Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Danish Ministry of Defence

Programme Document

Syria – Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme (2019-2021)

Final
Programme overview

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<td>Implementation period</td>
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Strategic objective

To reduce regional insecurity, terrorism, irregular migration and protracted displacement by meeting immediate and medium-term stabilisation needs in Syria and Iraq.

Budget

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<th>Thematic Area A: Peacebuilding and Justice</th>
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Source of funding

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- Annex 8: PSED Bundle, Syria and Iraq
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1 Executive Summary

This programme document describes arrangements for Denmark’s three-year Syria and Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme (hereafter, ‘the PSP’), a programme with an overall funding envelope of approximately DKK 397 million to be implemented between 2019 and 2021. This section provides an overview of the programme’s rationale and approach.

- This Syria and Iraq PSP builds upon Denmark’s ongoing diplomatic, military, stabilisation and humanitarian support to the region, and is grounded in a comprehensive analysis of the conflict context and drivers in both countries. The programme underscores Denmark’s long-term commitment to countering the threat from Da’esh and promoting stability in the region. The programme is delivered through strategic partnerships with the United Nations, the EU, coalition partners, and relevant civil society organisations.

- The greatest terrorist threat against Denmark and Europe more broadly remains from militant Islamism with its centre of gravity in Syria and Iraq, combined with significant presence in (other) fragile and conflict-affected states. The short-term context in Syria and Iraq is volatile and unpredictable: both conflicts have resulted in widespread displacement within the two countries, across the region, and beyond; they have left vast amounts of critical infrastructure in ruins and resulted in an unprecedented number of explosive hazards. In both countries, extremist, undemocratic, and divisive actors stand ready to exploit vacuums in governance, service delivery, security and safety. Despite progress against Da’esh in Iraq, political instability remains, and trust in government is low due to poor governance and inadequate service delivery. With Syrian regime intent on regaining control of Idlib fighting and further displacement seems likely, despite current Russian and Turkish attempts to secure a demilitarized zone in the area. Even if Idlib should come under regime control, the threat itself is highly likely to go underground and become asymmetric, rather than disappear.

- Targeted and sustained stabilisation engagements are required to address these complex challenges and conflict drivers. The objective of this regional PSP is therefore to ensure that: Immediate and medium-term stabilisation needs in both countries are met, thus contributing to reduced regional insecurity, terrorism, irregular migration and protracted displacement. Programme objectives will be achieved through a focus on three Thematic Areas (TAs), A, B and C, summarised below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TA-A: Peacebuilding and Justice</th>
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<tr>
<td>Supporting efforts towards an inclusive political solution in Syria, which promotes accountability for crimes and paves the way for transitional justice; supporting community cohesion and reconciliation efforts in Iraq.</td>
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<th>TA-B: Resilience and Recovery</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bolstering community resilience by supporting essential and life-saving service provision by moderate actors that can provide an alternative to extremism.</td>
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<th>TA-C: Security Governance</th>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq and Syria are supported to be more safe, secure and inclusive.</td>
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This programme document describes how these overall goals will be pursued through a comprehensive whole-of-government approach covering both Iraq and Syria, provides a conflict and scenario analysis, and describes the programme’s structure, risks and management approach. The Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Documents (PSEGDs) present each individual partner engagement in greater detail.
1.1 Programme Overview

**Anticipated key results**
- In Syria, efforts are supported towards an inclusive political solution which promotes accountability for crimes.
- In Iraq, efforts are bolstered to promote reconciliation and community cohesion.
- In Syria and Iraq, moderate actors capable to provide an alternative to extremism are better able to provide essential and life-saving services and bolstering community resilience.
- Iraq and Syria are supported to be more secure and inclusive.

**Justification for support:**
Ongoing instability in Syria and Iraq have resulted in humanitarian crises in the form of casualties, mass regional displacement and an unprecedented number of explosive hazards. In both countries, extremist and / or undemocratic actors stand ready to exploit the governance and service-delivery vacuum. The terrorist threat remains from militant Islamism with its centre of gravity in Syria and Iraq.

**Major risks and challenges:**
Multiple contextual, programmatic and institutional risks are inherent to this programme, which result from a dynamic, political and security environment which may render programmes less relevant in due course, cross-border implementation which may increase the risk of corruption.

**Strategic objectives:**
Supporting peacebuilding and justice, through efforts towards an inclusive political solution in Syria, which promotes accountability for crimes and paves the way for transitional justice; supporting community cohesion and reconciliation efforts in Iraq.

Supporting resilience and recovery through bolstering community resilience by supporting essential and life-saving service provision by moderate actors that can provide an alternative to extremism.

Supporting security governance, through promoting Iraq and Syria to become more safe, secure and inclusive.

**Justification for choice of partners:**
Continuity with implementing partners holds significant advantages in terms of familiarity with context, trust, tried-and-tested approaches, and to applying practical lessons learnt from implementing projects in the present conflict context, which inevitably involves higher than normal risks. The programme’s engagement partners have demonstrated good results so far and comply with the programme’s strategic focus on immediate stabilisation. The selection of partners is subject to Danish rules and policies on tendering and partnership modalities.
2 Strategic Programme Framework 2019-2021

This section outlines how the Syria and Iraq PSP aligns with key Danish foreign, security, defence and development priorities, the country’s international commitments. Critically, while building on previous programmes in both countries and the lessons learnt through their implementation, the programme complements humanitarian response and supports implementation to improve the living conditions of conflict-affected populations in Syria and Iraq.

Specifically, the PSP includes support to political dialogue and peacebuilding, through bolstering peace initiatives in Syria and reconciliation in Iraq; resilience and rapid response, through improved access and provision of priority services in former Da’esh-held areas— including areas under opposition control regarding Syria; and, strengthening community security and governance and inclusive governance promoted by moderate actors in the government in Iraq, and if feasible at some point and depending on the political situation to work with moderate actors in Syria.

2.1 Strategic Justification

The rationale for continued stabilisation support in Syria and Iraq is anchored in two Danish government policy documents and Denmark’s international commitments, primarily to the European Union and United Nations. Denmark’s Foreign and Security Policy Strategy and its global humanitarian and development cooperation strategy, The World 2030, focus on ensuring security and stability, curbing irregular migration, protecting human rights, and countering violent extremism. Denmark is also committed to several UN Security Council resolutions on Syria and Iraq, the UN charter which protect basic rights, the Global Counter-Da’esh Coalition, and to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) including goals 16 and 17. SDGs 16 and 17 promote the need for effective, accountable and inclusive institutions as a core component to peace, and reinforce the need to work through coherent international partnerships to achieve impact. Danish support is fully aligned with the EU strategy on Syria of April 2017 and the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) and the EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq. The strategy is designed to respond to the Da’esh threat which accelerated in March 2015.

Danish support to the stability in Syria and Iraq goes beyond the mere pursuit of Da’esh; in line with the January 2018 Council of the European Union’s Conclusions on Iraq, the PSP applied to Iraq, for example, supports the country’s authorities in reconstruction as well as tackling the underlying political, social and economic drivers of stability, laying foundations for an inclusive state in Iraq.

Taken together, Danish policy and international commitments are mindful of how instability in Syria and Iraq affects citizens in both states, as well regional, and Danish national interests. To address the causes of irregular migration and curb the threat from terrorist groups that find safe havens amidst chaos, Denmark is supporting activities which promote stability in Syria and Iraq, reduce the collateral negative impact of conflict and create the enabling conditions for sustainable peace to eventually take hold.

The regional and multi-year approach in this PSP reinforces Denmark’s long-term commitment to promoting stability in the Middle East. In alignment with Denmark’s Foreign and Security Policy Strategy, these objectives are pursued through flexible and adaptable engagements relevant to Danish interests, where suitable and capable partners can be retained, and where good prospects of generating a positive impact have been identified.

2.2 Whole of Government (WoG) Approach

The Syria and Iraq stabilisation programme, with an overall funding envelope of DKK 397 million over the period, has been designed to complement Denmark’s other means of support. It includes a budgeted commitment of DKK 355 million in Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a non-ODA contribution of DKK 42 million from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) over the programme period. MoD funding—which amounts to DKK 42 million of a total programme

The partnerships across civilian and security domains have demonstrated significant impact in terms of blending approaches and modalities, linking programmatic and political engagements, ensuring access to key local stakeholders, and devising and applying comprehensive approaches to multifaceted stabilisation challenges. The programme is situated in the context of Denmark’s on-going diplomatic, defence, and humanitarian support to the region. This cohesive effort includes a Special Representative for the Syria Crisis, regional embassies and humanitarian partnership agreements with Danish NGOs operating in Syria and Iraq. Besides Denmark’s military contributions described below, Denmark also contributes its expertise through civilian support to the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Iraq, which focuses on Security Sector Reform and has five deployed Danes including, at the time of writing, the Deputy Head of Mission. A regional Danish countering violent extremism (CVE) stabilisation programme, which will be phased out by early 2019, has also worked on addressing violent extremism in Iraq.

**International Policy Fora**

Denmark participates actively in the international policy fora that have been established in relation to the fight against Da’esh and other forms of support to Syria and Iraq. This includes the Global Coalition against Da’esh where Denmark participates in Coalition working groups at the political and technical level, including the Working Group on Stabilisation (WGS). Danish representatives also participate in coordination meetings amongst donors in Baghdad whenever possible.

Regarding Syria, Denmark follows closely the UN-led peace process under Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura, as well as the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), is part of the Syria Top Donor Group and has appointed a Special Representative for the Syria Crisis. The European Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP), managed by Denmark, addresses the complex consequences of the Syrian refugee crisis; and Denmark participates in the decision-making fora of the Syria Recovery Trust Fund that seeks to pool and coordinate relief and recovery efforts among a broad group of donors committed to supporting opposition-held areas. Denmark’s stabilisation support to Syria is coordinated through a range of donor coordination meetings at capital level in Istanbul, Gaziantep, Amman and Beirut.

**Military contribution**

Beyond direct monetary support to this programme by the MoD (specifically to demining and intelligence coordination), Denmark’s military contribution to the Coalition’s fight against Da’esh comprises of a capacity building contribution, amongst other types of support to stability in Syria and Iraq.

On 16 January 2018 a broad majority in the Danish parliament approved a deployment of a C-130J (Hercules) transport aircraft from October 2018, and the deployment of up to 30 additional soldiers to support the counter-Da’esh effort. The personnel deployment will be included in Denmark’s capacity building contribution, increasing the country’s contribution to approximately 180 soldiers. This capacity building contribution advises and trains Iraqi forces on the Al Asad airbase (Al Asad) in western Iraq. Denmark will also deploy an emergency medical team, which bolsters the medical element already included in the country’s capacity building contribution.

This package of support reinforces Denmark’s existing contribution, which includes mobile radar to provide airspace surveillance in support of the Coalition’s air operations, located at Al Asad, and around 30 support personnel, including operators deployed to the Al Dhafra airbase in the United Arab Emirates. Denmark has also deployed a staff contribution of up to approx. 20 people to the Coalition’s headquarters.

As part of NATO’s defence capacity engagement in Iraq, Denmark has contributed with subject matters experts within the field of human resources (HR) and logistics. Denmark will also contribute to NATO’s budget amounting to DKK 397 million over the three years—is specifically tailored at supporting demining (through UNMAS, Tetra Tech and Janus) and security sector reform, including human-rights compliant intelligence coordination to counter terrorism in Iraq. Moreover, in-kind support from the Danish National Police as well as the Ministry of Defence is considered under relevant engagements.
new training mission in Iraq – endorsed by heads of state and government at the NATO Summit in July 2018 – with personnel, including 22 persons who will contribute to the mission’s IT and communication infrastructure.

Denmark’s military contributions to date include: a) Expertise through civilian support to the EU Assistance Mission (EUAM) in Iraq, b) Military support to the Coalition including training units, radar capacity and special operations forces to the Coalition,² c) An F-16 combat contribution consisting of seven F-16 aircraft and up to approx. 110 people (the contribution has been deployed two times; October 2014 - October 2015 and June to December 2016 a total of 18 months) d) A C-130J (Hercules) airplane with crew who, from August 2014 until the end of 2014/15, solved transport duties in support of the British training-forces in northern Iraq, e) A C-130J transport flight contribution of up to approx. 60 people from June to December 2016 and f) military support to NATO’s capacity building and training efforts in Iraq.

**Humanitarian contribution and support to neighbouring countries**

The conflict in Syria has created the world’s largest forced-displacement crisis and continues to trigger large-scale displacement, with more than 1.3 million people reportedly internally displaced in the first half of 2018 alone. An estimated 5.6 million Syrians are refugees in neighbouring countries while more than 6.2 million remain internally displaced. The humanitarian situation in Iraq also continues to be dire in many areas.

In February 2016 at the ‘Supporting Syria and the Region Conference’ in London, the International community agreed to a comprehensive approach to address the protracted Syrian Crisis. International organizations and regional host countries agreed to policy changes and committed financial pledges to better address the needs of refugees and host communities. The response in neighboring countries is built around the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. The plan brings together plans developed by national authorities in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, to ensure protection, humanitarian assistance and strengthen resilience.

Denmark has been a major supporter in the response to the Syria crisis, both in Syria with humanitarian aid and in neighbouring countries with both humanitarian aid and development funds. Denmark has committed more than DKK 2.4 billion in humanitarian aid since the beginning of the conflict in 2011, and in addition, a considerable amount of development funds have been provided to most multilateral initiatives. In 2017, Denmark contributed a total of 862.5 million DKK in relation to the Syria crisis in 2017. It included 295 million DKK in humanitarian assistance, DKK 487.8 million in development assistance to neighbouring countries and DKK 79.7 million in new commitments to peace- and stabilization efforts. A similar level of total funding is expected for 2018.

This PSP clearly complements humanitarian initiatives, specifically through its support for civilian demining in Syria and Iraq (through UNMAS, Tetra Tech, and Janus), and to immediate recovery and resilience in Iraq, primarily through the UNDP’s Funding Facility for Stabilisation and the White Helmets (Mayday Rescue).

**2.3 Previous Danish Support to Stabilisation in Iraq and Syria**

The 2019-2021 PSP has its genesis in two separate programmes developed in 2014 and 2015, through which Denmark channelled support to Syria and Iraq. The Syria programme has supported, amongst others, activities relating to the peace process (Tracks I and II), civil society, transitional justice, early recovery, civil defence, and security and justice institutions. In Iraq, Denmark’s civilian stabilisation support has been primarily channelled through the 2015 start-up stabilisation programme and has included immediate stabilisation for newly-liberated areas, support to security sector reform, participatory and accountable governance, and independent media. The programme builds upon a broad and long-

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² At the time of writing, Denmark has around 150 personnel deployed at the Al Asad Airbase on a training and capacity-building mission and 20 staff officers in Coalition HQ. An additional 60 Special Operations Forces are supporting a local partner unit within Iraq, while a 30-person crew outside of Iraq manages Denmark’s radar contribution.
lasting civilian engagement in Syria and Iraq which, since 2014, has totalled DKK 765,100,000 in stabilisation funds (incl. 2018 pledges with an additional DKK 30 million approved), DKK 815,754,836 in humanitarian assistance and 59,800,000 invested in efforts to counter violent extremism in the region with some activities in Iraq.

Since 2013 and then through the 2016-2018 Syria Iraq Stabilisation Programme, Denmark has supported Track I and Track II initiatives to resolve the Syrian conflict, and bolstered civil society initiatives, such as The Day After (TDA) and Baytna which focus on transitional justice and amplifying the collective voice of civil society, respectively. Denmark’s contribution has been particularly critical to Baytna, which has matured into a hub for Syrian civil society actors since its set up with Danish funding in 2013. A strong Danish focus on accountability underpinned its bilateral contribution to the UN’s International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM).

Denmark’s support to nascent opposition police and justice institutions through the Access to Justice and Community Security (AJACS) programme also supported efforts to preserve civil records through the Civil Documentation Centres inside Syria, to ensure accurate record keeping despite shifts in territorial control. Further, Denmark has consistently supported Syrian Civil Defence (the “White Helmets”) through Mayday Rescue to respond to urgent civil needs such as rescue, fire-fighting, utility restoration and ambulance services in key urban centres, including Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia, and Homs. Likewise, Danish support has been giving to demining activities in Syria’s east. Finally, the Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRFT) has invested in the reconstruction of critical infrastructure across opposition-held areas.

As with Syria, Denmark’s support to Iraq focussed on supporting reconciliation and stabilisation, but primarily through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s Funding Facility for Stabilisation (immediate stabilisation and rehabilitation), FFS, and the Integrated Reconciliation Programme (reconciliation). This line of effort was reinforced through support to demining activities (through Janus and UNMAS), and institutional support to the Government of Iraq (GoI)’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiative, also delivered with and through the UNDP, which coordinates the international donor response in this area.

Applying lessons learnt from Denmark’s previous programmes of support to Syria and Iraq is key to this programme, both in terms of the types of engagements supported, and in terms of the programme’s management. These lessons are reflected in the PSP’s focus on protecting and promoting human rights and the rights and empowerment of women has informed a range of previous engagements including in Syria TDA, Baytna and SRFT and in Iraq the FFS and SSR-related work. The PSP supports initiatives that complement other donors’ programmes of support to avoid duplication (primarily through support to TDA, Baytna, and the Syria Network of Human Rights), and which have shown long-term relevance throughout the changing nature of the conflicts in the regions. Moreover, management of the programme will include an emphasis on detailed scenario planning and a more iterative approach to monitoring and evaluation; this ensures that that the programme can flexibly respond to changes on the ground.

2.4 Merits of a Consolidated Regional Programme

The programme’s regional character aims to respond to the common features, causes and challenges of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq – such as the need to counter Da’esh and strengthen resilience to extremism – while reflecting the distinct challenges and stabilisation needs of both countries.

The merging of the two independent programmes in 2016, was in recognition that the conflicts in Syria and Iraq display common features, causes and challenges and therefore cannot be understood or addressed in isolation of one another. Taking a regional perspective has enabled a common narrative on strategic issues, flexibility to move between engagements and between countries should circumstances require, and more effective communication on lessons learnt and commonalities between the two contexts. Critically, the programme also recognises that the impact of both conflicts on the European continent—primarily in the form of displacement—requires a joined-up and coherent response by the Danish (as well as other European) governments.
While the program seeks to address conflict drivers and dynamics with similarities in both countries, the operational contexts are different and the program’s implementation modalities are consequently tailored to each context. The prevalence of more legitimate and capacitated government partners in Iraq allows the program to work with Iraqi and through UN partners, which ensures coherence and accountability. In Syria the absence of a legitimate government means that the program, beyond its support to the formal peace negotiations, needs to work mainly with Syrian civil society organisations.

This PSP continues to account for the distinct contextual and conflict ecosystems in Syria and Iraq, while embracing the fact that a regional approach to programme management offers positive dividends in terms of efficiency and flexibility of effort. While the overall prospect of bringing peace and stability to the region spans both countries and while similar efficiencies are sought in management arrangements, many of the engagements in the programme are distinctively country-specific. The program should, however, continue to pursue strategic coherence and opportunities to consolidate engagements throughout the implementation period should such possibilities emerge. Moreover, and beyond enabling greater short-term efficiencies, taking a deliberately regional approach enables the MFA in the long term to create greater internal coherence and institutional memory working across two conflicts and countries that are significantly interlinked.

3 Conflict Analysis and Programmatic Responses

3.1 Conflict Analysis – Syria at a critical juncture

The conflict in Syria is at a critical juncture with large swathes of former opposition-held territory now back under Assad-regime control. While short-term prospects for the trajectory of the conflict remain, to some degree, uncertain, the conflict’s drivers and longer-term trajectory are clearer. Primary conflict drivers are detailed in Annex 1 and include, in summary:

- Continued human suffering, undermining recovery and development. The scale of human suffering in Syria, which remains immense and undermines recovery and development efforts that are critical to stabilising the country; accompanied by an absence of accountability for violations and agreement over transitional justice processes, jeopardizing the sustainability of any future recovery efforts.

- The regime restoring control without initiating meaningful reform. A pursuit by the regime and its allies of a “winner-takes-all” approach as it restores control over remaining opposition-held areas, further perpetuating drivers of opposition to the regime and marginalisation of non-loyalist constituencies.

- A persistent risk of violent extremism. The immense scale of destruction in former Da’esh-held areas, coupled with the high number of internally displaced and homes riddled with mines and IEDs perpetuates a sense of disenfranchisement. This is exacerbated by low levels of assistance or service delivery and grievances with existing governance structures.

- Geopolitical competition which perpetuates conflict. Significant interference of regional and global actors in Syrian affairs making the prospects of peace depending on dynamic also outside of Syria. Russia’s willingness and capacity to support the regime militarily and diplomatically, and doubts over the longevity of Washington’s involvement, make developments in Syria significantly impacted by decisions taken outside the country.

Overall, Conflict continues to be the principal driver of humanitarian needs and migration, with the civilian population in many parts of the country exposed to significant protection risks, which threaten their life, dignity and wellbeing on a daily basis. Of the more than 5.6 million Syrian refugees worldwide, most of whom remain in neighbouring countries, a very limited number have returned to Syria, and according to the UNHCR the conditions for safe, dignified and sustainable returns are not yet in place in the country.

3.1.4 Syria Scenarios

When considering the future of Syria, three scenarios seem realistic in the short to medium term:
1. Scenario 1 (static): High levels of uncertainty about the future and an operating space comprised of an unpredictable patchwork of influence and interests, which keeps changing and differs from location to location (in some areas with micro-local dynamics) but is characterized by gradual regime advances towards re-establishing control over the country.

2. Scenario 2 (regressive): Brutal and swift regime takeover of Idlib, partial Turkish retraction from Euphrates Shield area and gradual US disengagement from Eastern Syria, with limited to no concessions granted to groups opposing the regime and limited room for international reconstruction assistance.

3. Scenario 3 (progressive): Negotiated and gradual arrangements - in agreement with key external actors - for opposition surrender, including some concessions granted by the regime to local actors for some level of self-governance, opening up opportunities for international assistance.

Syria is at a critical juncture, with events unfolding in the near future defining the conflict’s trajectory, including in relation to this PSP. While this creates uncertainty in the short term, with significant potential impact on this PSP, it is possible to define with some certainty a slightly more predictable longer-term scenario, which presents two key implications for Danish assistance, detailed further below:

1. First, that opposition-held areas, on which most of the current Syria programme is based, are likely to disappear. This would entail a significant re-working of the Syria programme and necessitate policy-level considerations around current “red lines,” such as the EU line on reconstruction assistance to Syria.

2. Second, that while the regime may eventually declare victory, in terms of taking back territory and restoring administrative control over most of Syria, drivers of conflict will remain, implying that regime’s victory may be unstable and potentially untenable in the longer run.

It is important to recall that realities on the ground in Syria have seen several unexpected and unpredictable shifts in the past. In the short term, some events may therefore trigger a need to fundamentally re-calibrate the PSP and continue activities in other shapes and forms. While highly improbable, a sudden demise of the regime would constitute one such scenario. Significant changes in the positions and engagement of the regional and global actors described earlier constitutes another. Also, in the likely scenario of a gradual regime takeover of all of Syria, new dynamics and developments may, depending on the process and outcome, trigger a need to rethink current red lines of engagement at the policy level.

Finally, regardless of which of the scenarios outlined above might prevail, operating in Syria in the medium-to-long term will need to take into account that:

- Humanitarian, recovery, stabilisation, and eventually reconstruction and development needs will continue to be immense for decades to come, and the risk of relapse into conflict will remain significant. Despite public assertions by the regime and Russia to the contrary—particularly aimed at regional and European nations hosting Syrian refugees—it is unlikely that most refugees and IDPs will be able to safely return home in the foreseeable future.

- Access will remain challenging due to direct and indirect security threats, remnants of war including unexploded ordnances (UXOs), obstruction from neighbouring countries with regards to cross-border operations, and strict regime controls over operations in areas under its control.

- Operating costs will remain extremely high due to security and logistical challenges and programming will be subject to a range of material and reputational risks. Implementing partners will also continue to have limited human capacity and significant challenges relating to the legacy of war (trauma, local power dynamics, perceived allegiances, etc.), though an eventual return of diaspora Syrians could help mitigate this challenge in the long-term.

- The war-related depletion of governance capacity combined with regime advances will likely mean that, for an extended period, many areas will have either an absence of governance structures that can serve as an entry point for programmatic engagements or will host regime-
affiliated governance structures that pose challenges for engagement. Reduced governance capacity will also likely impact the regime’s ability to deliver essential services or reconstruction assistance adequately—key demands of loyalist constituencies who will be expecting preferential treatment in return for their continued allegiance.

- The regime’s “winner-takes-all” approach to restoring its authority over areas retaken by its forces is likely to exacerbate existing drivers of instability, further marginalising communities that actively supported the revolution and potentially increasing their vulnerability to extremist ideology. As violent extremist groups expectedly lose their remaining territorial control and the regime exercise brutal force in their efforts to take back territory, violent extremist groups are likely to find fertile ground for recruitment among disillusioned Syrians across the territory even in certain Kurdish-controlled areas. It is not apparent that the regime will pursue any meaningful reforms to reintegrate Syrian society and initiate transitional justice processes that would allow the country to heal and move on. Other ways of supporting local reconciliation processes may therefore be needed.

- In the longer term, Syria may see the mobilisation of various forces outside of formal governance structures i.e. broad groups of Syrians uniting to rebuild the country - a mobilisation of the general population with no active role in the conflict and a deep desire for peace and reconstruction. However, the regime and Russia have also demonstrated an intent to control the narrative and resources around reconstruction, seizing on a rebuilding narrative that aims to attract the support of European governments facing domestic political constraints in the wake of the migration crisis. Despite the regime’s initiative, partners may emerge for potential recovery efforts, including for empowering returnees directly outside of government channels if possible.

3.2 Conflict Analysis – Iraqi government being formed but major challenges ahead

The Da’esh occupation of large parts of Iraq initiated the latest cycle of political and sectarian bloodletting in Iraq’s brutal history since 2003. It introduced another period of violence and suffering for the Iraqi people, releasing deep scars and legacies, especially in the communities occupied under Da’esh’ self-proclaimed caliphate. Tens of thousands of people have lost their lives and isolated Da’esh attacks still stoke fear. With protests in Basra and full government formation yet to be finalised, what social stability existed prior to Da’esh has been largely depleted. Primary conflict drivers are detailed in Annex 1 and include, in summary:

- **Lack of a sustainable political settlement enabling the GoI to sustain military gains.** Resurfacing political and sectarian tensions and grab for power, compounded by entrenched rivalries in Baghdad and backed by fragmented Popular Mobilization Unit (PMU). These factors limit the extent to which the country’s political and security elite can transition recent gains against Da’esh into a sustainable peace/political settlement, uniting Iraq under one GoI banner.

- **Displacement, insecurity and recovery needs.** The rate of return of large swathes of the Sunni community to their areas of origin is a key factor for social cohesion, preventing a slide back into conflict; livelihoods and adequate access to resources is key to incentivising, and then sustaining, IDP returns.

- **Poor governance, critical needs, and a lack of basic services.** Poor governance, which has limited GoI effectiveness and legitimacy, and eroded public trust in government; this includes the perceived and actual corruption, which continue to drive protests across the country, and particularly in southern Iraq.

- **A geopolitical landscape which undermines government cohesion and effectiveness.** Regional and geopolitical rivalries, which further undermine government cohesion and effectiveness.

Overall, there remains 1.93m internally displaced people (IDPs) in Iraq; most of them Sunnis who are increasingly marginalised by the Shi’a-dominated Federal Government and the PMUs. Tensions between host communities and IDPs put immense pressure on Iraq’s broken basic service infrastructure, intensifying competition between groups and enabling divisive elite voices to exploit and deepen
divisions. The return or resettlement of these people, and an equitable settlement for those who collaborated with extremist groups over the last decade would provide the ground for a more peaceable society on the more equitable distribution of basic services and other resources.

Although the fight against Da’esh united large parts of Iraq, the completion of major military operations has renewed old tensions and triggered new ones. The consequences of these political tensions— including first and foremost the Baghdad-Erbil disagreement over the Kurdish referendum and the GOI’s subsequent campaign to reassert control over disputed areas—have already led to armed clashes in Kirkuk, among other places, since Da’esh’s defeat. Real and perceived grievances have been left unaddressed and competition for political influence, including the accompanying financial benefits, continues to be a potential driver of conflict. Rivalry between Sunni and Shi’a and Kurdish factions continues to play a role in the fragmentation of the Iraqi state, driving societal divisions along religious and tribal lines and challenging genuine state-building efforts, including those related to reforming the security sector. So far, international, national, and local reconciliation efforts have struggled to make progress.

### 3.2.1 Iraq Scenarios

As Iraq attempts to navigate this uncertain future and reap the political and social rewards of military victory over Da’esh, three scenarios seem likely:

1. **Scenario 1 (static):** Sporadic Da’esh attacks continue from rural hideaways as divisions between the ISF and PMU hamper operational effectiveness. Iran’s Qassim Soleimani and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps continue to fund, command and control PMUs challenging GoI territorial integrity and committing permissive violence against the Sunni and minority populations of the liberated provinces.

   The continued operations of the PMU disempower provincial level government and civil society actors’ capabilities to coordinate with and/or challenge power holders in Baghdad. Some 200,000 IDPs remain displaced³ due to hostile security actors, political marginalisation and social divisions in areas of origin.⁴

   The economic stagnation, due to shortages in oil revenue amid the continued overreliance on oil and gas in Iraq’s current account prevent much-needed investments in long-term infrastructure and public service provision. The political terrain discourages participative and inclusive politics and Iraq remains at peace but split with division.

2. **Scenario 2 (regressive):** The Government of Iraq, increasingly dominated by Shi’a or Iranian aligned actors, renews its campaign of Sunni exclusion and the main Shi’a parties strip the state and empower Iranian aligned actors with rents and privileges, while subjugating the elites, civil society actors and people of the Sunni majority provinces.

   The new government is unable to reign in the PMU’s ability to act extra-judicially. An uptick in Da’esh-affiliated attacks accompanies growing Sunni disillusionment. The entrenched position of the PMU allows them to apply strict security vetting procedures, reject ISF led attempts to re-integrate Da’esh families, and deepen their political foothold in liberated areas, alienating Sunni and other minorities and disrupting social cohesion between ethno-sectarian communities.

   Community level tensions and the hostility of the Federal Government to allies outside the Shi’a crescent’s sphere of influence means FDI is minimal and Iraq cannot diversify its economy. The popular discontent directed at corruption, and lack of jobs and basic services (which started in the southern provinces in 2018) is replicated in the Sunni provinces as – faced with a collapsing economy – the GoI are forced to favour the Shi’a provinces, in funding and project allocation,

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³ Human Rights Watch estimate.
⁴ The IOM survey data (IOM, Obstacles to Return, 2017) revealed that 10% people cite either fear of the controlling security actor, fear of reprisal or fear of harassment as the main reason for not returning.
to protect their political base. The clashes spill over into a Sunni insurgency, sparking a potential civil war, akin to 2006–7.

3. Scenario 3 (progressive): Western led capacity building assists the ISF to reduce Da’esh inspired attacks and enables the GoI to bring the PMU under full command and control. The stable security environment not only reduces Iranian interference and funding, but the Iraqi people increasingly see the GoI as their security guarantor. Sunni and other minority IDPs are permitted to return to their areas of origin under ISF protection and tensions between host communities and IDPs are averted.

The return of nearly all IDPs, the reign in of PMU abuses and the unity of Iraq’s people under one GoI banner provides the foundation for successful reconciliation efforts, led by formal national and provincial level actors, and in consultation with civic and community leaders from all groups. The newly formed government led by the expectedly moderate compromise candidate, Adel Abdul Mahdi, demonstrates its willingness and ability to bring political factions together. A new basis for an active media ad civil society is established, on which these informal institutions can challenge government and government figures engage in dialogue on future policy.

The political settlement, including all Iraq’s minorities, encourages foreign investors to fund infrastructure and development projects supported by a hedged national economy, delivering a period of sustained political stability and economic growth to Iraq.

The post-Da’esh era of Iraq’s nascent democratic history is moving forward but how rapidly and how robustly depends on developments in the drivers of conflict including the need for an inclusive and responsive political settlement. Despite this short to medium-term uncertainty, Iraq will likely experience a period of continued fragile stability, necessitating efforts to promote immediate recovery, reconciliation and reform in the period 2019-2021. This imperative is particularly relevant across scenarios and are core to this PSP.

- Iraq is at a critical juncture between sectarianism and inclusiveness. This PSP understands that addressing this effectively involves tackling complex centre-periphery dynamics and elite power grabs that have traditionally undermined the interests of the general public and stoked instability. Key features of this instability include the lack of effective conflict resolution, poor governance and a lack of essential services due to corruption and delayed institutional reforms.

- Efforts to support reconciliation and social cohesion remain key and form a core part of the PSP. An important indicator of Iraq’s future cohesion and stability will be the government’s willingness and ability to share power and include a broad range of Sunni, Kurdish and minority stakeholders (including women) in key decision-making bodies and positions. If successful, this would help strengthen the social contract between the state and the periphery, including Iraq’s many minority communities, where the state traditionally has limited reach. If unsuccessful, individual groups will continue to contest and undermine policy development and implementation. Support to national-level reconciliation also remains critical: the marginalisation of Sunni political forces, which was enforced by PM Maliki and then softened by PM Abadi, is yet to be fully reversed.  

- Supporting basic reconstruction and service delivery is key to stability, or else create the risk that Da’esh forces resurge. The Sunni-majority provinces north of Baghdad—predominantly Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al-Din but also parts of Kirkuk and Diyala—are likely to see continued Sunni insurgency, whether under Da’esh flags or another jihadist banner. The same areas are also at risk of receiving limited recovery and development investments due to the lack of access of international partners and the GOI’s apparent unwillingness to channel funding to already (pre-Da’esh) economically marginalised communities they see as complicit in helping Da’esh spread. This may fuel further grievances and a sense of marginalization in the Sunni communities. Through the efforts of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and with support from the Global Counter-Da’esh Coalition and the PMU, Da’esh will be unable to hold territory in Iraq. But the group’s

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5 The National Coalition – the best performing Sunni bloc in the May 2018 parliamentary elections – finished sixth. The absence of a strong Sunni voice in the Shi’a dominated post-election political settlement, and the GOI’s potentially unforgiving and ineffective handling of Da’esh collaborators, compensation processes and reconciliation may sow the seeds of another Sunni Islamic insurgency in Iraq.
extremist ideology resonates in parts of the Sunni community. Some localised and globalised financing networks remain intact. It is expected and being observed that Da’esh, or remnant thereof, will continue to operate and carry out asymmetric attacks.

- Civil society (CSOs) in Iraq could play an important role with regards to local conflict resolution and collaboration between different groups in society. These CSOs currently see themselves primarily as training and educating bodies, rather than bodies for political advocacy or social cohesion. This modality is the probably a result of the political space in which they operate; Iraq’s political system is unaccustomed to independent or critical voices challenging the entrenched power dynamics. Equally, some civil society organisations have been caught up in sectarian dynamics and instrumentalised by narrow group interests. CSOs themselves recognise the need to rebuild public confidence and (re)establish their reputation as trusted mediator in a divided society. With the resettlement of many million people (2.6m already settled and 3.6m yet to be settled, according to the UNDP FFS Q2/2018 report) in their communities of origin and the limited government reach into some of these areas, Iraq’s civil society are well-placed to (re)strengthen and contribute to a more peaceable Iraq.

Finally, while Iraq has experienced more stability relative to Syria, events in the country are also unpredictable. In the short term, some events may therefore trigger a need to fundamentally re-calibrate the PSP and continue activities in other shapes and forms. While highly improbable, an embrace by the GoI of extremist Shi’a / anti-Sunni narratives, or a GoI configured by highly sectarian figures would constitute one such scenario. Though currently unlikely, this might change in the lifetime of this PSP.

3.3 International Response

Both Iraq and Syria have seen significant levels of international support since the outbreak of the crisis in Syria (with Syria receiving more than double the amount of ODA per capita as the second largest recipient in 2016) and the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the subsequent emergence of Da’esh (Iraq was the ninth largest recipient of ODA per capita in 2016 the latest year for which data exists).

The type of international support has shifted according to challenges and opportunities and needs on the ground. In Syria, significant funding was channelled into propping up and capacitating the moderate Syrian opposition in the early years of the conflict (2011-2012). In the early days of the conflict, Syrian civil society and the complex network of armed and non-armed opposition governance structures were considered the best hope to counterweight the regime, which was expected to eventually collapse, and to provide a safe haven for Syrian wishing to escape Assad’s regime. Between 2012 and 2015 increasing support was therefore dedicated to institution-building and efforts to retain some level of governance capacity in opposition areas. These efforts continued in 2016 and 2017 after the Russian support to Assad intensified and it became increasingly evident that a regime collapse was unlikely. Institution building, capacity development of the opposition representative functions, community resilience, stabilisation and crisis response programming continued to focus on strengthening the opposition including with a view to ensure a strong opposition to engage in peace negotiations. Throughout 2017 and 2018 the international support provided has increasingly reflected the regimen advances compounded by extremist groups including designated terrorist organisations, gaining grounds in non-regime-controlled areas. This shrinking operational space has necessitated a shift towards a renewed civil society focus, strengthening capacities for ensuring accountability for war crimes and atrocities, resilience and humanitarian response programming, refugee responses in the region, and CVE efforts. Denmark has been at the forefront of this development and other donors seem to largely begin to adopt a similar focus.

In Iraq, international support to large-scale development programmes launched after the fall of Saddam Hussein came to a halt with the emergence of Da’esh and its 2014 proclamation of the caliphate. These programmes had, with some exceptions, largely focussed on areas where the international forces operated (Central Iraq) as well as areas where the security situation allowed for safe operations (mainly the Kurdistan Region of Iraq). Programming was mainly focussing on reconstruction and peacebuilding outcomes with limited traction on both fronts due to inadequate state capacity and corruption on the one hand and continued unresolved grievances on the other hand undermining genuine reconciliation
and peacebuilding efforts including with regards to the security sector. International support to Iraq is now seeing another uptick with a focus on reconstruction particularly in Da'esh affected areas with a view to allow displaced populations to return and renewed security sector reform and governance reform initiatives. The international donor community seems committed to learning from its mistake and stay the course for necessary reforms to take hold.

The rapidly shifting dynamics on the ground will, in any scenario for Syria’s development over the coming years, require a flexible and adaptable program, which can be significantly adjusted along the way as opportunities and challenges reveal themselves. Efforts in Syria under the future PSP are likely to target outcomes, which provide immediate assistance to the Syrian population and strengthen local structures, which can have a positive impact also in the longer run. Such efforts are combined with activities aimed at strengthening the role of opposition actors in the on-going negotiations, as well as activities aimed at dialogue and reconciliation outcomes, which can help prepare the ground for a post-agreement process in which all parties to the conflict will have a voice. Another critical priority for the programme is that the atrocities committed as part of the conflict can be redressed and accounted for if, and when, the context allows it. In both contexts, the role of women as actors in peace negotiations and processes has remained limited and must be promoted and their specific needs and challenges relating to the legacies of conflict addressed.

3.4 Lessons Learnt from Previous Programmes

As the programme of stabilisation support to Syria and Iraq has evolved across the international community, some key lessons have been learnt that relate to strategic design, contextual understanding, and programme implementation.

Strategically, the international community developed programmes that were useful and had impact on the outputs or outcomes of the conflict, but which struggled to have an impact on the macro trajectory of developments on the ground in both countries. This was partially the result of ineffective cross-programmatic coordination and integration, and the absence of a sense of strategic direction and interest across donor governments and, at times, within donor government institutions compounded by the military developments on the ground.

Partnerships across civilian and security domains have demonstrated significant impact in terms of blending approaches and modalities, linking programmatic and political engagements, and ensuring access to key local stakeholders. Denmark has remained steadfast in its support to civil society in Syria, especially those that represent women’s voices (such as through Baytna, the Syria Network for Human Rights, and TDA). This investment has complemented other donor support and, more recently, has prompted other donors consider providing further support to similar society organisations. In Iraq, the prevalence of capable UN partners ensures a reasonable level of coherence and coordination within and across sectors.

Contextually, a key lesson learned from the previous programme is that risk is an integral part of being actively engaged in Syria and that risks must be understood, sought, mitigated and genuinely accepted. Cutting across all lessons is the need to ground programmes in a sound understanding of the context as this develops, to both, inform strategic redesign, and to shed light on implementation risks. In Iraq, a key lesson learned relates to the importance of the formal as well as informal political dynamics as defining the space for what is possible and how - particularly for programme significantly impacted by the political economy and legacies of conflict.

Operating in complex conflict environments which are fragmented and in which a multiplicity of stakeholders dominate means that programmes in both countries can be put under pressure, be this from Islamist groups or by criminal and patronage networks in Iraq. This programme therefore takes a more detailed conflict analysis and scenario planning exercise as a starting point. The aim is to continuously review the relevance of support through ongoing monitoring by the programme’s stabilisation advisors, and more regular formal reviews of project relevance and effectiveness, discussed in the Management section, below.
**Programmatically**, the 2017 mid-term review found that the main area of weakness in the programme was in reporting, especially on results, which the review found could be substantially improved. While efforts have been made to enhance reporting, this PSP reflects efforts to continue to improve on this front. The mid-term review found that reporting, particularly at the thematic programme level linked to the Theory of Change, could be strengthened, hence developing in this PSP realistic and tangible outcomes under each Thematic Area; PSEDs (annexed) are also explicit in their consideration of partner obligations to report on relevant indicators from their own M&E frameworks.

Both Syria and Iraq demonstrate extremely high levels of contextual (political and security), programmatic and institutional risks. A key lesson from previous engagements has been that risks need regular monitoring, and that programmes need to mitigate and manage risk flexibly since high levels of risk exposure is inevitable. That said, reliable monitoring in the context of cross-border programming is difficult, may not consistently yield reliable data, and may expose monitors to risk. As such, pursuing and deepening existing partnerships with trusted implementers (as per this PSP) is key.

Gender has increasingly been mainstreamed into the activities of, for example, the FFS and SSR work in Iraq and the activities of the SRTF. Baytna has also been engaged in providing a “bottom-up” voice for Syrian women, which the DPA led peace negotiations process has sought to accommodate. The PSP will need to sustain a strong focus on the gender aspects of programming in the two male-dominated contexts, which are furthermore in active conflict or in a post-conflict phase, which often further marginalise the role of women and increase their exposure to violence and negative collateral impacts of the conflict.

### 3.4.1 Implications for Programming

As outlined in the mid-term review of the 2016-2018 programme, there is a need to apply a very flexible and adaptable approach to programming with significant room to revise, discontinue, or expand engagements throughout the programming cycle to reflect emerging challenges and opportunities. Practically, this flexibility requires regular monitoring with recommendations to adapt the course of the programme as necessary. The regional perspective creates flexibility to move between engagements and between countries should circumstances require, and more effective communication on lessons learnt and commonalities between the two contexts.

This PSP programme reflects the **art of the possible** and has indeed identified and capacitated legitimate partners and stakeholders involved in key stabilisation work in both contexts. In Iraq, it focuses on processes identified as critical recovery and efforts to sustain peace in Iraq, and in Syria, it works with local partners to the extent possible and has successfully identified ways of supporting the Syrian opposition even as its operational space was diminishing.

The complicated and high-risk operating environments of Iraq and Syria require human resource investments in program (including financial) management and M&E, even for engagements implemented through multilateral partners or delegated to other bilateral actors. Notwithstanding this complexity, the mid-term review commended the programme for achieving tangible results in an extremely challenging context, even if “the ability of the engagements to substantially influence the objectives in the theory of change are limited in comparison to the overwhelming political and military context in which they operate.”

With the profoundly challenging and dynamic context on the ground in both Syria and Iraq, it is proposed that a budget is allocated to on-going studies and analysis to inform programme development or any strategic shifts. As the programme will inevitably have to respond to significant changes on the ground throughout the programming period in both countries, a mechanism should be identified under the USD 3 million budget line allocated for “Technical assistance, M&E, review”, which allows programme staff to rapidly commission tailored pieces of analysis and research, to inform changes in the programme without relying on heavy procurement processes. This might include the contracting of a think tank to deliver such analysis for both countries without developing detailed ToRs for single sourcing every time. This PSP proposes that reviews are carried out when needed and in line with implementers’ project cycles, and that the mid-term review scheduled for mid-2020 is capacitated and prepared in such a way
that genuine course correction and, possibly, re-programming can be supported drawing on evidence from the ground.

Finally, drawing on positive experiences of accompanying financial contributions with the deployment of experts, the PSP will aim to deploy advisors in key strategic positions, including: a) police deployments to UNDP's SSR programme in Iraq; b) expert advisors from the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) potentially deployed to the Tansiq program in Iraq; c) military personnel deployed to the NATO mission in Iraq; and d) the three stabilisation advisors based in Istanbul. The option to deploy a military advisor to a relevant engagement or in a more generic function will also be kept open during the implementation of the programme. Furthermore, the programme will draw on advice from the Special Representative for the Syria Crisis and the Danish Ambassador to Iraq as well as other relevant ministerial colleagues.
4 Presentation of the Programme

Iraq and Syria were respectively the third-least and least peaceful countries on the 2017 Global Peace Index. Despite progress against Da’esh in Iraq, political instability remains and trust in government is low due to poor governance and service delivery. Syria remains an active war zone with the number of casualties likely to be nearing half a million people since 2011. The conflicts have resulted in widespread displacement within Syria and Iraq, across the region, and beyond; vast amounts of critical infrastructure in ruins; and an unprecedented number of explosive hazards spread among communities. In both countries, extremist, undemocratic, and divisive actors stand ready to exploit vacuums in governance, service provision, security and safety.

Stability and safety in both Iraq and Syria are a prerequisite for the eventual safe return of refugees and internally displaced populations, and for recovery and governance efforts to take hold. In Syria this will also help build the resilience of populations fighting to retain some level of autonomy even in the face of expected regime take-over.

While Da’esh has been defeated on the battlefield and popular support for it has diminished, remnants of the organisation remain and continues to threaten the stability of parts of Iraq and in some pockets in Syria along the Iraqi border including in the form of sleeper cells.

The need is urgent to ensure that populations living in, or returning to, Da’esh-controlled areas in Iraq and Syria experience improvements such as demining and delivery of critical services, to substantively shift loyalty away from Da’esh.

While the coming years will represent an opportunity for Iraq to be rebuilt—physically, socially, economically and politically—the legacy of the conflict has physically shattered large parts of the country and has also depleted trust and cohesion between and within groups. In Iraq, there is a risk that the country’s PMUs are not effectively integrated into the Iraqi security forces, leaving tens of thousands armed and outside state control and at times under influence of outside actors. The marginalisation of minority groups in Iraq must be addressed by genuine efforts to build inclusive and responsive institutions and more equal access to power, as must the divide that has been built between religious sects and Northern and Southern Iraqis.

The need is urgent to reconcile groups in society and to ensure that the monopoly of violence is administered in an accountable and responsive way by actors that are also capable of exercising control across the Iraqi territory.

The outlook in Syria is grim. The regime of Bashar al-Assad has celebrated significant military victories backed by its Russian and Iranian allies. The opposition consequently controls rapidly diminishing pockets of the country and has furthermore been pressured by violent extremist groups including Designated Terrorist Organisations gaining increasing control. The atrocities and human rights abuses currently committed in Syria risk exacerbating and strengthening a self-perpetuating cycle of violence and worsening existing grievances also in the long term.

Accountability for abuses will be a prerequisite to end atrocities and pave the way for any lasting peace in Syria. An agreement for Syria also hinges on the ability of different groups to work together with adequate capacity to engage in the peace negotiations however futile they may seem at the time of writing.

Finally, political dynamics around the relationship between the Kurdish communities and their governance structures, the states hosting them, and regional powers will likely continue to shape political developments in both countries. Adding to this, the relationship between—and interests of—regional and global powers, including but not limited to Turkey, Iran, Russia, the Gulf countries, major EU member states and the US continue to significantly impact developments in both countries in various constellations.

Support to political settlement processes must be inclusive and comprehensive and pave the way for local actors, including women, to reconcile and address the root causes of conflict.
4.1 Programme Overview

The PSP Iraq-Syria 2019-2021 will focus on three overall Thematic Areas (TAs) under which a range of engagements are organised:

- **TA-A Peacebuilding and Justice.** Contribute to ensuring that the Syrian opposition remains actively engaged in peace negotiations towards a political settlement as outlined in Security Council Resolution 2254 and that civil society actors are capacitated and can contribute to keeping the Syrian opposition united to provide an ideological counterweight to extremism and the regime and that atrocities and war crimes are accounted for. This will be done by:
  o Making sure that human rights abuses and rule of law violations in Syria are systematically documented with a view to ensure accountability and deter further violations and through
  o Bringing the Syrian people together around commons agendas and aspirations also in the context of the Geneva-based peace negotiations and supporting reconciliation processes in Iraq within the overall UNAMI assisted process toward political settlement, which build social cohesion and facilitate dialogue at both national and local levels.

- **TA-B Resilience and Recovery.** Improve the safety and resilience of people and communities living in Syria and Iraq through support for critical response, demining and early recovery efforts. This will be done through delivery of essential services and life-saving civil defence capabilities in Syria, and through stabilisation and recovery efforts in Iraq in areas previously controlled by Da’esh. This will ensure a safe return of displaced Iraqis and lay the foundation for longer-term recovery and the ability to withstand violent extremism (both countries) and avoid collapse or surrender of opposition-controlled areas (Syria).

- **TA-C Security Governance.** Improve the safety and security for the civilian population through critically needed reform of the security sector, comprehensive capacity building of these security forces and through enhancing the capacity of legitimate counterparts to address threats from violent extremist groups operating in the region.

The programme is predicated on the following overarching **theory of change** captured below, that:

If, an inclusive political solution to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq are promoted, which include accountability for crimes committed. And, moderate actors capable to provide an alternative to extremism are supported and capacitated to provide essential and life-saving services. And, the region is supported to be more secure, safe and inclusive. Then, immediate and medium term stabilisation needs in both countries are supported, and contribute to reduced regional insecurity, terrorism, irregular migration and protracted displacement.

It is of critical importance to Denmark, as expressed in the government’s *Foreign and Security Policy Strategy*, to reduce the collateral negative impact of conflict including the need for humanitarian assistance, pervasive human rights violations, protracted fragility, and undermined economic growth; to address the causes of irregular migration; and to curb the threat from terrorist groups finding safe havens amidst chaos. The PSP is therefore designed to focus on generating short-to-mid-term stabilisation outcomes, which intend to create the enabling conditions for longer-term development efforts to commence, such as post-conflict accountability for atrocities committed in Syria. In Iraq, they include SSR, reconciliation, and institutional strengthening which are also preconditions for sustainable peace and development. The Programme accepts comparably high levels of risk and evidently operates in the cross-disciplinary “sharp end” of Denmark’s international engagement by leveraging its ability to work in the civil-military nexus.
Moreover, the programme is predicated on a certain number of assumptions that are relevant in Syria and Iraq, chiefly, that:

- In Syria,
  - The regime and members of the opposition continue to participate in processes that seek to find a political resolution to the conflict;
  - Civil society continue to wish to engage with the public, and the public perceive these organisations to be legitimate and representative of their views.

- In Iraq,
  - That the government continues to operate in a way that is not sectarian and aims to distribute its resources equitably to its citizens;
  - That the government continues to support national and local reconciliation initiatives;
  - That the UNDP remains engaged in stabilisation initiatives and continues to lead this effort (given the capacity gap in the Ninewah provincial government).

- In Syria and Iraq,
  - That a broad range of international actors continue to be committed to the demining agenda;
  - That there is no significant resurgence of Da’esh (or another such extremist element) which would precipitate the withdrawal of international actors and / or change the focus of international efforts toward stabilisation narrowly defined in its focus on CT.

4.2 Human Rights Based Approach and Gender Dimension of the Program

A human rights-based approach will be applied throughout the Programme and several engagements will focus explicitly on strengthening accountability mechanisms for deterring and addressing human rights abuses. Support to participation and accountability is at the heart of the programmes aiming to mobilise and strengthen civil society; principles of transparency are at the heart of the monitoring of violations being carried out by the Syria Network of Human rights. The engagement with The Day After (TDA) and the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), for example, are focussed on ensuring the human rights of Syrians caught amidst conflict and on documenting violations with a view to deter further violations and eventually hold perpetrators accountable. In Iraq, the SSR work includes a focus on human rights compliance by security authorities with Tansiq addressing these aspects particularly in relation to the work of Iraq’s intelligence agencies. Finally, political settlement processes aim to be inclusive and comprehensive, in line with the HRBA principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination and transparency.

While challenging, the programme will seek to protect the rights of, and to empower, women in line with principles espoused in UNSCR 1325, both through political engagement (such as through the role of the Special Envoy) and specifically through the programmes being supported. Every PSED outlines the programme’s approach to gender empowerment and mainstreaming. The engagement with Baytna in Syria, for example, seeks to strengthen and promote the views of women on the conflict and possible post-conflict scenarios; TDA surveys access both genders equally and gives these a voice in more high-level negotiations. The Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF) supports the role of women in recovery efforts and consider the specific needs of women in early service provision. UNDP’s Integrated Reconciliation Programme in Iraq focuses on the role of women in reconciliation processes while UNDP’s Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS) implement particular programs for women.

4.3 Selection of Engagements and Partners

Overall programme design is illustrated in Table 1. Engagements in both countries to some degree represent the art of the possible; in Iraq because some engagements depend heavily on political buy-in from key stakeholders and, in Syria, because developments are both extremely unpredictable and will dictate what is possible in terms of securing access for implementing partners and identifying meaningful outcomes to work towards.
Two engagements are new to this PSP: 1) engagement to prevent and counter violent extremism in Iraq (Tansiq), which complements existing support to the UNDP’s SSR initiative in Iraq; and 2) support to the SNHR to support accountability and justice. Other engagements have been re-organised or adjusted to reflect realities on the ground. In addition, other partners were not part of the original programme but were added in 2017 including Tetra Tech (though this support built upon an existing agreement with the US Department of State) and UNDP’s Integrated Reconciliation Programme and Security Sector Reform Program.

Continuity with implementing partners holds significant advantages in terms of familiarity with context, trust, tried-and-tested approaches, and to applying practical lessons learnt from implementing projects in the present conflict context, which inevitably involves higher than normal risks. The programme’s engagement partners have demonstrated good results so far and comply with the programme’s strategic focus on immediate stabilisation.

In its selection of engagements and engagement partners, the following criteria have been taken into consideration:

- Nature of the engagement and the relevant profile for implementing partners
- Existing familiarity and track record of satisfactory delivery under the existing programme
- Ability to operate in the context of Iraq and/or Syria including capacity and access constraints
- Local legitimacy and ownership of organisation
- The partner’s experience, reputation and presence on the ground
- Ability to meet Danish criteria for transparency, management and reporting

The selection of partners is subject to Danish rules and policies on tendering and partnership modalities, and we provide below a table to capture procurement modalities for each programme being supported (see also Annex 9).

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<th>Engagement Title</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>IIIM</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDA</td>
<td>No</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRTF</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Helmets/Mayday</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining Tetra Tech</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP FFS</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP SSR</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tansiq CT/CVE</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the UN’s limited operations in non-government controlled and contested parts of Syria, the most legitimate and fit-for-purpose Syrian civil society organisations must engage directly. In Iraq the prevalence of multi-partner programmes makes it possible to engage Iraqi civil society through broader and more comprehensive programmes managed by the UN and others, which ensures coherence and lowers transaction costs. This explains the relatively high number of Syrian partners for the engagements there as compared to activities in Iraq.
New partners include SNHR, which is supported through Baytna, and Tansiq an EU-led programme that DANIDA is considering funding.

PSEDs are attached to this document, and Annex 9 provides an overview of timeframes for implementation of the PSEDs; this is because some of the PSEDs are due to expire in August 2019 and will require a refresh, and some PSEDs will be finalised and implemented after programme approval.
## Table 1: PSP Programme Results Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TA Objectives</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Intermediate Outcomes</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Partner / source for indicator</th>
<th>Output indicator</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **TA-A, Peacebuilding and Justice** | **In Syria, efforts are supported towards an inclusive political solution which promotes accountability for crimes; In Iraq, efforts are bolstered to promote reconciliation and community cohesion** | **Conflict drivers are articulated and addressed; moderate and democratic actors in Syria and Iraq are empowered to engage constructively in efforts towards building social cohesion and reconciliation** | **A political settlement to the Syrian crisis and a Syrian-led transition to a political system aligned with the Geneva Communique** | **UNDPA** | Intra-Syrian negotiations and consultations undertaken.  
1. A set of thematic working groups are established, which correspond to the elements highlighted in the Geneva Communique and which bring together actors to work towards the resolution of the conflict in Syria.  
2. Technical experts are mobilised to provide timely backstopping of the DPA process  
3. The opposition continues to be involved and active in negotiations | N/A |
| **In Syria, efforts are supported towards an inclusive political solution which promotes accountability for crimes; In Iraq, efforts are bolstered to promote reconciliation and community cohesion** | **Civil society are supported to act as a force for democratic change, inclusive peace and security, supporting democracy and transitional justice and promoting respect for human rights and civil liberties** | **Civil society actors are more representative, better coordinated and amplified, and able to bring to discussions cohesive, evidence-based, widely supported recommendations, with an eye on a future transition** | **UNDP** | **Expand the number of LPCs supported directly through UNDP-vetted training and operational assistance in governorates most affected by Da'esh—and for these LPCs to be assisted to deliver concrete results** | **Baytna** | 1. Number of high-level engagements by Baytna supported CS with international policy forums / T2 meetings and briefings to ISSG members  
26 LPCs established | Five (5) engagements |
| **Mechanisms are supported to gather and record evidence on human rights violations committed by perpetrators on all sides of the Syrian conflict and contribute to transitional justice** | **Reports are published or shared for use by the international community to expand the evidence base of violations committed in Syria** | **Reports are published or shared for use by the international community to expand the evidence base of violations committed in Syria** | **TDA** | **Community satisfaction with TDA supported CSO campaigns** | **SNHR** | 1. Number of organisations (researchers, decision-makers, civil society groups, human rights activists, and truth-finding mission) citing SNHR reports in their public or internal inquiries  
2. Satisfaction among key recipients (COT, III, UN agencies, and states) with the data provided** | Approx. 10 report citations monthly | 70 % satisfaction  
0 meetings  
64 completed  
3 completed |
|  | **Advocacy and awareness raising for human rights and accountability issues** | **Advocacy and awareness raising for human rights and accountability issues** | **IRP** | **Civil society actors are more representative, better coordinated and amplified, and able to bring to discussions cohesive, evidence-based, widely supported recommendations, with an eye on a future transition** | **TDA** | 1. Community satisfaction with TDA supported CSO campaigns  
2. Number of thematic track 2 meetings with grass-roots CS actors, women led groups, political opposition leaders, and other local stakeholders on transitional justice and rule of law  
3. Number of surveys completed to identify community perceptions and needs  
4. Number of position papers / policy briefs produced by supported CS actors with recommendations on transition issues.** | 0 meetings  
64 completed  
3 completed |
|  | **Support for justice and reconstruction initiatives** | **Support for justice and reconstruction initiatives** | **UNDP** | **Expand the number of LPCs supported directly through UNDP-vetted training and operational assistance in governorates most affected by Da'esh—and for these LPCs to be assisted to deliver concrete results** | **Baytna** | 1. Number of high-level engagements by Baytna supported CS with international policy forums / T2 meetings and briefings to ISSG members  
26 LPCs established | Five (5) engagements |
|  | **Mechanisms are supported to gather and record evidence on human rights violations committed by perpetrators on all sides of the Syrian conflict and contribute to transitional justice** | **Mechanisms are supported to gather and record evidence on human rights violations committed by perpetrators on all sides of the Syrian conflict and contribute to transitional justice** | **TDA** | **Community satisfaction with TDA supported CSO campaigns** | **SNHR** | 1. Number of organisations (researchers, decision-makers, civil society groups, human rights activists, and truth-finding mission) citing SNHR reports in their public or internal inquiries  
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3 completed |
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2. Number of thematic track 2 meetings with grass-roots CS actors, women led groups, political opposition leaders, and other local stakeholders on transitional justice and rule of law  
3. Number of surveys completed to identify community perceptions and needs  
4. Number of position papers / policy briefs produced by supported CS actors with recommendations on transition issues.** | 0 meetings  
64 completed  
3 completed |
|  | **Support for justice and reconstruction initiatives** | **Support for justice and reconstruction initiatives** | **UNDP** | **Expand the number of LPCs supported directly through UNDP-vetted training and operational assistance in governorates most affected by Da'esh—and for these LPCs to be assisted to deliver concrete results** | **Baytna** | 1. Number of high-level engagements by Baytna supported CS with international policy forums / T2 meetings and briefings to ISSG members  
26 LPCs established | Five (5) engagements |
| TA-B, Resilience and Recovery | In Syria and Iraq, moderate actors capable to provide an alternative to extremism are better able to provide essential and life-saving services and bolstering community resilience |

**In Syria and Iraq, moderate actors capable to provide an alternative to extremism are better able to provide essential and life-saving services and bolstering community resilience** |

| Accountability for international crimes committed in Syria is advanced through the effective: preservation and analysis of information and evidence; sharing of information, evidence and analysis with criminal justice actors who are working towards accountability; and engagement with affected communities about the IIIM's work |

| Critical infrastructure rehabilitation provided in opposition-held areas of Syria to improve living conditions of affected populations. |

| White Helmets essential services are sustained in areas where they operate. |

| In Syria and Iraq, moderate actors capable to provide an alternative to extremism are better able to provide essential and life-saving services and bolstering community resilience |

| Number of outreach events and engagements with NGOs, Academia and the press |

| % of location assessments conducted in liberated areas |

| Clearance of explosive hazards performed in priority sites after being released through non-technical surveys. |

| Conditions improved for the safe return of Internally Displaced Persons in Newly Liberated Areas. The Government of Iraq is supported to address the immediate stabilization and recovery needs in newly liberated areas which allows for the sustainable return of internally displaced persons. |

| A nationally led response to threat of explosive hazards operates efficiently and effectively |

| To set the stage for Iraq's citizens, to return to their homes and resume their lives. |

<p>| Iraq and Syria are supported to be The Iraqi Security Forces, including its police and military, is supported to become |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TA-C, Security Governance</th>
<th>more secure and inclusive</th>
<th>form part of an increasingly accountable and responsive security architecture</th>
<th>development, the rule of law and accountability are met by stronger systems of democratic governance.</th>
<th>2. # of small grants provided to civil society organizations to undertake local level initiatives to contribute to strengthening security sector governance in Iraq</th>
<th>Nine grants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq and Syria are supported to be more secure, safe and inclusive</td>
<td>Iraqi actors are better able to respond to violent extremism through preventive as well as reactive measures spanning intelligence capabilities and whole-of-society efforts</td>
<td>Improved GoI capability to respond coherently, inclusively and efficiently to terrorism threats and challenges.</td>
<td>Project Tansiq, European Union</td>
<td>1. The adoption of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), as defined in the 2017 Iraqi National Security Strategy.</td>
<td>The National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC) produces a National Intelligence Estimate by April 2018.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Project Tansiq, European Union</td>
<td>2. NIE identifies specific national intelligence requirements relating to terrorism threats.</td>
<td>The NICC disseminates intelligence requirements to the Iraqi intelligence community by July 2018.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Project Tansiq, European Union</td>
<td>3. The NICC has a standing agenda item to discuss intelligence collection efforts relating to these national intelligence requirements</td>
<td>The NICC has a standing agenda item in place to discuss these requirements by October 2018.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4 Thematic Area A: Peacebuilding and Justice

**TA-A Objective:** In Syria, efforts are supported towards an inclusive political solution which promotes accountability for crimes; In Iraq, efforts are bolstered to promote reconciliation and community cohesion.

TA-A aims to support critical political and justice-related processes in both countries, while ensuring adequate representation in these processes by individuals across societies, specifically women.

Engagement in Syria is with two objectives in mind: 1) To ensure that the opposition to the Syrian regime remains actively engaged in a viable negotiation process towards a political settlement as outlined in Security Council Resolution 2254. This objective is pursued through supporting credible and recognised civil society organisation as well as supporting the UN-led peace process. 2) To ensure accountability, since violations of rule of law, as well as atrocities and grave human rights violations, have been committed on a daily basis - and most systematically by the regime. These violations must be documented in order to deter further violations as well as to ensure that perpetrators can eventually be held accountable and transitional justices’ processes can be supported.

In Iraq, the demise of Da’esh has opened a space for possible reconciliation to address grievances rooted in past conflicts and exacerbated by the emergence and spread of Da’esh. To ensure that peace in Iraq can be sustained, it is crucial that past injustices are addressed and reconciled, and that social cohesion develops among individuals and within communities including religious minorities and between the Iraqi people and the formal and informal structures governing them. This requires efforts in support of formal national reconciliation as well as a sustained focus on addressing local conflict dynamics and the facilitation of community-level reconciliation.

From a Danish perspective, this will ensure a stable Iraq allowing refugees to return, the significant investments in Iraq’s stability to be sustained and the risk of violent extremist groups re-establishing themselves in the country to be reduced. In Syria, in addition to somewhat similar aims, the interventions aim at ensuring the continued engagement of the legitimate opposition and accountability for war crimes and atrocities committed during the conflict regardless of recent negative developments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IF</th>
<th>THEN</th>
<th>Engagement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syrian counterparts are capacitated to represent, and remain relevant to, moderate Syrians within and outside the country, including in the context of negotiation processes, and Key Iraqi actors, including women, are supported to engage in processes aimed at facilitating reconciliation between disputing groups in Iraq at the national and local level;</td>
<td>Conflict drivers and needs will be articulated, and moderate actors empowered to engage constructively in efforts towards building social cohesion in the long term. (link to Output 1.1)</td>
<td>The Day After, Baytna UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on atrocities and potential human rights violations is systematically collected, and stored, and Independent and credible justice mechanisms have access to this information and are able to make use of it,</td>
<td>perpetrators can be held accountable for atrocities and grave human rights violations committed. (link to Output 1.2)</td>
<td>SNHR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IF</th>
<th>THEN</th>
<th>Engagement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP IRP</td>
<td>UNDP IRP</td>
<td>UNDP IRP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assumptions underpinning Thematic Area 1 and its engagements in Syria include:

- The continued ability of the implementing partners to operate within Syria. Should the regime take control over all of Syria, Baytna will, in particular, need to rethink its implementation modality, though SNHR and TDA are less likely to be affected. The collection of human rights violations could be continued under some circumstances.

- Complete regime control would also indicate fundamentally shifting dynamics in the political negotiations and have consequences for the UN-led negotiation process.

- Linked to this is another key assumption that the current dialogue and reconciliation processes will remain relevant and accepted. Envisioned engagements: In Syria, support should be sustained for the formal UN-led Track I negotiation process and to civil society. Denmark has been a consistent supporter of these efforts, through funding provided to the UN Special Envoy for Syria supported by the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA), the activities of the Danish Special Representative for the Syria Crisis, and through supporting the activity of moderate Syrian civil society actors that develop and represent the views and interests of Syrian people in both Track I and Track II processes.

Envisioned engagements

Besides continued support to the activities of UNDPA, this programme will maintain support to the civil society organisation Baytna. Looking forward, if the regime expands further into Idlib and other areas where Baytna has been operating, their mission will continue but their tactics will have to change. To date, Baytna’s support of civil society enabled access to—and supported the resilience of—these actors, including women-led organisations, in Syria. Baytna will need to assess where and how it is possible to operate underground in regime-held areas and where they can add value working with external civil society and cultural organisations.

To ensure that rule of law violations, as well as atrocities and grave human rights abuses, are documented and organised in a way that allow perpetrators to be held accountable, the programme will continue support to the Independent Impartial Investigation Mechanism (IIIM). An effective IIIM is at the moment dependent on local Syrian organisations that can document events on the ground, including those in many “hard-to-reach”-areas. The Syria Network for Human Rights (SNHR) is well positioned to complement IIIM’s work through credible, on-the-ground information-gathering and storing capacities and a track record of good performance. As a new partner that has not received funding from donors, SNHR has agreed to partner with the more established Baytna on a joint funding mechanism. The Baytna platform could be used as a pass through for funding to SNHR. The mechanism for doing this, including Baytna Board approval, will be worked out among the parties by the time scheduled disbursements to SNHR begin in 2019.

The activities of The Day After (TDA) in Syria play a key role in supporting the broader transitional justice agenda, which paves the way for a more sustainable peace in Syria. TDA as a strong, well-respected leadership that is connected inside Syria and is able to contribute to dialogue on a future Syria. TDA’s projects inside opposition-held areas, particularly their CSO capacity building work, would need to be revisited should the regime regain control; their polling of views on pertinent issues relevant to Syria’s future is unique in its representation of women’s voices as well as men, thereby ensuring that these voices are accounted for in peace processes. Moving forward their process appears to be twofold, focusing on supporting accountability efforts and influencing the political process on Syria. The current program timeframe runs until August 2019 and could be extended with the agreement of the co-donor Sweden.

In Iraq, the sectarian basis upon which the state was constructed post-2003 has entrenched sectarian divisions and intra and inter-sectarian rivalry remains widespread and undermines state-building efforts. Therefore, UNDP through its Integrated Reconciliation Project (IRP) had ambitions to launch a reconciliation programme working with the federal-level National Reconciliation Commission (NRC)
and linking these up to community based local Peace Committees (LPCs). Given challenges pertaining to working with the NRC, the project has since focussed on developing LPCs to act as trust-building mechanisms for community reconciliation, and its programme has specifically focussed on the inclusion of women (both as participants and mediators) and youth in these dialogue processes.

Despite setbacks in the IRP’s ability to engage effectively across the reconciliation chain (i.e. through linking local reconciliation initiatives, to national reconciliation programmes), IRP has created a framework within which reconciliation programmes could be better coordinated and strategically managed. More broadly, while donors agree on the need to move forward on reconciliation, the community is unclear on the best approach to pursue this. UNDP’s re-opening of FFS’ Window 4 reconciliation activities in parallel to its expansion of reconciliation activities under IRP might create duplication of efforts, reduce capacity building efforts and lessons learned, further weaken coordination and prevent optimal GoI ownership to donor supported reconciliation activities (and some donors, such as USAID, have ring-fenced funding to FFS away from reconciliation). In view of potential fragmentation on this critical initiative there is a need for UNDP to take the lead to consolidate with donors other mechanisms that will rebuild trust in UNDP led reconciliation programs at community and to work with the new government to get national buy in for reconciliation at all levels.

### 4.4.1 Overview of TA-A Engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing partner</th>
<th>UNDPA (MFA funding)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Budget</strong></td>
<td>DKK 7.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project period</strong></td>
<td>2019-2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other donors</strong></td>
<td>Numerous other donors provide funding to the UNDPA relevant to Syria and to the office of the Special Envoy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Activity objective (output to overall programme results framework)**

Syrian counterparts capacitated and empowered to remain relevant for, and being able to represent, moderate Syrians within and outside the country including in the context of negotiation processes.

**Engagement description**

Support should be sustained for the formal UN-led Track I negotiation process and to civil society.

**Previous support**

Denmark has already supported the missions of the special envoys to the United Nations and the Arab League in 2012 and 2013 with a total of DKK 4.5 million, provided a further DKK 6 million in 2014 and then DKK 4 million from 1 September 2015 to 31 August 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing partner</th>
<th>The Day After (TDA) (MFA funding)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Budget</strong></td>
<td>DKK 9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project period</strong></td>
<td>September 2019 to December 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other donors</strong></td>
<td>Sweden, Canada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Activity objective (output to overall programme results framework)**

To coordinate and amplify the voices of Syrian CSOs in key policy and Track I discussions on transition in Syria. Syrian counterparts capacitated and empowered to remain relevant for, and being able to represent, moderate Syrians within and outside the country including in the context of negotiation processes.

**Project description**

TDA focuses on carrying out Track II consultation meetings with Syrian stakeholders around key themes, including transitional justice, the rule of law, and forced displacement. These aim to build consensus amongst Syrian actors on a blueprint of action and to make recommendations to Track I actors on these issues. TDA is also engaged in activities aimed at increasing the focus on peacebuilding, including boosting the participation of women, engaging the media, reinforcing local security initiatives, expanding networks across dividing lines, and building CSO capacity.
Previous support

Denmark has supported TDA’s work on Syria with earlier funding of DKK 1.5 million in 2012-13 and DKK 6.5 million in 2014-15, DKK 4 million in 2015-16 and DKK 10 million 2016-2019.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing partner</th>
<th>Baytna (MFA funding)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>DKK 15 million (including support to SNHR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project period</td>
<td>September 2019 to December 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors</td>
<td>Sweden; Switzerland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Activity objective (output to overall programme results framework)

To strengthen the capacity of civil society to act as a force for democratic change, inclusive peace & stability, to support transitional justice, and to promote respect for human rights & civil liberties using different tools & approaches including advocacy, lobbying & policy making.

Project description

Baytna’s headquarters in Gaziantep are a “convening hub” at no cost for Syrian NGOs working in the region. They have also hosted cultural events in their offices. They have a subgrants program that has distinguished them from other NGOs, and most of their partners operate inside Syria’s opposition-held areas, focusing on themes of civil rights and governance, capacity building, and public policy with a clear civil society dimension, including human rights and accountability, basic freedoms, and public policy.

Previous support

Denmark supported the establishment of Baytna with DKK 5 million in 2013 and provided an additional DKK 10 million for 2014-15, DKK 7.5 million for 2015-16 and DKK 10 million 2016-2019.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing partner</th>
<th>Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), via Baytna (MFA funding)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>DKK 6 million, granted through Baytna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project period</td>
<td>January 2019 to December 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors</td>
<td>No other state donors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Activity objective (output to overall programme results framework)

Perpetrators can be held accountable for atrocities and grave human rights violations committed by them in an aftermath to the Syrian crisis using evidence collected and systematised, which in itself can also currently serve as a deterrent.

Project description

The Syria Network for Human Rights would be a new partner under the program. The organisation has a good track record of effectively and systematically documenting human rights abuses in Syria and needs a core funder to sustain its critical activities. It is a large, trusted and credible Syrian network of activists documenting atrocities on the ground and is frequently referred to by INGOs and international organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the UN.

Previous support

None received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing partner</th>
<th>International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) (MFA funding)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danish contribution</td>
<td>DKK 20 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30
### Project period
January 2019 – December 2021

### Other donors
United States, United Kingdom, EU member states

### Activity objective (output to overall programme results framework)
Support mechanisms to gather and record evidence on human rights violations committed by perpetrators on all sides of the Syrian conflict

### Engagement description
The IIIM collects and analyses information and evidence of international crimes committed in Syria to assist criminal proceedings in national, regional or international courts or tribunals that have or may in the future have jurisdiction over these crimes. By pursuing its mandate, the IIIM seeks to support accountability processes aimed at bringing perpetrators to justice for the victims of serious international crimes committed in Syria since March 2011.

### Previous support
Denmark agreed to contribute 7.65 million DKK between July 2017 and December 2018 to support IIIM’s work.

### Implementing partner
UNDP Integrated Reconciliation Project (IRP) (MFA funding)

### Danish contribution
DKK 18 million

### Project period
1 January – 31 December 2019

### Other donors
Germany

### Activity objective (output to overall programme results framework)
Increasing public awareness of the needs and possibilities for reconciliation and transitional justice, and enhancing social cohesion in targeted communities, as well as ensuring higher levels of trust between these communities and the national Baghdad leadership. Ensuring that national reconciliation mechanisms address civic concerns, and that constitutional review processes consult the broader Iraqi public.

### Project description
The UNDP's IRP aims to support the National Reconciliation Commission at the national level while simultaneously establishing Local Peace Committees (LPCs) at the local level to support community-based reconciliation. LPCs serve as a venue to develop civic-driven agendas for reconciliation, including early warning, conflict resolution, transitional justice and development prioritisation. It is focusing on including women and youth.

### Previous support
IRP falls under the UNDP’s Resilience and Recovery Programme (RRP) number two peacebuilding pillar. IRP receives funding from Germany and Denmark. They are discussing with the Canada and Australia. UNDP have $3 million for IRP through the end of 2018 and are seeking to double that amount next year.

### 4.5 Thematic Area B: Resilience and Recovery

**TA-B Objective:** In Syria and Iraq, moderate actors capable to provide an alternative to extremism are better able to provide essential and life-saving services and bolstering community resilience.

TA-B aims to strengthen the resilience of local communities to mitigate negative impacts from the conflict through addressing the most urgent life-saving needs of Syrian and Iraqi communities including UXO/mine clearance, critical infrastructure repairs and supporting the resumption of service delivery. The aim of these efforts is to prevent those areas from falling (back) into the hands of violent extremist or criminal groups and enabling communities to remain in place and displaced populations to return. The continued need to minimise human suffering stemming from the on-going conflict in Syria requires efforts to deal with the immediate effects of the war, including from aerial bombardment, battles fought
in and over densely populated urban centres, widespread IEDs, UXOs\textsuperscript{6} and mine contamination. Further, the shifting patterns of control in Syria occasionally create pockets of stability where early recovery work can commence to address the collateral negative impact of the conflict though the potential complete take-over of all Syrian territory of the regime will expectedly make such pockets harder to identify, access and support.

The level of destruction in major urban centres in Iraq is incomprehensible and rehabilitation of towns in the Salah Ad-Din and Diyala governorates, as well as in the governorates of Anbar (including Ramadi), Kirkuk, and Ninawa (including Mosul), will take decades and cost billions of dollars. Critical to the success of this effort is the level of local support. There is also an uneven level of commitment to these efforts at the local level, with some governates like Anbar being more progressive. The proliferation of IEDs and UXOs constitutes a severe risk and undermines the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure such as water, sanitation, electricity and roads. The recuperation of such critical infrastructure represents important early peace dividends, which can help solidify the Iraqi people’s hope for the future and serve as a prerequisite for the eventual resumption of social service delivery.

While the operational space for engagements in Syria is decreasing due to regime advances, areas not fully controlled by the regime will continue to be supported to the extent possible. The support will alleviate the immediate war-related suffering by providing emergency response and basic services to the population. Liberated areas in Iraq must also be supported to enable peace dividends to emerge creating resilience against violent extremist ideologies. A safe and enabling environment for recovery and reconstruction is also a prerequisite for the safe return of IDPs and refugees, while also creating conditions that can sustain the estimated 250,000 to 500,000 IDPs who are not envisaged to return anytime soon.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IF</th>
<th>THEN</th>
<th>Engagement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| IF the basic needs of the Syrian and Iraqi population are met including UXO/mine clearance, critical infrastructure repairs and civil defence | The resilience of communities is strengthened, which help prevent those areas from falling (back) into the hands of violent extremist groups or, in Syria, collapse under the duress and regime pressure - thus enabling communities to persevere, allowing displaced populations to return, and capacitating partners and institutions Denmark can work with also in the longer run. | Tetra Tech (Syria)  
UNMAS (Iraq)  
Janus (Iraq)  
Civil Defence (Syria) |

**Assumptions** underpinning TA-B in Syria include that the SRTF, the White Helmet and Tetra Tech all continue to be able to operate inside Syria and that SRTF’s board is able to reach consensus on new activities / areas in Syria. Civil defence, UXO and mine clearance activities depend on access and a permissible local context. In Iraq, stabilisation efforts need to find a new form and function following the defeat of Da’esh. At the time of writing, it is not clear whether the Recovery and Resilience program (RRP) would eventually provide a suitable platform for stabilisation efforts and/or a suitable multi-partner platform under which to integrate all UN engagements in Iraq. Across the board, TA-B assumes that activities should be measurable and monitorable through the PSF monitoring and reporting framework

**Envisioned engagements**

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\textsuperscript{6} Improvised Explosive Devises and Unexploded Ordinances
The operational space in Syria has been shrinking as the regime has gained territorial control and as the opposition in some areas has lost control to violent extremist groups. The political dynamics between regional and global players further necessitates a cautious approach to engage in stabilisation efforts in Syria. The SRTF supports the provision of basic services to Syrian populations in areas not controlled by the regime through moderate civil society organisations and local level structures. The SRTF comprises a very broad donor platform, including its host countries Turkey and Jordan, which on the one hand secures the SRTF’s widespread legitimacy while, on the other hand, results in certain limitations to its geographical operational space due to diverging donor interests.

In many parts of Syria stabilisation and recovery activities are effectively impossible in the current situation, and interventions are constrained to focus exclusively on limiting the extent of the destruction associated with regime attacks and other armed conflicts. One urgent priority is clearing UXOs and IEDs in areas liberated from Da’esh and areas that have seen heavy fighting where people live or attempt to return. The level of access and the nature of activities needed in each area necessitates work on mine clearance agents in Syria, a line of effort which will be implemented via a delegated partnership with the US Department of State (DoS) for mine clearance activities in Eastern Syria by Tetra Tech or other relevant actors.

In other areas where fighting is on-going, the White Helmets as the only actor serving as a first responder across most non-regime-controlled parts of Syria, are supported, through the NGO Mayday Rescue. Mayday Rescue is an organisation set up as a remote support entity focusing on resource mobilisation, management and capacity building for front line staff. This will be done in support of the White Helmets’ life-saving activities, which include rescue, fire-fighting, utility restoration and ambulance services.

In Iraq, resilience and recovery is profoundly dependent on the ability of the Iraqi population to return to their homes in areas previously controlled by Da’esh to start rebuilding their lives. In addition to the devastation caused by the military campaign against and by Da’esh, when faced with defeat, Da’esh strove to leave as much destruction as possible in its wake, meaning that IED contamination, including in private houses, is widespread. The World Bank estimates that 130,000 residential buildings have some form of explosive hazard contamination. The basic infrastructure needed to sustain day-to-day life has also been destroyed at an unprecedented scale. In addition, there are also numerous challenges, especially to clearing homes due to liability concerns and how to prioritize clearance without exacerbating communal conflict. The GOI has also put limitations on foreign operators destroying ordnance stockpiles, importing technical equipment and receiving accreditation. Therefore, the future PSP focuses on UXO and IED clearance which, to be effective, requires a range of approaches and modalities ranging from armed teams with highly specialised capacities to clear purposely planted, sophisticated IEDs to general UXO risk education.

This programme will retain partnership with UNMAS, which is building the capacity of Iraqi demining agencies and is the major institutional actor working on most aspects of mine clearance. To complement UNMAS’s efforts and support home clearance, this programme will support activities by Janus, a company specialised in complex mine clearance, through a delegated partnership with US DoS. Janus operates in different areas (mainly Ramadi and West Mosul) than UNMAS, working in close cooperation with the Coalition forces and can, where needed, operate from Coalition bases. UNMAS’s programme is also specifically focussing on mine-risk education amongst affected female populations in liberated provinces, with a focus on training women to recognise, warn and report any EOD risks. They have also trained 25 female first responders. Data disaggregated by gender also shows a near equal split of male-to-female beneficiaries from the programme.

To support broader stabilisation and recovery efforts in Iraq, this programme will continue to fund the UNDP’s FFS. The FFS mechanism has been extended to 2020 and provides support for the safe return of IDPs to liberated areas through light infrastructure rehabilitation, small-scale reconciliation, support to local administration, microcredit and cash-for-work schemes. This programme will monitor discussions within the FFS around a potential expansion to work in Southern Iraq. Separately, discussions
are also taking place for a UN-wide RRP which would be set up to focus on recovery—including economic recovery—and social efforts, such as youth unemployment. At the time of writing, the nature of this transition is being evolved, and it is envisaged that the two programmes will run concurrently for an undetermined period.

### 4.5.1 Overview of TA-B Engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing partner</th>
<th>Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF); KfW (trustee) and the SRTF’s Management Committee and Management Unit. (MFA funding)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danish contribution</td>
<td>DKK 20 million in 2019 and 2020 when the recovery needs are expected to be at their highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project period</td>
<td>2019-2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors</td>
<td>Germany, UAE, USA, Sweden, Finland, Japan, UK, Kuwait, France, Italy, The Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity objective (output to overall programme results framework)</td>
<td>The most urgent life-saving needs of the Syrian and Iraqi population are met including UXO/mine clearance, critical infrastructure repairs and supporting the resumption of service delivery to strengthen the resilience of communities to minimise the negative impact of the conflict. To prevent those areas from falling (back) into the hands of violent extremist groups or collapse under the duress while enabling communities to persevere and displaced populations to return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement description</td>
<td>The Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF) supports the provision of basic services to Syrian populations in areas not controlled by the regime through moderate civil society organisations and local level structures. It aims to boost the legitimacy of the opposition with whom it works through supporting essential services, including food security, primary health centres, water and electricity. SRTF’s focus has shifted from infrastructure recovery towards stabilisation in response to conflict developments in Syria and to bridge the gap between disaster response and recovery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous support</td>
<td>In the 2016-2018 programme, Denmark committed DKK 20 million to the SRTF focussed on critical infrastructure rehabilitation provided in opposition-held areas of Syria. Previously, Denmark committed its first contribution to SRTF (DKK 25 million) in August 2013 and a further contribution in 2014 (DKK 25 million), followed by DKK 13 million in 2015-16.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing partner</th>
<th>UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) (MFA and MoD funding)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danish contribution</td>
<td>DKK 73 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project period</td>
<td>2019-2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors</td>
<td>Australia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Portugal, Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity objective (output to overall programme results framework)</td>
<td>A nationally led response to threat of explosive hazards operations efficiently and effectively, including providing emergency response in areas prioritised for stabilisation, the removal of identified explosive hazards including IEDs, in response to UN stabilisation priorities, the provision of technical advice to national / regional authorities, and risk education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement description</td>
<td>UNMAS is the major institutional actor working on many aspects of mine clearance (except the home clearance and stockpile management) and is likely to remain in Iraq for the long haul. UNMAS is building the capacity of the Iraqi Demining Agency and engages in all aspects of demining work from mine risk education to complex mine clearance. Its strategic priorities moving forward include strategic communications and the training of women on mine risk education.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNMAS expressed appreciation for Danish funding and the flexibility to use that funding where most needed. The Danish contribution was of DKK 48m in 2017. UNMAS currently has $216 million but needs a further estimated funding input of $166 million in 2018. A top priority is more funding to clear Sinjar.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing partner</th>
<th>Mayday Rescue/White Helmets (MFA funding)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danish contribution</td>
<td>DKK 10 million in 2019 and DKK 5 million in 2020 and 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project period</td>
<td>2019-2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors</td>
<td>Germany, UK, Netherlands, Canada, US (direct support to White Helmets beyond Mayday)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Activity objective (output to overall programme results framework)**

In areas of Syria where fighting is on-going, The White Helmets is the only actor serving as a first responder across most non-regime-controlled parts of Syria. Teams responded daily to urgent civilian needs by delivering essential services such as rescue, fire-fighting, utility restoration and ambulance services. The White Helmets is recognised as a credible, effective, and legitimate organisation delivering essential services such as rescue, fire-fighting, utility restoration and ambulance services.

**Engagement description**

The White Helmets is at the time of writing under tremendous pressure and threat as the fall of Idlib seems inevitable rendering most of Syria inaccessible, or only partly accessible, to the White Helmets. The engagement with the White Helmets will therefore need to be developed once its future is more certain and the organization has responded to the new operational realities.

**Previous support**

In March 2016, SCD started deploying unexploded ordnance (UXO) teams and, with previous Danish funds, it developed a Chemical Survey capability. At the operational level, increased challenges during 2015 with crossing the border into Syria from Turkey led Mayday and SCD to adopt a Training of Trainers approach through which SCD personnel are now trained through five training centres inside Syria, contributing to SCD sustainability. Under the previous program, Mayday received DKK 60 million.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing partner</th>
<th>Janus (MFA funding)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danish contribution</td>
<td>DKK 19,5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project period</td>
<td>2019 – 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors</td>
<td>USG (DOS/PM/WRA), Germany, Canada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Activity objective (output to overall programme results framework)**

The most urgent life-saving needs of the Syrian and Iraqi population are met including UXO/mine clearance, paving the way for light rehabilitation support and contributing to refugee return.

**Engagement description**

To complement and reinforce UNMAS efforts in Iraq, this programme will continue engagement with Janus, a company specialised in complex mine clearance, through a delegated partnership with the US Department of State (DoS). Janus operates in different areas than UNMAS and works in close cooperation with the Coalition forces and can, where needed, operate from Coalition bases.

**Previous support**
### Implementing partner
Tetra Tech (MFA funding)

### Danish contribution
DKK 45 million

### Project period
2019-2021

### Other donors
U.S. Department of State

### Activity objective (output to overall programme results framework)
The most urgent life-saving needs of the Syrian and Iraqi population are met including UXO/mine clearance, paving the way for light rehabilitation support and contributing to refugee return.

### Engagement description
The Department of State has established a mechanism to finance the survey, marking and removal of explosive hazards from habitable sections and critical infrastructure in areas of northeast Syria liberated from ISIL control, while simultaneously developing and training a Syrian national capacity according to international mine action standards (IMAS). The Danish support will be channelled via a Funding Agreement with the Department of State to support the demining project in Manbij, Raqqa and Tabqah, which will be implemented by the demining company Tetra Tech in partnership with the American authorities and operations in Syria.

### Previous support
Denmark’s current contribution to this project consists of DKK 30 million within the period from June 2018 to December 2018.

### Implementing partner
UN Funding Facility for Stabilisation (Iraq) (MFA funding)

### Danish contribution
DKK 50 million

### Project period
2019 until 2020, after which point the programme is expected to close.

### Other donors
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, Turkey, the UAE, United States and United Kingdom.

### Activity objective (output to overall programme results framework)
Conditions improved for the safe return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in newly liberated areas. (UNDP programme Outcome). This is carried out through assessments to identify the immediate stabilisation needs of liberated areas; the rehabilitation of light infrastructure; livelihoods support to jumpstart the local economy and generate income; technical support to GOI to build local capacity to facilitate stabilisation; and, designing and implementing community reconciliation and dialogue initiatives.

### Engagement description
The UNDP-led FFS provides support for the safe return of internally displaced persons in areas liberated from Da’esh in Iraq through light infrastructure rehabilitation, small-scale reconciliation, support to local administration, microcredit and cash-for-work schemes, and more recently reconciliation. By supporting state delivered critical public services the expected impact of the FFS is that the economic marginalisation of people in the liberated areas will decrease, thereby bolstering the Iraqi society against radicalisation and extremism.

### Previous support
The FFS program began in 2015 with funding from USAID. It has grown into a $850 million program, with new inputs from the Dutch (20 million Euros) and the US ($26 million for West Mosul). They are currently in negotiations with the Germans. The Danish FFES “quality assurance note” from October 2017 recommended an inception review of Denmark’s funding to the FFES. This review is currently in process.

### 4.6 Thematic Area C: Security Governance
TA-C Objective: Iraq and Syria are supported to be more secure, safe and inclusive.

TA-C aims to support capacity building and critical reforms within the security sector in Iraq as well as efforts to counter and prevent violent extremism in the aftermath of Da’esh in the country. Although this TA currently only applies in Iraq, it will be reviewed for relevance to Syria if the context evolves and conditions allow.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) has been publicly supported by senior political leaders as a fundamental priority of the outgoing Iraqi government in terms of rebuilding social contracts and ensuring longer-term stability in Iraq. The government has shown initial willingness to reform through the adoption of the National Security Strategy and, subsequently, the National Security Sector Reform Programme, which includes an integrated objective to countering terrorism and violent extremism. However, reforming the Iraqi security sector will require both political leadership and assertiveness by post-election political leaders. This will include some very hard decisions along the way, including, but not limited to; 1) finding a durable solution to the issue of how to re-establish the GoI’s monopoly on the use of armed force vis-à-vis the PMUs; 2) right-sizing the national security forces, based on what the country needs and can afford to budget; 3) ensuring stronger democratic oversight and control; and 4) capacity building of police forces in order to strengthen the social contract.

Another critical priority for post-Da’esh Iraq, and one of the two main priorities in Iraq’s National Security Strategy, is to ensure that violent extremism, whether in the guise of Da’esh or other extremist groups, is prevented and countered. Sunni insurgencies have mainly been fuelled by widespread post-Saddam Hussein marginalisation and discrimination, while violent Shi’a extremism has been fuelled by external influences, reference to past grievances, and distrust in the political establishment and the intentions of international actors. Building the capacity of Iraqi stakeholders to engage effectively in P/CVE efforts is a prerequisite for sustaining peace and stability and will require efforts at many levels. These efforts include effective security and intelligence capabilities as well as the ability of stakeholders at all levels to detect and handle emerging violent extremism. It will also involve addressing the root causes of violent extremism and the way in which violent extremist groups use these root causes to their advantage.

### TA-C Theory of Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IF</th>
<th>THEN</th>
<th>Engagement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the formal Iraqi Security Forces, including both police and military, are capacitated and all major militias are formally integrated into an accountable and responsive security architecture under civilian oversight and in accordance with human rights</td>
<td>The Iraqi people, regardless of sectarian and socio-cultural belonging, will not only experience growing confidence in the ability of the security forces to effectively control the Iraqi territory but growing trust in the security forces as a legitimate and responsible custodian of the state’s monopoly on violence (Link to Output 3.1)</td>
<td>UNDP SSR (Iraq)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And IF</td>
<td>And</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi actors at all levels are capacitated to detect and respond to violent extremism through preventive, as well as reactive measures spanning intelligence capabilities and whole-of-society efforts particularly at the local level</td>
<td>the risk of violent extremist groups once more becoming a critical national security threat is reduced and the remnants of Da’esh’s “infrastructure,” including its financing networks, can be eliminated. (Link to Output 3.2)</td>
<td>Tansiq (Iraq)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assumptions** underpinning Thematic Area C include the supposition that the Iraqi government will, after the elections, commit to security sector reform and will seek to draw on international partners in
the process. The assumption forms the onset of the PSP is that legitimate partners cannot be identified in Syria but that this may change over the course of the program.

**Envisioned engagements**

UNDP has taken the lead on coordinating international support for SSR in Iraq, and the program has been assessed as being well designed and the most effective mechanism for supporting Iraqi efforts in this regard. This programme will support the UNDP’s work while constantly assessing the willingness and ability of the Iraqi government to implement the needed changes under the National Security Sector Reform Programme. A possible military advisor could be deployed to UNDP’s SSR programme to assist the Office of The National Security Advisor in coordinating international efforts on SSR in Iraq if a relevant military assignment is identified. Such a deployment would complement the Danish senior police advisor (currently deployed) to UNDP's SSR programme to assist the Office of The National Security Advisor in coordinating international efforts on SSR in Iraq will continue in the new phase and potentially align with plans to include future Danish police training under UNDP’s SSR program.

Separately, the programme’s SSR support will be bolstered by Denmark’s contribution to the coming new NATO mission in Iraq with the deployment of up to 15 military advisors/trainers in addition to the IT and communications personnel who have already been deployed to the mission, financed by the MoD budget for international operations. This deployment will aim to develop military capabilities as well as the effective management of the Iraqi Armed Forces. These deployments will accompany and, most likely, eventually replace other Danish military engagements currently provided under the Coalition umbrella.

Finally, Denmark’s contribution to countering violent extremism will include support to strengthen the capacity of various Iraqi security and intelligence services to collaborate on countering violent extremism in accordance with human right-compliant norms. The programme will therefore support the EU-funded program, Tansiq, which is focused on strengthening the coordination capacity of intelligence agencies. In light of current developments in Iraq, such possible engagements related to further support to the security sector or reconciliation initiatives Iraq could be further explored in collaboration with PET and the Ministry of Justice. Support to Tansiq would seek to leverage synergies with current support to UNODC's Terrorism Prevention Branch under the Danish regional CVE program.

### 4.6.1 Overview of TP3 Engagements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing partner</th>
<th>UNDP SSR (MFA funding)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danish contribution</td>
<td>DKK 27 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project period</td>
<td>2019 -2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors</td>
<td>UK, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity objective (output to overall programme results framework)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement description</td>
<td>The UNDP leads the SSR donor coordination process in a programme of effort that works on three specific outputs: 1) Establishing and implementing under one central GoI framework (within the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) an implementation model for the National SSR Programme, 2) Developing and implementing a civilian and local policing roadmap to address local-level public security and criminal-justice requirements, and 3) Supporting civil society and parliament’s Security and Defence Committee to play an active role in oversight of security sector governance in Iraq. The UNDP will continue to coordinate this cross-donor piece, and directly implement elements (2) and (3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous support</td>
<td>Grant of DKK 11.3 million paid on 25 December 2017 to cover the period of 18 December 2017 to 31 December 2018.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing partner</td>
<td>Project Tansiq (EU managed, implemented by Crown Agents, Aktis) (MFA and MoD funding)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish contribution</td>
<td>DKK 9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project period</td>
<td>2019-2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors</td>
<td>The European Union</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Activity objective (output to overall programme results framework)

Iraqi actors at all levels are capacitated to detect and respond to violent extremism through preventive as well as reactive measures spanning intelligence capabilities and whole-of-government efforts particularly at the local level.

### Engagement description

The EU program, Tansiq, funded under the EU Foreign Policy Instrument and reporting to EU HR / VP Mogherini is currently focused on, within a human-rights bases approach, capacity development of the domestic military and civilian intelligence services as well as strengthening their capacity to coordinate, share information and align their activities. The program seeks to draw on intelligence capacities from partner countries, and it could be explored with the Ministry of Justice whether Danish support is able to go beyond financial support to include the deployment of senior advisors from the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), which Tansiq personnel have expressed an interest in. Support to Tansiq would seek to leverage synergies with current support to UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch under the Danish regional CVE program.

### Previous support

Not previously supported.
5 Overview of Management Set up

5.1 Management modalities

The PSP will be implemented in accordance with the PSF Guidelines. A broad range of stakeholders, including the Danish military and police as well as several offices across the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have an active role in managing the PSP for Syria and Iraq. Defence Command Denmark is responsible for the implementation of defence-related engagements (which currently sit outside the scope of this PSP), while police advisors seconded to the programme report to the National Police and keep the Ministry of Foreign Affairs closely informed. The ambition is that all partners actively share information and knowledge with a view to enhance coherence, pursue synergies and collectively address challenges through the MFA MENA department, supported by the stabilisation advisors based in Istanbul.

The PSP is cognisant of the programme’s administrative resource constraints and consequently seeks to combine engagements with a potential for a strong Danish footprint in terms of influence, interest and visibility with implementation modalities, which impose the least possible administrative burden on the program staff. Such modalities include delegated partnership agreements as well as multi-partner and multilateral implementation mechanisms. All engagements except from three (Baytna and The Day After) utilise either joint (pooled) and/or delegated cooperation arrangements with well-established partners (mostly with United States government and United Nations agencies). Specifically, in the Syrian context of remote programme implementation, the programme considered direct awards to trusted partners to be the most appropriate procurement process; this, coupled with close programme oversight by the Stabilisation Advisor, Syria, would limit programmatic risk.

5.2 Programme oversight and management

5.2.1 Programme and Financial Management

An Inter-Ministerial Peace and Stabilisation Fund Steering Committee, which includes the Danish Prime Minister’s Office, MFA, MoD and Ministry of Justice will continue to provide a strategic forum for discussion, oversee the program, and approving any major changes to it. The MFA and the MoD provides the funding, are the main drivers of the Committee, and the Chairmanship alternates between the two.

The MENA Department of the MFA will be responsible for setting overall direction and form the primary point of contact, through which other ministries and departments, such as the MoD and MoJ, will liaise with and feed into the programme. The Danish Ambassador to Iraq will play a key role serving as the political interface of the programme vis-à-vis the Iraq-focussed programme elements of the programme. The programme will further benefit from the activities of the Special Representative for the Syrian Crisis (funded separately) who will maintain regular contact with the Syria Stabilisation Advisor and the MENA department.

The MENA Department is supported by three stabilisation advisors currently based in Istanbul handling the day-to-day management of the programme in Iraq and Syria (including a Programme Officer), and with support from the Danish Special Representative for the Syria Crisis and the Danish Embassy in Beirut, which assists in covering programme-related discussions taking place in Lebanon and Jordan. The stabilisation advisors will be key to monitoring the programme’s relevance and effectiveness, liaising with partners, and keeping abreast of political developments.

Throughout the conflict, Denmark has maintained its embassy in Damascus, however, with no diplomatic staff posted since 2012. The Danish Embassy in Beirut conducts frequent visits to Damascus. The travels of the advisory team in are governed by a security plan developed in partnership with the MFA security department. In Baghdad, the Advisor will draw upon existing arrangements with Control Risks and travels to Syria, if eventually possible, will need to be assessed and the subject of separate security arrangements.
Funds managed by the MFA will adhere to the general guidelines for accounting and auditing, including the General Guidelines for Accounting and Auditing of Grants Channelled through Multilateral Organisations and General Guidelines for Accounting and Auditing of Grants Channelled through National NGO’s.

Independent reviews and audits are undertaken of the fund as per fund guidelines.

5.3 Implementation plan

The programme will commence in January 2019 and is due to run until December 2021 (36 months). The programme is based on a range of documentation, including:

- This overall programme document, providing its rationale, budget, management framework etc.
- A number of Peace and Stabilisation Engagement Documents (PSEDs), one for each engagement. Each PSED will have only one partner (a PSED has been developed for SNHR even though Baytna serves as the recipient of funds); in most cases this will be the implementing partner but in cases where delegated cooperation is being used, the partner will be the donor that will be managing the engagement on behalf of Denmark. In each case, the PSED will set out the main purpose, expected results, monitoring and reporting arrangements, and financial commitment expected.
- A funding agreement (or MOU or Delegated Cooperation Agreement) with the implementing partner concerned.
- Project documentation, being the project document and any other material that relates to actual implementation from the implementing partner.

Given that the majority of the engagements are extensions of previous support, the effect should be one of a seamless Danish contribution through which the new resources made available come on-stream when there is a need for further contributions to the relevant budgets. Disbursement patterns take into account the relative size and disbursement of the most recent Danish contributions.

At the time of programme finalisation (September 2018), a number of the engagements are in a state of reorientation, particularly Syria’s Baytna programme. There is also a risk that programmes which currently operate within Syria—such as Tetra Tech, the White Helmets, and SRTF—may no longer be able to operate effectively if the Syrian regime accelerates its gains. These risks and uncertainty will be reviewed in the programme’s midterm review. Given that the Baytna and TDA PSEDs extend only into August 2019, there will be the opportunity to review programme design and their relevance into context.

A PSED finalisation timeline (Annex 9) provides an overview of timeframes for implementation of the PSEDs (some PSEDs are due to expire in August 2019 and will require a refresh, and others will be finalised and implemented after programme approval).

To ensure the programme’s continued adaptability and responsiveness to context, the programme will have an internal programme follow-up committee comprising interested representatives from the MFA, MoD and others to monitor and review possible developments and provide feedback to the MFA / PSF Steering / Programme Committee. This mechanism will revolve around the following elements:

- The MENA department will be responsible for overseeing progress reports, and will have responsibility for compiling and consolidating reporting.
- The regional Stabilisation Advisors will be the primary day-to-day points of contact with partners and other donors, with responsibility for six-monthly progress reports, which are to be submitted to the MENA department. These reports will be drawn or supplemented by regular reporting
from partners, the third-party monitoring mechanisms that exist, and by discussion/decisions taken in the various management boards.

- The MENA Department (consulting the MoD and MoJ) as necessary provide policy guidance and keep the PSF Steering Committee informed. Decisions are taken in the PSF as required.
- Major shifts on the ground constraining or altering the feasibility of the programme (most likely in Syria) will require a separate dedicated process to re-calibrate the programme including terminating or altering one or more engagements.
- External advice/input is sought as necessary (short-term consultancies) and lessons learned processes supported by the programme budget.
- The MTR is utilised as a mechanism for a strategic review of the programme at the approximate (and most appropriate) mid-point. Moreover, and in order to ensure flexibility and responsiveness, the programme will commission regular reviews of risks and assumptions through utilising unallocated funds for the purposes of regular technical reviews.

Technical reviews at engagement level (bilaterally or together with other donors) will be utilised where necessary to ensure that engagements remain on track.

### 5.4 Understanding, managing and mitigating risk

The broad nature of projects being implemented by this programme in Syria and Iraq brings a variety of attendant risks. Many of these risks are inherent to the complex and rapidly-evolving environments, politically and militarily, in Syria and Iraq, and some can be offset by the regional approach to project implementation. This Programme’s duration, while enabling Denmark to commit resources strategically, poses significant delivery risks and the possibility that individual activities or entire thematic objectives of the programme may not be achieved or may be redesigned over the course of this programme.

Monitoring of engagements implemented under Danish funding in Iraq and Syria, however, presents a special challenge, as access to the field is often difficult or not possible at all due to security risks. Accordingly, monitoring of will often rely on second or party monitoring thus increasing programmatic and institutional risk. Given the elevated risks associated with stabilisation assistance in Syria and Iraq, the Danish MFA pursues an active risk management and mitigation approach.

- In the field, stabilisation advisors closely monitor programme implementation in accordance with the risk management framework and Theory of Change assumptions, reporting back on these regularly. This is done by working closely with implementing partners to oversee delivery and maintaining an updated analysis of conditions on the ground in both countries to inform risk management approaches.
- The Danish MFA’s MENA department also places an added emphasis on and attention to risk management within its operations and headquarters-level oversight of the PSP.

As indicated by the mid-term review of the 2016-2018 programme, given the size of and complexity of such a programme it is anticipated that certain cases might emerge relating to corruption or misappropriation of funds. The issue of mismanagement and corruption will therefore be actively managed by the regional Stabilisation Advisors through dialogue with partners, and they will also ensure that cases are registered and reported immediately, in line with The Guidelines for Danish Development Assistance which require any suspected corruption cases to be reported immediately.

Please consult Annex 4 for further detail on the risk management process.

### 5.5 Reporting, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms
The mid-term review of the past PSP mid-2017 found that the main area of weakness in the programme was on the reporting side; especially results reporting, which the review found could be substantially improved. To facilitate results reporting clear outputs and outcomes will be established based on log-frames of implementing partners (further iterations of which will particularly need to be developed with SNHR). Efforts have been made and capacities put in place to enhance reporting, which should be a continued focus area for the PSP. The mid-term review found that reporting, particularly at the thematic area level linked to the Theory of Change, could be strengthened.

Once PSEDs are iterated and / or finalised (per the timeline outlined in Annex 9), they will undergo a desk review by SSP/KFU.

All implementing partners will provide regular monitoring of engagement implementation and will be in regular contact with actors on the ground in the two countries. The partners will provide Denmark (either directly or via the delegated cooperation partners) with written narrative and financial reporting, normally on a quarterly basis. Narrative reporting will include reporting against the results frameworks set out in the PSEDs and their project documents. The semi-annual programme level reporting should be seen as an opportunity to generate solid reporting, which looks across the engagements and reports against the PSP’s thematic areas theory of change.

Several Syria engagements, such as SRTF and Mayday/the White Helmets, draw on Third Party Monitoring arrangements supported by donors individually or collectively, to which Denmark has and is expected to continue having access. It will be key to consider how Third Party Monitoring can continue to be funded and coordinated and how coherence can be ensured across engagements if, for example, similar geographical areas or beneficiaries are monitored.

In order to ensure flexibility and responsiveness, the programme will commission regular reviews of risks and assumptions through utilising unallocated funds for the purposes of regular technical reviews. These technical reviews provide an important tool to assess the technical aspects of the programme, such as its theory of change, assumptions, results frameworks and specific PSEDs. The pool of unallocated funding imbues the programme with flexibility to pursue such technical reviews.

A challenge across the PSP is that the programme attempts to contribute to wide-ranging and long-term impacts with many engagements involving other donors with Denmark as a relatively small contributor. The programme and engagement results framework have been adjusted to reflect this.

The PSP’s approach to monitoring and reporting is to:

- Monitor the impact indicators specified under each thematic programme through written reporting from the implementing partners;
- Report on results at the engagement level, acknowledging dependence on implementing partners’ own interest and capacity for assessing and attributing impacts;
- Maintain support for implementing partners to invest in outcome and impact monitoring;
- Review and update engagement documents as required by circumstances. This process will occur during the MTR if possible or ad hoc when needed.
- Conduct a Mid-term Review led by MENA with support from KFU, and MOD/DCD participation.

Please also consult Annex 7 on for further information on reporting, monitoring and evaluation considerations.

5.5.4 Role of Stabilisation Advisors in Monitoring

The programme will utilise the PSF reporting formats and procedures in the new PSF guidelines to ensure compliance against the results framework outlined in Section 4, above. These provide management information for the PSF Steering Group on overall programme progress, progress at outcome level for individual engagements, and facilitate a regular assessment of the validity of assumptions and monitoring of risks. This reporting will be led by the Stabilisation Advisors drawing from the results frameworks
developed by partners, ensuring a streamlined reporting system and reducing overall transaction costs. The inputs available from such reporting will also be augmented from other sources, including participation in coordination forums in which MFA and/or the stabilisation advisors participate.

The Stabilisation Advisors will provide close monitoring of the assumptions, risks, challenges and results of this programme, all of which will be crucial to the programme’s success. This will be achieved through close dialogue and regular meetings and engagements with the implementing partners as well as through active participation in all the relevant donor coordination forums.

With the profoundly challenging and dynamic context on the ground in both countries, it is proposed that reviews can be carried out when needed and that the mid-term review scheduled for mid-2020 is capacitated and prepared in such a way that genuine course correction and, possibly, re-programming can be supported drawing on evidence from the ground, with targeted technical reviews taking place before this, as appropriate. Amongst the tasks of the MTR will be to review overall progress being made; assess changes in the context and any changes that need to be made to the programme’s planning assumptions, including scenarios and risks; assess the usefulness of existing third party monitoring and mentoring arrangements; assess the utility of the programme management set up; review and recommend a way ahead for individual engagements.

A budget is allocated to on-going studies and policy analysis to inform programme management, which will inevitably have to respond to significant changes on the ground throughout the programming period in both countries. A mechanism should be identified, which allows programme staff to rapidly commission tailored pieces of analysis and research from think tanks, academics and consultancies (possibly through one big contract with the main Third Party Monitor), to inform changes in the programme without relying on heavy procurement processes.

5.6 Donor coordination

Up until now, the Danish stabilisation work in Iraq has been coordinated under the umbrella of the Coalition through working groups chaired by the Government of Iraq, UNDP and the EU at a Baghdad-level. This may, however, change as a result of a revision to the Coalition’s mandate and the planned deployment of a NATO mission. The Coalition is likely to move ahead with plans to downsize and change its mandate once its objectives have been largely met and its continued presence may be questioned.

Partnership relations have benefited from combining engagement at the political and programmatic levels and across the civilian and military domain and have secured rare levels of access and policy impact. The program will continue prioritize to cultivate and expand strategic partnerships with similar conflict-focussed programming instruments and donors.

The stabilisation advisor for Iraq will remain the focal point for donor coordination focussing on forums of particular relevance and where Danish influence can be obtained. The advisor will travel to Baghdad as necessary and participate in capital level coordination platforms as well.

Donor coordination for engagements in Syria remain scattered - thematically and geographically with discussions unfolding in Istanbul, Gaziantep, Amman, Beirut and outside of the region. The stabilisation advisor for Syria will remain the focal point for donor coordination focussing on forums of relevance and where Danish influence can be obtained.

5.7 Communication of results

A Programme Communication Plan will be developed. The plan will contain multi-pronged communication activities aimed at a variety of audiences including, but not necessarily limited to: decision makers in the focus countries and the region; stakeholders in Denmark, stakeholders/general public in host country/region; thought leaders, i.e. engaging and influencing the expert communities and opinion-makers in the relevant programme areas.
The Communication Plan will build on the ways and modalities that engagement partners use to communicate results. Given the various administrative modalities to be used for the engagements, this plan will build on specific clauses in the respective administrative agreements. For example, UN agencies have their established communication mechanisms, while the final PSEDs with other implementing partners should also specify communication responsibilities. Modalities to be specified may include social media, traditional media, online publishing of reports, workshops public meeting, infographics, etc.

The MENA office will draw on these to, where relevant, respond to specific internal and external communication needs and requests to communicate programme results, for example, related to high level Danish visits or at international summits and conferences etc. Communication activities over and above what is funded at engagement level is budget for under the Management, M&E and Knowledge budget line.

6 Budget

The PSP budget includes commitment of DKK 355 million in Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a non-ODA contribution of DKK 42 million from the Ministry of Defence over the programme period. These engagements have been checked carefully for their compliance with DAC funding criteria. Moreover, in-kind support from the Danish National Police as well as the Ministry of Defence is considered under relevant components.

A sum of on average DDK 12,8 million annually (and possibly increasing in 2020 and 2021 reflecting on-going analysis of expenditure) of the budget will remain unallocated from the onset, allowing the programme to respond with flexibility to emerging needs, i.e. should the crisis in Idlib escalate, or should opportunities to support emerge. Besides sustaining a reserve to address the unexpected, the unallocated funds can be used to increase existing engagements or support new activities that align with existing programme objectives.

<table>
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Please consult Annex 3 for a detailed budget overview.
1. Conflict Analysis – Syria at a critical juncture

The conflict in Syria is at a critical juncture with large swathes of former opposition-held territory now back under Assad-regime control. While short-term prospects for the trajectory of the conflict remain, to some degree, uncertain, the conflict’s drivers and longer-term trajectory are clearer. Primary conflict drivers are detailed in Annex 1 and include, in summary:

- The scale of human suffering in Syria, which remains immense and undermines recovery and development efforts that are critical to stabilising the country; accompanied by an absence of accountability for violations and agreement over transitional justice processes, jeopardizing the sustainability of any future recovery efforts.

- A pursuit by the regime and its allies of a “winner-takes-all” approach as it restores control over remaining opposition-held areas, further perpetuating drivers of opposition to the regime and marginalisation of non-loyalist constituencies.

- A persistent risk of violent extremism, which is perpetuated by low levels of assistance or service delivery and grievances with existing governance structures.

- Significant interference of regional and global actors in Syrian affairs making the prospects of peace depending on dynamics also outside of Syria.

Driver 1: Human suffering continues, undermining recovery and development

The consequences of the war in Syria, in terms of human suffering, are vast and human rights violations are rampant across conflict lines, with limited prospects for accountability or justice on the horizon. These violations are most visible in areas with active fighting but are prevalent across Syria and include summary executions, attacks on civilians, hindrance of the delivery of humanitarian aid, unlawful detention, torture, and the recruitment of child soldiers. As elsewhere, vulnerable groups of civilians, including women and children, have been, and will continue to be, disproportionally negatively impacted by the legacies of the conflict through a pervasive culture of violence and the breakdown of critical services on which children and their caretakers depend.

Conflict continues to be the principal driver of humanitarian needs and migration, with the civilian population in many parts of the country exposed to significant protection risks, which threaten their life, dignity and wellbeing on a daily basis. Of the 5.5 million Syrian refugees worldwide, most of whom remain in neighbouring countries, a very limited number have returned to Syria, and the overall conditions for safe, dignified and sustainable returns are not yet in place in many parts of the country.

The near complete absence of accountability for atrocities and war crimes committed during the conflict threatens to undermine any future peace agreement. Without some form of (transitional) justice for crimes committed, the opposition is unlikely to accept any sort of political settlement with a regime, which has demonstrated its indifference to the indiscriminate use of violence against fellow Syrians. As is often the case, vulnerable groups including women and children suffer disproportionately from the collateral impacts of the crisis and are exposed to a range of conflict-related types violence.
Driver 2: Regime restoring control without initiating meaningful reform

Generally, the territory controlled by the Syrian opposition has been significantly diminished since Russia’s intervention on behalf of the regime in 2015, a trend that accelerated with the fall of Aleppo in December 2016. The regime, with external backing namely from Russia and Iran, is progressing towards extending territorial control. In previously opposition-held areas of Syria where the regime has already restored control, including Aleppo city, the Damascus suburbs, and the South, the regime and its backers have pursued a “winner-takes-all” approach.

This zero-sum approach has favoured loyalist communities with assistance and rebuilding support while exacerbating the original drivers of marginalisation in society that contributed to the outbreak of the 2011 Revolution. Local opposition governance structures have been replaced by loyalist structures that have been slow to restore service provision in these areas. Armed and civilian opposition members, as well as civilian residents, that are deemed ‘irreconcilable’ have been evacuated to opposition-held areas of Syria, while those who remain are often housed in detention centres until they receive security clearances to leave, though often they have no homes to return to. Further, the regime has systematically denied residents of previously opposition-held areas permits to return home. Coupled with the recent passage of Law 10, which allows the state to seize properties whose owners have been absent for over a year and are unable to present proof of ownership in person, the regime’s intent to engineer demographic change and further marginalise communities traditionally aligned with the opposition in a post-conflict Syria appears clear.

Dynamics in areas that return under regime control are often shaped by the surrender arrangements entered into by local stakeholders (primarily in former “de-escalation zones”), as well as local power structures including armed groups, criminal groups, influential families, formal and informal governance structures, religious authorities, and diaspora influencers.

However, as the regime restores administrative control over areas that it has retaken militarily, it appears set to reinstate the Damascus-driven, centralised approach to governance that has been a hallmark of the Ba’ath Party’s rule in Syria for decades. The regime demonstrates little appetite for negotiating local, decentralised governance arrangements, including with Kurdish-majority authorities in areas of north-eastern Syria under the Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) control. Women have very limited presence and influence in these decision-making fora and gains for women during the period of non-regime control are quickly and effectively undermined. Despite the passage of a decentralisation law that officially (if cosmetically) devolves some powers to local authorities and a Russian-backed initiative to draft a new Syrian constitution, the regime’s Damascus-centric governance approach—a key grievance that contributed to the outbreak of the Revolution—seems set to endure in a post-conflict environment.

For this PSP, complete, or near-complete, regime control over all of Syria would mean a significantly different programming context. Most of the Syria-related engagements in the programme would have to be revised, likely with ministerial guidance on matters of policy and acceptable parameters for continued engagement in the country. While the underlying drivers of opposition to the regime remain and have worsened during the conflict, there will likely be intense pressure for the EU to support elements of the reconstruction process as part of an effort to stabilise the country to the point where it can be designated a safe destination for the return of refugees. What also appears clear is that whoever assumes control of the area, be it in the near, mid, or long term, will struggle to demobilise tens of thousands of rebel fighters, including hardcore jihadist militants. Continued insurgency and instability will likely pose a risk to the area’s recovery.

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7 Opposition refers to an evolving collection of moderate armed and civilian groups which oppose both extremist groups, which may also oppose the regime, and the regime itself. The programme only supports these moderate actors.
Driver 3: Persistent risk of violent extremism

In the eastern part of the country, Da’esh has been defeated in all but a sliver of territory along the Syrian-Iraqi border and in the desert region east of Palmyra by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian regime and its allies, respectively. Key cities, including Raqqa and Deir al-Zour, are now liberated but struggling with the legacies of Da’esh’s rule. The scale of destruction is immense, and many residents of liberated areas remain in IDP camps, unable to return home to areas that have either been destroyed or remain riddled with mines and IEDs. Despite the US-led International Coalition’s focus on providing humanitarian and early recovery assistance in liberated areas, the needs dwarf the level of assistance provided so far.

Furthermore, insurgency linked to violent extremist groups poses continued security risks in the region, particularly in the desert areas of eastern Deir al-Zour. Regime forces control most the province’s population centres south of the Euphrates and leverage their connectivity with local tribes, as well as the presence of hard-line Sh’ia militia, to maintain pressure on the SDF along the Euphrates frontline. Threats from Da’esh sleeper cells persist in the region, and factors for continued radicalisation and violent extremism remain in both sides’ areas of control. Improving local perceptions of early recovery is a key priority for preventing the resurgence of violent extremism in the region. Political settlements able to accommodate the needs and wishes of the Sunni Arab-majority populations living in these areas are also critically needed as the status of this community will be decisive for eastern Syria’s future trajectory, especially as it pertains to the risk of resurgent violent extremism. So far, Denmark has not provided assistance beyond de-mining and multi-lateral mechanisms in north-eastern Syria due to the multiple overlapping risk factors involved. Activities in the North East are likely to continue to pertain certain risks and possible engagements will only be supported based on a case-by-case assessment of the risks connected to the specific engagement.

Driver 4: Geopolitical competition perpetuates conflict

Developments on the ground in Syria are also severely impacted by decisions taken outside of the country by stakeholders operating in a complicated web of regional and geopolitical, intertwined and often opposing, interests and positions. Most importantly, Russia’s willingness and capacity to stay engaged with its military support to the regime, as well as to provide diplomatic cover for the regime’s war crimes, is critical in determining the strategies pursued by the regime.

Despite U.S. assertions that it also plans to remain engaged in Syria, alongside members of the Global Coalition and its Syrian partner, the Kurdish-dominated SDF, to prevent a resurgence of violent extremism and counter Iran in the east, doubts over the longevity of Washington’s involvement persist and may drive the Kurds to seek accommodation with Damascus in the mid- to long-term. Any support to SDF-controlled areas is severely contested by Turkey and further tensions with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) make cross-border assistance operations from Iraq complicated. Concerns about possible overreach by Kurdish-aligned governance entities persist in Arab-majority regions under SDF control, further elevating doubts over the sustainability of the status quo in the east.

Regional powers’ interests also play a critical role. Iran is deeply engaged in the country, backing the regime militarily across the country—directly and through proxy militias—and deepening sectarian divisions through propagandizing and cultural engagement. Turkey has demonstrated willingness to influence - also through military means - dynamics along its border through the creation of a buffer zone in the north by positioning troops in parts of Idlib and the Euphrates Shield zone. It has also firmly demonstrated its opposition to a Kurdish-dominated enclave on its border, culminating in their ouster of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) from Afrin and Manbij. Jordan and Israel are also actively involved in promoting their interests in southern Syria, as they are respectively concerned by the potentially rising influence of Sunni extremists and Iranian-backed militias in the context of the regime’s
recent gains against the opposition there. These neighbouring countries could accept full control by the regime in southern Syria in exchange for security guarantees relating to their shared borders, though these guarantees have not been forthcoming from the regime.

Underlying all of these external dynamics lies the fundamental question of whether an overarching “endgame” for the conflict is in sight following the Assad regime’s recent military victories expanding its control over most of “productive Syria” with direct control over the barren desert areas in the South-East considered less important.

External stakeholders continue to pursue opposing and disconnected visions for a political settlement, and the various political processes aimed at generating such a settlement remain stalled at present. Russia will likely seek to reinvigorate the diplomatic process with the goal of re-legitimizing the regime following their parallel push to re-draft the Syrian constitution with a cosmetic array of local stakeholders and promote the return of refugees. The US and likeminded allies, including EU member states, are at the time of writing committed to withhold reconstruction assistance from Syria; this decision will be kept under review throughout the programme implementation period.

2. Conflict Analysis – Iraqi government being formed but major challenges ahead

The Da’esh occupation of large parts of Iraq initiated the latest cycle of political and sectarian bloodletting in Iraq’s brutal history since 2003. It introduced another period of violence and suffering for the Iraqi people, releasing deep scars and legacies, especially in the communities occupied under Da’esh’ self-proclaimed caliphate. Tens of thousands of people have lost their lives and isolated Da’esh attacks still stoke fear. With protests raging in Basra and full government formation yet to be finalised, what social stability existed prior to Da’esh has been largely depleted. The primary conflict drivers include:

- Resurfacing political and sectarian tensions and grab for power, compounded by entrenched rivalries in Baghdad and backed by fragmented Popular Mobilization Unit (PMU). These factors limit the extent to which the country’s political and security elite is able to transition recent gains against Da’esh into a sustainable peace / political settlement, uniting Iraq under one GoI banner.

- The rate of return of large swathes of the Sunni community to their areas of origin is a key factor for social cohesion, preventing a slide back into conflict; livelihoods and adequate access to resources is key to incentivising, and then sustaining, IDP returns.

- Poor governance, which has limited GoI effectiveness and legitimacy, and eroded public trust in government; this includes the perceived and actual corruption, which has—and at the time of writing, continue to—drive protests across the country, and particularly in southern Iraq.

- Regional and geopolitical rivalries, which further undermine government cohesion and effectiveness.

Driver 1: Lack of a sustainable political settlement enabling the government to sustain military gains

Although the fight against Da’esh united large parts of Iraq, the completion of major military operations has renewed old tensions and triggered new ones. The consequences of these political tensions—including first and foremost the Baghdad-Erbil disagreement over the Kurdish referendum and the GOI’s subsequent campaign to reassert control over disputed areas—have already led to armed clashes in Kirkuk, among other places, since Da’esh’s defeat. Real and perceived grievances have been left unaddressed and competition for political influence, including the accompanying financial benefits, continues to be a potential driver of conflict. Rivalry between Sunni and Shi’a and Kurdish factions
continues to play a role in the fragmentation of the Iraqi state, driving societal divisions along religious and tribal lines and challenging genuine state-building efforts, including those related to reforming the security sector. So far, international, national, and local reconciliation efforts have struggled to make progress.

The consequences of the 12 May 2018 Iraqi elections remain hard to predict at the time of writing while the formation of a new government is taking place (some key positions are now filled and the reportedly moderate Adel Abdul Mahdi has been asked to form a government). In the vacuum of a new government, increasingly intense public protests have spread from the city of Basra particularly across the southern parts of the country during the summer of 2018. Growing public resentment concerns first and foremost the insufficient delivery of essential services such as clean water, steady power supply and job creation, the absence of which is often linked to endemic corruption and poor governance. There is an urgent need to make up for the long delay of institutional reforms and to strengthen the judiciary and independent oversight agencies to enhance transparency and accountability. This, however, requires action from both government and parliament, both of which have often served sectarian or individual self-interest and self-preservation to the detriment of the public interest. The growing influence of Iran over some of Iraq’s leading politicians is a threat to GoI independence and the Iranian funded militias’ extrajudicial conduct incites sectarian tensions and undermines the formal actors tasked with delivering jobs, services and security. The degree to which the GoI can control the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) and (re)establish authority over Iraq will be a determining factor for security and improve the effectiveness of the Iraqi state in the eyes of its citizens.

The largely Shi’a-controlled PMUs, which were instrumental in defeating Da’esh constitute a complex patchwork of militias with varying levels of internal command and control and different political masters. Some liaise closely with the leadership in Iran, while others work in closer coordination with the Government of Iraq (GOI). The most militarily capable PMUs are penetrating the political and democratic process in an attempt—so far successful—to trade their military victories into political influence and recognition. With a view of reducing the risk of permanent parallel military structures, demobilisation and/or integration of the non-governmental armed groups into the Iraqi Security Forces is a major challenge for post-Da’esh Iraq. Implementation of key elements of security sector reforms (SSR) is essential in this regard, but at present there are questions and concerns over the level of commitment the current and future iterations of the GOI are willing to commit to SSR.

**Driver 2: Displacement, insecurity and recovery needs**

There are still 1.93m internally displaced people (IDPs) in Iraq; most of them Sunnis who are increasingly marginalised by the Shi’a-dominated Federal Government and the PMUs. Tensions between host communities and IDPs put immense pressure on Iraq’s broken basic service infrastructure, intensifying competition between groups and enabling divisive elite voices to exploit and deepen divisions. The return or resettlement of these people, and an equitable settlement for those who collaborated with extremist groups over the last decade would provide the ground for a more peaceful society on the more equitable distribution of basic services and other resources.

The reconstruction needs after the fight against Da’esh in Iraq are enormous and will take at least 10 years to complete according to recent World Bank analyses. The reconstruction needs span improvised explosive device (IED) and UXO clearance; rebuilding critical infrastructure; restoring housing; revitalising the economy; and reintroducing service delivery infrastructure and systems. At the Kuwait International Conference of Iraq in February 2018, co-chaired by the EU, donors (including regional actors) pledged nearly USD 30 billion to support reconstruction in Iraq against an estimated cost by the Iraqi government of USD 88.2 billion. United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has assessed that IEDs and UXO clearance alone will also take at least 10 years to complete. Vulnerable groups including women and children have been disproportionally negatively impacted by the conflict yet see very limited representation and protection. Quickly and effectively delivering dividends of peace to all Iraqis following the defeat of Da’esh will be critical in demonstrating the government’s ability to support recovery efforts
and definitively shift their loyalty towards the government and formal institutions away from groups trying to undermine the legitimacy of Iraq's democratically elected institutions.

**Driver 3: Poor governance, critical needs and a lack of basic services**

While formal state structures have been established at both national and provincial levels, informal systems of patronage, clientelism, criminal networks, and clan and religious identities continue to be extremely influential, particularly when shaping public policy. Iraqi politics and development cannot be understood without accounting for dynamics in these informal domains. While the current governance vacuum is expectedly temporary, the need for a government, which is inclusive and responsive, is critical in terms of addressing grievances and conflict drivers related to marginalisation, discrimination and exclusion.

The three years of continuous conflict and economic stagnation have impacted nearly every aspect of Iraqi society. The number of displaced persons has fallen to 1.93 million, meaning that a total of four million Iraqis have returned, of whom 97% were able to move back to their homes and communities of origin (albeit often dilapidated). Although returns of displaced populations are thus on-going, some groups remain in a protracted state of displacement due to their real or perceived association with Da’esh or the loss of homes and property. The UN, US and others estimate that somewhere between 220,000 to 500,000 IDPs may never return home. The reason for this primarily revolves around security, especially for minority communities and fear of retribution among those who collaborated with Da’esh. Even for those able to return, Da’esh's extensive use of IEDs will represent a major risk in years to come. According to OCHA, during 2017, some 11 million Iraqis required some form of humanitarian assistance.

With the demise of Da’esh the security situation in Iraq has generally improved—albeit from a starting point—and is expected to continue to do so, which will open potential avenues for economic recovery, peacebuilding and state building. As a middle-income country, domestic resources, as well as loans from IMF, the World Bank and private sector investors, should be able to meet many of the reconstruction needs as well as other recovery and relief efforts, such as continued humanitarian assistance for IDPs. However, the government’s capacity is severely decimated by corruption and poor governance and further, the Iraqi economy remains largely dependent on extractive industries (oil and gas). Alternative revenue-generating sectors have been neglected for decades and there are numerous impediments to establishment of a viable private sector and foreign investment in the non-oil and gas sector.

**Driver 4: A geopolitical landscape which undermines government cohesion and effectiveness**

On the regional and geopolitical scene, Iraq is also caught in a critical transition period. The current US engagement in Iraq is assessed as being modest and current domestic political dynamics in the US makes their future engagement hard to predict. To fill this vacuum Iran remains a key player in Iraq, though its influence must be understood in a context where the Iraqi population is becoming increasingly self-confident and focused on national interests. As a regional power broker, Iran can, on one side, contribute to fuelling division in Iraq and, on the other—committing to a stable Iraq—help bring Iraq's political parties to the table with a view to establishing workable political settlements. Iraqi authorities must therefore be reformed and capacitated to withstand external pressure and ensure their own independence, which is critical in terms of re-establishing trust in public authorities and their commitment to ensuring the public good for all Iraqis.
3. Context Analysis

1. Overall development challenges, opportunities and risks

Briefly summarise the key conclusions from the analyses consulted and their implications for the programme regarding each of the following points:

**General development challenges including poverty, equality/inequality, national development plan/poverty reduction strategy, humanitarian assessment.**

The conflict in Syria has had a devastating impact on the Syrian economy and has destroyed large parts of the building mass, critical infrastructure, service delivery architecture and productive sectors.

More than 500,000 Syrians are estimated to have died and more than 5.5 million Syrians have fled the country. Another 6.2 million people remain displaced internally as of June 2018. According to OCHA, some 13 million people in Syria require humanitarian assistance. Of these, 5.2 million people are in acute need due to a convergence of vulnerabilities resulting from displacement, exposure to hostilities and limited access to basic goods and services. Conflict continues to be the principal driver of humanitarian needs and migration, with the civilian population in many parts of the country exposed to significant protection risks, which threaten their life, dignity and wellbeing on a daily basis. Of the 5.5 million Syrian refugees worldwide, most of whom remain in neighbouring countries, a very limited number have returned to Syria.

In the first five months of 2018, some 760,000 Syrians returned to their communities of origin. While the number of self-organised spontaneous returns has increased from 2017 levels, the overall conditions for safe, dignified and sustainable returns are not yet in place in many parts of the country, and 325,000 people in South-Western Syria alone were newly displaced between June and July of 2018.

In Iraq, more than two million Iraqis remain internally displaced and the damage to infrastructure and the contamination of unexploded ordnances (UXOs) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are immense. Consequently, the trauma left by Da'esh will continue to haunt Iraq for many years to come.

According to OCHA, during 2017, some 11 million Iraqis required some form of humanitarian assistance. Now, close to 1.9 million Iraqis experience food insecurity, 7.3 million people require health care, 5.2 million are in need of protection support, 5.4 million require water and sanitation assistance, and 4.1 million people are in need of shelter. Almost 50% of children displaced in camps do not have access to quality education and 3.2 million children attend school irregularly or not at all. 3.4 million people are currently targeted under OCHA's Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), of which 1.3 million could be reached within the first five months of 2018 (by a total of 105 humanitarian partner organisations), constituting 38% of the target population. Of the 1.3 million people reached, more than 65% were located in Ninewa governorate which has the most substantial humanitarian need. Rapidly shifting from humanitarian response to recovery efforts will be critical in terms of strengthening the Iraqi population's ability to withstand shocks and stresses and undermining the efforts of groups seeking to exploit grievances among underserved and disillusioned communities.

OCHA estimates that up to 4.2 million internally displaced people may need assistance. Of these, 1.1 million are expected to be residents in camps and emergency sites, and 3.1 million to live in host communities. Partners also estimate that 1.9 million returnees will require assistance, including 1.5 million people who are expected to return at some point during the year and 400,000 of the 1.2 million who have already returned home in previous years. At least three million Iraqis living in host communities and 1.4 million Iraqis living in newly retaken areas, including 800,000 people in Mosul city and 600,000 in surrounding areas, are expected to require assistance.

According to the World Bank, Iraq’s economic outlook is expected to improve under the assumption of a more favourable security environment and continued fiscal consolidation. The non-oil economy after three years of contraction was able to rebound in 2017 due to improved security and higher non-oil investment spending. However, overall GDP contracted by 0.8% in 2017 due to a 3.5% reduction in oil production resulting from the November 2016 OPEC+ member agreement. Nonetheless, by August 2018, 3.7 million barrels per day were exported out of Southern Iraq alone.

*Development in key economic indicators: GDP, economic growth, employment, domestic resource mobilisation, etc.*
Syria used to be an economic powerhouse in the region with significant exports of advanced products such as medicine and industrial equipment. The conflict has profoundly disrupted the Syrian business and industrial community as well as the economy as a whole. It will take years, if not decades, to rebuild it. The Syrian business sector in regime-controlled areas is largely, directly or indirectly, intertwined with regime structures often to mutual benefit. In Kurdish controlled areas, businesses operate at the behest of political actors and under the constraints of the Rojava administration's political ideology. In the diminishing opposition-controlled area, the economic sector has suffered tremendously, and business operations often rely on the patronage and protection of local armed groups.

The Syrian economy has contracted dramatically. According to the World Bank, the cumulated loss of the war, in dollar terms, amount to USD 226 billion in 2010 prices, making up a 63% contraction vis-a-vis the Syrian economy in 2016. Most sectors have experienced massive declines in production levels and there has been large job losses, increasing budget deficits as well as a 459% currency depreciation. Capital losses in itself account only for a small proportion (around 5%) of these losses. The decrease in GDP caused by casualties is around the same level, although these effects are more persistent. However, casualties (the increased human insecurity) is the major driver behind two thirds of out-migration from Syria, and these effects are likely to have negative effects on Syrian GDP for many years to come - more so than other channels of economic costs.

The majority of the economic impacts from the conflict have come from the disruptions in economic organisation, including lower total factory productivity and worse labour-capital-matching. It is most likely also due to disrupted value- and supply-chains, intensified rent seeking and higher trade costs, as well as strict international sanctions imposed by the EU and the US. These sanctions have not only caused prices to dramatically increase for fuel, foodstuffs, and medical equipment, but have created fear among international banks and companies who have withdrawn any investment in the country out of fear of large fines. While a large portion of Syria's physical business sector has been destroyed by fighting, remaining plants have been forced to close as increased sanctions have restricted the ability of Syrian companies to access the raw materials needed to maintain production.

Economic incentives, in addition to conflict dynamics, continue to be a primary driver of outward migration from Syria. An eventual recovery process would therefore also need to consider how economic recovery might be achieved without supporting the regime.

Although reliable data on Syria is difficult to come by, estimates put the current GDP at around 73.67 billion USD - a GDP per capita at USD 1,700, but very unequally distributed with 82.5% of the population currently living below poverty line. (IMF). The unemployment rate is estimated to be around 50% (latest known IMF data, from 2017) and the annual GDP growth rate is 9.9% (latest known IMF data, from 2015).

Iraq is a middle-income country with significant oil production. However, war economy dynamics, transnational crime, and illicit money flows remain a key challenge. The GDP in Iraq was USD 171.49 billion in 2016. The latest value for GDP per capita (current USD) in Iraq was USD 4,609.60 as of 2016. The unemployment rate stood at 16% in 2012, with approximately 23% of the population currently living below the poverty line. Recent World Bank numbers suggest that, while portions of the country’s unemployment rates have dropped to 11%, areas most affected by the war against Da'esh are almost twice that at 21%. Notably, unemployment has increased for those between the ages of 25-49 and labour force participation rates for youth, ages 15-24, have dropped markedly since 2014 from 32.5% to 27.4%.

Similar to what is currently being seen in Syria, Iraq's economy was dramatically impacted by the levying of international sanctions that contributed to political and sectarian breakdowns throughout the country. Status and progress in relation to the SDGs, in particular those that are special priorities for Denmark.

Both Iraq and Syria have fallen far behind in their ability to achieve virtually any SDGs due to the conflict and the lack of existing comprehensive measurement mechanisms. In 2017, Iraq’s Ministry of Planning launched the first round of discussions on the National Development Plan of Iraq (NDP) 2018-2022, which reflects the SDGs, and continue to be focused on providing investment in education, healthcare, and basic services, as well as empowering youth, promoting the inclusion of women and vulnerable groups, job creation, and providing support to small business.

The Iraqi Kurdistan Region has shown improvement related to education (SDG 4) and the re-opening of schools in areas previously controlled by Da'esh as well as the establishment of laws and regulations that not only target women's issues and gender mainstreaming (SDG 5) but are also generally compatible with CEDAW. The government of Iraq has also taken steps to partner with UNDP, the Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and...
Energy Efficiency (RCREEE) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to create provisions for clean and renewable energy sources in an effort to sustainably meet the country's energy demand (SDG 7).

It should be noted, however, that while the NDP and additional steps taken throughout the country show promise, progress has been small and, depending upon the tenuous nature of Iraq's overall political stability, look to remain small in the near future. From a gender standpoint, values throughout the country continue to promulgate patriarchal norms and women's access to socioeconomic capital remains limited.

The situation in Syria is not conducive to SDG planning.

**Political economy, including drivers of change (political, institutional, economic) (e.g. political will, CSO space, role of opposition, level of donor funding to regime expenses, level of corruption, foreign investment, remittances, role of diaspora, youth, gender, discovery of natural resources or impact of climate change etc.).**

The political economy in both Syria and Iraq is deeply impacted by the on-going (Syria) and recent (Iraq) conflict.

The war economy in Syria is extensive and has created an entire ecosystem of actors benefiting from the pervasive insecurity and lawlessness. The space for different actors to exercise influence and control varies significantly from area to area. There is very limited space for genuine civil society organisations to operate in regime-controlled Syria; however, such organisations can operate—under a range of constraints—in People's Protection Units (in Kurdish it is YPG)-controlled parts of the country. The thriving civil society and NGO environment, which prospered in the areas controlled by the moderate opposition, has evidently suffered from a loss of territory and influence, although some actors remain active within and outside of Syria.

The political settlement following the Iraqi elections will be the most complicated thus far in Iraq's nascent democratic history. The outcome carries the potential to significantly change the post-Da'esh era—a period in which Iraq will be placed at critical junctures between sectarianism and inclusiveness; centre and periphery; and between elites and the public in general. However, the vast number of political parties and political alliances makes it extremely challenging to predict the outcome of the new government formation. The alliances are seldom based upon common tenets for the future of the country, but rather, aimed to ensure the continued political power of a particular party and individual, many of whom have been part of the ruling political elite since 2003. All of members of the new government so far either hold positions in, or are closely linked to, the outgoing government. The existing delicate power-balance within the government and the broader Shi'a-elite is unlikely to be fundamentally changed by the elections. In other words, the national political context in which the new government will have to manoeuvre will most likely remain unchanged in a short- to medium-term perspective.

Iraq's position as “frontline state” in the regional power struggle and the massive and direct Iranian influence on national politics make Iraq extremely vulnerable to external factors beyond the control of the government of Iraq. The meddling of external powers plays into local power dynamics and divisions, as the US and neighbouring Iran continue to be particularly influential (and conflicting) players. Iran, in particular, will remain a key actor that can, on one side, fuel division in Iraq and, on the other—if deciding to commit to a stable Iraq—also help bring the parties to the table with a view to establish workable political settlements.

With the demise of Da'esh, generally, the situation in Iraq has improved—albeit from a low starting point—and is expected to continue to do so, which will open potential avenues for recovery, peacebuilding and state building. As a middle-income country, domestic resources, as well as loans from IMF, World Bank and private sector investors and others, should be able to cover reconstruction efforts, which are estimated at USD 88.2 billion by the Iraqi government. Currently, the government covers 80% of all costs related to humanitarian assistance, reaching almost two million IDPs. However, high levels of corruption and a bloated public sector—especially due to the size of police and security forces—has drained and distorted public resources. In addition, the Iraqi economy remains dependent on extractive industries (oil and gas) where alternative revenue-generating sectors have been neglected for decades. Therefore, Iraq is in drastic need of economic reforms to counter the non-permissive environment for foreign investment.

The reconstruction needs after the fight against Da'esh in Iraq are immense, spanning mine IED and UXO clearance; rebuilding critical infrastructure; housing; revitalization of the economy; and reintroducing service delivery infrastructure and systems. At the Iraq Reconstruction Conference in February 2018, donors (including many regional actors) pledged nearly USD 30 billion to support reconstruction in Iraq against an estimated cost by the Iraqi government of USD 88.2 billion. While some 3.2 million Iraqis are reported to have returned to their
(often ramshackle) homes and communities, another two million are seemingly in a protracted state of displacement due to their association with Da'esh or the loss of homes and property. Even for those able to return, Da'esh's use of IEDs have often made return close to impossible. United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has assessed that clearance of IEDs and UXOs from the military campaign is likely to take at least a decade. Vulnerable groups including women and children have, as always, been disproportionately negatively impacted by the conflict, yet see very limited representation and protection.

Regardless of the final political settlement following the 2018 election, Iraq will likely experience a period of continued fragile stability. In this scenario, different parts of Iraq will continue to demonstrate significantly divergent characteristics with some level of Sunni insurgency, tribal conflict, criminality and political infighting as potentially destabilising factors across the country. An important indicator of the future cohesion and stability of Iraq will be the government's ability to share power and include a broad range of stakeholders in key decision-making bodies and positions. If successful, this will help strengthen the social contract between the state and the periphery, to which the state has limited reach including Iraq's many minority communities. If unsuccessful, individual groups will continue to contest and undermine policy development and implementation, including in relation to key areas such as security sector reform and reconciliation. The Sunni majority provinces north of Baghdad—predominantly Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al-Din but also parts of Kirkuk and Diyala—are likely to see continued Sunni insurgency, whether under Da'esh flags or other jihadist groups. Dependent on the outcome of the new government formation, the same areas are at risk of receiving limited recovery and development investments due to the government's unwillingness to channel funding to groups they see as complicit in helping Da'esh spread and the lack of access of international partners. This may fuel further grievances and a sense of marginalization in the Sunni communities.

Civil society in Iraq is recovering after the conflict. Civil society existed mainly at the grassroots' level during the rule of Sadam Hussain but played important roles with regards to local conflict resolution and collaboration between different groups in society. While some civil society organisations have been caught up in sectarian dynamics, the foundation for rebuilding a strong civil society ecosystem is assessed as being present but will also depend on the overall political developments in the country. According to International Media Support, ethnic, religious and political divisions have led to a fragmented media sector with hundreds of publications and numerous radio and TV stations.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

- OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview
- Word Bank analysis and sources
- The Century Foundation analysis
- Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue analysis
- The Brookings Institution analysis
- International Crisis Group- Crisis Group Middle East Briefing 9th February 2018
- Human Rights Watch Reports on Iraq and Syria- World Report 2018
- International Monetary Fund Statistics Database

2. Fragility, conflict, migration and resilience

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

Situation with regards to peace and stability based on conflict analysis and fragility assessments highlighting key drivers of conflict and fragility, protection and resilience, organised transnational crime and illicit money flows, and how conflict and fragility affect inclusive private sector development, women and youth

Protection needs remain significant in both countries with the active conflict situation in Syria posing particular challenges. Both countries have demonstrated noteworthy pockets of resilience to cope with extreme stresses and shocks, which may be leveraged when circumstances allow it in Syria and in on-going stabilisation and early recovery efforts in Iraq. As elsewhere, vulnerable groups of civilians, including women and children, have been, and will continue to be, disproportionally negatively impacted by the legacies of the conflict through a pervasive culture of violence and the breakdown of critical services on which children and their caretakers depend.
Transnational crime has in particular ravaged both countries, as drug cartels and the illicit arms trade have given rise to collapse of the rule of law, increased gang violence, and decreased trade and investment. In Syria, drug trafficking has increased with the conflict since shifting routes and control groups have emerged to take advantage of the increased number of combatants and migrants who are using drugs as stimulants. While lucrative, the trade has gone largely unchecked in Syria since other political priorities have taken precedence, and the lines between cartels and local government structures have blurred in many areas. In both Syria and Iraq, however, the illicit weapons and drug trade presents long-term concerns for stability, particularly in regards to peace consolidation and public health.

A 2015 study found that “the Syrian economy has been reordered into a new decentralised, fragmented and regionally and globally connected economy, in which the main economic activities depend on violence; and where violence in turn depends on those same economic activities. The country has thus entered a vicious circle where Syria’s own resources are being used to destroy it, and where ordinary people have no choice but to rearrange their lives around the conflict and either join or pay (directly or indirectly) armed actors in order to meet every day needs such as fuel and food. The degree of this reordering varies hugely from one area to the other. The pre-war formal economy has dramatically contracted while new illicit and informal revenue-raising activities have greatly expanded. The financing of violence is a combination of local resources and external, mainly regional, funding”.

Identifying on-going stabilisation/development and resilience efforts and the potential for establishing partnerships and alliances with national, regional and other international partners to maximise effects of the engagements.

A very broad range of active actors in both Syria and Iraq are engaged in stabilisation and resilience efforts and, to a lesser extent, development interventions. These include bilateral actors, multilateral agencies, civil society and non-governmental organisations, foundations and private sector actors.

The majority of the proposed engagements will prolong Denmark’s existing cooperation. This continuity holds significant advantages in terms of familiarity with context, trust, tried-and-tested approaches, and applying practical lessons learnt from implementing projects in the present conflict context, which inevitably involves higher than normal risks. The engagements selected have demonstrated good results so far and comply with the programme’s strategic focus on immediate stabilisation. As outlined in the Concept Note, the engagements are aligned with international frameworks, guidance, and partnerships and draw on alliances with national, regional and other international partners to maximise effects of the engagements.

Issues and concerns of relevance to Danish interest in the area of security and migration.

The Syrian refugee crisis is now the largest refugee and displacement crisis of our time with an estimated 5.6 million people having fled Syria as refugees and another 6.2 million (including 2.5 million children) living as internally displaced within Syria due to the civil war. These figures include 2 million Syrians registered by UNHCR in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, 3.5 million Syrians registered by Turkey as well as more than 33,000 Syrian refugees registered in North Africa.

In Iraq, more than two million Iraqis remain displaced across the country since the start of 2014 (an estimated 1.1 million in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq) and nearly 250,000 are refugees in other countries in the wider region.

According to the Regional and Refugee Plan, the crisis continues to have an enormous social and economic impact on the host countries, with many local, municipal and national services such as health, education and water under severe strain. It seems evident that the absorptive capacity of the most affected regional host countries has been exhausted. While the refugee routes to Europe have been largely contained, there is growing pressure in several host countries to identify durable and sustainable solutions to the refugee situation. Change in host country policies, new refugee groups being forced out of Syria, or changing dynamics within the refugee communities themselves may once more send refugees towards European shores. The refugee situation around Syria and, to a lesser extent Iraq, therefore remains a key concern for Denmark.

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8 Countering the logic of the war economy in Syria; evidence from three local areas. Rim Turkmani with Ali A. K. Ali, Mary Kaldor and Vesna Bojicic Dzelilovic. London School of Economics, 2015
Identify where Denmark has comparative advantages that may lead to more effective and efficient programming and better results, including where Denmark may contribute with deployment of specific expertise and capacities.

The proposed PSP draws on core approaches and capacities in the stabilisation programming space. The Programme intervenes in areas with immediate stabilisation needs by combining capacities from across foreign affairs, defence and police. The partnerships across civilian and security domains have demonstrated significant impact in terms of blending approaches and modalities; linking programmatic and political engagements; ensuring access to key local stakeholders; and devising and applying comprehensive approaches to multifaceted stabilisation challenges. Drawing on positive experiences of accompanying financial contributions with deployments of experts, the PSP will aim to deploy advisors in key strategic positions, including a) a military advisor and several police deployments to UNDP's SSR programme in Iraq; b) expert advisors from the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) potentially deployed to the Tansiq program in Iraq; c) the three stabilisation advisors based in Istanbul as well as the Danish special envoy to the Syrian crisis.

Considerations regarding the humanitarian situation, migration, and refugee and displacement issues, including the need to integrate humanitarian-development linkages and long-term strategies;

The PSP is cognisant of the need to support a transition from life-saving humanitarian assistance to resilience-building stabilisation and immediate recovery efforts in Iraq, which has informed the selection and design of the proposed engagements. Efforts in Iraq include support for the safe return of internally displaced persons in areas liberated from Da'esh through light infrastructure rehabilitation, small-scale reconciliation, support to local administration, microcredit and cash-for-work schemes.

In Syria, engagements aim to enhance the resilience of the Syrian population and work in pockets of stability on early recovery activities. These activities support the provision of basic services to Syrian populations in areas controlled by moderate opposition groups and through moderate civil society organisations and local-level structures.

Relevant issues and considerations related to radicalisation and violent extremism and the potential for Danish engagement to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE)

Efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism are a key concern of the program. Syria is host to a range of violent extremist groups and has seen growing oppression by Salafist-Jihadist groups such as Hay'et Tahrir al-Sham and other designated terrorist organisations. regime and its allies.

Improving local perceptions of early recovery are a key priority for preventing the resurgence of violent extremism in the region.

In Iraq, The Sunni majority provinces north of Baghdad—predominantly Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al-Din, but also parts of Kirkuk and Diyala—are likely to see continued Sunni insurgency whether under Da'esh flags or other jihadist groups.

The PSP proposes an engagement supporting Tansiq, an EU-funded project aimed at strengthening the capacity of various Iraqi security and intelligence services to collaborate on countering violent extremism. The programme draws on intelligence capacities from partner countries. Exploration can also be made to see if Danish support is able to go beyond financial support and include the deployment of senior advisors from the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), which Tansiq personnel have expressed an interest in. The precise nature of such support would need to be explored and developed in collaboration with PET and the Ministry of Justice.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

- The PSP Concept Note
- UNHCR analysis
- The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) for the Syria crisis
- International Crisis Group analysis
- The Century Foundation analysis
- Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue analysis
- The Brookings Institution analysis
- Global Peace Index
- US State Department CIA World Factbook
Human Rights Watch analysis

Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done?

The PSP should remain open to addressing critical knowledge gaps, for example, in relation to the contextual drivers of violent extremism in Iraq.

3. Assessment of human rights situation (HRBA) and gender

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:
The HRBA Guidance Note may provide further guidance, or hrbaportal.org

Human Right Standards (international, regional and national legislation)

A Human Rights-Based Approach will be applied throughout the Programme, and several engagements focus explicitly on strengthening accountability mechanisms for addressing human rights abuses.

Human Rights Watch lists the following key types of human rights violations in Syria:
- Targeting civilians, indiscriminate attacks, continued use of cluster munitions and incendiary weapons
- Unlawful restrictions on humanitarian aid, sieges, and forced displacements
- Unlawful use of chemical weapons and nerve agents
- US-led coalition airstrikes as well as those of the Russian and Syrian Arab Air Forces
- Enforced disappearances, death in custody, arbitrary arrests, torture
- Non-state armed groups’ abuses
- Violations in areas under Kurdish Democratic Union party (PYD) control, including oppression of political opposition and reports of torture and ill-treatment in detention facilities controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
- Displacement crisis and forcible evacuations

Furthermore, UNICEF has documented a range of human rights violations targeting or impacting children.

As state and formal authorities have failed to protect against, or are the direct perpetrators of, human rights violations, there is an urgent need for other accountability mechanisms that can ensure that perpetrators are held accountable. The PSP contains several engagements aimed at ensuring accountability in Syria so that rule of law violations—as well as atrocities and grave human rights violations—committed on a daily basis by a range of actors, and most systematically by the regime, are documented in an effort to hold perpetrators accountable. A key task is to collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of violations and to prepare files to facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings in national, regional or international courts.

In Iraq, Human Rights Watch has identified various key human rights challenges in the post-Da'esh phase to include fair trials for Da'esh suspects that allow for victim participation, the protection of families of suspected Da'esh members from collective punishment, free movement of the displaced, cessation of forced returns and displacements, and accountability for abuses by anti-Da'esh forces. To ensure that peace in Iraq can be sustained, it is therefore crucial that past injustices are reconciled and addressed. It is also imperative that steps are taken to foster social cohesion among individuals and between groups, as well as between the Iraqi people and the formal and informal structures governing them. This requires efforts in support of formal national reconciliation as well as a sustained focus on addressing local conflict dynamics and the facilitation of community-level reconciliation.

Universal Periodic Review (UPR)

The Universal Periodic Review for Syria, undertaken by the Human Rights Council during its thirty-fourth session (27 February - 24 March 2017), is strikingly different from a traditional UPR; thus, making an attempt to summarize it is futile. It contains one of the longest lists of recommendations ever produced under a UPR and

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9 The purpose of the analysis is to facilitate and strengthen the application of the Human Rights-Based Approach, and to integrate gender in Danish development cooperation. The analysis should identify the main human rights issues in respect of social and economic rights, cultural rights, and civil and political rights. Gender is an integral part of all three categories.
every single recommendation was rejected by the regime. The recommendations largely covered issues similar to those found in the Human Rights Watch list of human rights violations in Syria.

The Universal Periodic Review for Iraq is from November 2014 and, hence, is not up to date.

A Court of Human Rights was set up to deal with cases of domestic violence alongside a Ministry of Human Rights and transitional judicial institution to provide accountability for those who perpetrated acts of violence. The region of Kurdistan also saw institutional developments to protect human rights, most notably the High Commission on Combating Violence Against Women.

Longer-term measures which have been taken include implementing capacity-building measures. The UPR found that to ensure that human rights violations do not persist, monitoring and evaluation programs should be set up. Thematic recommendations include improving livelihoods of IDP’s and supporting primary school enrolment and access to education for all Iraqis, regardless of ethnic background. More importance must also be given to Kurdistan, since the region has suffered from countless human rights violations and an influx of refugees as well as poor infrastructure and basic services.

Identify key rights holders in the programme
People residing lawfully (under international law) within Syria and Iraq, including vulnerable groups such as children, women and minorities.

Identify key duty bearers in the programme
National and international governments, and international organisations operating in Syria and Iraq.

Human Rights Principles (PANT)
Although the present state of conflict in Syria and Iraq principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, and transparency (PANT) are relevant to a limited extent. While the thrust of the programme remains to support immediate resilience and stabilisation, support to participation and accountability is at the heart of the programmes aiming to mobilise and strengthen civil society; principles of transparency are at the heart of the monitoring of violations being carried out by the Syria Network of Human rights. Finally, political settlement processes aim to be inclusive and comprehensive, in line with the PANT principles.

Gender
The current situation in both Syria and Iraq is such that a traditional gender analysis makes little sense for the purpose of this program. As stated in the Concept Note, vulnerable groups of civilians, including women and children, have been, and will continue to be, disproportionality negatively impacted by the legacies of the conflict with a pervasive culture of violence and the breakdown of critical services on which children and their caretakers depend.

Youth
The current situation in both Syria and Iraq is such that a traditional youth analysis makes little sense for the purpose of this program. Youth will, however, be a critical constituency in the post-Da'esh recovery process in Iraq and instrumental in building sustainable peace in Syria when an agreement to end the civil war is eventually reached.

List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis:

- Universal Periodic Review
- CEDAW- Iraq and Syria country reports
- OHCHR Human Rights Watch Country Reports for Iraq and Syria
- United Nations Human Rights Reports – Syria
- United Nations Population Fund Country Reports for Syria and Iraq

4. Inclusive sustainable growth, climate change and environment
Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

In Iraq, it will be important for the war economy dynamics to be dismantled. It will also be crucial for the post-Da'esh recovery process to support inclusive and sustainable growth in an effort to respond to the needs of the broader population, and to ensure that environmental degradation from both the Gulf War and the fight against Da'esh is not further exacerbated.

5. Capacity of public sector, public financial management and corruption

Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points:

The breakdown of institutions in war-torn Syria had led to the formation of multiple alternative centres of power and influence across the political, social, security, economical and religious spheres though most of these outside of Kurdish-controlled areas have vanished following regime take-over.

In areas controlled by the regime, the regime has made it a priority to keep staff on payroll and has even redirected funding from positions no longer paid for in opposition-controlled areas to new positions in regime-controlled areas. This has increased the overall number of locally employed staff in an effort to ensure their loyalty. The regime of Syria has thus retained its administrative structure, even though many ministries and authorities have been depleted of financial and human capital and are operating at much lower levels than prior to the crisis. At the provincial and district levels, this is even more so the case, with some institutions existing in name only after the discontinuation of funding from the central level (where all income is traditionally generated and distributed). This has further exacerbated the regime’s shift in focus from service provision and delivery to security. Most regime functions have also retracted to de facto urban areas, leaving most rural areas underserved. However, this strategy has also allowed the regime to consolidate its ability to deliver vital resources to its core territories and cities while, occasionally deliberately, leaving others behind. This has potentially strengthened the regime’s public authority in areas loyal to it.

In a range of communities in opposition-controlled Syria, a mass-evacuation of government civil servants and a withdrawal of state institutions had made local councils become main actors in sustaining some level of service delivery amid crisis and chaos. Local Administration Councils (LACs) generally perceive themselves as equivalent to local municipalities, providing services impartially to citizens, and are often the de facto implementing partners for NGOs and charities. At the height of opposition control, the LACs numbered in the hundreds, each with different technical and financial capacities. These once-promising local governance structures have been increasingly dismantled and squeezed by the advancement of the regime, in addition to the growing influence of hardliner Islamist groups. Following regime take-over, these structures have been rapidly dismantled.

The Kurdish majority areas demonstrate a complex network of formal and informal governance and service delivery structures, where formal structures are reasonably easy to access, but have limited capacity and often-limited genuine authority. The real authority lies with Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) affiliated cadres from the central level down to individual communities and service delivery must be understood in this political context. The Rojava administration (the Kurdish-controlled de facto autonomous region in northern Syria) institutions are generally perceived as reasonably capable of managing service delivery, covering everything from reconstruction, health, education, security, and rule of law through unconventional governance mechanisms that are anchored in the ideology of democratic confederalism.

In Iraq, the state is often the subject of elite grab and senior public officials and elected representatives are prone to look after the interests of their networks rather than the public interest. There are, however, pockets of capacity and leadership, which can be supported and serve as entry points for strengthening critical reform processes. Many of these now need to be relaunched after the conflict-induced standstill.

There are other interesting institutions aimed at strengthening public administration and accountability in Iraq. The Federal Board of Supreme Audit, for example, is an independent public financial institution whose mission is to enhance the efficiency and productivity of the economy. Another aim of the Federal Board is to address corrupt practices.

On the Corruption Percentage Index, Iraq ranks 169 out of 180—a ranking that is unlikely to have improved in the context of the recent war economy. If or when the oil industry is restructured to play an influential role in the
global oil market, the oil wealth should be more evenly distributed and its revenue more effectively used to rebuild Iraqi society. Positive economic growth would then be fostered.

For analyses on security sector actors and actors involved in reconciliation, please consult the main Concept Note.
Annex 2: Partner Analysis, Syria & Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2019-2021

The majority of the proposed engagements is a continuation of Denmark’s existing cooperation. This continuity holds significant advantages in terms of familiarity with context, trust, tried-and-tested approaches, and to applying practical lessons learnt from implementing projects in the present conflict context, which inevitably involves higher than normal risks. The engagement partners proposed have demonstrated good results so far and comply with the programme’s strategic focus on immediate stabilisation. The selection of partners is subject to Danish rules and policies on tendering and partnership modalities.

In its selection of engagements and engagement partners, the following criteria have been taken into consideration:

- Nature of the proposed engagement and the relevant profile for implementing partners
- Existing familiarity and track record of satisfactory delivery under the existing programme
- Ability to operate in the context of Iraq and/or Syria including capacity and access constraints
- Local legitimacy and ownership of organisation
- The partner’s experience, reputation and presence on the ground
- Ability to meet Danish criteria for transparency, management and reporting,

The PSP is cognisant of the programme’s administrative resource constraints and consequently seeks to combine engagements with a potential for a strong Danish footprint in terms of influence, interest and visibility with implementation modalities, which impose the least possible administrative burden on the program staff. Such modalities include delegated partnership agreements as well as multi-partner and multilateral implementation mechanisms (trust funds, UN implementation, etc.). All proposed engagements except from two (Baytna and The Day After) utilise either joint (pooled) and/or delegated cooperation arrangements with well-established partners (mostly with the UK, US and UN agencies).

A main difference between partners in Syria and Iraq is that the United Nations has limited operations in opposition-controlled parts of Syria except for humanitarian assistance, whereas the UN has string programmes in Iraq. This also means that in Syria, the most legitimate and fit-for-purpose Syrian civil society organisations must engage directly, whereas in Iraq the prevalence of multi-partner programmes makes it possible to engage Iraqi civil society through broader and more comprehensive programmes managed by the UN and other. This also explains the relatively high number of Syrian partners for the engagements there as compared to activities in Iraq.

This programme will include only one partner:

- The Syria Network for Human Rights is a new partner under the programme but supported through Baytna.
1. In addition, other partners were not part of the original programme but were added in 2017 including TetraTech (though this support built upon an existing agreement with the US Department of State) and UNDP’s Integrated Reconciliation Programme and Security Sector Reform Program, though UNDP was already supported through the UNDO Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS).

2. Brief presentation of partners

3. This section presents proposed and possible partners again subject to Danish rules and policies on tendering and partnership modalities.

**UNDP (Syria):**

Denmark has provided large amounts of funding to support stabilization efforts in post Da’esh areas. The purpose of UNDP is to broker a peace deal, which can foster political settlement. As part of the UN Secretariat structure, UNDP is a trusted and credible partner. The UN-led talks in Geneva strive toward a credible political settlement in line with resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva Communiqué (2012). The Secretary-General appointed the UN’s current Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, in July 2014. Intense diplomatic engagement in 2015 between Russia and the US, and other key international stakeholders resulted in the establishment of the International Syrian Support Group (ISSG) and the adoption of Security Council resolution 2254 (2015). Resolution 2254 (2015) reiterated the endorsement of the Geneva Communiqué and set the Special Envoy’s mandate. Since January 2016, Special Envoy de Mistura has conducted a series of intra-Syrian negotiations with talks in late 2017 into 2018 focusing on two key aspects of resolution 2254: the schedule and process for drafting a new constitution and precise requirements for UN-supervised elections.

**UNMAS (Iraq):**

A nationally led response to threat of explosive hazards operates efficiently and effectively. The efforts of UNMAS have regularly been supported by Denmark as both missions align well and aim to train members of government in dealing with hazardous material. As part of the UN System, UNMAS is a trusted and credible partner. UNMAS addresses the threat posed by explosive hazards in Iraq in through three pillars of work:

*Explosive Hazard Management*

A blended approach, combining national and international commercial companies and NGOs, enables survey and clearance response in areas liberated from ISIL in direct support of the Government of Iraq/UN stabilization plan and humanitarian response. As soon as areas are declared liberated, UNMAS will first deploy risk assessment teams, followed by specialized teams including: survey, high-risk search, battle area clearance, mechanical assets, and/or debris management.

*Capacity Enhancement*

UNMAS supports a nationally led and implemented response. Building on existing capacities, UNMAS focus is to provide training and technical advice to the Government of Iraq in various ministries: mine action authorities, Ministry of Interior (police and civil defence), and government operations coordination centres to support the management, regulation and coordination of response to
EH. The “National Strategy and Executive Plan for Mine Action 2017-2021” was launched in December 2017 with support from UNMAS.

Risk Education

Coordinated with the UN Protection Cluster and DMA, RE is provided to IDPs, returnees and resident communities. Efforts are specifically targeting communities living in, or returning to, liberated areas known or suspected to be contaminated with IEDs and explosive hazards. UNMAS has provided national authorities with management training to improve coordination and management of RE in Iraq. Risk Awareness is provided to humanitarian and stabilization partners.

UNDP (Iraq):

UNDP has taken the lead on coordinating international support for Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Iraq, and the programme has been assessed as being well designed and the most effective mechanism for supporting Iraqi efforts in this regard. UNDP has also launched an Integrated Reconciliation Program aimed at supporting the National Reconciliation Commission at the national level while simultaneously establishing Peace Councils at the local level. While the program was off to a slow start and is currently running low on international funding, the initiative still has the potential of becoming the only inclusive, comprehensive, and sustainable reconciliation program in Iraq. The Stabilisation Advisor, in coordination with the Danish ambassador to Iraq, will follow the program implementation closely, and make a final decision on the avenue of Danish support for reconciliation will await development over the following months. As part of the UN System, UNDP is a trusted and credible partner.

UNDP-led Funding Facility for Stabilisation, FFS (Iraq):

Starting in Tikrit in August 2015, UNDP’s Funding Facility for Stabilization is now active in 19 newly liberated high-priority cities and districts, helping to restore public infrastructure, put people to work, jump-start local economies, boost Government capacity and more recently accelerate reconciliation. FFS provides support for the safe return of internally displaced persons in areas liberated from Da’esh in Iraq through light infrastructure rehabilitation, small-scale reconciliation, support to local administration, microcredit and cash-for-work schemes. FFS has proven capable of delivering its activities in extremely challenging contexts and should be supported until a credible successor arrangement is in place. The FFS has supported 19 of the most strategic towns and cities across Anbar, Ninewah, Salah al-Din and Diyala, contributing to creating a safe environment for the return of over 1.39 million men and women, boys and girls. It is proposed to retain support to FFS with a view to eventually transition support to the planned UN-wide Recovery and Resilience Programme (RRP) if and when it is deemed capable of taking on these ambitious responsibilities. As part of the UN System, UNDP is a trusted and credible partner.

European Union, Tansiq (Iraq):

Tansiq is an EU-funded programme currently focused on capacity development of the domestic military and civilian intelligence services as well as strengthening their capacity to coordinate, share information and align their activities. The current programme is coming to an end by September 2018, but it is expected that a successor arrangement will be established and sustain the current focus. The European Union is a trusted and credible partner of Denmark. The programme is currently implemented by Aktis Strategy and Crown Agents and have demonstrated a good track record of achieving results through
building trust with the Iraqi partners and by drawing on EU Member States intelligence capacities as peer advisors. The programme will, however, likely need to tender the assignment going forward.

**Independent Impartial Investigation Mechanism, IIIM (Syria):**

Impunity has been a hallmark of the Syrian conflict and has challenged one of the UN’s core values—accountability. This gap was initially addressed when on 21 December 2016, the General Assembly adopted resolution 71-248 to establish the International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) to assist in the investigation and prosecution of the most serious crimes under international law, in particular the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

The IIIM is the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011- mandated to collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of violations, and to prepare files to facilitate and expedite fair and independent criminal proceedings in national, regional or international courts. The Mechanism is headed by a senior judge or prosecutor with extensive experience in criminal investigations and prosecutions, and a deputy with extensive experience in international criminal justice and an in-depth knowledge of international criminal law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

The UN Secretary-General appoints the Head and Deputy Head of the Mechanism upon consultation with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Legal Counsel.

**The Day After, TDA (Syria):**

TDA is an independent, Syrian-led civil society organization working to support democratic transition in Syria, which has strong, well-respected leadership connected inside Syria and is able to contribute to dialogue on a future Syria. TDA receives funding under the current program and focuses on carrying out Track II consultation meetings with Syrian stakeholders around key themes, including transitional justice and the rule of law. These aim to build consensus amongst Syrian actions on a blueprint of action and to make recommendations to Track I actors on these issues. TDA is also engaged in activities aimed at increasing the focus on peacebuilding, including boosting the participation of women, engaging the media, reinforcing local security initiatives, and expanding networks across dividing lines.

**The Syria Network for Human Rights (Syria):**

The organisation is a genuinely Syrian grassroots organisation, which values its independence greatly and operates in a lean, cost-effective and flexible manner. The organisation has a good track record of effectively and systematically documenting human rights abuses in Syria and needs a core funder to sustain its critical activities. It remains one of the most trusted and credible Syrian networks of activists documenting atrocities on the ground and is frequently referred to by Amnesty International and the UN. The Syria Network for Human Rights would be a new partner under the programme.

**Baytna (Syria):**

Baytna is a civil society organisation and its support to civil society in Syria remains an important contribution to retaining a space for opposition voices, especially women, and for strengthening pluralistic values. A key advantage of the organisation is its close relation with Syria-based constituencies.
and its small grant mechanism, which supports projects with a clear civil society dimension, including human rights and accountability; basic freedoms; and public policy.

The Syria Recovery Trust Fund, SRTF (Syria):

SRTF supports the provision of basic services to Syrian populations in areas controlled by moderate opposition groups and through moderate civil society organisations and local level structures. The SRTF comprises a very broad donor platform, including its host countries Turkey and Jordan, which on the one hand secures the SRTF’s widespread legitimacy while, on the other hand, results in certain limitations to its geographical operational space due to diverging donor interests.

US Department of State (Syria and Iraq):

It is proposed that the MoD co-finances support to UNMAS and Janus, and that the engagements with Janus in Iraq and Tetra Tech in Syria are implemented through a delegated partnership with the US Department of State (DoS). The DoS is a trusted and credible partner managing the implementing partners:

- **Janus (in Iraq):**
  Janus is a company specialised in complex mine clearance, through a delegated partnership with the US Department of State (DoS). Janus, being a private contractor, has more flexible security arrangements than the UN and can therefore operate in a number of areas that are inaccessible to UNMAS. Moreover, Janus works in close cooperation with the Coalition forces and can, where needed, operate from Coalition bases. In addition, the partnership with Janus has proven invaluable in terms of sustaining a trusting and close dialogue with the US Embassy in Baghdad, which benefits Denmark greatly.

- **Mine clearance agents in Syria:**
  Tetra Tech is conducting sophisticated mine clearance activities mainly around critical infrastructure in Eastern Syria - including Raqqa and other liberated areas. Being a private contractor, Tetra Tech (as with Janus) has more flexible security arrangements and can work with in the political / policy guidelines set by donor.
## Summary of key partner features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner name</th>
<th>Core business</th>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Exit strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDPA</strong></td>
<td>Monitoring and assessing global political development s and advising and assisting the UN Secretary General and his envoys in the peaceful prevention and resolution of conflict around the world.</td>
<td>Low, many donors</td>
<td>Medium, of political importance but not big recipient</td>
<td>Continuing to commit to peace process in the Syrian crisis by bringing all stakeholders to the table.</td>
<td>Strength: Capable of brokering a peace deal if all parties brought to the table</td>
<td>Weaknesses: Possibly diminishing importance if parallel negotiations tracks gain traction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNMAS</strong></td>
<td>Ensuring an effective, proactive and coordinated response to the problems of landmines and explosive remnants of war, including cluster munitions. IEDs kill and maim civilians and peacekeepers.</td>
<td>Medium, Denmark is a big donor</td>
<td>High - major recipients of funds</td>
<td>Develop a national response to increase awareness of the threat of WMD’s and find safe ways of disposing of hazardous waste</td>
<td>Coordinate procedures with UNDP and coalition forces in Iraq to build transparency and increase government involvement of establishing de-mining zones in Iraq</td>
<td>Strength: Capable of producing high results by building national institutions and through UN legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP</strong></td>
<td>To eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities through the sustainable development of nations, in more than 170 countries and territories.</td>
<td>Medium, Denmark is a big donor. High, leads two critical engagement s and major recipients of funds.</td>
<td>SSR, reconciliatio n and stabilization efforts in libearted areas.</td>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong>: Proven track record in SSR and stabilisation. <strong>Weaknesses</strong>: Slow start of reconciliation program. <strong>Opportunities</strong>: Successful transition in the hum-dev-peace nexus. Program completion. Other donors can take over as they are larger programs.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>European Union (Tansiq)</strong></td>
<td>Prevent and counter violent extremism in Iraq.</td>
<td>High, Denmark among few donors. Medium, small engagement but high profile and MoJ engagement.</td>
<td>Capacity development of the domestic military and civilian intelligence services as well as strengthenin g their capacity to coordinate, share information and align their activities.</td>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong>: Unique access and trust already built. <strong>Weaknesses</strong>: Reliance on political will and integrity of intelligence services. Capacity developed. Other partners take over.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Impartial Investigation Mechanism (IIIM)</strong></td>
<td>Strengthening accountability of evidence of violations in Syria.</td>
<td>Medium, Denmark among other partners. High, connected with other engagement s</td>
<td>Will collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of violations, and prepare files to facilitate and expedite fair and independent</td>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong>: The recognized mechanism to hold perpetrators of human rights violations to account. <strong>Weaknesses</strong>: Reliance on End of conflict. Other partners take over.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Weaknesses</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Day After (TDA)</td>
<td>A CSO working to support democratic transition in Syria.</td>
<td>High, Denmark among key donors</td>
<td>Low, smaller engagement</td>
<td>The Day After (TDA) has strong, well-respected leadership connected inside Syria and is able to contribute to dialogue on a future Syria.</td>
<td>Strengths: Very well connected in Syria Weaknesses: Potentially growing access constraints and other constraints in operational space</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Syria Network for Human Rights</td>
<td>An NGO, which effectively and systematically documents human rights abuses in Syria.</td>
<td>High (very) Denmark as likely lead donor</td>
<td>Low, smaller engagement</td>
<td>One of the most trusted and credible Syrian networks of activists documenting atrocities on the ground</td>
<td>Strengths: Trusted and credible organization frequently referred to by Amnesty International and the UN Weaknesses: Potentially growing access constraints and other constraints in operational space</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baytna</td>
<td>A CSO, which supports civil society in Syria and remains an important contributor to retaining a space for opposition voices, and for</td>
<td>High, Denmark among key donors</td>
<td>Low, smaller engagement</td>
<td>Support to civil society in Syria remains an important contribution to retaining a space for opposition voices, and for strengthening</td>
<td>Strengths: Close relation with Syria-based constituencies and its small grant mechanism, which supports projects with a clear civil society dimension, Political settlement/agreement. Other partners take over</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Syria Recovery Trust Fund (SRTF)</td>
<td>Supports the provision of basic services to Syrian populations in areas controlled by moderate opposition groups and through moderate civil society organisations and local level structures.</td>
<td>Low, many other donors</td>
<td>High, big recipient of funds</td>
<td>Supports the provision of basic services to Syrian populations in areas controlled by moderate opposition groups and through moderate civil society organisation s and local level structures</td>
<td>Strengths: A very broad donor platform, including its host countries Turkey and Jordan, which secures the SRTF’s widespread legitimacy</td>
<td>Weaknesses: Certain limitations to its geographical operational space due to diverging donor interests</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Syria Civil Defence aka White Helmets/Mayday Rescue</td>
<td>The only actor serving as a first responder across most non-regime controlled parts of Syria.</td>
<td>Low, many other donors</td>
<td>Medium, important partner and big recipient of funds</td>
<td>White Helmets’ life-saving activities include rescue, firefighting, utility restoration and ambulance services.</td>
<td>Strengths: Good coverage in non-regime areas. Effective under very hard circumstances. Constructive structure with Mayday providing support</td>
<td>Weaknesses: Does not operate in regime-controlled areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Department of State (Janus &amp; Tetra Tech)</td>
<td>Implements (planned) engagements with Janus in Iraq and Tetra Tech</td>
<td>Low, US DoS backed</td>
<td>Medium, loss of privileged partnership. Medium</td>
<td>Mine and UXO clearance in Iraq and Syria - critical</td>
<td>Strengths: being a private contractor, has more flexible security arrangements</td>
<td>Acceptable levels of mine/UXO contamination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in Syria through a delegated partnership.

size engagement

infrastructur e and homes

than the UN and can therefore operate in a number of areas that are inaccessible to UNMAS

# Annex 3: Budget

## Syria and Iraq Programme Budget, 2019-2021

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Contextually, both Syria and Iraq are highly dynamic environments, with political conditions that are highly fluid in both countries, and military dynamics in Syria that can change swiftly and often threaten project implementation supported by Danish assistance. Syria is an active war zone with several foreign militaries operating within Syria’s border in addition to its own armed groups. The moderate opposition’s continued loss of territorial control is a particular concern, as is mounting pressure from extremist Islamist groups such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and other Designated Terrorist organisations.

Continued advances of the regime, rendering more and more areas inaccessible or unsuitable for programming, and regional dynamics further limiting the operational space in Syria, particularly in relation to operating in areas under Kurdish control, is also an increasing concern. Disengagement by the US on Syria would render support to areas in Eastern Syria further complicated. Dynamics also in neighbouring countries also matter particularly if partners to the PSP are forced to relocate or discontinue operations, including in response to diminishing access and heightened risk of their staff.

In Iraq, contextual risks include the final settlement following the May 2018 election (with key cabinet positions yet to be appointed at the time of writing) and the subsequent formation of a government, which will have an impact on the space for critical reform and national processes such as security sector reform (SSR) and reconciliation. Escalating conflict between Iraq’s major groups (Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurdish) as well as intensifying conflict within those groups will also have significant impact on the ability of the PSP to achieve its objectives. Recent developments in Kurdish Regional Government controlled part of Iraq with growing factionalism and fighting between Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)-aligned groups and Turkey in Sinjar is particularly worrying. But also the on-going territorial disputes between the Baghdad government and the Kurdish Regional Government including over oil-rich Kirkuk is cause for worry.

Developments within and between external actors, namely Iran and the US, also matter greatly, and both countries have the potential to influence domestic dynamics in Iraq. The US relinquishment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) known commonly as the Iran Nuclear Deal, for example, is likely to lead both countries to change policies on and actions in both Syria and Iraq.

While contextual risks cannot be mitigated, they can be understood, and engagements can be designed in ways that allow for on-going and tailored responses. Programmatic and institutional types of risks must also be understood and analysed, and effective risk mitigation measures put in place. Some level of residual risk is an unavoidable part of most engagements and must be tolerated to an extent, as it reflects the criticality of the intervention. Operating in both Syria and Iraq is extremely costly due to the security risks, complicated logistics and challenging access constraints.
It is essential to maintain access to independent, accurate, and updated information flows from the ground to reduce risks. This can be done through regular visits of programme staff – as far as possible – and through robust research, monitoring, and evaluation efforts that are built into existing projects or commissioned as third-party initiatives. The programme management team would be supported in its effort to adjust programme implementation and strategy to ensure relevance and impact in both country contexts.

Programmatically, operating in these challenging contexts involves risks to material, financial, and existential risks to continued Danish assistance. While Syria, with a regime that appears ready to reclaim remaining opposition-held areas where Denmark currently provides assistance, poses the most significant programmatic risks for Danish assistance, uncertainties related to the final outcome of government formation efforts in Iraq also pose risks to Danish assistance there, as assistance opportunities or priorities may shift. Another risk in Syria is the limited capacity of national or local implementing partners to absorb funding and adequately report on activities and outcomes, which may necessitate an international intermediary, which raises costs and risks undermining local ownership.

Institutional risks are present in both countries, particularly vis-à-vis reputational risk to the Danish government, but are most relevant to Danish assistance in Iraq rather than Syria, since Denmark does not programme through existing state structures in Syria. A combination of institutional inefficiency, corruption, and lack of will jeopardises opportunities to build on initial progress following the defeat of Da’esh in Iraq and initial stabilisation efforts there. Should Denmark change strategy and support Syrian-government institutions in future through the United Nations or other partners, this risk profile will need to be revisited.

They also include the challenges associated with exercising effective oversight of funds and programme resources and the consequential risk of misuse including funds ending up in the wrong hands. In Syria in particular, access is likely to remain extremely limited, which will necessitate a variety of remote monitoring and management models. Some specific engagements also require that international partners make significant headway in programmatic delivery including, for example, the UNDP-led reconciliation programme in Iraq.

As indicated by the mid-term review of the 2016-2018 programme, given the size of and complexity of such a programme it is anticipated that certain cases might emerge relating to corruption or misappropriation of funds. The issue of mismanagement and corruption will therefore be actively managed by the regional Stabilisation Advisors through dialogue with partners, and they will also ensure that cases are registered and reported immediately, in line with the January 2018 Guidelines for Danish Development Assistance (s.18) which outlines a zero-tolerance approach to corruption while also accepting that engaging in complex environments necessitates an acceptance of the risk of corruption. These guidelines require that any suspected corruption cases are reported immediately.
## Major risks

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contextual</td>
<td>The fast-moving political environment in both countries (and military context in Syria) elevates the risk that conditions on the ground can change significantly, impacting the ability to implement programming, or even necessitating a review of programme strategy.</td>
<td>The programme management team should maintain access to independent sources of information and understanding (research) and design the programme to be adaptable and responsive. Other Danish engagements, especially through the Coalition, NATO, and EU contribute to a mitigation of these risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic</td>
<td>The risk of project failure is most acute in Syria, where trends indicate any programmatic interventions will need to scale back or shift in scope as the regime regains more territory. In Iraq, this risk is less pronounced, though the programme may need to adjust to shifts in direction from the new government once in power.</td>
<td>The programme management team should ensure it has the capacity to respond to opportunities and challenges as they arise; maintain robust monitoring and evaluation of conditions on the ground to ensure ability to adjust programming to protect project funding, materiel, and reputation; engagement with local stakeholders to understand the trajectory of the assistance environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Institutional risks are most prevalent in Iraq, where the composition of a new government is unknown, and where the will of the current and future governments to adequately reform is questionable or uncertain. If the international community loses trust in the government, there is a risk that donors will withdraw funding and other support.</td>
<td>Maintain support for diplomatic engagement to encourage government formation and reform in Iraq, while realistically assessing and adjusting programming based on the “art of the possible.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contextual – Syria</td>
<td>As the Syrian regime retakes control of most of the remaining opposition-held areas of Syria, it is unlikely that civil society organisations will be able to continue operating openly, and those that do continue to operate will have to shift tactics to do so underground.</td>
<td>Ensure agreements with partners have break clauses, and that those able to continue working have made appropriate arrangements in terms of duty of care and continuity of operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual – Iraq</td>
<td>Sectarianism and political power grab - including due to external interests - prevent a concerted effort by GoI to reconcile thus disempowering national and local reconciliation efforts.</td>
<td>Engage with the international community, especially through the UN and EU but also with likeminded to leverage international funding with commitments from GoI to reconciliation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic – Syria</td>
<td>Partners are likely to be forced to curtail their operations on the ground in Syria, and some may be forced to cease operations entirely.</td>
<td>Continue funding partners as long as they can operate, and projects that continue to add value. Discontinue projects that can no longer function in this environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic – Iraq</td>
<td>Failure by UNDP/IRP as an implementer, as well as by the GOI, to engage local CSOs, women and youth, that are active within victimised or marginalised communities risks undermining potential gains towards local and national reconciliation post-Da’esh. Lack of harmonisation and coordination between UNDP’s FFS Window 4 and IRP reconciliation activities risks reducing impact.</td>
<td>Encouraging UNDP/IRP and the GOI to engage with active local CSOs would also go a long way towards building trust with local communities. Denmark to facilitate discussions with UNDP and donors regarding joint approach to reconciliation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional – Syria</td>
<td>If the regime is not incentivised to participate in internationally-sponsored peace talks, there may be limited space for opposition actors to play a meaningful role in negotiating a political settlement. Further, international institutions, such as the UN and ICC, will struggle to secure a mandate to prosecute regime officials for crimes against humanity despite evidence-collection efforts.</td>
<td>Work with partners to push for negotiations that include a role for the opposition and to continue collecting and safeguarding evidence for accountability-focused processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional – Iraq</td>
<td>If the GOI, both in its current and future iterations, and other international stakeholders do not adequately invest in the National Reconciliation Council (NRC) or other reconciliation bodies, national and local reconciliation efforts could falter.</td>
<td>Encourage the UN to deconflict, take the lead with the donors, rebuild trust in UN reconciliation programs and then discuss this and an approach with the GOI, which needs to demonstrate leadership and commitment on the issue. Leverage Danish funding to do so.</td>
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<td>Category</td>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contextual –</td>
<td>Regime gains will likely reduce or eliminate the potential</td>
<td>Support partners when and where they are able to operate, while simultaneously ensuring close monitoring of the situation and their performance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>areas of operation for the White Helmets. Further, various donors’</td>
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<td></td>
<td>resistance to working in respective non-regime held areas will</td>
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<td></td>
<td>limit the extent of recovery interventions SRTF is able to undertake</td>
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<td></td>
<td>in Northwest and Northeast Syria.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contextual –</td>
<td>The sheer scale of destruction in Iraq means that the UXO and</td>
<td>Continue to support UXO removal and de-mining efforts in Iraq, as a means to remove barriers for IDP return and longer-term reconstruction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>de-mining efforts are projected to continue for years, undermining</td>
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<td></td>
<td>efforts to rebuild, both physically and socially.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Programmatic</td>
<td>Partners that are no longer able to operate on the ground inside</td>
<td>Build in break clauses to contracts and identify alternative funding options, either in country or in Iraq.</td>
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<tr>
<td>– Syria</td>
<td>Syria will not be eligible to receive continued stabilisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Programmatic</td>
<td>As the UN and international donors, including the World Bank, shift</td>
<td>Leverage Danish funding to encourage stronger donor coordination on reconciliation, and prioritise projects that will support more sustainable stabilisation, such as employment programmes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>– Iraq</td>
<td>from immediate stabilisation to extended stabilisation and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>reconstruction phases, there is a risk that a combination of donor</td>
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<td>fatigue and multiple, overlapping initiatives will undermine</td>
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<td></td>
<td>progress to date on the enormous task of rebuilding the country</td>
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<td>after the defeat of Da’esh.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional –</td>
<td>Regime attempts to reassert state authority over remaining Syrian</td>
<td>Consider discontinuing support to existing projects in areas that are retaken by the regime. Engage with EU counterparts to ensure that any eventual reconstruction assistance, which would require revising the PSP’s scope, does not reinforce Syrian regime institutions or incur reputational risk to the Danish government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>territory will accompany a renewed push by the regime and its</td>
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<td></td>
<td>backers to secure international assistance for reconstruction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional –</td>
<td>Institutional inefficiency within relevant GOI and KRG de-mining</td>
<td>Engage with the UN, GOI, and other donors to encourage progress on addressing inefficiencies that prevent partners from operating, such as approving access or visas.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>agencies risks delaying vital de-mining efforts by complicating</td>
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<td></td>
<td>implementing partner access and operations.</td>
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## Risks for TA-C: Security Governance

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contextual - Syria</strong></td>
<td>Legitimate partners cannot be identified in the current context in Syria but may emerge throughout the implementation period.</td>
<td>No current activities in Syria but on-going analysis of potentially emerging opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contextual – Iraq</strong></td>
<td>Should long overdue security sector reforms not be implemented by the GOI and should the PMF retain an outsized role in Iraq’s security sector, there is a risk that the predatory behaviour by state security services that marginalised Sunni communities pre-Da’esh will continue, setting the conditions for continued extremist insurgency in Iraq.</td>
<td>Denmark should continue to invest in UNDP and EUAM efforts to support SSR in Iraq, while also supporting initiatives that strengthen P/CVE and CT efforts, including maintaining training support via the Danish MOD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Programmatic – Iraq</strong></td>
<td>The GOI, in its current or future form, unwillingness to pursue the National Security and SSR Strategies would constitute a significant risk to Danish-funded programming in this sector.</td>
<td>Denmark should leverage its engagement in the UNDP and EUAM SSR programmes to push for continued attention to and implementation of the National SSR Strategy by the GOI while evaluating continued assistance against a standard of progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional – Iraq</strong></td>
<td>Programmatic support for Iraq’s security sector agencies, including policing and criminal justice sectors, entails reputational risk should those entities fail to abide by their human rights commitments.</td>
<td>Ensure human rights compliance is mainstreamed into all Danish-funded security sector assistance programmes in Iraq.</td>
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10 Excludes Syria given this TA’s scope.
Annex 5 – List of supplementary materials, Syria & Iraq Peace and Stabilisation Programme 2019-2021

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<th>Document / Material</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<td>Syria – Iraq Regional Stabilisation Programme (2016-2018)</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Concept Note for Regional Syria/Iraq Stabilisation Programme, 2016-2018</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Mid-term review of <em>Syria – Iraq Regional Stabilisation Programme</em> (2016-2018)</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The policy for “Denmark’s integrated stabilisation engagement in fragile and conflict-affected areas of the world”,</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Strategi: Verden 2030. Fra bistand til investeringer/The World 2030</td>
<td>Danida, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Mere Danmark i Verden</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Danmarks Udenrigs- og Sikkerheds-politiske Strategi 2017-2018/</td>
<td>Government of Denmark</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Foreign and Security Policy Strategy 2017-2018/</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Peter Taksøe-Jensens Udredning: Dansk Diplomati og Forsvar i en brydningsstid</td>
<td>Taksøe-Jensen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Denmark's Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Ministry of Defence of Denmark</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Danish Defence Agreement, 2018-2023</td>
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<td>Guidelines for Aid Management</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark</td>
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<td>Prioriteringen af Freds- og Stabiliseringsfonden efter 2017</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Evaluation of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund, 2014</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Worldwide threat assessment of the US intelligence community. February 2018.</td>
<td>Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, USA.</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Syria’s Reconstruction Scramble</td>
<td>German Institute for International and Security Affairs</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Crisis Group Middle East Briefing 9th February 2018</td>
<td>International Crisis Group.</td>
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<td>Reports on Iraq and Syria; World Report 2018</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund’s Statistics Database</td>
<td>IMF</td>
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<td>Global Peace Index</td>
<td>The Institute for Economics &amp; Peace</td>
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<td>CIA World Factbook</td>
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<td>CEDAW- Iraq and Syria country reports</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>OHCHR Human Rights Watch Country Reports for Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>United Nations Human Rights Reports – Syria</td>
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<td>United Nations Population Fund Country Reports for Syria and Iraq</td>
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<td>Corruption Perception Index, 2017</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
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<td>Assessments on Iraq and Syria</td>
<td>PEFA</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>Syria’s Economy: Picking up the Pieces, June 2015.</td>
<td>Chatham House</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>Funding Facility for Stabilization Quarter III Report 2017</td>
<td>UNDP, Iraq</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>Denmark supports stabilization in Iraq with US$21.4 million contribution</td>
<td>UN, Iraq</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Needs in Syrian Arab Republic</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>Saving America’s Syrian Ceasefire. Oct. 2017</td>
<td>Sam Heller</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>What happens when ISIS goes underground? Jan. 2018</td>
<td>Brookings Brief</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>ISIS still in Business. Jan. 2018</td>
<td>Chatham House</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>Turkey Through the Syrian Looking Glass. Nov. 2017</td>
<td>Sam Heller</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>The Rise of Jaysh al-Fateh in Northern Syria</td>
<td>Terrorism Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 12</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>No easy way out of reconstructing Raqqa. Nov 6, 2017.</td>
<td>Brookings Brief</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>The Strategic Logic of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. 2017</td>
<td>Sam Heller</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>Averting Disaster in Syria’s Idlib Province. February 2018</td>
<td>International Crisis Group.</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>Israel, Hizbollah and Iran: Preventing Another War in Syria. February 2018</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>IRAQ 2018 SCENARIOS: Planning After Mosul. July 2017</td>
<td>Humanitarian Foresight Think Tank</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>Iraq After the Fall of ISIS: The Struggle for the State. July, 2017.</td>
<td>Chatham House</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>The Future of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces Sep 2017</td>
<td>Carnegie</td>
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<td>Iraq beyond ‘mosul’</td>
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<td>Al-Monitor</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>What’s next for Turkey, the US, and the YPG after the Afrin operation? Jan, 2018.</td>
<td>Brookings Brief</td>
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<td>64</td>
<td>Saudis see opportunities in helping to rebuild Iraq. Feb, 2018.</td>
<td>Al-Monitor</td>
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<td>65</td>
<td>Iran and Israel face off in Syria, as if it wasn’t complicated enough. Feb 2018</td>
<td>Brookings Brief</td>
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</table>
Annex 6 - Overview of previous programming and lessons learned

From 2014-2015, Denmark’s support to Syria and Iraq was channelled through two separate programmes. The Syria programme supported, amongst others, activities relating to the peace process, civil society, transitional justice, early recovery, civil defence, and the Free Syrian Police. Danish civilian stabilisation support to Iraq was channelled through the 2015 start-up stabilisation programme and included fast-track stabilisation for newly liberated areas; support to security sector reform; participatory and accountable governance; and support to independent media (through International Media Support).

The current programme includes support to political dialogue & peacebuilding spanning peace initiatives in Syria and reconciliation in Iraq; resilience and rapid response through improved access and provision of priority services in former Da’esh-held areas of Iraq and areas under moderate opposition control in Syria and; community security and governance strengthening community security and inclusive governance promoted by moderate actors in Syria and the government in Iraq.

Denmark’s contribution to Syria has included support to UN Syria Special Envoys as well as Track II initiatives in support of the political process by gathering and capacitating key stakeholders critical to Syria’s eventual political transition. Denmark has also supported significant Syrian civil society initiatives including The Day After (TDA), which focuses on transitional justice, and Baytma which has matured into a hub for Syrian civil society actors since its set up with Danish funding in 2013.

The police and justice support delivered through AJACS has supported Free Syrian Police (FSP) officers in Idlib and Aleppo. This project also supported efforts to preserve civil records through the Gaziantep-based National Documentation Office, paving the way for a post-transition justice and complementing Denmark’s support to The Day After. Further, Denmark has consistently supported Syrian civil defence through Mayday Rescue to respond to urgent civil needs such as rescue, fire-fighting, utility restoration and ambulance services in key urban centres, including Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia, Homs and Damascus. Finally, the Syria Reconstruction Trust Fund (SRTF) has invested in the reconstruction of critical infrastructure across opposition-held areas.

In Iraq, support has been provided to a broad range of mine action activities combined with activities implemented through UNDP’s immediate stabilisation (FFS) programme, which, in coordination with Iraqi counterparts has delivered urgent support to areas liberated from Da’esh. Useful results have also been achieved in relation to security sector reform, where the UNDP programme is closely linked to the key Office of the National Security Advisor and has succeeded in engaging and generating consensus amongst major government and non-government stakeholders regarding overall security goals outlined in the new national security strategy.

Several issues have been observed relating to support under the current program provided to organisations operating in the opposition held areas of Syria. Islamist groups, including Hay’et Tahrir al-Sham - a Designated Terrorist Organisation - other extremist organisations, are very influential in Western Aleppo, the Idlib countryside and Eastern Ghouta. They are known to put pressure on organisations operating in their areas of control, including programmes such as the Syrian Civil Defence and the AJACS programme’s Free Syrian Police. While both the AJACS project and the Syrian Civil Defence, or White Helmets, have put in place measures to mitigate the risk of misuse of funds, it remains challenging to fully account for programmatic funding in Syria. A key lesson learned from the current phase is that risk is an integral part of being actively engaged in Syria and that risks must be understood, sought, mitigated and genuinely accepted. In Iraq, a key lesson learned relates to the importance of the formal as well as informal political dynamics as defining the space for what is possible and how - particularly for programme significantly impacted by the political economy and legacies of conflict. Another lesson is that operating in both Syria and Iraq is extremely costly due to the security risks, complicated logistics and challenging access constraints.
The mid-term review of the current program reinforced the need to apply a very flexible and adaptable approach to programming with significant room to revise, discontinue, or expand engagements throughout the programming cycle to reflect emerging challenges and opportunities.

The complicated and high-risk operating environment requires, as is the case in similar engagements elsewhere, significant human resource investments in program (including financial) management and M&E - even for engagements implemented through multilateral partners or delegated to other bilateral actors. The mid-term review highlighted reporting as one area with room for improvement. To ensure quality management, monitoring and reporting, a third advisor has been hired - in addition to the two existing stabilisation advisors who manage the programme from Istanbul in collaboration with the Middle East Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MENA) - also to help close projects from previous programme phases.

Against this complex backdrop, it is worth noting that the mid-term review of the current program was largely positive and commended the program for achieving tangible results in an extremely challenging context, even if “the ability of the engagements to substantially influence the objectives in the theory of change are limited in comparison to the overwhelming political and military context in which they operate.” Essentially the current programme reflects the notion of the art of the possible and has indeed identified and capacitated legitimate partners and stakeholders involved in key stabilisation work in both contexts. In Iraq, it focuses on processes identified as critical recovery and efforts to sustain peace in Iraq. In Syria, it work with local partners to the extent possible and has successfully identified ways of supporting the Syrian opposition even as its operational space was diminishing.

Drawing on positive experiences of accompanying financial contributions with the deployment of experts, the PSP will aim to deploy advisors in key strategic positions, including: a) a military advisor and several police deployments to UNDP’s SSR programme in Iraq; b) expert advisors from the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) potentially deployed to the Tansiq program in Iraq; c) military personnel deployed to the NATO mission in Iraq; and d) the three stabilisation advisors based in Istanbul as well as e) a Danish special envoy to the Syrian opposition.
Annex 7 – Further Considerations on Results Monitoring, Syria / Iraq 2019-2021 PSP Results Framework

PSP monitoring will take place at three levels.

At day to day level the engagement managers will review reports submitted by implementing partners, ensuring they are compliant with the PSED requirements of frequency and content, including narrative and financial reporting. The engagement manager will, in the first instance, be responsible for seeking additional or clarifying information from implementing partners where reports are lacking. This will also involve attending engagement Project Board or Steering Meetings or other meetings at which strategic issues and concerns can be raised, and to bring any concerns to the attention of the implementing partner.

This monitoring will be supported by the MENA department who will also have an occasional monitoring function, which will involve reviewing the engagement reports and providing guidance on issues the engagement managers should follow-up on. Finally, the MENA department and MOD will review and monitor engagement-level reports from the engagement managers to ensure congruence with the results framework. They will perform a quality assurance role, including, where necessary, seeking clarification from the engagements managers.

In terms of reporting, the MENA department (in collaboration with MOD International Department) will report as required by the PSP guidelines to the Inter-Ministerial PSF Steering Committee through the Whole of Government Secretariat. Moreover, a quarterly meeting on a VTC basis called by MENA with participation of the engagement managers, MOD International Department and MFA (SSP and MENA) will follow up on any adjustments required in the programme. The MTR will also allow for adjustments to the oversight and reporting arrangements if necessary.

An annual meeting with each of the partners will take place. The format will depend on the engagement. Some implementing partners already have meetings to which donors are invited, where strategic decisions such as major changes to the programme, and annual work plans and budgets are reviewed and discussed.

The Mid-Term Review will be an opportunity to review the broader context, engagement and thematic theory of change assumptions and progress on risks. It is an important mechanism for a number of reasons. First, the volatile context of the Programme requires a mechanism to check relevance and impact. Second, in the absence of a results-level reporting framework, the MTR provides an opportunity to review the progress against the high-level objectives. Third, it helps mitigate the lack of human resources by bringing expertise from MENA and KFU to review progress alongside the engagement managers.
## Annex 8 – Timeline of signing agreements with partners under the stabilization programme for Syria and Iraq 2019 – 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Engagement Title</th>
<th>Tender yes/no</th>
<th>Timeline for entering agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDPA</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Agreement between the United Nations Department of Political Affairs and the Government of Denmark, is expected to be signed in March 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baytna incl. SNHR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Agreement between Association Baytna pour le Soutien de la Société Civile and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is expected to be signed in September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIM</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Agreement between the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism and the Government of Denmark, is expected to be signed in January 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDA</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Agreement between The Day After and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is expected to be signed in September 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP Reconciliation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Agreement between the United Nations Development Programme and the Government of Denmark, is expected to be signed in January 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRTF</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No need to make a new agreement between Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau and the Government of Denmark, since we already have a valid framework agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Helmets/Mayday</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Agreement between the Foreign Commonwealth Office of the United kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Danish Ministry of Affairs, is expected to be signed in January 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining Tetra Tech</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Agreement between the Department of State of the United States of America and the Government of Denmark, is expected to be signed in January 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Agreement between the United Nations Mine Action Service and the Government of Denmark, is expected to be signed in January 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP FFS</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Agreement between the United Nations Development Programme and the Government of Denmark, is expected to be signed in January 2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP SSR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Agreement between the United Nations Development Programme and the Government of Denmark, is expected to be signed in January 2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tansiq CT/CVE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Agreement between the European Commission in Brussels and the Government of Denmark, is expected to be signed in Q1 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>