

Annex 1: Global Displacement Humanitarian Development Nexus: Lessons Learned

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Abbreviations

CIREFCA	Conferencia Regional sobre Refugiados Centroamericanos (International Conference on Central American Refugees)
CPA	Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese refugees
DG DEVCO	Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development
DG NEAR	Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Nations
GCFE	Global Concessional Financing Facility
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
GPFD	Global Programme on Forced Displacement
GPPi	Global Public Policy institute
ICARA	International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
JDC	The World Bank-UNHCR Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
RDPP	Regional Development and Protection Programme
RoI	Region of Origin
RSW	Refugee Sub-Window
SA	Solutions Alliance
TSI	Transitional Solutions Initiative
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WBG	World Bank Group
WDR	World Development Report
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit

1. Introduction

This annex is intended to support and inform a Danida study on the role of donors in supporting humanitarian-development nexus work. That study tests the global relevance of recommendations from an evaluation of the Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic Development Programme initiative in the Turkana region of Kenya. This initiative seeks to implement a long-term comprehensive development approach to the displacement situation in Turkana. The global relevance of the evaluation findings and recommendations is tested through consultations with select bilateral development partners and displacement affected states.

This annex provides a snapshot of historic and recent evidence of nexus approaches to forced displacement situations. The purpose is to draw lessons from this evidence that are of relevance for how donors, and in particular their development agencies, can take the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) agenda forward in the present global displacement context. How can long-term development assistance and humanitarian action be mutually supportive in addressing the challenges and opportunities of displacement situations? The focus will be on looking at key policy and operational evidence on development interventions to extract relevant lessons for the global context on forced displacement today and beyond.

The methodology has been a desk review of past and emerging evidence of nexus approaches to displacement in literature; interviews with select individuals¹; and experience of the author². From the myriad of initiatives, select examples of past and more recent nexus approaches have been identified to extract lessons to inform reflections and recommendations in the main study. The evidence is divided in two parts looking first at initiatives prior to 2015, and then subsequent events signalling the important political and momentum changing impacts of the Syrian crisis. The aim is not to discuss the granularities of these initiatives but to briefly present them, and then extract what seems to be the relevant for the continued development of nexus approaches to displacement.

¹ See acknowledgements in main report.

² The author was centrally involved in the Indochinese CPA, the Brookings process, the 4Rs as UNHCR staff and as WBG staff in the design of the TSI and the Solutions Alliance. He later became the head of the Solutions Alliance secretariat.

2. Today's Context

The displacement context. Before looking back at historic experience, evidence and lessons, it is pertinent to take a quick look at the present state of play of forced displacement. A solid understanding of the situation today will enhance the distillation of the most relevant lessons from the past. As of early 2020 more than 70 million people are forcibly displaced of whom 41 million are IDPs and 29 million are refugees or asylum seekers. 80% of the refugees live in neighbouring countries, and most in protracted displacement.³ In today's protracted and complex displacement contexts, the needs of the displaced do not start out as humanitarian and then become development oriented as time passes. There is no linear progression of impact, needs and opportunities. The consequences of forced displacement are, instead, varied and often severe, as well as costly and enduring in both a humanitarian and development sense from day one. The social, economic and poverty impacts and related cost are being documented by expanding volumes of analytical work by the World Bank Group (WBG) in close collaboration with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has analysed trends in donor contributions in covering these costs and 72 % of the 26 billion provided in the period 2015-17 was from humanitarian sources for short-term interventions.⁴

In practical terms, displacement often entails the loss of homes, land, belongings and livelihoods, the disruption of family and community life, loss of community resilience, human capital challenges, creating special needs and vulnerabilities but also opportunities. The displaced may strain the capacities of the communities in which they live, impede the achievement of development goals, and create community tension. On the other hand, refugees have strong coping mechanisms and possess skills and resources that, if harnessed, can contribute to the local economy, the building of community resilience, and the wellbeing of host or return communities and the displaced themselves.⁵ That refugees can be an economic opportunity is obvious from both a technical and intellectual perspective. The 2016 high level panel report "Too important to fail – addressing the humanitarian financing gap"⁶ highlights the unsustainability of the global approach to displacement, and argues for better use of existing resources, new donors, and most importantly, efforts to reduce needs. The latter can be done by building on the opportunities that displacement situations offer.

The international structure. The international system for responding to displacement situations is divided between humanitarian aid and development assistance, proceeding along separate funding mechanisms, principles, implementation modalities, and accountability measures. Institutional and organizational mandates operating in such a manner do not address the holistic and diverse array of consequences arising from complex crises and forced displacement. Instead, these siloed approaches may worsen structural vulnerabilities, and constitute inefficient and unsustainable responses in environments that demand the best and most innovative engagements that the international assistance community can supply. These impediments and the need to address them going forward

³ UNHCR, "Figures at a glance".

⁴ OECD, "Financing for refugee situations".

⁵ The positive impact of refugees is documented in a number of studies for example the WBG study on the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya "not in my back yard" and a Danish study on the environmental and economic impact of the Dadaab camp also in Kenya and a number of World Bank studies on impacts of Syrian refugees in neighboring countries. The Jordan compact is based on the very notion that refugees are seen as an economic opportunity.

⁶ High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing Report to the Secretary-General, Too important to fail – addressing the humanitarian financing gap.

are outlined in the UN Secretary General’s report “One Humanity, Shared Responsibility”⁷ to the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit.

The nexus approach to displacement. There is a long history of difficult efforts to align and interlink humanitarian aid and development assistance in order to better address these aspects of complex crises and protracted displacement. The nexus substance (see below) emerged from UNHCR in the 1950s and 1960s and got its name in the late 1990s as the EU invented the Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) terminology which looks at the humanitarian development link more broadly. In recent years, there are concerted efforts by states and agencies towards applying a nexus approach to humanitarian and development challenges. There is no unified agreement on the definition of the nexus, but there is broad political will to make it work. On the question of providing a concrete definition, the recent OECD Humanitarian Development Peace recommendation provides perhaps the best attempt: “*Nexus refers to the interlinkages between humanitarian, development and peace actions*” and approaches “*aim to strengthen collaboration, coherence and complementarity*” and *capitalize on the comparative advantages of each pillar – to the extent of their relevance in the specific context- in order to reduce overall vulnerability and the number of unmet needs, strengthen risk management capacities and address root causes of conflict*”.⁸

Towards the Global Compact on Refugees. The issue of humanitarian-development coherence (or “nexus”) reached the global policy agenda at the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in May 2016, with renewed impetus both in the lead up to, and in the aftermath of the WHS. The culmination came as part of the New York Declaration later in 2016, where the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was given the task of developing a new Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) in consultation with states and other stakeholders based on the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), which was part of the New York Declaration. At the Leaders’ Summit, also in September 2016,⁹ many donors made pledges, but displacement-impacted states such as Ethiopia, Jordan, Uganda and Chad also made pledges signalling progress towards inclusive refugee policies. Following formal consultations during 2017 and 2018, the GCR was adopted at the 2018 General Assembly. The GCR embodies a nexus approach to displacement, and it requires all actors to adapt. The GCR is a unique opportunity to strengthen the international response to large movements of refugees and protracted displacement situations through a comprehensive nexus approach. It builds on existing international law and standards, including the 1951 Refugee Convention and human rights treaties, and seeks to better define cooperation to share responsibilities. Its four key objectives are to (i) ease the pressures on host countries; (ii) enhance refugee self-reliance; (iii) expand access to third-country solutions; and (iv) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. Achieving the GCR objectives are foreseen to be done by reducing humanitarian needs through more inclusive approaches with a focus on self-reliance, improved coping capacity, more effective use of existing resources and localization of aid. This has to be achieved through a comprehensive approach that involves development actors more substantially and from the outset.

Challenges and resistance. The challenges facing the successful implementation of “nexus” programming, however, are substantial and complex. First, the concept needs further operationalization and several major actors assisting the forcibly displaced have yet to come to consensus on how to implement key elements of nexus programming. Second, the nature of forced

⁷ UN Secretary General “One Humanity – Shared Responsibility”.

⁸ Recommendation on the OECD Legal Instruments Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus.

⁹ UNHCR, “Summary Overview Document – Leaders’ Summit on Refugees”.

displacement environments continues to become increasingly complex and take longer and longer time to resolve. Third, most approaches to forced displacement to date have been country-specific, while regional approaches to addressing forced displacement are in their infancy – but show some promise.

An example of how difficult it is to get the development community involved in nexus work on displacement is the World Bank World Development Report (WDR) of 2011 on conflict and fragility. A background document to the WDR produced by the WBGs Global Program on Forced Displacement (GPDF) made the clear case as to why displacement needs to be considered not only as a humanitarian issue, but as a development issue as well.¹⁰ Yet the WDR full report failed to pick this up, and instead described displacement as a risk that needed to be mitigated, rather than as an issue that needed to be factored into development work in situations of conflict and fragility. The turnaround came years later when the WBG changed its policy on displacement, realising that it could not achieve its development objectives of poverty alleviation unless it included the displaced and their host communities as a core element in its development work. The combination of the internal groundwork of the Global Programme on Forced Displacement (GPDF) and the Syrian crisis were among the important factors that stimulated this realization.

Protracted displacement. With global refugee situations extending for decades in the absence of resolutions to conflicts and the emergence of peace, millions of forcibly displaced face protracted displacement before lasting solutions can be found. The important issue is that as displacement today almost invariably ends up being protracted and lasting for a decade or more, the contexts develop restrictive policy environments and international agencies provide costly and unsustainable humanitarian assistance for many years rather than supporting local sustainable livelihoods and delivery systems. Protracted displacement has a profound impact on host communities. Each displacement situation needs therefore to be seen as a development issue by default. In operationalizing the transformative vision of the GCR in the years to come, the main challenges will be to improve conditions in displacement-affected communities, while also preparing the displaced and their hosts for durable solutions. Voluntary return and sustainable (re)integration remain the most realistic long-term but often distant option for most. Addressing these prospects, requires a deep understanding of context, conditions, and the political economy of forced displacement to inform a comprehensive approach that addresses these challenges. Success also requires the involvement and investment of host governments in the strategies and activities designed to address persistent and complex displacement impacts on their territories.¹¹

The centrality of a development approach. The original UN structure made a clear distinction between humanitarian and development efforts also reflected in agency mandates. Many states designed their own national systems along these lines. This has led to the strong habitual assertion of displacement being considered only as a humanitarian issue entrenched both in the development and humanitarian communities, leading to effective ringfencing of humanitarian action on displacement and never reaching the core of development policy, strategy, tools and operations. In addition to the structural reason, there may be other reasons. On the political side, refugees are often associated with political controversy wherever they are, and therefore rarely considered part of the development priorities and plans of governments. It may also at times be in the (cynical) political interest of states to separate the political (and related wars and conflicts) from the humanitarian

¹⁰ Christensen, A. & Harild, N., “The Development Challenge of Finding Durable Solutions for Refugees and Internally Displaced People”.

¹¹ Harild, N. “Forced displacement: a development issue with humanitarian elements”.

agenda. This allows states as duty bearers of wars and conflict to address the calamities they are responsible for through so-called impartial humanitarian aid.

The author's own experience leading the WBG GPDF efforts to change the approach of the World Bank towards a development approach to displacement is a case in point. In an interview after the end of his tenure¹² he elaborated on this experience and made the following points amongst others:

"The biggest obstacle was to achieve the necessary paradigm shift and change of mindset inside the Bank but also with client governments and partners."

"For a comprehensive approach to work effectively, governments need to provide the political space and strong leadership. Humanitarian actors should focus on the short-term lifesaving needs with a clear exit strategy built in up front. Development actors should engage from the beginning and focus on the long-term development needs of the displaced and their host countries or return communities."

To understand why a nexus approach is necessary, it is important to understand the contribution of a development approach to a forced displacement situation. The argument on the need for substantial and early engagement of development actors has been around for a long time and is finally largely agreed as also exemplified recently by WBG and EU DEVCO and some bilateral and national development actors' policies. Any displacement situation is a development and security challenge that may have humanitarian lifesaving needs.¹³ This realization implies a mindset shift from the traditional humanitarian needs and vulnerability driven approach to one of poverty alleviation, resilience building, and capacity development. This mindset shift also implies that displacement affected persons should not be seen as victims in need, but as survivors with capacity, while also acknowledging the importance of a sustainable reduction in vulnerability as part of the commitment to leave no one behind. The CRRF and GCR offer an opportunity to change the model of refugee hosting in order to benefit both refugees and their hosts. This is perhaps the most challenging and important mindset change required particularly as the current practice remains so entrenched. To enact a shift, it is important that state leaders and their foreign policy, security and development strategists and planners pay more attention to the full policy and operational implications.

In the last few years there has been a change in the development community, and a nexus approach has been emerging through increased engagement by development agencies. Bearing in mind the above context and understanding the most important lessons from the evolution of nexus approaches can be extracted as outlined in the following chapters of this study.

¹² World Bank, "The Evolution of World Bank Group's Role in Forced Displacement – Interview with Niels Harild, former manager of WBG's Global Program on Forced Displacement (GPDF)".

¹³ Harild, N. "Forced displacement: a development issue with humanitarian elements".

3. Past Attempts to Promote a Nexus Approach

While the nexus term only emerged in the 1990s,¹⁴ the rhetoric on this topic began in the 1950s and 1960s, in UNHCR speeches. For example, Prince Sadrudin in his 1967 statement to the Third Committee of the UN general assembly¹⁵ where he promoted a comprehensive approach to the refugee crisis at the time, said:

“We have, I believe, won acceptance for the argument that development plans which disregard the presence of large numbers of refugees, often as many as hundreds of thousands of persons amidst the indigenous population, would quite simply be doomed to failure.”

Since then, a variety of humanitarian and development approaches have been propagated and pursued by international and national actors to address the challenges and opportunities associated with different displacement scenarios. Displacement situations have varied in geopolitical importance and interest with impacts on political and operational attention and activities. There were conferences, regional initiatives and operational pilots all attempting to solve the riddle of “relief-to-development linkages”.¹⁶ They have largely been driven by the UN agency mandated to find durable solutions to displacement, namely UNHCR.

For the purpose of the quick overview of relevant nexus history, the following institutionalized processes have been selected: The International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA I and II), 1981 and 1984¹⁷, the Conferencia Regional sobre Refugiados Centroamericanos (CIREFCA), 1989¹⁸, the Indochinese Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), 1979-1996¹⁹, the Brookings process, 1999, the 4Rs 2002, the Secretary-General’s Decision on Durable Solutions 2011, the Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI), 2010-2013, the Solutions Alliance (SA), 2014-2017, and the CRRF as part of the GCR. These are reviewed to extract any policy and operational lessons which would be relevant today for decisionmakers, specifically in displacement affected states and for donors and their development agencies. The author also draws on his own direct experience with most of these initiatives.

3.1. The International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa

ICARA was launched in 1981 at a time when half of the world’s refugees were in Africa. ICARA I was a joint effort between UNHCR, (O)AU and the UN Economic Commission for Africa and built upon UNHCR experience in developing the Refugee Aid and Development initiative. Most ICARA proposals focused on large infrastructure projects. Issues that were later to concern humanitarian and development actors – such as displaced peoples’ rights to employment, legal status, and other socio-economic and political rights – were not included within ICARA. ICARA I did not succeed in raising enough funds for infrastructure projects and failed to address the refugee-related development needs of African countries of asylum. Although many donors remained sceptical, ICARA II was launched in 1984, giving a new boost to the concept of ‘integrated’ projects. The United Nations Development

¹⁴ See attached Table 1 on glossary on nexus terminology and Table 2 on member states and donor frameworks and commitments related to the nexus. Both are developed by NCG.

¹⁵ Khan, P. S. A. “Statement by Prince Sadrudin Aga Khan, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly at its 1519th meeting, 20 November 1967”.

¹⁶ Crisp, J 2012, “25 years of forced migration” *Forced Migration Review*.

¹⁷ The 1981 International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA).

¹⁸ International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA).

¹⁹ Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA).

Programme (UNDP) was this time much more involved. ICARA II had a wider scope than ICARA I and sought to raise additional resources for refugees and returnees in Africa for relief, rehabilitation and resettlement, to assess the impact on national economies of the concerned countries, and to strengthen the social and economic infrastructure to cope with the burden of refugees and returnees.

Although Tanzania was generally promoted as ICARA II's success model for its achievements in promoting self-sufficiency, the initiative was largely considered a failure due to:

- Participating states and agencies' divergent interpretations of the ultimate aim of developmental refugee assistance;
- A failure to guarantee the principle of additionality (i.e. the idea that any investment should be supplementary instead of substituting development aid) in pledges for ICARA II projects;
- Rivalries and divisions among assistance agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and host government departments.²⁰

3.2. The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese refugees

The Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) for Indochinese refugees is considered one of the more successful approaches to a regional refugee situation. The refugee crisis began in 1975 in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, and was successfully resolved by 1996. The CPA model negotiated in the Cold War context saw agreement by the Asian countries to grant the boat people asylum, while the international community would agree to resettlement in third countries and cover the cost of the upkeep in closed camps. Those who did not qualify for refugee status would return to Vietnam. For both resettlement in third countries and voluntary return, the respective developmental efforts secured integration and reintegration. The CPA worked because displacement affected states and donors were at the centre of decision making, with both parties having strong political will and long-term commitment to make it work. In addition, UNHCR facilitated the state-to-state negotiation processes prudently and effectively. To put things in historic perspective, the resolution of the Indochinese refugee crisis was one the fastest on record i.e. inside 20 years.²¹

3.3. The International Conference on Central American Refugees

CIREFCA, the Spanish acronym for the International Conference on Central American Refugees held in 1989, was a UNHCR-UNDP partnership with regional governments to link emergency assistance to development plans. The process was complicated by differences among the seven participating central American nations, and the evolution of field realities as conflicts subsided and refugees were repatriated. Some of the key factors in the success of the CIREFCA process were associated with the political will of states to address the development challenge of forced displacement, regional ownership in planning and implementation of projects, and strong donor support. CIREFCA represents an example of an effective comprehensive framework for securing stability and promoting development in conflict-affected environments.²² CIREFCA helped promote reconciliation in war-torn countries, wider recognition of the nature of asylum, and the concept at a global policy level that emergency relief and development should be seen as a single continuum, rather than a two-step process. However, coordination and evaluation were poor, with some CIREFCA projects developed without local consultation.²³

²⁰ Kibreab, G 1991. "The State of the Art Review of Refugee Studies in Africa" Uppsala Papers in Economic History, Research Report 26. Uppsala: Department of Economic History, University of Uppsala.

²¹ This assessment is provided by the author who spent eight years of his career with UNHCR on CPA issues.

²² World Bank "The Impact of Refugees on Neighboring Countries: A Development Challenge".

²³ Jeff Crisp, 1994, UNHCR, Review of the CIREFCA Process.

3.4. The Brookings Process

The Brookings Process was the name given to a structured discussion begun in 1999 with two high-level conferences hosted by the Brookings Institution and co-chaired by the World Bank and UNHCR, subsequently supported by UNDP. Piloted in Sierra Leone, it identified two gaps in existing responses to displacement:

- A “gap in approach” between humanitarian and development agencies: closing it required operational linkages between the two types of agencies early in the transition process;
- A “level of interest gap” reflecting the various political interests of donor countries that produced inadequate and unpredictable funding for societies emerging from war.

The initiative sought to bridge humanitarian relief and development assistance in post-conflict situations, including linkages between short-term humanitarian assistance and longer-term development solutions.

The principal drivers of the process – Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and James Wolfensohn, the President of the World Bank – stressed that:

“The challenge is to develop a more comprehensive approach that would address the specific needs of people in war-torn societies, thereby helping to reduce the recurrence of violence and displacement... We believe that the starting point for a more integrated humanitarian-development response (with an international political-military dimension when necessary) is a more coherent, co-operative planning process that utilizes organizations’ particular strength in particular situations. This, in turn, could drive, and be driven by, more coherent funding arrangements.”²⁴

The declared aim was “a global voluntary, loosely-knit tiered coalition for post-conflict stability” which “aims to mobilize all those key players who share the Brookings ‘spirit’, the ‘gap’ concerns, and who are determined and committed to work together towards addressing the gaps, including in situations with low donor interest.”²⁵ While the two conferences saw high level ministerial participation from donor countries, this interest soon evaporated and the follow up was left with UNHCR, the World Bank and UNDP. Post-conflict Sierra Leone was identified as a test case for the Brookings Process’ concept of ‘partnership initiatives.’²⁶ This was initiated by UNHCR, the World Bank and UNDP with the two latter as reluctant partners. While Ogata and Wolfensohn had the same vision and ideas similar to what is now enshrined in the GCR, neither UNHCR nor the WBG as institutions were ready to back them up. The situation was the same in UNDP. In addition, there was substantial opposition in the UN system at large to what was seen as UNHCR wanting to drive the development agenda. Donors instead preferred to retain control of funding and urged the agencies to address gap issues through improved coordination. Ogata and Wolfensohn were ahead of their time, but it was the beginning of a closer partnership between UNHCR and the WBG, which only began to become a reality when the WBG internalized its need to engage in forced displacement through its GPDFD initiated in 2009. Now, with the GCR adopted, these two institutions appear ready to operationalize Ogata and Wolfensohn’s vision.

3.5. The 4Rs process

The 4Rs process – Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction – was launched in 2003, when UNHCR became a member of the UN Development Group. It was promoted by UNHCR

²⁴ Sadako Ogata and James Wolfensohn, 1999. The transition to peace in war-torn societies: some personal observations.

²⁵ Crisp, J. UNHCR, 2001, Mind the gap! UNHCR, humanitarian assistance and the development process, p. 15.

²⁶ UNHCR “Reintegration: A Progress Report”.

and UNDP as “a general transition strategy for countries emerging from violent conflict”.²⁷ Piloted in Sri Lanka, Eritrea, Afghanistan and Sierra Leone, the 4Rs concept sought to “ensure linkages between all four processes so as to promote durable solutions for refugees, ensure poverty reduction and help create good local governance.”²⁸ The approach came out of the observation that the needs of returnees had not systematically been incorporated in transition and recovery plans by host governments, the donor community and the UN system. This had, it was recognised, made reintegration unsustainable and many returnees were therefore opting to return to their country of asylum or needing to undertake secondary migration internally, mostly to city slums.

The 4Rs initiative attempted to bring together humanitarian, transition and development approaches throughout the different stages of a reintegration process in a structured manner, thus contributing to national recovery and the consolidation of peace, stability, and the foundation for longer-term development. It was intended that UNHCR would take the lead on repatriation, while reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction would be shared between the UN Country Team and the World Bank.

The 4Rs concept was seen as unsuccessful because it lacked adequate institutional arrangements between agencies such as UNHCR and UNDP, as well as poor direction, insufficient resources, limited training for UN staff, and inadequate technical guidance in pilot countries. Reflecting the general perception that the initiative was overly driven by UNHCR, UNICEF complained that in Sierra Leone the 4Rs was “managed primarily by one agency with little substantive participation by others.”²⁹

In all pilot programmes, there was a weak culture of collaboration, few incentives to build constructive sustainable partnerships and a general failure by all actors to anticipate the huge and resource-intensive challenges associated with repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction in transition contexts. In summary, “the concept failed to take root precisely because it lacked adequate institutional arrangements between agencies such as UNHCR and UNDP, as well as poor direction, insufficient resources, limited training for UN staff, and inadequate technical guidance in pilot countries”.³⁰ Other reasons for failure was limited preparatory context analysis and limited consultations and involvement of displacement affected states. Also, at the time, multilateral and bilateral development institutions including host states had limited institutional commitment to include displacement issues in their work, and that is perhaps the most important reason for the failure of the 4Rs.

3.6. The Secretary-General’s Decision on Durable Solutions

[The Secretary-General’s Decision on Durable Solutions \(2011\)](#), initially implemented in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and the Ivory Coast, marked a formal recognition of the need to identify priorities and allocate responsibilities between key international stakeholders – humanitarian agencies as well as development and peacebuilding actors – to support durable solutions for both IDPs and refugees returning to their countries of origin. UNDP and UNHCR, working with the Global Early Recovery and Protection Clusters, produced a preliminary guide to inform application of the decision which set out an indicative nine-step model to developing a joint durable solutions strategy.³¹ The preparation for the Secretary-General’s decision was largely an internal UN process and never achieved sufficient ownership from displacement impacted states or donor states.

²⁷ Lippmann, B and Malik, S 2004, “The 4Rs: The way ahead?” *Forced Migration Review* 21.

²⁸ UNHCR, 2003, Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern.

²⁹ UNICEF, 2004, Global: Assessment of UNICEF’s Contribution to UN Reform and Its Impact on UNICEF in the Humanitarian Sector, p. 55.

³⁰ Muggah, R. «The Death-knell of 4R: rethinking durable solutions or displaced people».

³¹ UNDP and UNHCR “A preliminary operational guide to the united nations secretary-general ‘s decision on durable solutions to displacement”. The guide notes (p.14) that “Engagement with Solutions Alliance members throughout the conception and drafting processes may help identify allies at global and local levels”.

3.7. The Transitional Solutions Initiative

The Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI) was launched in 2011 by UNHCR, UNDP and the World Bank, with TSI pilot projects in Eastern Sudan and Colombia. The TSI has its intellectual roots in the work of a Nordic+ objective of ensuring a more harmonised approach to displacement by a range of development actors.³² The TSI sought to ensure the integration of displacement issues into development agendas, promoting the need for sustainable interventions for refugees, IDPs and host communities in recovery and development programming, and sought additional bilateral and multilateral assistance. In essence, the TSI approach has promoted holistic area-based projects for the complex needs of displaced persons and host communities. TSI built on earlier initiatives, recognising the importance of decentralised decision-making, and that transitions are invariably risky, political, time-consuming, non-linear, fluid, and difficult to predict.³³

The TSI Concept Note from 2009 frankly notes, that:

“Some fundamental questions still remain valid: why is it so difficult to include displacement on the development agenda of donors, governments and development agencies’ programmes and funds? Even where refugees and IDPs receive some assistance for return, why are the longer-term needs of the returnees not systematically integrated into the reconstruction planning? How can humanitarian agencies adapt their programmes further to facilitate early recovery without compromising humanitarian principles? How can additional, flexible and timely transitional and development assistance be ensured for refugees who are non-citizens?”

Since then, the narrative, policies and operational practices have evolved and it is now broadly accepted that displacement situations are also a development issue. We have seen a significant scale-up of development interventions by the WBG, the EU, some bilateral development partners and displacement affected states in protracted displacement situations benefitting both the displaced and their hosts. However, there are to this day no good examples where the longer-term integration needs and opportunities in connection with return to country of origin are factored into post-conflict economic rehabilitation and reconstruction planning.

UNHCR reported initial progress with the TSI pilot in Colombia³⁴ although subsequently there were inter-agency challenges and a lack of alignment with the Government’s *Law on Victims and Land Restitution*, which slowed progress. The government was not centrally involved and saw it as a UN initiative. The World Bank was not involved. In Eastern Sudan, a coordinated approach by the World Bank, UNDP and UNHCR faced serious implementation challenges as the Government of Sudan raised concerns about the integration of refugees. By contrast, UNDP and UNHCR found that, despite its temporary suspension, the TSI initiative contributed positively to improved basic services, livelihoods, and promoted self-reliance across the targeted communities.³⁵ However, a UNHCR-commissioned report wondered if TSI was “a re-branding exercise”, noting that lack of funding had made success “elusive”. In addition, it was observed that the relatively limited scope of the collaboration – with stakeholders essentially limited to UNHCR, UNDP and the World Bank – limited the reach and prospects for success.³⁶ Most importantly, the government was not consulted significantly

³² Deschamp, B. & Lohse, S., for UNHCR, “Still minding the gap? A review of efforts to link relief and development in situations of human displacement, 2001-2012”

³³ UNHCR “Transitional Solutions Initiative: UNDP and UNHCR in Collaboration with the World Bank: Concept Note.”

³⁴ UNHCR, TSI Colombia, 2015. Progress update for Colombia.

³⁵ UNDP & UNHCR, “Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI) Joint Programme Phase 1, 2012-2014”

³⁶ Deschamp, B. & Lohse, S., for UNHCR, “Still minding the gap? A review of efforts to link relief and development in situations of human displacement, 2001-2012”. (02/2013), p. 43.

upfront, which created fatal obstacles to effective programme implementation. At a conference among friends of the TSI in Amsterdam in 2013, it was realized that for initiatives like TSI to have success, displacement impacted states have to not only be involved, but to be centrally involved, and similarly civil society and the private sector need to be part of the process. This led to the creation of the Solutions Alliance in 2014.

Looking back at these initiatives, a veteran humanitarian analyst observed:

“While there have been good analyses of the obstacles to overcoming this division, it is hard not to feel cynical about the possibility of ever overcoming the divide between humanitarian and development actors.”³⁷

While this cynicism may still linger with many today, the present GCR inspired momentum may have shifted many to a more optimistic and less cynical position perhaps inspired by the tangible actions taken by a few displacement impacted states and some of their multilateral and bilateral development partners.

3.8. The Solutions Alliance (2014-2017)

The Solutions Alliance (SA) was created in 2014 to advance a comprehensive approach to solutions to forced displacement. Contrary to previous initiatives, the SA had displacement affected states at its core and also included donor states, IFIs, the UN, NGOs, academia, private sector and civil society. The SA first and foremost supported locally led solutions to forced displacement crises.

The aim of the SA was to improve the lives of displaced persons and the communities that host them by responding more collaboratively to displacement and contributing to durable solutions. The Alliance had a three-pronged approach: (i) “Supporting innovative solutions through the development of appropriate strategies, programmes and projects in selected displacement situations; (ii) “Helping shape the global policy agenda to recognize displacement as a development challenge, as well as a humanitarian and protection issue, and to work with the governments in affected countries toward the inclusion of displacement issues as a cross-cutting theme in national and local development plans”; and (iii) “Ensuring that a diverse and growing group of partners form a vibrant network and seek to maximize the impact of their individual efforts.”³⁸

Working hand in hand with displacement affected countries, the SA aimed to move beyond treating forced displacement simply as a humanitarian issue and towards more holistic approaches. Partners of the Alliance worked with affected countries to promote appropriate political and legal frameworks for pursuing lasting solutions for displaced people, using an evidence-based and partnership approach. This included seeking to mainstream the response to displacement within the wider framework of local and national development plans, programs and budgets in affected countries.

The Alliance also sought to drive a greater degree of coherence in efforts to foster a development-oriented approach to displacement. The Alliance formed a cooperative platform of actors committed to including displacement as a key part of the international development agenda, helping to inform and guide the approach of bilateral and multilateral actors in providing development support to affected governments. Committed to tangible and measurable achievements, the Alliance endeavoured to share and scale up practices that have led to lasting solutions in other displaced population operations.

³⁷ Ferris, E. “Transitions and Durable Solutions or Displaced Persons: 21 Reasons for Optimism”.

³⁸ UNDP «Geneva Partnerships».

Guiding Principles. The SA was guided by the following seven partnership and programming principles:

- Foster openness, country ownership and accountability
- Engage key stakeholders
- Adopt a purpose driven, flexible and partnership-oriented approach
- Be strategic about expected outcomes, success and sustainability
- Be context specific and evidence based
- Be data driven and results oriented
- Be prepared to engage long term

The governing board of the SA consisted of two states, Turkey and Denmark, representing both donors and displacement affected countries, the WBG representing the IFIs, IRC representing the NGOs and civil society, as well as UNDP and UNHCR representing the UN family.

The multi-stakeholder approach of the SA has been highlighted as one of the ways it surpassed previous nexus engagements which have failed to encompass donor countries, host governments, development and humanitarian agencies, NGOs, the private sector and academia in their totality. Moreover, the SA's work was grounded in tying high-level policy discussions to actual solutions for real contexts, something that was done by working through National Groups and Thematic Groups.³⁹

Following the New York Declaration and the ensuing CRRF/GCR process, it gradually became clear that the two initiatives were so similar that it made no sense to have both and it was decided by the governing board to close the SA. Some board members felt the CRRF should build on the SA platform but the majority – led by UNHCR – saw it differently. With the SA closure in June 2017, focus and attention of the broad spectrum of actors involved, turned towards the CRRF and GCR. The SA experience is important for the operationalization of the GCR as it had a configuration and objectives very similar to the CRRF/GCR.

3.9. Lessons learned from past attempts to promote a nexus approach

From these select institutionalized processes and structures, individual lessons are known from many assessments and analyses. For the purpose of this study, the major reasons for failure and success of the initiatives are summarized in the box below:

Box 1. Reasons for the failures of past initiatives

The main reasons why past nexus initiatives failed to gain traction and deliver results and impact were first and foremost policy related:

- Failure to recognize up front from a policy and strategy perspective, the inevitable longevity of displacement.
- Failure to recognize the importance of joint political and context analysis and local country leadership. The local context should define the stakeholder engagement process to produce this analysis. Consequently, there was no attempt by displacement affected states to include displacement in their national plans and programmes.
- Initiatives were perceived as being UN-centric, top down, driven by UNHCR, and instruments of resource mobilization for UN projects, rather than as strategic initiatives with

³⁹ Betts, A. (2016). "A new approach to an old problem: The Solutions Alliance". *Forced Migration Review* 52.

transformative objectives to change response strategies. This was a key factor in their low impact both at policy and operational levels.

- Pilots were designed for specific contexts and failed to develop a broader development approach, thus missing focus on why a development approach was needed and what it would imply for policy, operations and timelines to pursue such an approach. As a result, there was little understanding from development actors of why to engage, and hence no institutional commitment nor engagement from multilateral or bilateral development actors.
- Failure to deliver a comprehensive agreed understanding and trust amongst displacement affected states and donor states to reach agreement on burden sharing.
- Initiatives were personality driven with limited institutional commitment. Personality driven initiatives have severe limitations. Agencies and states found it difficult to move beyond their own business agenda to achieve results for the greater good, limiting the effectiveness of partnerships.
- Initiatives had no common framework and indicators to hold stakeholders accountable against expected changes both at the local and global level.
- Some failures were also related to technical and operational issues, including: (a) institutional understanding gaps between humanitarian and development actors, (b) disagreements between and within agencies on HQ/field on approach, (c) underestimation of donor funding rigidity and the overall funding implications of the initiatives, and (d) resistance to changing operational approaches both in the humanitarian and the development sectors.

Box 2. Reasons for the success of past initiatives

The main reasons why some initiatives gained traction and delivered results and impact were:

- From the policy perspective: (a) strong high level political and policy commitment and (b) deep sustained engagement by displacement affected states and donor states all with political will to succeed.
- From the technical and operational perspective: strong, smart and prudent facilitation by UNHCR with other multilateral agencies in support.

Drawing from these past initiatives, particularly the SA, the following three key lessons emerge as important reminders to displacement affected states, their development partners and UNHCR when further developing the CRRF and operationalizing the GCR:

Box 3. Key Lessons learned from past attempts to promote a nexus approach

- Full involvement of displacement affected states, donors and their development institutions from the onset. based on comprehensive political and context understanding at both country and regional level.

- UNHCR should facilitate the nexus process at large. UNHCR should lead on protection while other actors based on comparative advantages should lead the long-term inclusion, self-reliance and solutions aspects of the GCR.
- The main challenge for the GCR will be to seek agreement and action on burden and responsibility sharing as that is an essential cornerstone in a comprehensive approach and a prerequisite for meaningful impact. Sustained political will and commitment of displacement affected states and donors to work directly together to achieve agreement on policies and costs will be required.

The outbreak of conflict and violence are often grounded in grievances caused by governance failures. The resulting displacement will only end once a lasting political solution has been agreed to by all warring parties, thereby also allowing the gradual introduction of better governance. It is a political issue that needs to be solved through effective interplay between politics and policy, with a full understanding of political economy perspectives. Many initiatives have ignored political conditions and attempted to solve the situation through technical and operational means. The few that had some success did the opposite.

4. Recent Attempts to Introduce New Nexus Approaches

As mentioned above, recent years saw a number of processes and operational initiatives emerge, from the New York Declaration, the SDGs, the New Way of Working, and the CRRF, culminating in the adoption of the GCR. On the practical policy and operational side, and most importantly, the big actors of the WBG and EU DEVCO and DG NEAR entered the displacement scene changing their policies and approaches with substantial resources for development operations addressing displacement needs and opportunities. Some bilateral development partners have joined with resources for operations and finally, some displacement affected states have shown the way with inclusive refugee policies and their application. This chapter describes these efforts in detail and extracts relevant policy and operational lessons for the future operationalization of the GCR.

4.1. The New Way of Working

The 2016 New Way of Working (NWoW) has three objectives: (I) Reinforce, do not replace national and local systems; (ii) Transcend the humanitarian-development divide by working towards collective outcomes, based on comparative advantage and over multiyear timelines; and (III) Anticipate, do not wait for crisis. The overall conclusions of a review by New York University/Center on International Cooperation entitled "*The Triple Nexus in Practice: Toward a New Way of Working in Protracted and Repeated Crises*"⁴⁰ are that the NWoW is having positive effects as behavioural change is occurring at the country level. However, there is room for improvement and there are risks that momentum is stalling. One finding of the review of importance for the displacement nexus is that government leadership is a critical success factor, whether or not state systems are used in the short term. The report recommends that governments mainstream humanitarian and peacebuilding aspects into their development planning. Otherwise the review is very focused on the UN system and less on other actors, thereby missing an opportunity to highlight the important role donors, and particularly their development agencies, can play as development and negotiation actors at the country level.

4.2. The CRRF towards the GCR

On 19 September 2016, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. It reaffirmed the importance of the international refugee regime and contained a wide range of commitments by Member States to strengthen and enhance mechanisms to protect people on the move. The CRRF focuses on supporting those countries that host a large number of refugees to promote their inclusion, to ensure the involvement of development actors from an early stage, and to bring together national and local authorities, regional and international financial institutions, donor agencies, and the private and civil society sectors to generate a "whole of society" approach to refugee responses.

The adoption of the New York Declaration, signalled a new commitment to global solidarity and refugee protection at a time of heightened political concern about displacement, its protractedness, and particularly on ensuring that comprehensive responses to refugee protection are developed. Specifically, the New York Declaration called upon UNHCR to develop and initiate the application of a CRRF in specific situations that featured large-scale movements of refugees and protracted refugee situations, with the four key objectives of easing pressure on host countries, enhancing refugee self-reliance, expanding access to their country solutions and, supporting conditions in countries of origin for return

⁴⁰ Zamore, L. "The Triple Nexus in Practice: Toward a New Way of Working in Protracted and Repeated Crisis".

in safety and dignity. An important element of the CRRF process was to inform the design of the GCR based on practical experience.

To assess how the practical application of the CRRF in specific contexts has worked, an internal evaluation by UNHCR, an independent evaluation by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), and a think piece by the Global Public Policy institute (GPPi), has been picked amongst others⁴¹ to inform this report.

4.2.1. UNHCR evaluation of the CRRF roll-out

In December 2018, UNHCR⁴² published a review of the CRRF roll-out. In September 2019, the ODI followed with a review of CRRF progress in four East African countries⁴³. In October 2019, UNHCR published the first think piece of a longitudinal assessment of UNHCR's engagement in humanitarian-development cooperation. Together, these reviews present a generally positive but mixed picture of the CRRF roll-out with many challenges still to be overcome.

The UNHCR review concluded that in the two years since the adoption of the New York Declaration, there has been tangible progress made towards some of the key objectives of the CRRF. The CRRF has produced renewed political momentum at the global, regional, and national levels on refugees and forced displacement. While much more still needs to be done, the first two years of the CRRF approach have demonstrated promising change. Donors have shown their commitment by maintaining their humanitarian funding levels, and new potential funding and financial resources have been made available, although the impact of these changes will only become visible in future years. To enhance refugee self-reliance, refugee hosting countries overall have moved considerably towards more inclusive policies, with progress noted across most countries since September 2016. To support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity, policy initiatives have taken place and there is evidence of increased political momentum in countries of origin on key areas related to voluntary return.

4.2.2. Key findings from the ODI study “The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework: progress in four East African countries” (2019)

The CRRF and the GCR offer an opportunity to change the approach to hosting refugees to the mutual benefit of refugees and the communities that host them. An ODI review of the application of the CRRF in four East African countries – Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda – shows some positive progress, but high-income countries and donor governments are largely failing in their commitment to share responsibility for refugees. On the positive side the review notes that host governments, donors and aid actors increasingly pursue more inclusive refugee approaches in the Horn of Africa, and that progress has been made on some refugee rights and freedoms; and new donors, actors and initiatives have emerged. Nevertheless, with limited attempts to address mobility or supporting self-reliance in urban environments, there is a risk that this new way of working risks perpetuating the challenges arising from isolating refugees in remote, impoverished regions in continued dependency on humanitarian assistance. As a remedy, host government should be encouraged to integrate refugees into national systems and allow greater freedom of movement, and in

⁴¹ Hammond, L., Sturridge, C., Sebba, K. R., Owiso, M., Mahdi, M., Manji, F., and Osman, A. A., “Comprehensive Refugee Responses in the Horn of Africa: Regional Leadership on Education, Livelihoods and Durable Solutions Summary of findings”; and Crawford, N. & O’Callaghan, S. “The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework: responsibility-sharing and self-reliance in East Africa”.

⁴² UNHCR, “Two Year Progress Assessment of the CRRF Approach, September 2016-September 2018”

⁴³ Carver, F., Crawford, N., Holloway, K., Lowe, C., Manji, F., Nigusie, A. A., and O’Callaghan, S. “The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework: progress in four East African countries”.

return, predictable and long-term development funding must be stepped up dramatically in support of such moves. Finally, the study makes the important point that self-reliance and refugee inclusion will cost more, not less, in the short term, and that the CRRF/GCR should not be used as justification for humanitarian support withdrawal. Overall, the evaluation indicates the need for more inclusive refugee policies and urges donors to be more directly involved. It does, however, not suggest how this should be achieved.

4.2.3. GPPi review of UNHCR efforts to improve engagement with development actors

UNHCR's Evaluation Unit has commissioned a longitudinal assessment of this covering the period 2018 to 2021 carried out by the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi).⁴⁴ A think piece covering the first period from November 2018 to June 2019 was released in October 2019. It suggests that UNHCR has considerably increased its engagement in humanitarian-development cooperation and the predominant narrative within UNHCR is centred on the organization's role as a facilitator and catalyst for development actors. The effects are only beginning to emerge with mostly positive signals, but UNHCR's engagement with development actors is less transformative than could be expected. Thus, UNHCR's ability to leverage development actors towards including displacement appears limited, and when it happens, mainstreaming into national service delivery systems is a long and gradual process. Internal UNHCR procedures and budgetary obstacles are also challenging its ability to engage with development actors. While UNHCR has taken a number of adaptation steps towards a more effective approach, the think piece highlights a low level of advocacy commitments of international development actors, and questions if their engagement so far really represents a fundamental shift in their way of working.

Reflections. An overall reflection from the UNHCR, ODI and GPPi reviews would be that some small steps have been taken by displacement impacted states; UNHCR has begun to take steps to be more facilitative, while most donors and their development agencies in particular, are largely still sitting on the fence. The approach seems to have been predominantly projectized without getting to the core of addressing the national politics and political economy challenges faced by host states. The CRRF piloting or rollout in 15 countries was very much led and steered by UNHCR, which is perhaps understandable given the New York Declaration mandate held by UNHCR in developing the GCR. This is perhaps also the main reason why CRRF progress is relatively timid, and why the involvement of other central actors, particularly development partners, has been sketchy at best. The fact that UNHCR has chosen to, or had no other choice than to work with pre-existing host country counterpart structures may also have been an impediment, as the very existence of these structures and their resistance to change runs counter to the transformative objectives of the GCR. If local leadership of each CRRF processes could have wiped the slate clean and instigated leadership on the basis of national and external partners' comparative advantages in each displacement context, progress may have been better.

From the historic evidence presented in Chapter 3, most earlier nexus initiatives failed principally due to political disagreements and lack of political will by displacement affected states and their donors. Importantly, national and international development actors were not institutionally committed and hence not involved. This has started to change over the last five years or so. Two large multilateral development agencies, the WBG and EU DEVCO, have changed policy and approach and taken important steps to include forced displacement into their development policies and operations. Some displacement affected states and a few bilateral development actors have also begun steps in this

⁴⁴ Lehmann, J., Reichhold, U., and Steets, J., "UNHCR's Engagement in Humanitarian-Development Cooperation".

direction. This can possibly be accredited to a combination of internal evolution processes begun earlier, the emergence of the Syrian displacement crisis, and influence by the SA and CRRF processes.

4.2.4. The World Bank Group⁴⁵

The World Bank Group (WBG) has recently made forced displacement one of its core development concerns.⁴⁶ As a leader of development approaches globally, the WBG is well-placed and has taken on the task of promoting inclusion of displacement in development work, through analytical work, operational approaches and resourcing, but increasingly also through policy dialogue. On the basis of pilot operations and analytical work from 2009 and onwards, and with the impetus of the Syrian crisis, the WBG has significantly scaled up its work on forced displacement, most notably with the approval of the IDA18 sub-window for refugees and host communities in 2016, and the 2015 Global Concessional Financing Facility for middle-income countries spearheading this work.

Partnerships. When the WBG established its Global Programme on Forced Displacement (GPDFD) in 2009, it not only strengthened its own institutional approach to displacement, it also created the basis for developing a solid partnership with UNHCR. Initial efforts concentrated on involving UNHCR in WBG analytical work on the social and economic impact of three displacement situations in Africa. This exemplified, for the first time, what transpires when a development approach to displacement situation is led by a development institution, rather than by UNHCR. On the flip side, from UNHCR's perspective there was a longstanding need for professionally conducted economic and development-related analyses of refuge situations to inform dialogue on the best policies and programmatic approaches. The approach later expanded to the Middle East and elsewhere, and became the norm for WBG collaboration with UNHCR.⁴⁷

The WBG's partnership with UNHCR is naturally central to the WBG's work on displacement with governments. The partnership is not based on financing (no money flows from the WBG to UNHCR) but on a complementarity of mandates and instruments. While UNHCR works on refugee protection and ensuring the legal environment in which the WBG provides financing is conducive to socio-economic progress for refugees and host communities, the WBG provides analytics and financing to support refugee-hosting countries with a view to strengthening country ownership and sustainability. UNHCR provides the World Bank with extensive knowledge of the situation on the ground, which helps inform the design of operations. UNHCR is also providing an assessment of the refugee protection framework (respect of basic human rights and the principle of nonrefoulement), so that the WBG can make an informed decision as to whether and how to engage, and mitigate reputational risks. Finally, the WBG provides economic analysis of the data shared by UNHCR.

Looking at wider partnerships⁴⁸, the WBG's way of working is to focus on its operations with country governments and taking its cues from the government's coordination and leadership. However, as per the traditional humanitarian nature and approach to displacement, many country coordination mechanisms are still only amongst the humanitarian part of donors, humanitarian agencies and led by UNHCR, where close involvement of the government makes the humanitarian community uncomfortable. Therefore, CRRF forums provided a better forum for coordination. However, it is recognized that the WBG in many situations could collaborate more effectively with bilateral development partners. For that to work, the government must be at the centre and some of the traditional ways of working with prescriptive approaches to governments may have to be abandoned in

⁴⁵ The information in this section is based on desk review and consultations with WBG staff.

⁴⁶ The WBG flagship report on forcibly displaced was published in 2017: "Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Development Approach Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts".

⁴⁷ Global Program on Forced Displacement «Annual Progress Report, January 2014-June 2015».

⁴⁸ From discussion with senior WBG staff.

favour of placing government priorities and development at the core of the discussion. This corroborates with the lead article of the Forced Migration Review No 52,⁴⁹ which amongst others points out that for a successful future approach to displacement, all actors must understand and accept that conflict-induced forced displacement is predominantly a development issue with humanitarian issues – and not the other way around. This change in mindset requires an understanding that, while protracted forced displacement often requires short-term humanitarian action, it is fundamentally about responding to the social, economic and fiscal implications for the displaced people and for hosting countries to the benefit of all affected. Often this may require area-based, targeted investments to boost economic activity, particularly in host areas with high unemployment.

The Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement. To further strengthen this partnership, and to inform work on operationalizing the Global Compact on Refugees, the World Bank-UNHCR Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement (JDC) was established in 2019, to enhance the ability of stakeholders to make timely and evidence-informed decisions to improve the lives of displacement impacted people. The improved collection of demographic, socio-economic and fiscal data and strengthening the sustainability of a global data collection system by the JDC will be important for analysis, and will aim at strengthening country systems where necessary. The eventual effectiveness and impact of the JDC will depend on if and how the analysis of this data will be able to inform and influence the development and refugee policies of states with displacement. The Center will capitalize on the synergies between the UNHCR and the WBG, complementing each other's strengths; UNHCR in protection data, registration and collection, and the WBG in household survey data, policy dialogue, analytical and evaluation work. The JDC also have the potential to become the centre point for and custodian of all development relevant social, economic, fiscal and security data and analysis of displacement situation. As a basis for dialogue on refugee policies, this type of information produced by the development community has been lacking for decades. As the data bank builds up, states affected by displacement will be able to take informed decisions on what refugee policy suits their concerns best.

The WBG's partnership with the Multilateral Development Bank Coordination Platform on Economic Migration and Forced Displacement was launched in April 2018. This platform was set up to enhance the institutions' collaboration on economic migration and forced displacement, advancing strategic dialogue and operational coordination to maximize the impact of MDBs' growing engagement in these two areas.

Operations. Through the IDA18 sub-window for refugees and host communities (RSW), the WBG provides support to low-income countries with a USD 2 billion allocation. The RSW will continue under IDA19 with a slight increase in budget. The Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF) provides support to middle-income countries.

As of the end of 2019, some 20 countries have asked the WBG for support to manage the medium-term socio-economic impacts of hosting refugees through the RSW and the GCFF. There are as of mid-2019, 32 projects for a commitment of USD 1.5 billion in 13 countries, and another USD 1 billion in the pipeline for 2019-2020:

- For low-income (IDA) countries, which host roughly 9 million refugees, 14 countries are eligible to access the IDA18 sub-window, with 20 projects so-far approved in 10 countries (USD 932 million) on: education, health, social protection, social development, and expanding economic opportunities. Five countries - Burundi, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mauritania, and Rwanda - have become eligible for assistance in November 2018, in

⁴⁹ Harild, N. "Forced displacement: a development issue with humanitarian elements".

addition to Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Niger, Pakistan, and Uganda in September 2017, and Bangladesh in June 2018. While these countries have become eligible according to WBG criteria, it is still to be seen if they are interested, as some have shown reluctance to accepting the terms and conditions for accessing these resources. Primarily as borrowing for none nationals is not an attractive proposition, even on very concessional terms. Tanzania for example has rejected a lending package for support to naturalized Burundi refugees. The negotiations in Bangladesh resulted in the government not accepting a loan and the full amount of the IDA18 allocation was provided as a grant and with a rather paradoxical or perverse effect that the grant can only benefit refugees and not host communities.⁵⁰

- For middle-income (IBRD) countries, which host roughly 8 million refugees, the GCFF provides concessional resources. Jordan, Lebanon and Colombia are currently eligible to access GCFF resources, with 12 projects approved worth a total of USD 514 million. While Jordan and Colombia are under negotiation Lebanon has decided not to take advantage of this financing option.

The World Bank has fielded forced displacement focal points into key country programs (e.g. in Uganda, Ethiopia, Chad, and Kenya) to work alongside government and other stakeholders in the establishment of the CRRF and to support the development of IDA18/19 operations. These focal points are expected to work closely with other multilateral and bilateral partners to support government plans and programs.

Policy reform. Over and beyond the financial resources and operational commitments mentioned above, the IDA18 sub-window on refugees and host communities requires an assessment by UNHCR that a given protection framework is satisfactory, and an ‘action plan or strategy with concrete steps, including possible policy reforms for long-term solutions that benefit refugees and host communities. With this new involvement of the WBG, the evidence in terms of policies, analytical work, partnerships and operational experiences is building, with increased levels of policy dialogue at the country level.

This work is facilitating more dialogue between the displacement affected state and the WBG on the importance of moving from humanitarian aid to a development agenda. However, the discussions are still predominantly bilateral and could be more effective if the WBG involved other development partners more systematically in these dialogues.

Box 4. Examples of policy results at the country level

- Ethiopia: Adoption by the government of a new refugee law that allows refugees to live out of camps, access jobs, and services (in the same condition as other foreigners);
- Cameroon: Inclusion of refugees who have been in the country for over 15 years in education, health, and social protection services;
- Uganda: Environment and water services in the refugee-hosting north of the country;
- Bangladesh: Coordinated policy dialogue on the right to education for the Rohingya (currently not allowed to attend school beyond Grade 2);
- Jordan, Colombia: A policy opening to provide budget support to help mitigate the costs of hosting refugees.

⁵⁰ Reflections by the author.

Assessing the degree to which the efforts by the WBG are having impact on countries' refugee policy is complicated as (i) policy change take time from formulation to ratification, and actual implementation, (ii) policy change is most effective if it comes from the inside and not from the outside and (iii) causality and attribution are difficult to track and measure. Of the situations noted above, Ethiopia is one where indications are that World Bank engagement and operations have had some influence on the government's decision to instigate the out of camp policy as part of the so-called nine policy pledges for the Leaders' Summit in September 2016. The remaining examples in Box 5 represent situations where refugee policies are fitted to WBG criteria for support, thus allowing for lending to take place. It should also be noted that the WBG in line with its mandate pursues economic and social issues, and not specific political agendas. The very fact that the WBG has displacement as part of its operational portfolio discussions with governments cannot avoid having some influence on refugee and development policies, however difficult such impact is to quantify.

Under the IDA process the WBG has made a commitment to review refugee policy situation in countries that benefits from financing from the IDA and to develop Refugee Policy Review Framework to this effect. Consultations are foreseen with displacement affected states and donors and UNHCR on the design of such a framework including to agree upfront on which refugee policies will be reported on. Such an analysis done by the WBG could have value informing states and other actors as well as 'WBG work on displacement in different countries. This would be powerful in streamlining policy dialogue in displacement affected countries and to minimize unilateral approaches by development partners.

Surveys and analytical work. Analytic and operational evidence is particularly important to inform displacement affected states in the design of their development and refugee policies. This WBG generated evidence is mostly developed in close collaboration with states, and with input from UNHCR. Household surveys rarely cover refugee and displaced populations, but more and more WBG teams are seeking to do so, especially with the emergence of the JDC. Early efforts to close this critical data and evidence gap include novel data collection methods and analysis to assess impact of refugee influxes to inform policies and programs (e.g. the Syrian Refugee and Host Community Survey 2015/16) in Lebanon, Jordan and Northern Iraq, and the survey of refugees and migrants (asylum seekers) in Greece and Italy, to inform political debates on migration and integration in the EU. More recently, the WBG has been working closely with national statistical agencies and other partners to support the inclusion of displaced populations in national household surveys. Such efforts are needed to undertake analytic work and to underpin support towards a long-term development response in countries that have been affected by protracted crises and influx of refugee populations.

Box 5. Examples of relevant analytical work

- In Jordan, the National Household Income and expenditure survey, completed in 2018/19, is the first household survey that is representative of all residents of Jordan, including refugee populations. It provides evidence to inform the government strategy on refugees.
- In Africa, a concerted effort is underway to build such an evidence base in the high priority list of fragile countries: Uganda, Chad and Niger included refugee samples in their household survey in 2018/19. They have completed data collection. Uganda has launched the first diagnostic report and Chad and Niger are in the process of completing the analysis. The diagnostic assessments that follow from these surveys are the first to provide a systematic understanding of sources of vulnerability (employment, services and overall welfare status) of refugee and host populations.

- In Bangladesh, a detailed representative longitudinal survey of refugees and hosts in Cox’s Bazar was completed in July 2019. In addition, a new analytical program is underway in Bangladesh to strengthen the evidence base for policy and programming for the medium-term Rohingya response. This program includes building strong partnerships with UN agencies, national academics and researchers, new data collection and analytical work to fill evidence gaps, and a sub-national inclusive growth diagnostic for Cox’s Bazaar.
- An example of analytical work which had operational effects is the “Yes, In My Backyard? - The Economics of Refugees and Their Social Dynamics in Kakuma, Kenya”.⁵¹ It was jointly conducted by the World Bank and UNHCR and facilitated policy dialogue with the Turkana County government on a new settlement, Kalobeyei, which integrates refugees into the host community. Another report, “The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Turkish Labor Market”⁵², was used to promote labour market policies that subsidize and incentivize Turkish employment in the formal labour market to ensure that host communities’ benefit.
- In Afghanistan, the WBG and UNHCR have an in-country joint data sharing and analysis agreement (since October 2017), the first output of which focuses on post-return settlement and living conditions of the 2016 wave of Afghan returnees. The second, estimating on the impact of an increase in the UNHCR cash grant for documented returnees, was presented at the January 2020 JDC conference.
- The WBG report “The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis”⁵³ (2019), identifies factors affecting Syrian refugees’ contemplation of return. The report uses various statistical techniques, including machine learning, to conclude that security and quality of life are often a trade-off for refugees. It also finds that insecurity in the home country (Syria) affects both the scale and composition of returns.

The inclusion of displacement in many WBG poverty assessments, as described above, may be the most important analytical development in the WBG’s expansion of its displacement related activities. To further strengthen this work, the JDC is expected to support a number of poverty assessments to be undertaken in partnership between the WBG and UNHCR. Country political and economic assessments for design of IDA18 operations and job compacts are also important, as are the many displacement impact-cost assessments undertaken particularly around the Syrian crisis. WBG analytics are of critical importance for policy dialogue with host states, because they are based on an economic rationale rather than political or humanitarian concerns. Where national surveys do not include an explicit strata on displaced population, stand-alone assessments using national surveys can allow for benchmarking welfare outcomes for the displaced relative to other groups (such as [World Bank, 2018](#)).

Evaluations and reviews. The Mid-Term Review (MTR) of IDA18⁵⁴ (published October 2018), concluded that within its first year, the refugee sub window had provided an effective entry point for the WBG to engage with governments on medium-term development approaches to displacement. It also noted that there were indications that policy reform efforts were successful, although it was still early to draw conclusions. In addition, the MTR finds that the requirement to contribute from the national allocation as well as the 50/50 credit/grant element has proven attractive to governments.

⁵¹ Onder, H., Sanghi, A., and Vemuru, V. “Yes, in my backyard? – The Economics of Refugees and their social dynamics in Kakuma, Kenya”.

⁵² The World Bank (08/2015) “The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Turkish Labour Market”.

⁵³ The World Bank “The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis”.

⁵⁴ International Development Association “Mid-term Review Fragility, Conflict and Violence”.

Finally, a key lesson is that political dimensions are a continuous risk in that governments' commitment to policy action may be derailed by changing political and security concerns.

The WBG's Independent Evaluation Group published an evaluation of the WBG's work in displacement situations in late 2018⁵⁵. The evaluation highlights that the WBG seeks to achieve its twin objectives of shared prosperity and ending extreme poverty by addressing displacement through the following approaches:

- Addressing socioeconomic aspects in displacement-affected communities to address vulnerability and reduce poverty;
- Mitigating impacts on host communities to build cohesion and leverage economic opportunities;
- Applying a medium- to long-term perspective by strengthening institutions and promoting economic opportunities;
- Broadening partnerships with governments and other partners to leverage capacity where the WBG does not have the comparative advantage.

The evaluation highlighted what works in addressing the specific vulnerabilities associated with forced displacement, namely: (i) mitigating the impact of forced displacement on host communities; (ii) focusing on institutions and policies to promote economic opportunities and self-reliance; (iii) supporting medium-term solutions through development planning; and (iv) partnering with others for a coordinated response.

Reflections. The WBG has financial resources, operational and policy tools to continue to enhance its operations for displacement affected countries. As the WBG has taken important steps to include displacement as a core part of its work, it has changed the way forced displacement is being discussed in countries affected by displacement. Displacement is now in many countries part of WBG negotiations with its regular counterparts in government ministries of finance and planning and informed via its partnership with UNHCR. This is different from the traditional UNHCR negotiations with its regular government counterparts – often a government unit or ministry with relatively limited influence.

The WBG, the displacement affected states, and UNHCR need to get accustomed to this new and different way of discussing displacement approaches. This will have important implications for how the GCR is operationalized. The already large volume of WBG analytical work and operational experience is important as a reference point for displacement affected states and bilateral development partners, as they proceed to mainstream displacement into their development policies and tools. It is also important information to inform the creation of context specific mechanisms for burden and responsibility sharing.

In its operationalization of IDA18 and the GCFF, it seems the WBG has initially taken advantage of low hanging fruits. That is very important in its own right, as it makes clear that displacement is a core development issue. The WBG's ability to change restrictive refugee policies is difficult to assess and attribute. What seems to be clear is that, particularly in restrictive policy environments, the WBG and bilateral development actors should work more closely together to achieve a unified policy and operational dialogue with the displacement affected states, tailored to the context in each specific displacement situation. As the accepted global leader on development policies and approaches the WBG is well placed to take the lead.

⁵⁵ The World Bank Group “World Bank Group Support in Situations Involving Conflict-Induced Displacement”.

Some refugee-hosting countries are increasingly calling for changes to the way aid is being provided, and for a shift to comprehensive, medium-term responses that are led by the authorities, rely on national systems, and are targeted not only at refugees but also to host communities. This shift is probably a combination of inspiration by the GCR process, dialogue with the WBG, and the country's own assessment of the impact of various policy options. This underscores the importance of improved collaboration between the WBG and other development partners in their engagement with the displacement affected state.

4.2.5. EU roll-out of a development approach to displacement

While DG DEVCO leads the EU's development efforts, other parts of the EU also support these efforts, notably the EEAS on the external relations, diplomatic and political side, and DG NEAR in its respective geographical area of responsibility (notably including assistance in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan). Since 2015-16, DEVCO has scaled up its involvement in forced displacement issues substantially and is today one of the (most?) important global development actors in this field, with policies and resources for addressing displacement situations operationally, with a main focus on the Horn of Africa (financed through the EUTF for Africa) and Afghanistan. In December 2014, DG NEAR the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis, the 'Madad' Fund for the EU's non-humanitarian aid for Syrian refugees and their host countries⁵⁶. The Fund has as of end-2019 reached a total volume above EUR 2 billion and has recently been extended until December 2020. In view of the C-19 crisis both TFs may be extended further. Some of the Madad funds also covers activities in Turkey. Most of EU's support to Turkey comes from the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey⁵⁷ (FRIT). While the EU/ Turkey deal on FRIT is controversial, it is implementing a very development-focused approach, as a clear example of substantial operationalization of the Lives in Dignity policy of the EU.

Policy framework. The first EU policy framework on development aspects of forced displacement is outlined in the EU communication, 'Forced Displacement and Development - Lives in Dignity: from Aid-Dependence to Self-reliance' (2016)⁵⁸, supported by Council conclusions, thus signifying Member States' approval and commitment. Also, of relevance to the EU's work on displacement is the EU Council Conclusions on Operationalizing the Humanitarian-Development Nexus of 19 May 2017⁵⁹, which focused on cooperation between EU humanitarian and development actors, including the EU approach to forced displacement and development. Prior to that, the common humanitarian-development agenda has long been referred to as Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). The EU attaches great importance to the link between humanitarian and development aid, as a rapid response measure in crisis situations and more medium and long-term development action. The humanitarian-development nexus is complex and requires increased coordination – leading to joint humanitarian-development approaches and collaborative implementation, monitoring and progress tracking.

The EU's engagements in the humanitarian-development nexus underscores building resilience as a central aim of EU external assistance. Resilience is understood as the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, adapt to and quickly recover from stresses

⁵⁶ European Union «Europe's support to refugees and their host countries: EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis».

⁵⁷ [European commission "The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey"](#).

⁵⁸ European Commission «Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: *Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance*».

⁵⁹ European Council «EU Council Conclusions on Operationalizing the Humanitarian-Development Nexus» <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/council-conclusions-operationalising-humanitarian-development-nexus>

and shocks related to conflicts and sudden and recurrent natural disasters. This was reaffirmed by the May 2013 Council conclusions on EU approach to resilience. The 2017 Joint Communication, *A Strategic Approach to Resilience*, established a coherent EU policy framework on resilience across the EU's external action⁶⁰. Together with the Council Conclusions of May 2017 on *Operationalizing the humanitarian-development nexus*,⁶¹ the EU response to global challenges thus comes through EU development and humanitarian efforts with political and diplomatic engagement, notably in conflict prevention and forced displacement – as guided by *Lives in Dignity*.

The *Lives in Dignity* policy recognizes forced displacement as a developmental and political challenge, in addition to a humanitarian concern. The policy promotes the engagement of political, diplomatic and developmental stakeholders, in close cooperation with humanitarian actors, from the outset of a displacement crisis to ensure an effective, multi-actor approach. Lives in Dignity aims to prevent forced displacement from becoming protracted, and to gradually end dependence on humanitarian assistance in existing displacement situations. It does so by fostering self-reliance and enabling the displaced to live in dignity as contributors to their host societies, until lasting solutions can be found primarily through voluntary return. The “Lives in Dignity” policy framework illustrates the EU displacement agenda aimed at maximizing the impact of the EU's development and humanitarian support to appropriately tackle the magnitude, multi-dimensional drivers and impact of forced displacement at local level. In support of the policy, DEVCO developed policy guidance through a series of expert meetings engaging Member States to also create communities of practice and to provide strategic and technical guidance and training for EU staff. Commission services report annually to the relevant Council Working Groups on the implementation and roll-out of the *Lives in Dignity* framework.

Pilots and operations. The European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and EU Member States have taken concrete steps at the policy level to operationalize their global commitment to the humanitarian-development nexus. At the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC/DEV) on 11 September 2017 EU Ministers requested the operationalization of the humanitarian-development nexus in six pilot countries, namely Chad, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda. The pilot in Uganda explicitly focused on how the nexus approach could support responses to forced displacement, and in particular, the CRRF roll-out in Uganda. Displacement was a key component of the challenges faced in most of the other pilot countries. As examples of success pilot delegations have started doing joint analysis and mainstreaming conflict and displacement sensitivity in country activities. Challenges still to be overcome are how to fully comply with the different principles that guide humanitarian, development and peace actions respectively. Joint ECHO, DEVCO/EEAS guidelines are being developed for delegations on the basis of the pilot lessons and the OECD Humanitarian Development Peace recommendations.

The combination of New York declaration, the EU “emigration crisis”, the EU communication *Lives in Dignity*, which fundamentally aligns with the CRRF and now the GCR and informed the EU positioning in these processes, provided the opportunity for innovative policy dialogue on refugee management. The countries of the Horn of Africa decided to embrace this new approach to refugee management. Uganda, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya as well as Tanzania who exited again, decided to roll-out the CRRF but all IGAD countries also engaged in its regional application under the framework of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). IGAD adopted a regional approach to refugee management based on the Nairobi Declaration by Heads of State and Governments of the IGAD region. This includes the adoption of a set of commitments in favor of the integration of refugees, especially in the areas of education and livelihood.⁶² The Horn of Africa

⁶⁰ European Union External Action «A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action».

⁶¹ Council of the EU «Council Conclusions on operationalising the humanitarian-development nexus».

⁶² IGAD, Nairobi declaration on Somali refugees, March 2017.

window of the EU Trust Fund for Africa allowed the EU to quickly provide large amounts of medium to long-term financial support to these processes. To date, the EUTF has invested more than EUR 450 million in activities related to forced displacement and supporting the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees in the Horn of Africa. Implementation required the availability of sufficient dedicated staff. The Trust Fund's emergency features allowed the EU to quickly respond to emerging opportunities.

To build institutional experience, the EUTF Horn of Africa window invested in the creation of a Research and Evidence Facility as well as innovative research and monitoring tools that would help to fine-tune programs and ensure they responded to real needs and support real solutions. One related product is a 2019 report that provides field-based insights and evidence regarding the implementation of the CRRF in the HOA region to inform future programme design⁶³. This is in the early stages of learning by doing. Under the IGAD-led processes, two annual progress reports also document the impact of the CRRF roll-out. At the 2019 first Global Refugee Forum, the IGAD process was officially transformed into the IGAD Refugee Support Platform, one of the institutional modalities foreseen in the Global Refugee Compact.

From the Madad trust fund for the Syrian displacement situation more than EUR 1.6 billion have been allocated to some 80 projects for education, health, livelihoods and local development, benefitting both displaced and host communities, reaching more than 4.3 million beneficiaries. The TF promotes refugee self-reliance and a nexus approach in line with the GCR and successive conferences on Syria and mitigates the additional economic and social burden of host communities.

Level of mainstreaming. In the Horn of Africa and the Syria region, the EU has taken important steps to include displacement in development operations. In other areas with a smaller displacement dimension or of less political significance, and thus without dedicated funding streams or personnel, it remains more of an exclusive ECHO/humanitarian task. Steps towards mainstreaming are happening, but it is situational and to some extent personality driven. With the DEVCO communication (policy), guidelines and operational experience increasing, the EU has a good foundation in place for improving mainstreaming. But the trust fund for the HoA is scheduled for discontinuation, while the Madad fund is set to continue. The EU's ability to further mainstream displacement in its development activities will depend on the overall priority setting by the new EU Commission, and the level of the specific budget allocations for this purpose during the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework

Operational resources and future planning. The 2021-2027 draft plan and budget has under its development portion a 10% funding allocation to forced displacement and migration, amounting to ca EUR 9 billion. It is unclear how much is intended for forced displacement. Forced displacement appears to remain a core development issue for the EU, partly because there is political interest in addressing root causes. During the present planning cycle, significant extra funding was allocated by DEVCO for displacement over and above the original budget (more than EUR 250 mill for the CRRF in the Horn and EUR 150 mill for Afghanistan). While this was politically motivated by the migration crisis in Europe, it still represents groundbreaking levels of financing for development action on forced displacement. The importance of the communication on *Lives in Dignity* as the basis for this substantial DEVCO action on forced displacement is seen as significant, if not essential. In other words, it is important for development institutions to have an enabling the policy framework in place. The financing and the engagement possible through dedicated personnel, allowed substantial operations and influence on policies. It was also additional funding important for the burden sharing debate.

⁶³ Hammond, L., Sturridge, C., Sebba, K. R., Owiso, M., Mahdi, M., Manji, F., and Osman, A. A., "Comprehensive Refugee Responses in the Horn of Africa: Regional Leadership on Education, Livelihoods and Durable Solutions Summary of findings".

Partnerships. EU's partnership with displacement impacted states is central to EU's development interventions addressing displacement situations. The key is how the discussions on host country development priorities and the corresponding EU funding level evolves. Level of EU development support depends on the host countries prioritizing displacement issues in their development plans, and providing credible sector costing. As host countries require additional development funding, the EU requires clear commitments that this is really about changing, and that strategies and planning concretely fit the new approach. This includes costed sector plans reflecting refugee inclusion, of which there are a few good examples in the Horn of Africa. The EU also considers context and socio-economic impact assessments as important to inform the partnership dialogue with host countries. Freedom of movement and access to employment are critical issues for development, and as part of the partnership dialogue, the EU requires, in line with the GCR, policy commitments in that direction. The EU appreciates that all these changes take time and has engaged substantially in the HoA on the basis of positive trends for legal refugee rights, rather than waiting for full policy transformation. From the EU perspective, for partnerships with displacement impacted states to be effective, there has to be a common understanding that a development approach to displacement and policy dialogue in this respect are important. The SDGs are clear on the requirement to leave nobody behind and displacement impacted countries and donors need to collectively to move forward.

While there are examples of partnerships between EU DEVCO and the WBG and with some bilateral development partners under the RDPPs, it remains ad hoc. It is fair to say that overall, the EU's ability to work on real collaboration with other development partners is not its strongest competence. There is a case for DEVCO and WBG to increase coordination, cooperation and collaboration as the two biggest development actors. There is also a case for DEVCO to improve its nexus approach particularly in the field by bringing humanitarian coordination together with development work.

Reflections. EU DEVCO has a clear institutional commitment to the developmental importance of addressing displacement. It has a package of communications, council conclusions, guidance notes, results frameworks, training packages, strategic and technical advice for staff and Member States. Supported by the communications on resilience and the humanitarian development nexus, this package has been tested in a number of operations, and is seen as an important aspect of DEVCO's and DG NEAR's work in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan and the Syria region.

The displacement issue is in the narrative of the strategic and technical text for the 2021-27 programme package with indicative resource allocations. DEVCO and DG NEAR appear to be committed to long-term policy and operational engagement in situations of forced displacement in terms of political, diplomatic and operational engagement. However, it is unclear how the budget negotiations between the new Commissioner and the Member States will conclude by the end of 2020. Obviously, the role of Member States is important here.

The recent years of substantial involvement in displacement by the EU and the WBG – the two largest development actors – holds the potential to be the beginning of a fundamental change in the way displacement is dealt with as the GCR is operationalized. EU DEVCO and DG NEAR have addressed displacement substantially through development operations. Of equal importance is the EU's ability to tackle policy, political, diplomacy and developmental challenges in combined efforts by EU DEVCO, DG NEAR and EEAS. This would bode well for a partnership with the WBG, with its focus on development and economic aspects. Add to this bilateral development Member States that can bring the full pallet of diplomacy, trade and development cooperation to the table, the potential for one coordinated dialogue with displacement affected states is there. Creating such real collaboration among

multilateral and bilateral development partners in each displacement impacted context would seem essential for an effective roll-out of the GCR.

4.2.6. Bilateral development partners

A number of bilateral development donors are also considering how to address the nexus. For the purpose of this study, operational examples⁶⁴ from Denmark, BMZ and DFID are highlighted together with independent analysis of the nexus approach by Switzerland and Finland.

Denmark. With the Danish development strategy from 2017, the World 2030, addressing displacement and migration is identified as a key priority across all relevant development instruments in relevant partner countries. Country strategies are now prepared through a joint analytical and planning process with inputs from all relevant HQ units and embassies and with improved flexibility and agility built into future country programmes.

Denmark has been one of the front runners on nexus approaches to displacement situations, beginning with the Region of Origin (RoI) approach developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This approach signified the Danish realisation that displacement situations take many years to solve and have a significant impact on host communities. Therefore, support should go evenly to host communities and refugees with long-term and poverty reduction aims. One of the first examples of this was a development programme agreed between Denmark and the Uganda Prime Minister's office, and implemented in close collaboration with UNHCR and the Danish Refugee Council among others to operationalize UNHCR's Development Assistance for Refugees policy in support of Sudanese refugees and host communities. The programme included a focus on agricultural development through support to local infrastructure, agricultural associations etc. and is today a fully integrated part of the Danish bilateral country programme in Uganda under the label "Northern Uganda Resilience Initiative". The programme feeds into the district development plans but is implemented off-budget due to accountability challenges.

In earlier years, Denmark did not apply a similar approach in other displacement-affected partner countries, in part because governments did not prioritize it but also because of a lower degree of coherence across Danish assistance instruments that were applied in such countries. In Kenya, for instance, Denmark used humanitarian funds for more than 10 years from 2005 onwards to support health services for host communities around the Dadaab refugee camp through a national programme by Kenyan Red Cross. This was not in any way coordinated with Danish development support for the national health system that was ongoing during the same period. This disconnect in part stems from the fact that the RoI approach was managed and funded centrally from the humanitarian department, and not part of the country program envelope managed by respective embassies.

Afghanistan is another example of multi-year programming of a large displacement situation with support to return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons. Since its inception in the early 1990s, this program has been implemented through Danish and international NGOs along with UN agencies and during the last decade also with increasing support for Afghan government sector programmes.

Following the new global Danish strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action from 2017, coherence between all Danish engagements in Afghanistan is increasingly secured through a joint analysis, bringing together the Region of Origin efforts, livelihood initiatives, governance, capacity building, and stabilisation efforts into one country programme in 2020 or 2021. Similar processes are in progress in Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Palestine, Ethiopia and Kenya, thereby mainstreaming

⁶⁴ The details on these examples were obtained through bilateral consultations with Danida, BMZ and DFID.

the response to displacement with Danish bilateral development cooperation programmes in partner countries affected by large-scale displacement.

Denmark has also for a number of years provided substantial development support to multilateral development efforts addressing displacement through a number of trust funds such as the World Bank's Global Programme on Forced Displacement (GPDF) and Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF), along with the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian crisis (a.k.a. the Madad trust fund), and the EU trust fund for Africa. Denmark is on the governing board for both EU trust funds and hence able to promote a nexus approach to displacement in these. Finally, Denmark manages the multi-annual, multi-donor European Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) for Syrian refugees and host communities in the Middle East. Danish support to all these trust funds signifies a significant and consistent approach to support to displacement situations through development resources.

In 2017, the RDPP was subjected to a mid-term review followed by an external evaluation. Both confirmed the relevance of the integrated RDPP approach to protection, livelihoods, advocacy and policy dialogue. They also noted that RDPP had made some important progress in policy dialogue and influence with both donors and host states on the need for a long-term, development approach to Syrian refugees and affected host communities. Further, they underscored the importance of joint local engagement early on by bilateral development actors through the formation of a joint donor platform for dialogue with the governments on refugee policies. Finally, they confirmed the importance of working on the basis of evidence, and strong analysis. A sizeable part of the RDPP budget has from the beginning been set aside for research. Altogether, the RDPP is found to produce interesting and important results through being flexible, innovative, and based on evidence and local capacities.

The second phase of the RDPP is underway and now includes a stronger joint donor platform in Jordan and Lebanon that is intended to support bilateral development actors in strengthening policy dialogue with host governments. Further, it seeks to set the stage for improved linkages between operational approaches in host countries with eventual voluntary repatriation and integration processes in Syria.

Another example of locally evolving inclusion of displacement in Danish bilateral development cooperation is Tanzania, where the Danish embassy decided to allocated resources for Burundian refugees in the bilateral Danish health sector programme. Another example is the allocation of some USD 1.7 million from the humanitarian budget to the embassy in Myanmar, allowing the embassy to work strategically with local and international partners that were engaged in conflict prevention approaches in Rakhine state, including the Rakhine Advisory Commission, led by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. This also linked up with a Danish-led heads of mission initiative that focused on policy dialogue with the government on the human rights situation in Rakhine.

In Bangladesh, Denmark re-oriented elements in the existing country programme to provide agricultural support to host communities and a crisis centre for traumatized woman among refugees and host communities, shortly after the influx of Rohingya refugees occurred in August 2017. In 2018, Denmark decided to increase the bilateral country development programme by 10% to address host community issues in Cox's Bazar in addition to substantial humanitarian support. In conclusion, while the Danish nexus approach to displacement started 20 years ago in Uganda, it is now happening in several places and in many different ways, and is, in fact, moving towards being mainstreamed within the framework of overall development priorities as reflected in the Danish strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action.

BMZ policy, process, operations and displacement budget line. For several years, BMZ has had a policy promoting development interventions in displacement situations, integrating such support in

displacement contexts into country-specific development cooperation planning, for example in northern Uganda. Annual planning sessions by regional and sector desks of BMZ, for the respective region/continent, cover both bilateral country programs and special initiatives, such as the one on forced displacement. In these planning sessions, decisions on budget allocations for the following year are taken. Adjustments can be made e.g., if new displacement situations emerge. Protracted displacement situations are integrated into long-term planning. BMZ has a special initiative on forced displacement (funding inter alia CRRF-related secondments) and the transitional development assistance instrument working on the nexus and linking quick response to long-term development work. On-going collaboration with the Foreign Office (in charge of funding humanitarian assistance) contributes to synergies and ensures that there is no duplication.

With the recent special initiative, BMZ has the possibility to augment normal bilateral development programmes with additional funding if required. The total budget of the Special Initiative is approximately EUR 500 million p.a. So BMZ as a development actor with own resources is presently able to provide additional development funding if and where appropriate.

Bilateral development programmes can access funds based on performance criteria, plus the possibility of accessing additional funds from the special initiative on forced displacement through call for proposals. This allows country desks with good ideas how to address displacement in line with the CRRF to access more funds on top of normal bilateral funding level. This is an example of clear and identifiable additionality. Countries with many refugees can get additional funding, if they implement refugee policies conducive to supplementary development projects. BMZ has an integrated planning process under the leadership of the country division, where all sector divisions are fully involved. The cooperation between bilateral and multilateral divisions could be further improved, as is the case for other bilateral donors as well. Through an ongoing “BMZ 2030” reform process, all these planning processes and institutional issues are being reviewed for adaptation.

DFID and the Jordan and Ethiopia compacts. Today there is a broad awareness in DFID on the need to factor in inclusive refugee policy frameworks together with host country concerns and poverty reduction when designing country programmes. In practice the policy implementation sees decisions made at the country office level. Internal advocacy and documentation in this direction are pushed from the center. The Syria crisis has been a major factor in promoting this, including the emergence of the Jordan and Lebanon compacts. But the ideas had been developing for years inside DFID, so there was something to build on when the magnitude and the geopolitical political attention of the Syria crisis hit.

The February 2016 London conference hosted by DFID, brought two host states together with key donor states such as UK and Germany, as well as the WBG and the EU DEVCO. The Jordan Compact is a clear example of the application of reciprocal political capital and political will, trade, humanitarian and development engagement and cross-government support, including the push for a conducive business environment. This allowed direct negotiations pertaining to host state and donor states legitimate concerns and incentives, and as a result the Compact was agreed. The Compact opened the door for operationalizing an inclusive refugee policy framework. The global policy importance cannot be underestimated. It is a unique first on making policies and agreements on the basis of seeing refugee presence as an economic opportunity, and not purely as a burden. The Compact is also an example that support to host countries and host communities does not necessarily have to be only in the areas where the refugees are. The Compact had larger countrywide approach to burden sharing.

In the subsequent implementation there are many challenges, but these are identified and can be addressed. At the high policy level, this model’s applicability elsewhere will be context-dependent and

not necessarily ‘a one size fits all’ approach. The political will and global impetus generated by the scale and geopolitical aspects, including the issue of secondary movements to Europe, of the Syria crisis was important for the compact to come about. Such a model may thus not be applicable in all displacement situations. DFID also supports the jobs Compact in Ethiopia which came about a couple of years later. This is another operational example which builds on an emerging inclusive refugee policy and direct state/donor negotiations.

Switzerland and Finland. Two independent analyses have been selected for review to inform this paper, namely: (i) Switzerland’s approach to the humanitarian development nexus⁶⁵ and (ii) Evaluation on forced displacement and Finnish development policy⁶⁶. Whereas Switzerland’s analysis looks at the broad HDN approach, Finland’s looks specifically at the displacement nexus. In its recent publication on refugee financing, the OECD mentions that the HDP guidelines are fully applicable to the displacement nexus as well; thus, making comparison between these two evaluations appropriate for this paper.

Reflections. The two bilateral evaluations referenced above illustrate a strong political will from both Switzerland and Finland to promote a more effective nexus approach. In addition, they demonstrate the need for internal institutional adaptations for an effective nexus approach. They also indicate that clear, high-level policy directions and that staff incentives are important to affect the needed change from the traditional approaches which keep humanitarian and development efforts separate.

Comparing the two analyses, the approach of the SDC is somewhat more advanced, in terms of its understanding of the nexus, vis-a-vis the more traditional Finnish position. Both governments are keen to learn how to operationalize a more effective nexus approach by strengthening policies, and adjusting tools, structures, procedures and improving both internal and external advocacy. In both countries, the nexus issue is getting higher on their respective policy agendas. Common topics from these evaluations circle around the needs for: (i) a stronger knowledge base on the nexus; (ii) clearer and better funding streams; and (iii) decentralization decision-making to allow staff to voice suggestions and develop ways of working across the nexus. In conclusion, an effective bilateral nexus approach requires change from within, through full mainstreaming in policies, tools, structures and planning process. Leaving it to individuals based on broad visions will not suffice, and systematic elements such as improved incentives need to be introduced.

4.2.7. The OECD/DAC, INCAF

In 2009, the OECD/DAC established the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF). In the beginning, INCAF was particularly active in developing material and guidance for working with fragile states. The 2012 INCAF Guidelines for Post-Conflict Transitions point to the trend that while donors have been providing substantial and increasing amounts of support to fragile and conflict-affected states, the results have been insufficient.⁶⁷ In recent years, INCAF has focused more specifically on forced displacement and has produced a series of assessments, guidelines and policy notes of relevance for the displacement nexus. One of the first was [“Responding to Refugee Crises in Developing Countries, what can we learn from evaluations?”](#)⁶⁸ (September 2017). This paper was commissioned by OECD/DAC in recognition that international cooperation and development assistance strategies in relation to forced displacement, refugees and migration needed greater attention.

⁶⁵ SDC, “Independent Evaluation of the Linkage of Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation (Nexus)”.

⁶⁶ FMFA, “Evaluation of Forced Displacement and Finnish Development Policy”.

⁶⁷ Still minding the gap.

⁶⁸ OECD, “Responding to Refugee Crisis in Developing Countries – What Can We Learn from Evaluations?”.

Of particular importance are the OECD/DAC guidelines on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus from 2018,⁶⁹ that also apply squarely to displacement situations. These guidelines and their recommendations provide a framework for more collaborative and complementary humanitarian development and peace actions, particularly in fragile and conflict affected situations. This can incentivize donors towards more collaborative nexus actions.

Box 6. Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus guidelines – what is needed?

- Better coordination across the nexus by undertaking joint risk-informed, gender-sensitive analysis of root causes and structural drivers of conflict, providing appropriate resourcing to empower leadership for cost-effective coordination across the humanitarian, development and peace architecture and, utilizing political engagement and other tools, instruments and approaches at all levels to prevent crises, resolve conflicts and build peace.
- Better programming within the nexus by prioritizing prevention, mediation and peacebuilding, investing in development whenever possible, while ensuring immediate humanitarian needs continue to be met, putting people at the centre, tackling exclusion and promoting gender equality and, ensuring that activities do no harm, are conflict sensitive to avoid unintended negative consequences and maximize positive effects across humanitarian, development and peace actions, aligning joined-up programming with the risk environment, Strengthening national and local capacities and, investing in learning and evidence across humanitarian, development and peace actions.
- Delivering better financing across the nexus by developing evidence-based humanitarian, development and peace financing strategies at global, regional, national and local levels, with effective layering and sequencing of the most appropriate financing flows, which may include use of predictable, flexible, multi-year financing wherever possible.

These HDP nexus guidelines offer a comprehensive approach to avoiding silos. The purpose of the guidelines is to set in place a framework that can incentivize more collaborative nexus actions among OECD-DAC members. Adherence to the guidelines will be part of future peer reviews, and this provides development donors with an official platform on the basis of which to design their approach to and increase their commitment to becoming more active in the forced displacement agenda, in support of the operationalization of the GCR. In this new feature, members of the OECD have agreed to measure themselves by collecting financing data regularly, towards the GCR indicator framework to measure progress against the GCR objectives. The OECD will promote global participation of its development partners to ensure a comprehensive picture of contributions and identify response gaps.

Two documents are central to OECD’s work on member financing of displacement issues. The 2018 working paper 48: “Financing Refugee Hosting Contexts: An analysis of the DAC’s contribution to burden- and responsibility-sharing in supporting refugees and their host communities”,⁷⁰ and the more recent policy paper on “Financing for refugee situations”⁷¹. Finally, under the auspices of the OECD/DAC, development partners agreed to a common position⁷² for the GRF.

⁶⁹ OECD Legal Instruments, “DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus”.

⁷⁰ OECD “Financing Refugee-Hosting Context: Highlights”.

⁷¹ OECD “Financing for Refugee Situations”.

⁷² OECD “INCAF Common Position on supporting comprehensive responses in refugee situations”.

In an effort to improve joint engagement between host states and international development partners, the OECD common position for the GCR promotes the notion that the right amount of finance at the right time and in the right sequence can contribute to create incentives to: (i) facilitate shared regional political economy analysis and socio-economic analysis of refugee situations, (ii) apply rights-based policies that promote refugees' self-reliance through education, work and documentation and support host community welfare, (iii) promote collective priority setting and action, (iv) contribute to the joint policy frameworks that include refugees in development strategies of host states and development partners, including sectoral programming and support to local governance systems through, for example, area-based approaches and, (v) promote beyond-aid contributions particularly to support easing the pressure on host countries. The substantial attention of OECD/DAC (INCAF) to displacement in the last few years is very important as an official reference point both in terms of policy development and operational approaches by member countries.

5. Lessons Learned from Recent Nexus Approaches

Taking a bird's eye view of the recent and ongoing nexus approaches described above a number of issues that are important for the future can be extracted as described in the box below.

Box 7. Key lessons from recent nexus approaches

In reviewing the recent attempts to introduce nexus approaches, the following lessons of importance for future approaches have been extracted:

- The importance of the GCR as a common global framework with a transformative vision and an indicator framework;
- The importance of lead by the displacement affected state and promotion of the localisation agenda;
- The importance of displacement impacted states taking a whole of government approach to displacement based on inclusive refugee policies, moving away from traditional structures;
- The importance of a comprehensive approach based on comparative advantages;
- The importance of the broad agreement that displacement is also a development issue;
- The importance of development institutions including displacement as a core part of their work;
- The importance of understanding each specific displacement context and politics including the time it takes before lasting solutions can be achieved and what that implies for policies and approaches while displacement last;
- The importance of UNHCR adapting from lead and control towards more of a facilitative role;
- The importance of multilateral and bilateral development actors understanding that displacement is part of their core development work, and to adapt internal structures, procedures and tools accordingly;
- WBG and other development led analytics are of critical importance for policy dialogue with host states, because they are based on an economic rationale rather than political or humanitarian concerns;
- The combination of EU DEVCO and DG NEAR allows the EU to address displacement both from the developmental and the political side;
- When bilateral development actors have the political will to promote nexus policies as part of development cooperation, they can apply the full palette of diplomacy, policy dialogue and development operations.

6. Overall lessons learned

What are the key points displacement affected states and their development partners should bear in mind from history up to now, when deciding on their future nexus approaches to displacement situations? What do the historic pre-2015 lessons and more recent lessons described above tell us?

An overall conclusion would seem to be that whenever tangible nexus impacts have emerged, it has been when two separate vectors have met to point in the same direction. On the one hand, when development partners have begun to mainstream displacement into their development work, and on the other hand, when displacement affected states have taken a long term, whole of government and displacement inclusive refugee policy approach. It's when development actors engage that nexus results emerge. While it is clear that short-term life-saving humanitarian assistance will continue to be needed, achieving an effective nexus impact is centrally about what is done from the development side, and that the impact on achieving self-reliance and poverty reduction will take time to materialize. This implies turning the traditional mindset of how displacement situations should be addressed on its head, and to understand its full implications for structures, policies and operational approaches.

Box 8. Key historic lessons important for future nexus approaches to displacement situations

- The point of departure for dialogue and planning should be focused on long-term policy, and the operational lead should be the displacement affected state. The point of departure should also include a comprehensive political economy and context analysis, which take the concerns of the displacement impacted state into account.
- Both national and international development institutions and agencies must understand that displacement is a core development issue needing to be addressed as such from the beginning, while also considering the humanitarian concerns.
- The centrality of reaching agreement on BRS requires sustained political will from the displacement impacted state and its development partners, the role of UNHCR is to be a prudent facilitator.

Recent evidence signals an emerging shift in this direction. Successful application of these lessons is easiest to achieve in a conducive policy environment. In restrictive policy environments, joint efforts are particularly required to build trust and understanding. A successful nexus approach to displacement is centrally about displacement impacted states and their development partners having the political will and a sustained commitment to make it happen. Going forward, the international community should build on this positive momentum, including maintaining focus on turning around the reasons for past failures, so they become to reasons for future success.

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