countries in West Africa
JOB TITLE: CIVILIAN MARITIME ADVISOR, NIGERIA

DANISH MARITIME SECURITY PROGRAMME IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

Client: Government of Denmark

Location: Abuja, Nigeria with periodic travel within West Africa required.
Contract information: Fixed term for…. (Probationary period…, with possibility for extension)

Background:
These Terms of Reference relate to the position of Civilian Maritime Advisor to the Danish Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria with responsibility for assisting in the management of the Danish Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme (GoG MSP) 2019-2021. The Advisor’s activities will primarily be within Nigeria, although some regional (West Africa) and international travel may be required.

The Danish Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme is the second phase of Danish support to strengthening regional capabilities and capacities for maritime domain awareness (MDA) and response as well as a longer-term institutional strengthening of maritime governance. The programme is funded through the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF), which draws from both Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs sources.

The overall objective of the support is enhanced regional maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea through more capable maritime and law enforcement institutions at national and regional level. It builds on Denmark’s current and previous diplomatic, stabilisation, and development engagement in the region and has been designed to complement Denmark’s other channels of support between 2019-2021 (36 months). The programme further strengthens Denmark’s contribution to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. It also reinforces Denmark’s commitment to stability, the rule of law, gender and human rights.

The programme has been designed around four interlinked peace and stabilisation engagements:

- Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 1 – strengthened maritime law response to piracy (through UNODC). This is primarily a civil engagement and concerns the development and introduction of relevant maritime crime legislation in Nigeria and Ghana.
- Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 2 – maritime strategies in place and operational (through IMO). This is primarily a civil engagement and concerns the development and introduction of relevant strategic documentation and inter-agency cooperation on maritime security in Nigeria and Ghana.
- Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 3 – research informed dialogue and capacity development strengthens maritime security (through the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre – KAIPTC). This will be implemented in Ghana but with a focus on relevant agencies within Gulf of Guinea countries as well as regional and international partners.
- Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 4 – maritime operational planning and response enhanced to counter piracy (via Danish defence). This is primarily a military engagement and will be implemented in Nigeria and Ghana as well as at sea within the Gulf of Guinea.
The programme has been prepared in accordance with Denmark’s Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) Guidelines (October 2018). Inter alia, these guidelines set out the characteristics of PSF programmes and the general management arrangements that must apply. The latter are also described in the GoG MSP Programme Document, its annexes and its four Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Documents (PSEDs) that comprise the programme.

The Programme is managed by the Danish Embassy in Accra but has important linkages to the Danish Embassy in Abuja regarding activities in Nigeria, where the Danish Military Maritime Adviser (who also functions as Denmark’s defence attaché) has an important management function in relation to PSE 4.

The work of the Civilian Maritime Advisor will be primarily within the framework provided by the documents and guidelines as they apply to PSE 1 and PSE 2 in Nigeria and he/she will supplement the activity of the Military Maritime Adviser and come under the latter’s overall management.

**Purpose of the post:**

Under the overall management of the Danish Military Maritime Advisor at the Danish Embassy in Abuja, the Advisor will:

**a)** Support the implementation of PSE 1 and PSE 2 through interaction with UNODC and IMO and relevant stakeholders in Nigeria, notably NIMASA, NDLEA, NPA, the Nigerian Navy, and the Federal Ministry of Justice.\(^1\) This function will be separate from UNODC and IMO’s roles, where they have primary responsibility for implementing the two engagements alongside Nigerian maritime actors. The Civil Maritime Adviser will supplement UNODC and IMO through his/her capacity as a representative of the Danish Embassy in Abuja, thereby ensuring that the Embassy is kept fully informed on progress and that any obstacles and risks are identified and managed at an early stage.

  i. Monitor the implementation of PSE 1 and PSE 2 according to the work plans for these two engagements.

  ii. Provide technical input within the scope of the engagements as relevant (while respecting the primary implementing roles of UNODC and IMO). It is envisaged that regular meetings will be held with UNODC and IMO technical advisors and management to facilitate this.

  iii. Alert the Military Maritime Adviser where there is a need for Danish political dialogue input with implementing partners and/or national counterparts to help resolve any issues arising. Propose appropriate mitigating action where this is needed.

  iv. Provide input in the form of comments to the regular reporting concerning PSE 1 and PSE 2. Nb. This will be coordinated with the GoG MSP’s M&E Advisor located in Accra. Such input may take the form of comments on the reporting provided by the implementing partners.

  v. Maintain regular contact with national (Nigerian) maritime stakeholders, and represent the Embassy at meetings with UNODC, IMO, national counterparts and international partners.

---

\(^1\) NIMASA (the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency), NDLEA (the Nigerian National Drugs Law Enforcement Agency, Marine Unit), NPA (Nigerian Port Arturrites)
b) Monitor, assess and analyse developments within the maritime security field in Nigeria and in relation to Nigeria’s role within the Gulf of Guinea. Particular attention will be given to civil aspects of maritime security and the advisor will contribute to the maintenance of an overall overview together with the Danish Military Maritime Adviser.

c) Communicating results and other aspects of public interest relating to PSE 1 and PSE 2 in Nigeria. This will include preparing inputs to the Embassy’s homepage/twitter account as well as reporting on programme activities that may be of interest to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen.

d) Ad hoc support to the Danish Maritime Military Adviser in relation to civil aspects of maritime security in Nigeria and more widely in the region.

Required competencies:

a. Demonstrable project management and monitoring skills and techniques especially, experience in managing regional peace and security projects.

b. Proven organizational skills in coordinating activities and resources.

c. Excellent English language drafting skills, including the ability to draft reports with objectivity and independent judgment.

d. Ability to work as part of a team in an international cross cultural context.

e. Meticulous attention to detail, whilst maintaining an awareness of general policy directions and priorities of Denmark’s interventions in the Gulf of Guinea.

f. Excellent ability to present complex issues orally in a clear manner.

g. Demonstrated ability to multitask and to work under pressure to tight deadlines, whilst maintaining accurate high quality work.

h. Good interpersonal skills and ability to build and maintain effective relationships. Confidentiality and a high degree of tact, at all levels.


Professional Experience

a. Minimum ten years of progressively responsible experience working in the area of maritime administration and governance in West Africa.

b. At least five years of progressively responsible professional experience within the area of maritime security. It will be an advantage if this includes practical experience of maritime security administration and/or law enforcement.

c. Demonstrable experience working in the area of peace and security in West Africa.

d. Demonstrable experience managing and reporting on regional projects and/or programmes in Africa involving also international donors. This should include familiarity with results based management (RBM) principles, including output and outcome based reporting, monitoring and assessment of changes in assumptions and risks, theory of change etc.

e. Experience in organizing and participating in international meetings related to maritime administration and governance broadly and particularly, within maritime security.
f. Working experience of international conventions. Good knowledge of the maritime sector with personal network into national maritime administration, governance and law sector practitioner community in Africa.
g. It will be a significant advantage if applicants can demonstrate practical experience from the above areas of work in Nigeria.

Training
The Advisor will be provided with an introduction to the Danish Maritime Security Programme and regarding the Danish Peace and Security Fund (PSF). This will include an orientation regarding PSF guidelines, management and reporting.

Education
The Advisor will possess a university degree in social sciences, political science or maritime security/governance from a recognized university. Other additional and relevant certificates or commensurate experience is an asset.

Language skills
The Advisor will have excellent written and oral proficiency in English. Working knowledge of French and Portuguese will be an asset.

Other knowledge and skills.
Participation in the development of project monitoring systems and related documentation and procedures. Good working knowledge of standard MS Office applications.

Management
The Advisor will be a locally recruited member of the Danish Embassy in Abuja. He/she will report to the Danish Military Maritime Advisor at the Danish Embassy in Abuja.

Location
The Advisor will be allocated office space at the Danish Embassy in Abuja.

Periodic travel in Nigeria and to other countries in West Africa can be expected.
Annex 12

Danish Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme (GoG MSP), 2019-2021

Local Advisory Group

Terms of Reference

Introduction

These terms of reference relate to the establishment and operation of a Local Advisory Group, which will provide a mechanism for local discussion between the main programme implementing partners involved in the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme (GoG MSP). As such, it will support the Danish Embassy in Accra in its overall management of the programme.

The main stakeholders concerned are: the Danish Embassies in Accra and Abuja, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). The programme will run between February 2019 and end-2021 and consists of four engagements:

- Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 1 – strengthened maritime law response to piracy (through UNODC). This is primarily a civil engagement and concerns the development and introduction of relevant maritime crime legislation in Nigeria and Ghana.
- Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 2 – maritime strategies in place and operational (through IMO). This is primarily a civil engagement and concerns the development and introduction of relevant strategic documentation and inter-agency cooperation on maritime security in Nigeria and Ghana.
- Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 3 – research informed dialogue and capacity development strengthens maritime security (through the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre – KAIPTC). This will be implemented in Ghana but with a focus on relevant agencies within Gulf of Guinea countries as well as regional and international partners.
- Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 4 – maritime operational planning and response enhanced to counter piracy (via Danish defence). This is primarily a military engagement and will be implemented in Nigeria and Ghana as well as at sea within the Gulf of Guinea.

The programme has been prepared in accordance with Denmark’s Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) Guidelines (October 2018). Inter alia, these guidelines set out the characteristics of PSF programmes and the general management arrangements that must apply. The latter are also described in the GoG MSP Programme Document, its annexes and its four Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Documents (PSEDs) that comprise the programme.

The Programme is managed by the Danish Embassy in Accra but has important linkages to the Danish Embassy in Abuja regarding activities in Nigeria, where the Danish Military Maritime Adviser (who also functions as Denmark’s defence attaché) has a management function in relation to PSE 4.

Purpose

The Local Advisory Group is as a coordination and consultative forum at overall programme level and involving the main programme implementing partners.

Mandate and scope

The Local Advisory Group has the following mandate and scope:
a. Act as an overall programme discussion and coordination group enabling implementing partners to jointly reflect on overall progress, take action to utilise opportunities and synergies that may arise, and minimise overall risks.

b. Provide a framework for information exchange on the Gulf of Guinea and maritime security issues besides matters related to the PSF-programme, including relevant political developments.

c. Provide input to the monitoring of the overall programme (arrange participation in meetings, visits, reviews etc.) and provide feedback to group members on these.

d. Propose areas/activities where operational synergies might be achieved between development engagements.

e. Monitor and take account of developments/programmes being supported by other donors.

f. Respond to reporting from implementing partners (UNODC, IMO, KAIPTC and Defence Command Denmark) concerning overall programmatic results, assumptions and risks (i.e. including regular PSF reporting).

g. Contribute to terms of reference for programme reviews etc. as may be required and monitor implementation of overall programmatic findings as appropriate.

h. Consider communication issues.

**Organisation**

The Local Advisory Group will:

a) Meet at least twice time a year (more frequently if necessary).

b) Regular agenda points could be as reflected in points a-h above, as well as other urgent issues relating to the programme as a whole.

c) Membership will be the Danish Embassies in Accra and Abuja, UNODC, IMO and KAIPTC.

d) Be chaired by RDF Accra.

e) A short record (main points) of the meetings will be taken.

f) Meetings will timed to coincide with key GoG MSP events, such as reporting, reviews etc.
Introduction
These terms of reference relate to the establishment and operation of an Inter-Ministerial Resource Group, which will provide a mechanism for discussion between the main Danish stakeholders involved in the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Programme (GoG MSP). The membership of the group will reflect the inter-ministerial nature of the programme.

The Danish main stakeholders concerned are: the Danish Embassies in Accra and Abuja, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SSP and AFR), the Danish Ministry of Defence, and the Danish Defence Command. The programme will run between February 2019 and end-2021 and consists of four engagements:

- Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 1 – strengthened maritime law response to piracy (through UNODC). This is primarily a civil engagement and concerns the development and introduction of relevant maritime crime legislation in Nigeria and Ghana.
- Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 2 – maritime strategies in place and operational (through IMO). This is primarily a civil engagement and concerns the development and introduction of relevant strategic documentation and inter-agency cooperation on maritime security in Nigeria and Ghana.
- Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 3 – research informed dialogue and capacity development strengthens maritime security (through the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre – KAIPTC). This will be implemented in Ghana but with a focus on relevant agencies within Gulf of Guinea countries as well as regional and international partners.
- Peace and Stabilisation Engagement (PSE) 4 – maritime operational planning and response enhanced to counter piracy (via Danish defence). This is primarily a military engagement and will be implemented in Nigeria and Ghana as well as at sea within the Gulf of Guinea.

The programme has been prepared in accordance with Denmark’s Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF) Guidelines (October 2018). Inter alia, these guidelines set out the characteristics of PSF programmes and the general management arrangements that must apply. The latter are also described in the GoG MSP Programme Document, its annexes and its four Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Documents (PSEDs) that comprise the programme.

The Programme is managed by the Danish Embassy in Accra but has important linkages to the Danish Embassy in Abuja regarding activities in Nigeria, where the Danish Military Maritime Adviser (who also functions as Denmark’s defence attaché) has a management function in relation to PSE 4.

Purpose
Inter-ministerial Resource Group is as a coordination and consultative forum at overall programme level and involving the main Danish programme stakeholders.

Mandate and scope
The Inter-ministerial Resource Group has the following mandate and scope:
a. Act as an overall programme discussion and coordination group enabling Danish stakeholders to jointly reflect on overall progress, take action to utilise opportunities and synergies that may arise, and minimise overall risks.

b. Provide a framework for information exchange on the Gulf of Guinea and maritime security issues besides matters related to the PSF-programme, including relevant political developments.

c. Provide input to the monitoring of the overall programme (arrange participation in meetings, visits, reviews etc.) and provide feedback to group members on these.

d. Propose areas/activities where operational synergies might be achieved between development engagements and between the GoG MSP and other Danish programmes (e.g. under the Africa Programme for Peace).

e. Monitor and take account of developments/programmes being supported by other donors.

f. Respond to reporting from implementing partners (UNODC, IMO, KAIPTC and DCD) concerning overall programmatic results, assumptions and risks (i.e. including regular PSF reporting).

g. Contribute to terms of reference for programme reviews etc. as may be required and monitor implementation of overall programmatic findings as appropriate.

h. Consider communication issues.

i. Discuss (and prepare advice) regarding issues that need to be forwarded to the PSF Steering Committee.

**Organisation**

The Inter-Ministerial Resource Group will:

a) Meet at least twice times a year (more frequently if necessary).

b) Regular agenda points could be as reflected in points a-i above, as well as other urgent issues relating to the programme as a whole.

c) Membership will be RDEs Accra & Abuja, MFA (SSP, AFR), DMoD, DCD. Additional participants may be invited, including, DDIS, Danish Defence College etc.

d) The resource group will be jointly chaired by RDE Accra and DMoD.

e) A short record (main points) of the meetings will be taken.

f) Meetings will timed to coincide with key GoG MSP events, such as reporting, reviews etc.